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Summary 
 
 
 
This thesis revives the historical importance of a small, relatively obscure Australian workfare 
policy through a marxist theoretical framework that is equally marginal to Australian social 
policy analytics.  The Jobs, Education and Training Program (JET) was a first-wave Active 
Society social welfare policy introduced by the Hawke Labor government in 1989.  JET holds 
the peculiar distinction of being the only voluntary mass workfare program in Australian 
history.  JET not only affected the lives of close to one million people, mainly single mothers 
and their children, but played a key role in fundamentally restructuring Australian welfare 
production.  During the late 1990s state managers saw in the emotional and affective labour 
of JET workers an institutional opportunity to reconfigure frontline welfare labour processes 
into the neoliberal, ‘customer service’ model now adopted by Centrelink.  How did JET, ‘the 
best social justice policy Social Security ever had’ turn into a compulsory mass workfare 
template for current state social reproduction policy? 
 
This first historical appraisal of JET is a work of rescue and defence.  In adopting what Perry 
Anderson has termed marxism’s ‘classical tradition’ it revives a powerful method to navigate 
and focus the gaze on policy research.  Motivated by my extensive work and union activity in 
welfare delivery agencies, the thesis explores one question: how might a marxist analysis of 
the Jobs, Education and Training program (1989-2006) explain its character and demise in 
the context of an historical critique of the Australian 'welfare reform agenda'?  Most academic 
debates about welfare policy treat Centrelink as a ‘black box’ rather than critically analysing 
the institutionally conflict-ridden process of its production.  This thesis aligns with the 
progressive intent of those who argue that top-down and bottom-up policy implementation is 
in political tension, but replaces Lipsky’s liberal rendering of this tension with an historical 
materialist critique of policy production.  It investigates and evaluates the frontline worker 
discretion as a socially individuated agency occurring within capitalist production relations.  In 
the interviews of JET workers and policy managers conducted for this research, a capacity to 
elicit these social underpinnings from what is being said comes through a particular 
application of the theoretical insights offered by the Bakhtin circle and Marx’s critique of 
capitalist ideology.   
 
This thesis argues that state social reproduction relations in economically advanced 
countries have become a crucial and growing aspect of the accumulation dynamics of 
national capitals since the late 1900s.  Economic crises disrupt this state–capital relation, 
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exerting competing class expectations on a state and creating hesitant and lagging 
responses to these crises.  In Australia this contention finds empirical support in that the 
three major changes in social welfare policies came in the decade after the 1890s, 1930s 
and 1970s depressions/recessions. 
 
Under Labor in the 1980s, one reformist expression of an ideological rejection of 
Keynesianism was the Active Society premises underlying the politics of the compact it 
struck with the trade union movement – the Prices and Incomes Accord.  Active Labour 
Market Programs (ALMPs) were a social policy reflection of these politics.  JET was a 
precariously voluntary ALMP, expressing the declining political strength of the women’s 
liberation movement.  With the more explicit ideological acceptance of neoliberalism in the 
1990s, welfare policies and state organisations were structured to more openly meet the 
social reproduction strategies of the period.  This ‘strenuous welfarism’ of compulsory 
workfare for the majority of welfare recipients on one side of the counter had its corollary on 
the other.  The emotional and affective labour-readying work, once only conducted by JET 
Advisers, was added to the technical payment process activities of Centrelink frontline staff.  
The broadening of workfare reduced and generalised this work into a labour-forcing process.   
 
Three political conclusions are drawn.  Firstly, that workfare and industrial relations policies 
are connected aspects of a neoliberal ideology which principally aims to increase capital 
accumulation.  Secondly, that effective opposition to workfare needs to avoid the debilitating 
assumption that these are welfare arrangements rather than primarily programs designed to 
produce consumable labour power for capital.  Thirdly, that only by reinvigorating the social 
and labour movements would an effective opposition emerge capable of challenging the 
welfare and industrial straightjackets that neoliberalism is currently imposing.   
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
A single mum from Wendouree West goes to Centrelink to register for child Benefits. 
 
‘How many children?’ asks the Centrelink officer. 
 
‘10’ she answers. 
 
‘10?’ says the Centrelink officer.  ‘What are their names?’ 
 
‘Craig, Craig, Craig, Craig, Craig, Craig, Craig, Craig, Craig & Craig.’ 
 
‘Doesn’t that get confusing?’ 
 
‘Naah…’ says the westie chick ‘its great because if they’re out playing in the street I just have to shout 
“CRAIG, YER DINNER’S READY” or “CRAIG, GO TO BED NOW” and they all do it…’ 
 
‘What if you want to speak to one individually?’ says the perturbed Centrelink officer. 
 
‘That’s easy’, says the mum ‘I just use their surnames.’ 
 
Email circulating around Victorian police stations 
21st April 2002 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Even if tempered by changed social relations, single parents remain the butt of jokes, an 
object of welfare interventions and a television stereotype of personal irresponsibility.  
Despite heading a quarter of contemporary Australian families (de Vaus 2004: 42), state, 
social and media perceptions persist in marking out these parents as anomalous and morally 
suspect.  Such a reinforcing of the primacy of the nuclear family has an enduring historical 
thread.   
 
In the lead-up to the 1890s Great Depression the tragic increase of child deaths and 
infanticide triggered by rising poverty rates moved the Argus newspaper to brand single 
mothers as ‘a very army of murderesses’ (cited in Swain 1993: 3), who were bringing about 
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the ‘race suicide’ of the nation (Lake & Reynolds 2008: 158).  Deemed undeserving of the 
welfare payments granted to war widows at the turn of the century (Boland 1990: 23), 
women who had left their husbands or had a child born ex-nuptially were again excluded 
when these payments were extended to other widows and deserted mothers during World 
War II.   
 
Single mothers mobilising separately within the women’s liberation movement finally secured 
a social security pension in the 1970s.  It was an historical gain in that it proved financially 
sufficient for them to be a family.  Within two years the mid-1960s’ norm for ‘fallen girls’ to 
relinquish their child at birth was upended as the proportion of ex-nuptially born children 
given to adoption plummeted to one in ten (West 1991: 182).1  The stability and repute of this 
pension soon came under sustained state and market attack.  Within a decade, in a lagging 
response to the collapse in global profit rates in the 1970s, access to the pension was 
gradually restricted and became increasingly contingent upon pursuing paid work.  This 
international ‘welfare war’ (Fraser 1989: 144) against single parents was to be a protracted 
conflict in Australia.  Poverty and vilification continue to cut into the lives of single mothers.  
The incidence of poverty among single parent households, which had been increasing during 
the 1980s, dropped for five short years at the beginning of the 1990s before resuming an 
upward path which has shown no sign of slowing.2   
 
As the women’s movement began collapsing in the 1980s, sufficient political pressure still 
existed for feminists representing the interests of single mothers to manage one last, highly 
contradictory, victory – the Jobs, Education and Training Program (JET).  Introduced by the 
Hawke ALP government in 1989, JET provided a valuable range of emotional, financial, 
inter-agency and paid work supports.  Eight years free childcare was available if single 
parents were studying or training, and some limited provision for those starting work.  Each 
of the tiny group of 80 JET Advisers (JAs) that The Department of Social Security (DSS) 
deployed for this work frequently had a sustained case manager relationship with a single 
mother over a number of years as she sought to establish a more stable economic, social or 
personal footing in her life.  However, JET’s underlying market policy rationale increasingly 
cut against such promising social relationships.  As the first Active Society program to be 
rolled out in Australia, JET endorsed the 1980s OECD (2006: 68) neoliberal counsel to 
governments that they politically relocate the problem of finding and keeping a job to one of 
individual effort.   
                                                
1
 By 1990 fewer than one in fifty children were being adopted out (West 1991: 182).   
2
 During the 1980s single parents living in poverty rose from 44 per cent in 1981-82 to 54 per cent in 1985-86; 
reaching 58 per cent in 1989-90 (Saunders 1994: Table 9.2).  For the period 1990 to 2000 see Harding, Lloyd & 
Greenwell 2001: Figure 5, 8.  For the period 2001 to 2006 see Wilkins, Warren & Hahn 2009: Table 7.6, page 35.   
  5 
For a period, JET uniquely reflected these contradictory political pressures from above and 
below.  It became the only voluntary mass workfare program in Australian history – having a 
direct impact on the lives of over one million parents and their children.  During the 1990s, as 
state social provision became bureaucratically dominated by market managerialism under 
the Keating and Howard governments, JET’s voluntary underpinnings began to be eroded.  
A neoliberal expectation that JET more productively ready the labour of single parents for the 
immediate needs of the now booming market began to corrode the earlier social support 
relationship between JAs and single parents.  The policy-push for cajoling to replace 
listening was resisted on both sides of the welfare counter.  Public support for compelling 
single parents into work also remained low (Eardley, Saunders & Evans 2000: 28; SRC 
2005a: 32).  However, by the early 2000s, the general acceptance of ‘mutual obligation’ 
welfare policies by the ALP, most welfare bodies and many academics gave the Howard-led 
Coalition government the political confidence to turn JET into a compulsory program.  By 
2006, the policy logic of mainstreaming JET into workfare was finally played out when the 
program was abolished.  
 
 
1.2 Research project and questions 
 
Welfare workers, single parents and policy writers commonly hold JET to be ‘the best social 
justice policy Social Security ever had’ as one interviewee, Orion, put it.3  Whether merited or 
not, such a standing has not unexpectedly resulted in a significant corpus of departmental 
evaluations and academic literature about JET, though no history of the program has been 
written.4  Few ask, and none empirically explore, some basic questions.  Why were the first 
two mass workfare programs launched in Australia, JET and Newstart, considered by the 
Hawke government to be ‘parallel policies’ (OSW 1988: 227) when one was voluntary and 
the other compulsory?  What historical circumstances led to JET becoming compulsory for 
single parent pensioners?  No author asks why JET was abolished.   
 
 
                                                
3
 For more detail on interviews see 1.4 below and Appendix C 
4
 Meredith Edwards and Margaret Levi (1989; 1990) have outlined the program’s policy and political origins.  JET 
is a major focus, or receives more than passing mention, in the following texts – ACOSS 1989; AGB McNair 1996; 
ANAO 1993, 2003; Branigan 2007; Butterworth 2003; Cass & Cappo 1995; CSMC 1999; Dockery & Stromback 
2005; DSS 1997a; DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990; DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992; Gardiner 1999; Gunn 1989; Howe & 
Pidwell 2004; Jordan 1991; Pearse 2000a; Pech 1997; Richards 1990; Romaniuk, Sharp & Wright 1998; 
Sainsbury 1999; Shaver 1993, 1994; Silkstone & Peard 1996; SRC 2005b; Swinbourne, Esson & Cox 2000; 
Thibodeaux 2002; Walter 2002, 2003; Whiteford 1991; Wilson, Pech & Bates 1999; and Yeatman 2000a. 
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These are immediately political, not passively academic, questions.  JET’s trajectory towards 
state welfare compulsion for single parents was but one reflection of an oppressive state 
movement against income support recipients and the wider workforce.  How does an 
historical investigation of JET contribute to an analysis of these changes in the welfare 
labour processes and state social reproduction strategies during the last twenty years?  
Does the early, voluntary phase of JET provide political insights for a welfare model that can 
be counterposed to current workfare arrangements?   
 
Motivating and empirically informing this study is my experience of frontline work and union 
activity in the welfare sector.  As a regional office worker in the Commonwealth Employment 
Service (CES), the main government job-referral agency until the mid 1990s, I developed a 
national profile through organising cross-office industrial campaigns and contesting (and at 
times winning) state and national union elections on an openly socialist ticket.  Soon after 
transferring to Centrelink (the re-named DSS, which incorporated the non-privatised 
elements of the CES) in 1997, I had a similar profile until I resigned in 2008.  My work was 
primarily at an inner northern office in Melbourne, apart from a six-month period as a ‘relief’ 
JET Adviser (JA) at six offices.  Along with other union members who were politically or 
morally opposed to Centrelink’s dehumanising processes occurring on both sides of the 
counter, I found it difficult to effectively articulate the problem we were confronting.  Even the 
more militant disputes over staff victimisations or Taylorist-style speed-ups were hampered 
by a syndicalism that depoliticised, localised, and so weakened their potential.  As one of the 
activists building these disputes, I repeatedly looked for welfare literature contesting these 
processes which critically incorporated, rather than effaced, the work we did.  I found most 
Australian welfare policy research was content to leave the lid of its production firmly shut.   
 
Treating the institutional work of welfare as a black box weakens the various political, 
economic or moral investigations of welfare policy.  Such silos usually result in unduly static 
presentations of the consequences of workfare, rather than critically investigating workfare’s 
economic and historical character per se.  Depending on the chosen framework, analysing 
JET becomes a matter of: presenting a longitudinal compilation of the decisions taken by 
policy managers and politicians loosely connected to a general historical overview of the 
period; describing neoliberal welfare policy as an effect caused by the rise of globalisation 
and individualisation; or turning JET into a promotional vehicle extolling the merits of state 
paternalism in cajoling welfare dependent clients to enact their freedom.   
 
One seeming exception at the more radical edge of welfare policy analyses in the last two 
decades has been a small turn towards researching ‘street level’ practices of social policy 
(Lipsky 1978).  Such practices are usefully assigned a work-like character to contest the 
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normative notion that social policy is simply created ‘from above’ and mechanically 
implemented by those at the lower reaches of the bureaucracy.  Such investigations centre 
on the nature of ‘policy-as-produced’ (Brodkin 2000: 3) by public contact staff in social policy 
delivery agencies.  Australian contributions to this growing field mainly deploy Foucauldian 
analyses which either focus on the production of ‘welfare subjectivities’ (Dean 1995, 2002b; 
Marston & McDonald 2006a: 3) or centre on how social policy is made within public 
administration (Henman & Fenger 2006).  However, this study rejects utilising such a 
theoretical framework since it would involve accepting an idealised given autonomy of JET 
workers, reducing investigation to describing their discursively constructed interactions (see 
Appendix A for a brief review of what are termed governmentality studies within the 
Australian welfare reform literature).  Irreparably splintering the research gaze of these 
approaches is an underlying liberal positivism.  Little critical light is shed on how the social 
relations between single parents, welfare workers, workfare programs and broader 
circumstances historically shape JET’s form and content.  More pragmatically, they provide 
scant theoretical resources for those in the welfare sector and the broader social movements 
seeking to understand how they can better organise their opposition to state managerial and 
policy attacks in their workplaces.   
 
I adopt the theoretical, political and philosophical approach of what Perry Anderson (1976) 
has termed ‘classical marxism’ to respond to this problem (see 2.2).  It is primarily through 
the ‘vantage point’ (Ollman 2003: 99) of this small program that I attempt one of the first 
sustained marxist critiques of neoliberal Australian social policy.  To use the current financial 
crisis vernacular, I seek to ‘stress test’ classical marxism’s theoretical and methodological 
capacities to respond to the central thesis question: how might a marxist analysis of JET 
explain its character and demise in the context of an historical critique of the Australian 
'welfare reform agenda'?  In critiquing the political, economic and ideological circumstances 
within which workfare was produced this study leaves unexamined significant policy 
elements of this agenda such as the Disability Support Pension and Newstart Allowance.  
What it brings to the fore, principally through analysing JET and by locating Australian state 
social interventions in a wider spatial and historical context, is a broad historical critique of 
the agenda sufficient to sustain the argument for classical marxism’s unique analytical and 
evaluative capability.   
 
This highly exploratory inquiry identifies and adapts theoretical elements of this tradition to 
tackle the challenges raised for such an argument to be upheld.  Firstly, analysing the 
various macro- and micro-relations constituting recent Australian welfare policy and 
practices, I adapt insights identified from the various debates within this tradition most viable 
for the research, namely: dialectics, state theory; welfare, the changing character of the 
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capitalist family and women’s oppression, the various forms of historical critique, international 
relations, organisational studies, social psychology, the politics of social movements, 
industrial relations, and class theory.  Secondly, drawing on classical marxist methods, I 
weave the threads of these theories with the voiced experiences of JAs; the institutional 
division of welfare labour; the production of social policy in Australian capitalism and the 
nature of the relationship between states and capitals into an historical critique of the JET 
program.  
 
 
1.3 Defining neoliberalism5 
 
Marxist critiques of recent Australian social welfare policy are rare (Blunden 2004; Stilwell 
1997; Tomlinson 2001).  More common are the welfare discussions raised in studies that 
primarily focus on other fields of marxist inquiry.  These writings on Australian labour 
relations (Bramble 2005b; Dunn 2004), political economy (Bryan 2000a; Doughney & King 
2006; Kuhn & O'Lincoln 1996) and a range of social/political histories (Burgmann 1993; 
Griffiths 2005; McQueen 2002; O'Lincoln 1993; Stone 1996) provide valuable resources for 
this research.  However, compared to a burgeoning international body of marxist-aligned 
work,6 the more critical and perceptive local studies and debates about the complexities of 
recent welfare policies, practices and institutions during this period rarely engage with any 
aspects of classical marxism.7  In circumstances of a continuing neoliberal assault on wages, 
working conditions and the social wage (Choonara 2009), my thesis illustrates an argument 
for those opposing these attacks to urgently reconnect with this tradition’s concepts and 
methods.   
 
Some clarification of the highly ambiguous and contested term neoliberalism is required.  I 
use it, rather than other equally problematic phrases such as neo-conservatism, due to its 
political popularisation by the anti-globalisation movement a decade ago.  However, the 
contradictions in this social movement are expressed in neoliberalism’s contested meanings.  
One stream considers neoliberalism to be a particular ideology, promoted by anti-statist 
                                                
5
  Space does not permit a definition of liberalism.  I base my understandings of liberal political philosophy on the 
writings of Callinicos 2001 and 1999 
6
 Some of the more penetrating international welfare critiques are: Ferguson, Lavalette & Mooney 2002; Fine 
2000; Jessop 1999; Jones & Novak 1999; Lavalette, Goldson & McKechnie 2002; Lavalette & Mooney 1999, 
2000; Law & Mooney 2007; Mooney 2004; and Shaikh 2003. 
7
 For example, see Beilharz, Considine & Watts 1992; Bessant et al. 2006; Brady 2008; Johnson 1989; Kinnear 
2000, 2002, 2003; Kinnear, Grant & Oliver 2003; Lackner & Marston 2003; Maconachie 1996; Marston 2002; 
Marston & McDonald 2006a, 2006b; Marston & Watts 2003a, 2003b, 2004; McDonald & Marston 2003, 2005; 
McDonald, Marston & Buckley 2003; Spies-Butcher 2008, 2009; and Watts 2006b. 
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right-wing libertarians, which has captured those running capitalism.  Pierre Bourdieu (2000), 
for example, sourced this ‘philosophy [which] has become embedded in all the social 
practices and policies of the state’ to the growth of international finance capital.  Neoliberal 
attacks are therefore due to the effect of this ‘shared belief…which has created a climate 
favourable to the withdrawal of the state and so submission to the values of the economy’ 
(Bourdieu 1998a: 8-9),  The idea that neoliberalism is the ideology of globalising finance, led 
them to argue for tactics which would pressure local states and sections of capital to support 
policies ‘capable of effectively controlling and taxing the profits earned in the financial 
markets and…counteracting their destructive impact’ (Bourdieu 1998b).8   
 
The other, explicitly anti-capitalist current in the movement argued that neoliberalism was a 
much more complex system of attacks intrinsic to the post-Keynesian phase of capitalism: 
 
There was a structural crisis of capitalism. That is, the policies, practices and institutions that had 
been serving well capitalism’s goal of capital accumulation ceased to do so. More narrowly, one 
can say that capitalism abandoned the Keynesian compromise in the face of a falling rate of 
profit, under the belief that neoliberalism could improve its profit and accumulation performance 
(Campbell 2005: 189)  
 
Within the openly anti-capitalist wing of the movement there were also sharp differences.  
Hardt and Negri (2000; 2005) held the totalising idea that United States imperial hegemony 
was a singular expression of neoliberalism across the globe.  Others countered that 
capitalism continued to move through a process of combined and uneven development.  
Justin Rosenberg (2000), for example, argued that the effect of heightened international 
competition continued to generate specific national responses to the ongoing low rates of 
profitability – which materially undermined any consistent naturalisation of neoliberal ideas.  
These ideas may have been imbued with universalist notions of small government, the 
creative destruction of the market’s invisible hand and Lockean ethics of ‘negative liberty’ but 
in the highly competitive international context neoliberal practice often contradicted these 
ideas with bigger governments, greater regulation, and more extensive state paternalism.   
 
In Australia, neoliberal welfare policies, practices and institutions tentatively emerged in the 
late 1980s through a ‘partially blind, partially ideologically directed, discovery process’ 
(Callinicos 2009: 87).  A market morality of individual responsibility began to supplant and 
then reject poverty and inequality as explanatory frameworks.  Senior state managers and 
other sections of the ruling class began to accommodate the view, couched in the language 
of the ‘national interest’, that this would economically advantage a state seeking to restore a 
more amenable environment for local capital accumulation.  In practice, however, state 
interventions aimed at raising the rate of exploitation and supporting the movement of local 
capital to more profitable sectors were continually contested and historically quite fluid.  State 
                                                
8
 Other leading altermondialists such as Susan George (1999) and Bernard Cassen (2003) hold similar ideas. 
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responses to shifting international competitive pressures, local disputes between different 
sections of capitalists and state managers, and conflicts with the working class meant that 
welfare policy was being constantly re-jigged.  Empirically, one economic effect of these 
tensions was that state welfare expenditures continued to rise alongside privatisations and 
deregulation (Laurie & McDonald 2008).  One ideological contradiction was that social policy 
became more authoritarian in the name of individual freedom.    
 
No Australian text that has primarily focused on welfare policy, practices or institutions has 
grounded its analysis within such a theory of neoliberalism.  Consequently, though often rich 
historical and empirical resources, none has the theoretical capacity to effectively analyse 
what neoliberal welfare policy is, how it is changing, or why.  All incorporate elements of 
liberalism, which, to varying degrees, undercut their philosophical, theoretical and 
methodological capabilities to apprehend the social.  An overview of this literature is 
discussed in Appendix A.   
 
 
1.4 Data and interview methods 
 
This study critically uses and cites a wide range of publicly available reports,9 data sets, 
videos,10 contracts,11 working papers, media reports, press releases and speeches,12 
brochures,13 and union material14 associated with single parents and the production of the 
JET program.  For example, an analysis derived from Wave 7 of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) database informs an argument I make that employed 
single parents tend to remain in receipt of income support payments because they 
                                                
9
 Key reports cited in the research include: ACOSS 1989; ANAO 1993, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 
2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2002, 2003, 2007; Crofts 1990; DSS 1997a; DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990; DSS, 
DEET & DHHCS 1992; Silkstone & Peard 1996; and SRC 2005b. 
10
 Departmental JET-related videos include: DSS 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997b; and Kingsbury 1973.  Public 
broadcasts include ABC News 2008b and Today Tonight 2005. 
11
 For example, see ANAO 2008; and Centrelink 2002a. 
12
 The more significant speeches and media releases are:  Abbott 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003; ABC News 2008a, 
2008b; Albanese 2003; Andrews 2003; Burrow 2003; Costello 2004; Howard 1997, 2002, 2004a; Howe 1985; 
Latham 1999, 2003; Macklin 2003; McCallum 2005; Newman 2000b; Patterson 2003, 2004; RN 2004; Swan 
2000, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Thomson 2006; Treadwell 2002; Vanstone 2003; and Whalan 2005. 
13
 ; Centrelink 1998, 2002b, 2003c, 2005b, 2006b, 2006c, 2007c, 2009b, 2009c; DSS 1993 and Stephen 2000. 
14
 All the primary sources of union material, apart from Burrow 2001, are written by officials or delegates 
associated with DSS or Centrelink: Alexander 2003; CPSU 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c and Walker 2004. 
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disproportionately work in lower-paid occupations. 15  A study of the gender composition of 
frontline staff in the last thirty years, derived from DSS/Centrelink Annual Reports, suggests 
that the most rapid increase in the feminisation of the workforce occurred when the 
emotional and affective labour required for the government’s welfare reform agenda began to 
be implemented in the late 1990s.  Furthermore, data derived from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) Labour Force Survey 6202.0 give empirical support to particular arguments 
raised in the research.   
 
A large body of Centrelink documents which, for legal reasons cannot be cited, also richly 
informs this thesis.  This literature encompasses JET training manuals, staff surveys, 
meeting minutes, reports, emails and production statistics.  Because the organisation 
aggressively pursues those who breach the Privacy Act (1988) by disclosing the contents of 
these internal texts, I cite, where possible, elements of these documents that have entered 
the public domain to support claims made.  For example, analysed as a managerial 
restructuring of welfare work into workfare practices, Centrelink’s Cultural Change Program 
of the late 1990s involved intensive retraining meetings of local staff.  Because some of the 
Power Point images in these sessions came from new managerialist textbooks, they can be 
reproduced in this study.  I adopt a similar approach when discussing the rise of emotional 
labour by citing from the Business Partnership Agreements that Centrelink has entered into 
with other agencies and businesses.  
 
The transcripts of Centrelink staff interviewed for this research occupy a precarious middle 
ground.  While citing comments (usually under an interviewee’s pseudonym) I have changed 
elements of the transcripts.  This is for interconnected ethical, legal, and political reasons.  
Firstly, I have altered the names of any staff, income support recipients, locations and other 
identifying markers mentioned in transcripts to meet standard research ethical requirements.  
Secondly, I refer to many interviewees as she, or a ‘JA’ (JET Adviser), ‘PA’ (Personal 
Adviser) or ‘frontline worker’ rather than to their pseudonym.  I have pragmatic industrial 
reasons for this approach.  In the last decade, due to a weakening of union influence and 
new legislation, office managers have had a greater capacity to dismiss frontline workers.  
For example, in the process of a ‘poor performance’ appraisal of a staff member, local 
managers commonly document failures to meet particular production standards, quality 
                                                
15
 The HILDA Survey is an Australian panel study conducted yearly since 2001.  It is designed and managed by 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research and funded by the Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA).  Access to this database was authorised by 
Associate Professor Roslyn Russell as part of my research work with the ARC Linkage Project 0990992 The high 
cost of financial insecurity: exploring the role of the fringe economy in the lives of low-income Australians.  Wave 
7 is 2008 panel data.   
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performance indicators or infractions of the Code of Conduct provisions of the Social 
Security (Administration) Act (1999).  Managers’ prerogative to conduct these appraisals is 
now so powerful that the distinction between poorly performing staff and those ‘targeted’ for 
other reasons is unclear.  On any given day most staff breach one of these standards, 
indicators or legal provisions.  Leaving a document on a desk whilst on a toilet break, for 
example, violates Centrelink’s Privacy Guidelines.  Unionists at my local office threatened 
strike action to support a person being subject to a shoddy management appraisal which had 
misused such documented small lapses.  A major motivation was collective self-
preservation.  As one member put it, ‘any of us could be sacked by this process’.  Changes 
to the transcripts have sought to minimise adverse repercussions that frontline interviewees 
otherwise may have faced from their local managers.  My former employment in the welfare 
sector and active involvement in union politics heightens such a risk.   
 
Unsurprisingly, there has been a highly cautious response by senior managers to my 
research.  For my Honours thesis (Banks 2002), Centrelink Area management reluctantly 
agreed, after six months of negotiation, access to two hours of a programmer’s time to 
design and ‘run’ an internal data set detailing the weekly rate of contacts that 65,000 single 
parent pensioners had with 13 local Victorian offices between 2000 and 2002.  This data 
supported my argument that the establishment of the Family Assistance Office was 
coercively intertwined with the welfare reform agenda.  The frequency of these contacts rose 
dramatically over this period and a content analysis of various documents showed that the 
nature of these contacts increasingly became either useless or coercive.  This evidence 
came at the cost that the thesis would be indefinitely ‘quarantined’ from public view.  The 
rejection by a national manager for permission to interview staff for this current project was 
only resolved nine months later when a lower-level manager generously gave approval.   
 
Twenty-two people who had worked at DSS, Centrelink or both were interviewed – 
seventeen local office staff and five national managers.  Sixteen of the interviewees were 
JET workers or managers: seven JAs, four PAs and five who had national or state carriage 
of aspects of the program.  These interviewees worked in Victoria, South Australia, Western 
Australia, and the Australian Capital Territory.  Their office locations are usually only 
identified as either metropolitan or country.  Five of the JET frontline staff were (or had been) 
single parents.  Three were national union delegates and two local delegates.  These ten 
women and six men have been given gender neutral pseudonyms to further protect their 
identity.  Initially I had contacted fourteen interviewees because I knew their roles in the JET 
program or in Centrelink would be particularly relevant for this research.  All agreed to be 
interviewed.  Many gave suggestions of others to interview and, of the nine I followed up, 
only one declined.  No interviewee, however, knew the identity of any person actually 
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selected for the research, apart from those openly participating such as Geoff Hamilton, 
Carmen Zanetti, Sue Vardon, and Meredith Edwards. 
 
Sue Vardon, Centrelink’s first CEO, declined to be interviewed face-to-face but agreed to 
respond in writing to series of questions I sent her (see Appendix B).  At the time of the 
correspondence she was Chief Executive of the Department for Families and Communities 
in South Australia.  Geoff Hamilton was recruited as a JA in the program’s second intake in 
1991, working out of the Shepparton office in this role until he retired in the late 1990s.  
Carmen Zanetti was JET’s National Program Manager in the early 1990s before returning in 
the late 1990s to oversee Centrelink’s Cultural Change Program.  Meredith Edwards headed 
the Social Policy Division of DSS in the late 1980s and early 1990s and was a key architect 
of JET.  I interviewed her in 2006 when she was an Emeritus Professor at the University of 
Canberra.  Four of the other five interviewees worked in the Newstart section of local offices 
and one was a social worker.  Sharon Andrews worked in the department from 1986 to 1996 
and was a Newstart Team Leader during JET’s early period.  She is currently a lecturer at 
RMIT.   
 
In the interviews I applied a mixed-method approach of semi-structured questions and an 
eliciting of what Sarbin (1986) inelegantly terms ‘storied data’.  Each interview was broken 
into sections where an interviewee was initially asked to describe their work roles and 
employment history; their relationships with JET workers, other frontline staff, management, 
and clients; their view on whether the JET program had feminist politics; and their attitude to 
JET’s then pending abolition.  The methodological focus of these one- to two-hour 
interviews, however, was to ask the respondent to expand or elaborate on these ‘fact’ based 
descriptions – to ‘remember, argue, justify, persuade, engage, entertain…even mislead’– 
that is, to enter into a narrative (Bamberg & McCabe 1998: iv).   
 
While I had directly worked with very few of these staff all had predisposed opinions of me, 
which crucially inform their interviews.  Because narrative interviewing ‘takes the form of a 
conversation’ (Bates 2004: 16) I used examples from my own JET/Centrelink experiences to 
encourage an interviewee to offer storied accounts of an event or motive in their working 
lives.  If needed, I used the three types of questions suggested by Kielhofner and Mallinson 
(1995: 65) as prompts, asking: what they saw as a morally significant change in their 
experiences (e.g. how was your work better or worse when JET became compulsory?); 
about their hopes and fears (e.g. how did it happen that you felt that way?); and for their 
recollection of particular events or circumstances (e.g. what is the difference between then 
and now?).  All interviews were fully transcribed to assist identifying and thematising these 
narratives.  In 2.5 I describe these themes (alienation and various ‘tropes’ of fetishism) and 
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provide theoretical grounds explaining how these thematised discourses empirically reflect 
the historical changes occurring in JET’s production.   
 
Augmenting these twenty-two interviews is a group of sixteen more structured interviews that 
I had conducted in 2002 for my Honours thesis – with four Centrelink managers and five 
frontline staff, five single mothers, Mark Gepp (National Secretary of the Community and 
Public Sector Union for Centrelink), and Margot Northey (Victorian co-ordinator of the 
Council of Single Mothers and Their Children).  Their comments about the welfare reform 
agenda at that time and the JET program are primarily (and sparingly) used in this project to 
historically clarify the changes occurring at this time.  Appendix C lists these two groups of 
interviewees separately with the names and roles of those who can be identified and the 
pseudonyms and brief role description of those who cannot. 
 
 
1.5 Study limitations 
 
I limit this study to a ‘case-illustration’ of the analytical distinctiveness of a non-reductionist 
marxist historical critique of recent Australian welfare policy.  It is not a comparative analysis.  
The study engages with the extant literature to occasionally clarify this illustration, but does 
not present a sustained critique of the literature per se.  I delimit the scope of the research by 
focussing on the production of welfare policy at a state, institutional and coalface level.  In 
this study, single parents are analysed as the object of that production.  Though this allows a 
greater centring of the experiences and voices of JET workers and policy actors, it comes at 
the cost of leaving unexplored the experiences of those consuming these services.  A further 
limitation is the relatively small interview sample (22).  However, this was unavoidable, given 
the practical limitations imposed on this qualitative aspect of the research.  Furthermore, they 
have provided vital evidence for analysis beyond my personal experiences, observations and 
interpretations of primary and secondary print and video materials.  
 
 
1.6 Thesis outline 
 
The foundational theoretical and methodological components of the study are outlined in 
Chapter 2.  They provide a compass to the research direction, a body of thought on how to 
understand what is found, and methods for doing so.  The dialectical method used in my 
critique of JET’s production seeks to analyse the program as a relation at three levels of 
abstraction – as an aspect of the Australian state-capital relation, as an aspect of the state’s 
role in social reproduction role in capitalism, and as work practices.  A reconsideration of 
these elements is undertaken to critically account for the growth of state social policies, 
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practices and institutions in contemporary capitalism.  I propose that imperialist competition 
increasingly shapes welfare provision in a way that most marxist (and non-marxist) accounts 
of social policy fail to recognise, let alone integrate into their analyses.  I navigate a 
theoretical minefield of contested theories of the form and content of a state’s relationship to 
contemporary capitalism to situate my approach.  An elaboration of how the political, 
economic and class character of welfare administration and practices is theoretically treated 
and empirically investigated follows.   
 
Chapter 3 provides an historical analysis of JET when its voluntary character dominated 
under ALP governments (1989-1996).  The first section offers an historical context by 
arguing that Australian state welfare provision and interventions into the lives of mother-
headed households has moved through three stages since Federation – each a lagging 
response to a period of economic crisis in the 1890s, the 1930s and the 1970s.  Six 
responses, at different levels of abstraction, are given to the research question: how did the 
production of JET as a policy-practice express the contradictions of the state's 'autonomous' 
reproduction relationship with Australian capitalism under Labor?  They describe how a new 
accumulation and legitimation state activism, emerging in response to the economic crisis of 
the 1970s, linked Labor’s two key industrial and welfare policies: the Prices and Incomes 
Accord and the Social Security Review.  After outlining the cascade of policy changes 
directed at single parents, an examination of JET’s policy production ‘from above’ assesses 
the role of senior feminist managers in DSS.  The section on the program’s material and 
ideological production ‘from below’ critically analyses JET worker perceptions of their 
practices, their relationships with other staff, JET’s resource limitations, and the industrial 
possibilities that existed to address them.   
 
Chapter 4 investigates how JET moved towards a compulsory workfare program before 
being disbanded by the Howard government.  It situates the program in a period of 
increasing economic growth and falling unemployment rates, while a revamped state 
accumulation and legitimation strategy was reflected in its social welfare interventions.  The 
policy debates driving, resisting or reflecting the unfolding relationship between state’s new 
welfare reform agenda, single parents and JET are outlined.  The workfarist assumption that 
paid work would disentangle a single parent from ‘welfare dependency’ is empirically and 
politically contested. To successfully implement the Howard government’s welfare strategy 
required an institutional and labour process overhaul.  In analysing the tensions of this 
‘modernisation’ drive to institute new levels of flexible intensity of labour – termed here as 
‘strenuous welfarism’ (Law & Mooney 2007: 26) – I investigate the changing institutional and 
governance arrangements, and the restructuring of the division of labour and work practices 
inside Centrelink.  Three examples are given of how the notion of ‘customer’ tended to bring 
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both Centrelink staff and recipient practices under the same rubric.  Local and national union 
responses in Centrelink to these institutional and welfare agenda changes are assessed.   
 
Chapter 5 draws these arguments and critiques into an historical assessment of JET.  Three 
arguments dominate.  Firstly, that workfare and industrial relations policies are connected 
aspects of a neoliberal ideology, which principally aims to increase capital accumulation.  
Secondly, effective opposition to workfare needs to avoid the debilitating assumption that 
these are welfare arrangements rather than primarily programs designed to produce 
consumable labour power for capital.  Thirdly, that an effective opposition capable of 
challenging the welfare and industrial straightjackets neoliberalism is currently imposing will 
only emerge by reinvigorating the social and labour movements.  A number of proposals for 
further research are suggested. 
 
Appendix A reviews the theoretical limitations of current Australian welfare reform critiques 
by grouping them into three political categories: literature actively promoting attacks on 
welfare recipients; supposedly apolitical texts produced for the ‘evidence-based policy 
movement’ (Marston & Watts 2003a: 32); and left/feminist challenges to the neoliberal turn.  
My correspondence with Sue Vardon, Centrelink’s first Chief Executive Officer is attached as 
Appendix B, followed by a list of people interviewed for this research and a short description 
of their roles in Centrelink or the wider welfare field (Appendix C).  One consequence of 
instituting the emotional and affective labour required for strenuous welfarism from the 1990s 
was a changing gender composition of the frontline welfare workforce.  The increasing 
feminisation of Centrelink’s coalface is discussed in 4.5 and the methodology for the 
empirical analysis supporting the narrative is in Appendix D.  The final appendix details the 
various director-level company positions held by Centrelink Board members between 1997 
and 2002 to clarify the argument illustrated in Table 10 that the Howard government’s drive 
to institute business models within Centrelink was overtaken in 2002 by a sharp reassertion 
of its political control over welfare delivery. 
 
In summary, this first in-depth analysis of JET’s history brings the economic aspects of 
workfare policy production into political tension with how the Australian state has variously 
legitimised its role in supporting capital accumulation.  Using particular marxist concepts and 
methods, I identify how a small, voluntary, social-justice policy came to play a surprisingly 
significant role in the institution of strenuous welfarism.  The study’s conclusion that such a 
highly contradictory trajectory was both tragic and avoidable also provides provocative 
political insights and challenges for those contesting the current neoliberal attacks on welfare 
provision and its production. 
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2 
 
Resources for critique 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
One contention informs this historical study: that classical marxism provides an analytically 
acute method of navigating the theoretical challenges raised in investigating a social policy 
such as the JET program.  Uncovering JET’s highly mediated relationships with the social 
entails a marxist critique of the social, providing foci, methods and analytical ways of 
understanding the empirical findings.  An historical examination of how JET’s form and 
content evolved through state policy and in practice shows the significance of these 
theoretical elements.  These insights aim to strengthen the political activity of those opposed 
to neoliberal welfarism.   
 
Section 2.2 outlines how the conceptual and political grounds of this study operate within 
what Perry Anderson (1976) terms marxism’s ‘classical tradition’.  The possibility for a 
relevant, non-reductive analysis of JET is to be found in a tradition which keeps marxism’s 
political, economic and philosophical foundations in ‘lively interaction’ with each other 
(Trotsky 1986: 101).  A reprise of Marx’s critique of capitalist ideology scopes the theoretical 
context, developed later in the chapter, about how the economic and ideological relations of 
workfare are connected.  The methodological problem confronting any dialectical social 
inquiry – how to think adequately about change and interaction, is then elaborated.  The 
dialectical method applied in this research is summarised and illustrated with a discussion of 
JET as a social justice program and a critique of Mitchell Dean’s (1999: 197; 2009: 5, 25) 
Foucauldian-derived approach to analysing welfare policy.  
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The largest section (2.3) of the chapter contends that the connections and contradictions 
embodied in the productive intent and practices of JET to somehow regulate the ‘social’ can 
only be analysed by situating welfare policy within the competitive chaos of Australian 
capitalism.  The capitalist state is theorised as expressing three basic, contradictory and 
connected relations: as an ‘official expression of antagonism in civil society’ (Marx 1955: 80); 
as a dimension of the capitalist mode of production; and as a geopolitical entity in rivalry with 
other states.  A discussion of how the systemic and historic aspects of this relation become 
expressed in nation state policy production follows.  I propose that global competition 
influences the relationship between the capitalist state system and welfare provision in a way 
Marx and Engels were never historically in a position to sufficiently theorise and, more 
appositely, recent marxist social policy critiques still fail to fully recognise.  Identifying how 
these spatial and temporal dimensions qualitatively transformed in the late 1800s provides 
an analytical basis to elaborate a central conception of this thesis – the modern state-capital 
relation.  A short historical discussion of the increasing economic weight of OECD states 
within their national economies provides some empirical evidence of how crises in capital 
accumulation destablise geopolitical relationships and economic relations between states 
and capitals.  A more theorised engagement with Marx’s distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour follows to develop a number of contentions about the relationship 
between contemporary state labour and capitalist competition and accumulation.  The 
economic and ideological character of state social policy interventions is theoretically and 
historically elaborated to identify and respond to marxist critiques of the state which one-
sidedly treat the state-capital relation either through its difference (exemplified by the writings 
of Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas) or identity (as argued in the ‘logic of capital’ 
debates and by Georg Lukacs in his critique of the state) but not as a differentiated unity 
within capitalism.  By way of illustration there is a critical response to the proposition from 
Esping-Anderson and Bob Jessop that welfare production ‘decommodifies’ the relationship 
between the welfare subject and capitalism.  These components are reassessed to critically 
sharpen a marxist account of Australian contemporary capitalism – especially the ubiquitous 
rise of social policies, practices, and institutions.  A short theoretical and empirical 
engagement with the political, economic and class character of Australian welfare 
administration and practices follows.   
 
Section 2.4 focuses on how the rise of neoliberal economic ideas (New Institutional 
Economics) and management practices (such as New Public Management and Whole of 
Government policy interventions) underpin the ‘modernisation’ drive to institute new levels of 
flexible intensity of welfare labour.  The changing character of welfare production is analysed 
as a tension between a neo-Taylorist process of devalorisation and a welfare reform agenda 
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process of revalorization, epitomised by Gerry Mooney and Alex Law (2007: 26) as 
‘strenuous welfarism’.   
 
Before concluding, section 2.5 presents an outline of how the JET workers’ interviews are 
theorised from a particular ‘vantage point’ (Ollman 2003: 99) in order to support an 
investigation of the program.  Marx’s theories of alienation and commodity fetishism are 
linked to the insights of those in the Bakhtin circle and thematically groups the interviews 
through Mike Wayne’s (2003) typology of fetish ‘tropes’, which I propose opens a fruitful line 
of semiotic enquiry into the social context within which JAs worked.  
 
 
2.2 The active triangular tension of ‘classical’ marxism 
 
By the 1870s the various misconceptions of Marx’s writings being promulgated by sections of 
French socialists had already earned his ironic retort that ‘All I know is that I am not a 
Marxist’ (Engels 2001).  The following 130 years’ fracturing into ‘many marxisms’ (Beilharz 
1981: 172) has only further threatened to bury its revolutionary intellectual and political 
character.  In his 1844 manuscripts Marx vividly prefigured his subsequent theoretical and 
political trajectory – positing socialism as the struggle of the working class against alienation 
(Blackledge 2006).  He did so by synthesising what Lenin (1977: 21) later identified as 'the 
three sources and three component parts of Marxism’: German philosophy, English political 
economy and French socialism.  Marx links these threads by placing human labour, 
understood as purposeful social activity, at the heart of each source (Arthur 1986).  Marx and 
Engels also stressed in the German Ideology (1976: 41) that ‘the social structure and the 
state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals’.  After a ‘life’ of 
one and a half centuries a similar dynamic expectation applies to marxism.  If, as the late 
British socialist Tony Cliff argued, ‘the moment marxism stops changing, it is dead’ (cited in 
Birchall 2010), then how is it possible to assess what constitutes its enduring core, filter out 
from the subsequent myriad changes in marxist theories the germane from the cul-de-sacs, 
and identify within these relevant theoretical elements those most applicable to systemically 
and historically apprehend and critique JET?   
 
In an initial response to all three challenges this thesis takes what Burawoy and Olin Wright 
(2002: 459-460) term a building marxism stance, rather than a doctrinal, propagating 
marxism posture, or a plural, cherry-picking approach where marxism becomes simply 
another disposable, off-the-shelf resource to feed the ‘sociological imagination’ (using 
Marxism).  In short, a theoretically consistent and non-reductionist approach is taken here to 
apprehend and evaluate JET.  The program is grasped and explained within what Molyneux 
(1983) terms the ‘real marxist tradition’.  It is an approach which integrates historically 
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changing marxist concepts into its method of inquiry.  To investigate JET in this tradition 
builds the capability for a marxist critique through an open, critical engagement with current 
debates.  That is, it endeavours to attend to Goran Therborn’s (2007: 79) observation that 
social theory is precariously strung between two ‘ambitious poles’ – an explanatory 
framework for a changing set of social phenomena and, more importantly, a wider 
philosophical capacity to ‘make sense’ of such fluid phenomena, to apprehend what 
constitutes its meaning.  Classical marxism attempts to link these poles by bringing into 
contemporary tension its three foundational elements: historical social science; a philosophy 
of dialectics, with epistemological, ontological and ethical claims; and a revolutionary political 
compass for a self-active working class.  Theoretically underscoring this tradition is its 
prioritisation of agency.  
 
Marxist writers who have not simultaneously kept all three elements in tension variously 
move away from effective analysis and action. The most pervasive puncturing of marxism’s 
triangular tension – breaking from the idea of a self-emancipatory working class, reciprocally 
lacerates marxism’s philosophical and theoretical capacities (Blackledge 2008).  In perverting 
socialism to be an inevitable goal somehow puppeteered ‘from above’ (Draper 1966) the two 
dominant, state-centric and orthodox marxisms of the 20th century (Second International-
style reformism and Stalinism) politically, theoretically and philosophically rendered the 
working class to the wooden level of marionettes.  Because those who worked within these 
traditions, such as Althusser, amputated the ‘subjective vitality’ (Jackson 2007) from Marx’s 
dialectic, history was no longer the expression of an ‘alienated human subject’ but rather 
became ‘a process without a subject’ (Althusser 1976: 99).  According to E.P. Thompson 
(1978: 196-197), this theoretically left Althusser with ‘no category (or way of handling) 
“experience”’.  Similarly, writers in the Frankfurt School, regardless of whether they drew 
deeply pessimist or messianic conclusions, tended to consider capitalism’s systemic 
atomisation and pacification of the working class so ubiquitous that Marx’s socialist project 
was relegated to a vanishingly unattainable idea (Callinicos 1987a: 178-184). 
 
If the roots of post-structuralism are found in the impasse that marxism faced by the early 
1960s, so too was the rediscovery of what constitutes its actual tradition (Harman 1983).  
The flowering of the New Left at the time was an ethical and humanist challenge to its 
Stalinised caricature.  However, in attempting to reinstitute what Ernst Bloch (1995: 1200) 
called the revolutionary subjective ‘warm current of marxism’, many often did so at the 
expense of relegating its ‘cold current’ of historical social science to the margins.  For a 
project aiming to ‘rid utopia of its abstractions’, warm and cold, hope and reason, agency and 
  21
circumstance, are ‘inseparable’ if they are to be revolutionary ideas capable of making these 
abstractions concrete (Löwy & Sayre 2001: 184).16   
 
In the 1980s, for example, the methodological individualism of Analytical Marxism rejected 
dialectics as ‘vapid’ (Elster 1985: 37) and a mystical ‘yoga’ (Roemer 1986: 191).  Though the 
logical positivism underpinning these claims to offer a more ‘scientific’ marxist sociology 
proved unsuccessful, one question highly pertinent for this study was stressed – how are 
individuals motivated to realise the macro-tendencies of the system?  The very agency the 
Analytical school argued was missing in the straw-person version of marxism they attacked 
merely turned out to be based upon a liberal rendering of the subject – treating individuals as 
simply enacting rational choices.  The dynamics of capitalism are subjected to a similarly 
crude reduction.  Instead of understanding how dialectics provides the radical depth to 
Marx's critique of historical reason, with its emphasis on ruptures and unpredicted 
possibilities, Analytical Marxism reduced the circumstances of history to a set of logical rules, 
operating in a positivist model constructed out of a ‘tedious Meccano of forces and relations, 
infrastructures and superstructures' (Bensaid 2002: 45).  Rather than analysing the dialectic 
of agency and circumstances as a real, differentiated unity, agential capacities are stripped 
to ‘ventriloquist’ abstractions (Bensaid 2002: 129).  As a result this school’s capacity to 
conduct a social inquiry of events ‘as they really are and happened’ was drastically depleted 
(Marx & Engels 1976: 45)   
 
Classical marxism, as an anti-reductionist tradition in which the actions people take and the 
ideas they hold are at its core, demands a greater capability for effective social inquiry.  
Gramsci (1973: 136), for instance, cautions ‘If you are unable to understand real individuals, 
you can’t understand what is universal and general’.  It is, it will be contended, to be found 
within a tradition that applies methods and concepts where agency and structure; subject 
and object, are analysed in their ‘lively interaction’ (Trotsky 1986: 101).  
 
Marx’s critique of ideology in capitalism 
 
Marx’s (1975b: 93) methodological and empirical point of departure was that history ‘does 
nothing’ and ‘is nothing’ but the activity of ‘man pursuing his aims’.  Human activity, labour, 
changes nature and thus is an activity which ‘simultaneously changes’ (Marx 1976: 283) the 
nature of what it is to be human (Sayers 1998).  It forms part of a method which both 
understands and investigates history through the dialectic of ontology and epistemology – a 
material relation mediated by labour.  Marx’s concept of alienation (Cox 1998; Meszaros 
2006) historically locates this dialectic of labour in the rise of class society to argue how a 
                                                
16
  For an overview see Blackledge 2008; Callinicos 1987a, 178-184; Cliff 1999; Draper 1966; and Harman 1983. 
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human’s productive capacity partly became an alienating activity for non-productive classes.  
Under capitalism, due to a full separation of working class from what it produced, these 
productive capacities become comprehensively alienated activities (Rubin 1975).  Marx drew 
the seemingly paradoxical, but dialectical17 conclusion that a uniquely conscious act by ‘the 
immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority’ was required (and possible) if 
any new mode of production was to emerge (Marx & Engels 1973: 47).  In Capital, therefore, 
attention to questions of ideology and consciousness become deeply and specifically 
integrated into Marx’s critique (Bensaid 2002; Kohan 2005; Lukacs 1974).   
 
Through the Labour Theory of Value Marx defines capital by what it is and how it acts.  
Capital is an accumulation of surplus-value produced by labour (taking various forms – 
money, commodities, means of production) and acts to secure further accumulation – the 
self-expansion of value (Callinicos 1983: 105-139).  From the basic abstraction of ‘capital in 
general’, Marx investigates the sphere of competition through the recognition that ‘capital 
exists and can only exist as many capitals’ (1973: 414).  It is through the ‘battle of 
competition…fought by the cheapening of commodities’ that individual producers are forced 
to behave as capital, pressuring employers to increase the productivity of their workforce 
(1976: 777).  In part this occurs through introducing better or greater means of production, so 
expelling the source of profit – living labour, from the production process, and therefore 
putting a downward pressure on the rate of profit.  Despite many ‘counterveiling tendencies’ 
a major threat to accumulation comes from the internal dynamics of accumulation itself 
(Choonara 2007; Harman 2009; Shaikh 1977).18   
 
The crucial ideological consequence which flows from this critique is that capitalism inverts 
history from ‘one in which man is seen as the aim of production into production as the aim of 
man’ (Taussig 1980: 11).  Marx’s (Marx 1973: 853) theory of commodity fetishism materially 
elicits from the commodity relation generated by this mode of production the ideological 
‘germ’ of bourgeois societal relations.  The activity of exchange of useful products becomes 
‘characterised precisely by its abstraction from their use-values’ (Marx 1976: 127).  From the 
                                                
17
 Alienation is a seeming eternal contradiction where the ‘frenetic activity’ (Zizek 1997: 122) of capitalist social 
relations actually engenders passivity – a negation of the ‘free…enjoyment of life…in order to live’ (Marx 1975a).  
Alienation also creates the possibility for the struggle against alienation (negating this negation), reconfiguring the 
social relations within which alienation nevertheless still may occur (Harman 2007a). 
18
 No definitional journey is conducted into the highly contested concepts Marx uses to investigate history or 
critique capitalism.  I source my understanding of these ideas used to analyse JET (such as social relations of 
production, the means of production, constant and variable capital, absolute and relative surplus value, and the 
primitive accumulation of capital) from their contemporary expressions within the classical tradition, particularly in 
writings of Alex Callinicos (1983; 1987a; 1991), Chris Harman (1986; 1994; 1998a; 1998b; 1999b) and John Rees 
(1994; 1998; 2001).   
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perspective of the commodity producer, this has two consequences.  Objectively ‘a world of 
objects and relations between things springs into  being’ which ‘confront him as invisible 
forces that generate their own power’ – that is, fetishism.  Subjectively, ‘a man’s activity 
becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the non-human 
objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its own way independently of man just like 
any consumer article’ – that is, results in alienation (Lukacs 1974: 87).  Capital becomes 
‘personified and endowed with consciousness and a will’ in the shape of the capitalist (Marx 
1976: 254).   
 
Under capitalism, the exchange of potential labour power for wages is reified into a 
quantitative equality which affects all social life (Wayne, 2005: 205).  Grouping people as 
citizens, consumers, voters and so forth tends to dissolve the concrete, qualitative 
differences, connections and inequalities between them (Lukacs 1974: 98-99).19  The 
meaning of fetishistic independence therefore has two strands in Marx’s critique.  In Capital, 
Marx comments on how the products of labour seemingly gain a ghostly personality, an 
independence from the producers, and in the Grundrisse the owners of commodities gain the 
appearance-form of independence (cited in Wayne 2005: 208-209).  The LTV is a dual 
critique – of the commodity form and also of the consciousness which attends the commodity 
form at differing, connected, levels of abstraction.  Classical marxism holds onto the critique 
of fetishism as a ‘red thread’ discarded by the ‘orthodox marxism’ of the Stalinist period, 
including Althusser (Bensaid 2006).   
 
A central contention of this study is that social policy, when considered economically, is a 
(highly mediated) aspect of capitalist production relations.  Marx’s critique of ideology in 
capitalism becomes specifically operative to investigate the economic relations of workfare.  
Analysing the production of JET involves uncovering the fetishised social relations of the 
program as ‘they appear as what they are…not …as direct social relations between persons 
in their work, but rather as material relations between persons and social relations between 
things’ (Marx 1976: 166).  The fetishes generated by JET’s production are investigated at 
different levels of generality from two vantage points.  The empirical presentation of JET as a 
socially just welfare program is brought into relation with its production to consider the 
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 In the Grundrisse Marx terms such acts of exchange an appearance-form to analyse not what is false about the 
independence of individuals found in these activities, but rather their inadequacy:  
Out of the act of exchange itself, the individual, each one of them, is reflected in himself as its exclusive and 
dominant (determinant) subject.  With that, then, the complete freedom of the individual is posited: voluntary 
transaction; no force on either side; positing the self as…dominant and primary…Equality and freedom are 
thus not only respected in exchange based on exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values 
is the productive, real basis of all equality and freedom. As pure ideas they are merely the idealized 
expressions of this basis; as developed in juridical, political and social relations, they are merely this basis 
to a higher power. 
 (Marx 1973: 244-245) 
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contradictory ideological effects of this economic relation.  At a program level, JET becomes 
epitomised as a reified actor for social justice deserving praise (by social liberals) or 
condemnation (by neoliberals).  At a workplace level, the reifying effect on the consciousness 
of those producing work-ready labour power through the process of JET’s production 
becomes empirically elicitable (see 2.5).   
 
Method 
 
Marxism’s dialectical method of organising and manipulating reality for the purposes of 
inquiry and exposition exists on five levels, representing successive stages in its practice: 
ontology; epistemology; inquiry; intellectual reconstruction; and exposition (Ollman 2003: 
139).  Marx agreed with Hegel that despite Kant’s enormous philosophical insights, the 
contradictory distinctions Kant developed between epistemology and ontology, and so 
between the subjective conditions of perception and the unknowable reality of ‘things-in-
themselves’ (Kant 1855: 199), remained entangled in orthodox formal logic (Rees 1998: 22-
25).  The marxist dialectic challenges the idea that such an insurmountable epistemic gap 
exists between subject and object.  It poses a theory of knowledge and a method of 
reasoning which transforms such Kantian dualisms into concrete relationships of movement, 
change and interconnection, with their opposite and contradictory sides in unity.   
 
The methodological problem confronting any dialectical social inquiry is how to think 
adequately about change and interaction.  Carchedi (2009: 147) identifies three general 
principles co-ordinating Marx’s method: that all phenomena are both realised and potential; 
both determinant and determined; and subject to constant movement and change.  A 
dialectical inquiry of a social phenomenon’s origin, present state, and further development 
investigates:  
 
(a) the past dialectical relation with other phenomena through which it has emerged from a 
previous potential state to become a realised phenomenon with its own potential contradictory 
content, thus possibly superseding its previous realised form;  
(b) its present dialectical relation with other contradictory social phenomena, some of which 
are determined by it and some others are its determinants, some potential and some realised; 
and (c) its further development (change) due to the future realisation of its potentials as 
realised conditions of its reproduction or supersession’.  
(Carchedi 2009, 147) 
 
Such principles are derived from Marx’s reinterpreting Hegel’s self-movement of spirit in 
terms of the reality of conscious human practice to internalise a materialist dialectic into the 
object of Marx’s social inquiry.   
 
In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973 100-102) summarises basic aspects of his method.  He starts 
with an example of different ways to ‘consider a given country politico-economically’.  A 
comparison of the materialist dialectic to Hegel’s idealist method follows.  Marx initially 
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focuses upon the historical breakthrough political economists such as Adam Smith made by 
applying a two-step method of abstraction to investigate the economic dynamics of a country 
as a totality.  The methodological innovation Smith brought into his inquiries of ‘the social act 
of production’ was to recognise that immediately treating a country’s population as the ‘real 
and concrete’ basis for such an inquiry was itself an abstraction.  Marx talks of the ‘journey’ 
early political economists undertook to discover ‘a small number of ‘determinant…relations 
such as division of labour, money, value’.  Once identifying such ‘simple relations’, the 
voyage is ‘retraced’ to establish ‘economic systems’ at increasing levels of concreteness – 
‘the state, exchange between nations and the world market’. Marx contrasts the political 
economists’ method to others of their time.  The latter’s ‘process of thinking’ took as its ‘point 
of departure’ a population as self-evidently concrete, yielding only a ‘chaotic conception of 
the whole’ – a further abstract determination.  The former applied ‘the scientifically correct 
method’ by abstractly apprehending a population as a ‘concentration of many determinations’ 
beginning a process which led them in the opposite direction – an analytically enriched 
‘reproduction of the concrete by way of thought’.   
 
Marx (1973: 101) immediately seeks to clarify that, unlike Hegel, the retracing process of 
‘rising from the abstract to the concrete’ does not conceive the real ideally, as solely ‘a 
product of thought…unfolding itself out of itself’. In applying the dialectic of appearance and 
essence to the example of population, Marx (1976: 102) breaches Hegel’s idealist method 
with a materialist dialectic where the ideal becomes ‘nothing but the material world reflected 
in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought’.20  The simple categories he notes, 
such as exchange value, remain in historical relation with the ‘concrete, living whole’ of the 
population it presupposes.  That is, Marx bars reducing exchange value to a purely 
conceptual category ‘outside or above observation’ since appropriating society’s 
‘autonomous existence outside the head’ is an intrinsic aspect of the dialectical method.  
Such a ‘working-up of observation and conception into concepts’, turns Hegel’s one-sided, 
‘antediluvian’ rendering of these categories, which are only capable of inquiring into, 
intellectually reconstructing and describing a philosophical, ‘conceptual world’ (Marx 1973: 
101), into ‘real abstractions’ (Ollman 2003: 59-69) of the social world.  Through this ‘method 
of analysis…of social relations’ (Trotsky 1969: 1) historical investigation of the concrete 
                                                
20
 Marx and Engels’ problematic description of thought as a 'reflection' of the material world was more a rhetorical 
riposte to those promoting idealist conceptions than their more considered view that the relationship between 
thought and its material conditions was not reducible to a mechanical ‘copy theory of knowledge’ (Rees 1994).  
Engels (1976: 54-55), for instance, argued that any dialectical inquiry into the ideology of a society presupposed 
that there to ‘be an ideology’, where the method of ‘dealing with ideas as autonomous entities’ was to discover 
how the ‘intermediate links’ between ‘ideas and the material conditions of existence’ become more ‘complicated’ 
and ‘obscured’ and develop their own internal coherence. 
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becomes internalised in the materialist dialectic, rather than operating under the traditional 
opposition between deduction and induction (Ilyenkov 1982: 62).  That is, no separate mode 
of reasoning exists for an inductive historical analysis to abstract key elements through which 
a logical, deductive method is then applied. 
 
Marx’s example of the dialectic of a population’s appearance and essence is an aspect of a 
method based on reconstituting Hegel’s (2010: 382) formulation that ‘contradiction is the root 
of all movement and life’ out of its idealist modelling.  Dialectical categories such as totality, 
the unity of opposites, contradiction, mediation, the permutation of quantity into quality, of 
appearance and essence, and the negation of the negation, are transformed into a socially 
materialised web of connected abstractions.  Further, Marx argues against simply or 
immediately reducing an analysis of society as a totality to one centrally determining 
contradictory relation.  For example, in considering the relations of capital as a whole, 
production may determine ‘a definite consumption, distribution, and exchange as well as 
definite relations between these different moments’ (Marx 1973: 99-100).  However, because 
all these moments are real abstractions of ‘an organic whole’, all retain systemic and 
methodological influence – production is also ‘determined by the other moments…in their 
mutual interaction’.   
 
In Theories of Surplus Value Marx illustrates the dialectic of contradiction and unity in the 
‘mutual interaction’ of these moments by exposing the limitations of his prior positing (in the 
Grundrisse) that early political economists applied the ‘correct method’ of abstraction.  He 
attacks John Stuart Mill for assuming the identity of supply and demand, and so asserting the 
impossibility of crises: 
 
Mill says…demand is supply and supply demand…[which] taken in a wider and more concrete 
sense…comprises the relation of production and consumption…Here…the unity of these two 
phases, which does exist and which forcibly asserts itself in crises, must be seen as opposed 
to their separation and antagonism which exist just as much, and are moreover typical of 
bourgeois production…[Therefore] the unity of these two phases…is essentially just as much 
separation of these two phases, their becoming independent of each other.  Since, however, 
they belong together the two correlated aspects can only show itself, forcibly, as a destructive 
process.  It is just the crisis in which they express their unity, the unity of different aspects. 
(Marx 1971a) 
 
For Marx, the relational categories used to investigate society only become operative as 
definable categories through their conflictual unity, ‘a unity of opposites’.  A method which 
reduces a relation to a ‘direct identity of opposites’ conceptually erases how the real 
independence of its categories is expressed as a contradictory unity.  Because Hegel’s 
method also tended to resolve contradiction to its unity, rather than a means to apprehend 
contradiction in its unity, the extent to which Marx’s movement from an idealist to a 
materialist system transforms the structures of the dialectical method continues to be a 
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subject of controversy.  This thesis only has scope to raise one position taken within these 
contemporary debates.21   
 
In his preparing of Capital in the Grundrisse, Marx (1973: 151) noted that it would be: 
 
necessary later [in Capital]…to correct the idealist manner of the presentation, which makes it 
seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these 
concepts.  Above all in the case of the phrase: product (or activity) becomes commodity; 
commodity, exchange value; exchange value, money. 
 
I adopt the approach taken by Callinicos (2009: 29-34; 2008: 102-106) and Ollman (2003: 
182-192) that many of the strategic decisions taken by Marx which underpin the form and 
content of Capital are not reducible to an immanent unfolding of its conceptual logic.  The 
complexity of Marx’s method of rising from the abstract to the concrete takes more than the 
form of a deductive (Smith 2003) or conceptual (Arthur 2002) derivation as claimed by those 
promoting a ‘new’ or systematic’ dialectic. This methodological distinction, briefly outlined 
below, becomes central to developing a critical understanding of the relationship between 
state welfare production and the accumulation of capital (see 2.3).   
 
The object of Marx’s (1976: 90) investigations in Capital is ‘the capitalist mode of production, 
and the relations of production and the forms of intercourse that correspond to it’, primarily 
as an ‘illustration of the theoretical developments that I make’.  He finds two ‘constitutive 
contradictions’ (Callinicos 2009: 28) in this mode of production, termed by Brenner (2006a: 
26) as exploitative ‘‘‘vertical’’ (market and socio-political) power relations between capitalists 
and workers…and “horizontal” competition among firms that constitutes the capitalist 
system’s economic mainspring’.  Yet Marx does not start Capital with these central 
contradictions but with the commodity.  This move provides the context for his version of the 
labour theory of value.  Conceived as abstract social labour, value is a socially real 
abstraction imposed on economic actors by competitive processes where generalised 
commodity production prevails.  Marx encounters the analytical problem that the object of his 
investigation is a deeply occluded, fetishising system.   
 
In the first volume of Capital, Marx’s strategy to ‘capture the systemic and coercive character 
of the value-relation’ (Callinicos & Rosenberg 2008: 103) is to start with a category stripped 
of this character - the simple commodity.  In Part 1 Marx initially leaves surplus-value and 
exploitation out of his argument to develop a theory of the commodity from value’s simple 
form (an exchange between two commodities’ use-values) to forms where the wide 
diversities of use-values are rendered commensurable, through to their general 
exchangeability via the money commodity (Callinicos 2009: 28).  A non-deductive method is 
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  See Arthur 1998, 2002; Callinicos 2005, 2009; Callinicos & Rosenberg 2008; Carchedi 2009; Ollman 2003: 
Chapter 11; and Smith 2003. 
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applied, step by step, through which the theory of value becomes operative to explain how 
the subordination of economic actors to the value-relation, deriving from their own 
competitive interactions, increases productivity and reduces costs (Callinicos, 2009: 29).  
Marx develops his theory of the commodity prior to considering exploitation because it 
strategically allows him to introduce a new level of determination – that labour power is itself 
a commodity.  Because this move distinguishes buyers and sellers of labour power, Marx 
obtains a more concrete level of abstraction to analyse the alienated relations of exploitation.  
Deriving the concept of labour power as a new determination is not a diachronic process of 
deductively unfolding the category ‘commodity’ to a more concrete level of abstraction 
(Callinicos 2009: 32).  The flexibility of Marx’s method is that the different levels of 
determination exist synchronically in his discussion of the value-form.  Particular ‘vantage 
points’ and ‘levels of generality’ (Ollman 2003: 99) of the value-form (in its simple form and 
as socially necessary labour time) are adopted to illustrate distinctive properties of 
generalised commodity production.  It is a method of ‘dosed abstraction’ (Dumenil 1978: 78) 
where the introduction of a more complex determination is not implicit in its simpler 
antecedent.  Through such a strategic positioning of new abstractions, Marx deploys a 
method which: 
 
simultaneously explains that determination through its being situated in the larger theory of 
the capitalist mode, thereby permitting the critique of ideological representations that conceal 
this situation, and adds further content to the theory’. 
(Callinicos 2009: 34) 
 
 
Two examples 
 
One consequence for this research is an endeavour not to reduce a dialectical method to 
some parlour game of hunt-the-contradiction.  I heed Ollman’s (1993: 17) warning that 
‘dialectical thinkers…have a tendency to move too quickly to the bottom line’ by not giving 
‘enough attention to the complex mediations, both in space and over time, that make up the 
joints of any social problem’.  An example of how the changing social justice aspects of JET 
express the dialectic of contradiction, and appearance and essence, illustrates the study’s 
approach.  A too-quickly constructed line of analysis of how JET expressed this dialectic is 
initially presented, followed by a short rejoinder describing how inattention to the economic 
mediations of JET’s production leads to a one-sided interpretation.   
 
On one hand, the early JET program was overwhelmingly welcomed as a social justice 
policy.  On the other hand, I contend that the essential historical grounds for enabling JET to 
be socially ‘just’ were missing – primarily due to declining political strength of the women’s 
and labour movements.  JAs’ ideas and practices in the early 1990s pragmatically reflected 
this contradiction.  As one JA (Alex 2006) put it, single parents were ‘encouraged’ to gain 
better educational qualifications so that they could ‘punch above their weight’ in the labour 
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market.  At the local office level, social justice tended to become a project designed to 
support a parent’s non-labour market activities (up to eight years subsidies for tertiary 
education) prior to her gaining paid work.  Yet, because a weak social basis existed to resist 
a newly ascendant neoliberalism, the underlying contradiction of the social justice elements 
of JET being reliant on the labour market gradually intensified.  By the early 2000s, the 
program had transformed into its essential form – a quick, compulsory welfare to work 
intervention based on a marketised morality of individualised justice.  The initial, surface 
perception held by feminist policy makers, social liberal academics, frontline social security 
staff and many single parents – that JET was socially just – became an ever thinner shell 
during the 1990s.  State interventions under neoliberalism, dislocated from the impact of the 
earlier social and labour movements, increasingly expressed an essentially market-
moralised, oppressive dynamic.  Not only were the earlier social justice claims stripped out of 
the program, all liberal conceptions of justice were effectively negated.   
 
Closer attention to the complex mediations within which the ideology of social justice 
operates immediately problematises this line of argument.  Jumping to a conclusion that the 
dialectic of appearance and essence in the historical movement of social justice aspects of 
JET is only expressed in its relation to changing political ideas somehow brought into the 
workplace from the outside is found to be insufficient.  JET workers did not simply ‘reflect’ 
these ideas but produced them.  Their varying reified and changing notions of social justice 
were also internally influenced by their activity of producing JET (a productive process for 
capital).  An uncovering of how the dialectic appearance and essence of JET’s social justice 
notions were systemically generated (and individually expressed-resisted) in the changing 
economic movement of the program, particularly in the workplace processes of production, is 
also required.  It is only by applying a method which appropriately abstracts both movements 
of this dialectic with such mediations of a larger social totality that the possibility exists of 
capturing this ideological aspect of JET. 
 
At a more general level, keeping the relationship of appearance and essence in historical, 
philosophical, and revolutionary tension comes through attending to how working-class self-
activity is being centred into the dialectic as ‘a concrete and historically specific form’ (Rees 
1998: 11).  On the surface, this study seems to do the opposite, highlighting the historical 
significance of ‘new middle class’ (Carchedi 1975) feminist policy actors in the state 
bureaucracy, left union officials, academics, welfare organisations, politicians, the mass 
media and religious figures.  However, it is by investigating the contradiction between reality 
and potential of working class self-activity (a dialectic of appearance and essence) that these 
non-working class influences are stressed.  Due to the relatively low collective activity during 
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the period of JET, both among social security staff and within the broader Australian working 
class, the actions and ideas of these other actors become more prominent.     
 
A second example of the consequences of Marx’s multifaceted dialectic is in his method of 
critique.  Again, Ollman (2003: 191) cautions against Marx’s dialectic being ‘packaged 
exclusively’ as ‘critique’ (or a form of ‘capital logic’ as will be discussed in  2.3).  Marx breaks 
from the orthodox procedure of countering one notion with another to ‘prove’ it wrong to 
investigate how a notion, as an aspect of reality, is real and right.  It is by accepting the terms 
of any theory, and by pursuing it thoroughly to arrive at its implicit self-contradictions that its 
social basis and interest are eventually uncovered, thereby allowing the value of its actual 
content to become historically and intellectually recognised.  Actively keeping such a 
recognition in tension with marxism’s larger intellectual and political project turns this method 
of critique from either an all-encompassing or stand-alone exercise into an activity offering 
some potential to reinvest political or intellectual practices with new strategic or tactical 
insights.  By integrating an historical-materialist dialectic into an investigation this form of 
critique becomes politically and morally open to finding the ‘ought’ in the ‘is’ (Murray 1988: 
31).   
 
For example, critiquing Mitchell Dean’s (2009: 5, 25) claim to ‘modest’ insights in social 
policy against what he terms the narrative ‘posturing of grand…social theory’ can, at first cut, 
be shown to be in logical contradiction in his texts.  In Dean’s analysis of welfare to work 
policies under ‘advanced liberalism’, the Foucauldian-derived idea of the practices of ‘self-
formation’ (1998: 92) not only presumes (despite many caveats) a grandly universal notion of 
liberal ‘free subjects’ but also an equally high-arcing storyline.  Dean’s narrative constantly 
contradicts his initial modesty, eventually leading him to the impressive conclusion that 
‘today it is possible to change society – perhaps even revolutionise it – by acting upon the 
mechanisms through which it is governed’ (1999: 197).  Other textual contradictions require 
a similar first cut pursuit.  In Administering Asceticism: Reworking the ethical life of the 
unemployed citizen, Dean (1998: 88) attempts to historically analyse ‘how the unemployed 
are to be governed and how they are to govern themselves’ through one highly idealised 
abstraction: a liberal conception of freedom.  He finds that in the pre-ALMP period of social 
liberalism enacting individual freedom came ‘from apposition of tutelage under a responsible 
and benevolent state’.  Once ALMPs became dominant in the 1990s, ‘practices of self-
formation’ occur ‘within a governmentally contrived market in which the individual and service 
provider are made to accept responsibility for their choices’ (1998: 91-92).   
 
Such an idealist method negates the possibility of a detailed comparative historical analysis.  
Dean tautologically ‘discovers’ only what he already knows – that ‘freedom’ is notionally 
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enacted in both periods.  He therefore inevitably draws the ahistorical conclusion that there 
‘can be no question of taking an unequivocal position’ between ‘the notion of the active 
society’ and welfare provision prior to this time (1998: 101).  The blunt application of such an 
abstraction therefore white-ants a critical capacity to historically assess and compare, for 
instance, the welfare gains made by the women’s movement of the 1970s and their attacks 
under the aegis of neoliberalism in the 1990s.22   
 
This ‘first cut’ method of working through a range of such logical, textual contradictions 
gradually develops and informs a ‘second cut’ critique aimed at contextualising these 
contradictions.  What is the specific social and historical expression of Dean’s (1998: 91) 
approach which treats poor people in current workfare or earlier social rights-based 
programs as equally and mainly concerned about ‘notions’ within which ‘freedom is to be 
exercised’?  Why, instead of shining a light on how ‘social suffering’ (Bourdieu 1999) has 
risen under neoliberalism, does Dean’s (2009: 12) seemingly radical Neo-Foucauldian 
inflections actually reflect his accommodation with ‘advanced liberalism’?  One 
contextualising response emerges from Colin Wilson’s (2008) observation that Foucault’s 
ambiguous theoretical challenge to structuralism ‘speaks to people’ both moving to the left 
within recent social movements and also to those removed from these politics who are 
shifting to the right.  What social welfare writers informed by a governmentality approach 
‘hear’ therefore depends, in part, on their political trajectory.  If Dean’s texts obliquely 
represent his accommodation to ‘advanced liberalism’, those partially aiming to have some 
closer connection to social forms of resistance, such as McDonald and Marston (2003) take 
on a more progressive edge.  Both use the same theories.  Both analyses reflect what is real 
and right in the different social bases they seek to express.   
 
Overall, applying a classical marxist method investigates how the contradictions in Dean’s 
textual analysis of neoliberal welfare activation policies, to be ‘put before the educated public’ 
(2009: 1), are real expressions of its specific contradictory social, political and economic 
context.  It is a method which logically connects how a senior tenured academic can write 
that he and a job-seeker are implicitly coequal in ‘their capacities of responsibility and 
autonomy’ (Dean 2009: 226) to the political, social and intellectual bases for a progressively-
minded professor to so idealise freedom as an unmediated category it simply becomes: a) 
historically coextensive in social- and neo-liberalism; and b) methodologically welded onto 
                                                
22
 Dean allows one logical exemption from this position.  If every aspect of a compulsory welfare to work program 
precludes even a scintilla of choice (Dean gives the Work for the Dole Program as an example of where ‘choice 
and compulsion are bifurcated’) then such an idealist hypostisation of freedom cannot hold (1998: 105).  
However, this exception only serves to reinforce the contradictions of his normative rule – where programs meld 
coercion and choice no ‘position’ can or should be taken about their historical or political merits (1999: 34). 
  32
every empirical investigation.  Equally, it is a method which politically connects and evaluates 
how Dean’s claim to be progressive is in tension with his conservative acceptance of 
neoliberalism.  Therefore, this study’s research activity comes into dialectical relation with its 
investigation by detailing its logical and political oppositional character – what ought to be in 
a critical historical investigation of social welfare activation policies. 
 
The dialectical method applied through this form of critique holds such an investigation to be 
an activity in tension with the broader context in which the program exists, including the 
researcher.  The contingent, open nature of Marx’s philosophy of history is emphasised since 
the ‘facts’ and the logical basis of the inquiry are in a changing relationship where dialectical 
clarification remains provisional (Callinicos 2005: 41-59; Ollman 2003: 182-192). Rather than 
a ‘proof producing instrument’ which severs the connection between the act of investigation 
and object to be investigated (Engels 1978: 164), a dialectical inquiry is a conscious activity.  
Researching these relations to organise ‘the most common forms of change and interaction 
that exist on any level of generality’ is not, therefore, only for purposes of study – it is also an 
‘intervention into the world of which they are part’ (Ollman 2003: 97).   
 
Applying Marx’s multifaceted dialectic to an inquiry of JET poses complex theoretical and 
methodological challenges.  JET is investigated through a range of relations: as a 
component of ‘capital in general’ (Marx 1973: 414); as an aspect of the state’s social 
reproduction role; as a specific political expression of the changing relationship between the 
state’s legitimation role and popular expectations; and as a JET worker’s productive activity 
which is both alienating and fetishising.  To put this method ‘to work’ (Ollman 2003: 59) 
requires a conceptual clarification of the categories within these relations, of how they are 
potentially operative as ‘real abstractions’ of a state social policy.   
 
The task for any marxist investigation is how to adequately grasp, at appropriate levels of 
abstraction, the relationship between the object of its inquiry and the social totality within 
which it exists.  What are the realised and potential relations of JET with the social?  What 
theoretical capacity is there to non-deductively tease out what may be their determining and 
determinate relations, whether realised or potential?  What conceptual resources are 
available so that the past and further changes to such interactions are conceived 
adequately?  None of these questions can be methodologically worked up without an 
adequate theory of the capitalist state, its systemic relationship to capital, the political and 
economic contradictions of its autonomy within this relationship, and its class character.  The 
capacity to identify a specific articulation of Marx’s critique of capitalist ideology within the 
relations of JET presupposes, in part, that the labour of JET workers is productive of capital.  
Section 2.3 seeks to address these various challenges.  
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2.3 The state-capital relation and welfare intervention 
 
To develop an historical critique of welfare policies, practices and institutions, this study 
applies a range of concepts which dialectically apprehend their economic, political and 
ideological relations in capitalism.  The capitalist state is theorised as expressing three basic, 
contradictory and connected relations: as an ‘official expression of antagonism in civil 
society’, primarily between the working and ruling class (Marx 1955: 80); as a dimension of 
the capitalist mode of production in a systemic relationship with the competitive struggle 
between capitalists; and as a geopolitical entity in rivalry with other states.  The 
methodological purpose is to bring these foundational elements of the state into greater 
systemic and historical tension with each other.  By identifying how these spatial and 
temporal dimensions qualitatively transformed the core centres of capital accumulation in the 
late 1800s, an analytical basis is provided to elaborate a central conception of this thesis – 
the modern state-capital relation.  The question of locating the nation state in the capital 
relation without reducing it to the capital relation is elaborated through a number of concepts.  
In its economic relation to accumulation and competition, state welfare labour is theorised as 
being potentially productive of value for national and global capital.  This argument informs 
the historical outline of the ideological and economic tensions in a state’s social reproduction 
and accumulation relations with capital and the working class.  The contradictory unity of the 
state-capital relation is further clarified in a critique of orthodox marxist theories of the state 
which, by either splitting or fusing this relation, obscure its dialectical contradiction.  An 
outline of the class character of Australian welfare labour follows.   
 
The capitalist state 
 
Engels argued that the historical emergence of the state was inseparable from the division of 
society into classes.  The state is neither a ‘power forced on society from without’ nor the 
Hegelian ‘reality of the ethical idea’, rather it is  
 
A product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has 
become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that is has split into irreconcilable 
antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel.  But in order that these antagonisms and classes 
with conflicting economic interests might not consume themselves in fruitless struggle, it 
became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the 
conflict, and keep it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen out of society but 
placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state. 
(Engels 1977: 326-327). 
 
The essence of this power, exerted externally against rival states and internally against 
popular challenges, is control of the means of force – a ‘self-acting armed organisation’ with 
‘material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion’ (Engels 1977: 327).  In Marx’s 
writings on the Paris Commune these ideas are developed more concretely.  He traces the 
origins of the modern capitalist state, where ‘its ubiquitous and complicated military, 
bureaucratic, clerical and judiciary organs entoils (in meshes) the living civil society like a 
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boa constrictor’.23  The rise of capitalism qualitatively transformed the state as ‘the official 
expression of antagonism in civil society’ – massively strengthening the power and efficiency 
of the state apparatus while ideologically intensifying its seeming political independence to 
govern society (Marx 1955: 80).  In bourgeois democracy the state uniquely expressed these 
antagonisms – becoming one in which the ruling class does not necessarily directly rule.  
Working class women and men eventually achieved the democratic right to elect parties 
expressing their interests and hopes.  Yet this right was based on capitalist social relations, 
where more determining ‘freedoms’ from other forms of existence arose as capitalism was 
establishing.  Marx describes this transition in Britain: 
 
Then a doubly free mass of living labor power was thrown on to the labor market: free from 
the old relation of clientship, villeinage, or service, but also free from all goods or chattels, 
from every real and objective form of existence, free from all property. Such a mass would 
be reduced either to the sale of its labor power or to beggary, vagabondage, or robbery as its 
only source of income.  History records the fact that it first tried beggary, vagabondage, and 
crime, but was herded off this road on to the narrow path which led to the labor market by 
means of the gallows, pillory, and whip. 
(Marx 1965: 111) 
 
Generally dominating the working class is the normative fact of the ‘silent compulsion of 
economic relations’ which ‘breaks down all resistance’ to the hegemonic idea that capitalism 
operates under ‘self-evident natural laws’ (Marx 1976: 899). ‘Direct extra-economic force’ 
now becomes the historical exception rather than the norm – only to be used by the state in 
moments of crisis (Marx 1976: 899).  In this sense, the relative freedom for capitalist state 
autonomy partially rests on how tightly chained direct producers are to these bourgeois 
‘freedoms’.   
 
The capitalist state is also constituted by two other determining relationships – competition 
between capitalists and inter-state rivalry.  These are identified below by historically tracing 
classical marxist attempts to theorise how all three antagonistic relationships shape the 
organisation of capitalist state power.  These theorists stand with Marx in his contention that 
to breach these alienated divisions, to actualise real democracy against this antagonist 
social product, requires ‘a revolution against the state itself’ (Marx 1974 : 249).   
 
Marx’s writings are both necessary and insufficient to make such theoretical connections.  
Aspects of the state Marx analysed in his non-economic writings (see Draper 1977) are not 
integrated into his economic critique.  In considering Britain’s early industrial revolution Marx 
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 ‘The seigniorial privileges of the medieval lords and cities and clergy were transformed into the attributes of a 
unitary state power, displacing feudal dignitaries by salaried state functionaries, transferring the arms from 
medieval retainers of the landlords and the corporations of townish citizens to a standing army; substituting for the 
chequered anarchy of medieval powers the regulated plan of a state power, with a systematic and hierarchic 
division of labour…to develop, what absolute monarchy had commenced, the centralisation and organisation of 
state power…and its supernaturalist sway of real society’. 
(Marx & Engels 1975a: 162-163) 
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(1976: 342) argues that profits were made by ‘sucking…vampire-like’ as much absolute 
surplus value from labour power as possible by increasing the working day for men, women 
and children.  Because the state is analysed in relation to this particular economic 
movement, such as how the enclosure laws were designed to support this extraction, his 
early assumption was that states played a coercive, but not directly economic, role in the 
lives of the working class. By the mid 19th century, however, as the growing productive 
capacity of ‘machinofacture’ was transforming labour processes, a new economic critique 
begins to emerge (Marx 1976: 1034-5).  As this ‘specifically capitalist form of production 
comes into being’ (Marx 1976: 1024), profitability became increasingly dependent on the 
production of relative surplus value, inaugurating ‘the real subsumption of labour’ (Marx 
1975b).  The increased exploitation derived by this system further socialised the labour 
process into the ‘collective worker’ (Engels 1993) while creating a highly complex division of 
labour.   
 
As commodity production and social reproduction became more intricately interconnected 
greater state interventions became economically necessary.  Legislation defining limits to the 
working day, identifying who was required to attend school and similar state interventions 
became increasingly important.  Marx, however, did not theoretically draw out the 
implications of this changing state system as a dimension of the capitalist mode of 
production.  This was reflected in the misunderstanding Engels and Marx had of the 
changing character of the working class family – an institution they thought was being 
abolished by the mass employment of women and children in the factories of early industrial 
Britain (Engels 1977; Marx & Engels 1973: Section 2).  Marx’s unwritten fourth volume of 
Capital was intended to theoretically connect the capitalist state into his overall critique of 
political economy.  As a result the state was often effectively relegated in Capital’s economic 
considerations to a passive ‘nightwatchman’ role (Bottomore 1983: 305).  Further, since the 
international was also not thematised (volume five), the state was only ever theoretically 
treated as a singular entity abstracted from the world system (Barker 1978a).  The question 
of how to systemically locate the state in the newly emerging capital relation without reducing 
it to this relation was therefore undeveloped in Marx’s work.  
 
It was in the theories of Hilferding, Bukharin, Lenin, Luxemburg and Grossman in the early 
20th century that such capacities began to be developed.  By seeking to incorporate Marx’s 
argument of capitalism’s breakdown tendencies into their analyses of the new period of 
international competition and accumulation, a more theorised understanding of the role of 
states surfaces (Callinicos 2009; Kuhn 2007).  Bukharin, for instance, argued that states had 
become economically part of the concentration and centralisation of capital and that 
international competition between ‘state capitalist trusts’ was emerging as imperialism in a 
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way not envisioned by Marx: 
Economics is organisationally fused with politics; the economic power of the state bourgeoisie 
unites itself directly with the political power; the state ceases to be a simple protector of the 
process of exploitation and becomes a direct, capitalist collective exploiter. 
(Bukharin 1971: 36).24    
 
Contemporary marxist debates about imperialism tend to divide between those who integrate 
inter-state conflict into their economic critiques of global capitalism and its crisis tendencies 
and those who do not (see Callinicos 2009: 67-100).  This research aligns with the former 
theories of inter-state conflict since they provide crucial explanatory concepts about the 
economic character of the state and welfare policy in contemporary capitalism.  The 
‘theorists of the new imperialism’ hold two common positions (Kiely 2005).  Firstly, that within 
the competitive drive to source new sites of capital accumulation beyond national frontiers, 
global capitalism has yet to exit from the ‘long downturn’ in the overall rate of profit since the 
late 1960s (Brenner 2004).  Secondly, that advanced capitalism is divided into three 
competing centres of political and economic power – Western Europe, North America and 
East Asia, generating the geopolitical conflicts between themselves and other states.  The 
crucial insight these writers bring to the research is that contemporary capitalist competition 
now takes two forms – economic and geopolitical (Callinicos 2009: 72).  In economic 
competition there continue to be, following Marx, ‘vertical’ power relations between capital 
and labour and the ‘horizontal’ relations between capitals (Brenner 2006a: 23).  Intersecting 
with this form of competition, and also constitutive of capitalism, is geopolitical competition 
between states.   
 
Each contemporary nation state uniquely expresses the historical playing out of these 
combined and uneven systemic pressures (Hallas 1979).  States develop specific laws, 
policies and regulatory instruments historically shaped by the complex of co-operative and 
competitive relations with fractions of capital, and its relations with waged (and unwaged) 
labour.  Each individual capital, as with each commodity, not only has an exchange value but 
also a use value – ‘a concrete set of relations between individuals and things in the process 
of production’ (Harman 1991: 12).  Every local capital has its specific ways of organising 
labour power, materials and means of production, of sourcing finance, of developing 
distribution and marketing networks.  As a consequence, a nation-state’s indigenous 
relationship with productive, commodity and finance forms of capital actively remoulds its 
development into a national entity with its own language, system of laws and banking 
structures to correspond to a locally spatialised logic of exploitation and accumulation 
(Harman 1991: 7-15).  Intra- and international competition, as an inherent condition of 
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 Mike Kidron (1970) later drew on these theories to argue that the economic stability of the 1950s and 1960s 
was due to a ‘permanent arms economy’ generated by the two superpowers. 
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capitalism, means that not only does capital ‘exist and can only exist as many capitals’ (Marx 
1973: 414), but also that the state exists and can only exist as many states.    
 
As enactors of public policies, states can neither be reduced to acting in direct economic 
interests nor be considered as somehow ‘external’ from the economic system (Rosenberg 
1994: 130).  Because welfare and other state policies take economic and geopolitical forms, 
they are to be analysed as a ‘dialectical relation between territorial and capitalistic logics of 
power’ (Harvey 2003: 183).   
 
The rise of state expenditures 
 
Non-reductively locating the state-capital relation within contemporary capitalist competition 
provides a vantage point to identify and analyse the increasing economic weight of the state 
in its relation to national capitals.  In the last fifty years, for example, state expenditures have 
tended to rise faster than the overall national economy.  The revenue required for state 
activities has therefore taken a greater proportion of national income (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, Australia and the OECD: 1965-2007 
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Source: derived from data in OECD 2009.  Revenue Statistics 1965-2008.  Paris: 77-78 
 
Units of capital have also tended to expand as productivity increases, exerting a combined 
yet uneven downward pressure on the rate of accumulation and profit, and so generating 
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economic crises which destroys some capitals while restructuring and enlarging others (Fine 
2001).25   
 
Marx’s controversial argument that there is an overall tendency for the rate of profit to fall as 
capitalism ages courses through these tensions.26   In the last 40 years profit rates have 
partially recovered – but not back to the high levels preceding the long downturn.  Partially 
offsetting this tendency are many countervailing factors: diversions of surplus value out of the 
production cycle27 due to the dramatic growth of unproductive labour (see next section) in 
sections of finance, commerce and manufacturing capitals and in non-productive state 
functions such as the military and the legal system28; increases in the rate of exploitation29 
and access to lower cost raw materials and labour power through a greater 
internationalisation of trade.30  
 
The increasing dominance of denser capital concentrations reshapes the character of 
subsequent crises.  Larger-scale state interventions have tended to occur31 as the systemic 
consequences of allowing big corporations to go bankrupt has now become so acute that it 
partially undermines Schumpeter’s (1992) (and Marx’s) argument of capitalism’s ‘creative 
destruction’ held by leading state theorists such as Bob Jessop (2002).  Rather than a 
                                                
25
 Shane Mage (1963: 228), for example, estimated that the combined effect of World War Two and the crisis of 
the 1930s wiped 20 per cent off the value of US capital stock over a fifteen year period. For a rejection of this 
‘restructuring’ argument see Brenner 2002; and Dumenil & Levy 2004. 
26
 Empirical support for this argument can be found in marxist-based studies of profit rates over the last 30 years.  
All concur that profit rates fell from the late 1960s until the early 1980s (Alemi & Foley 1997; Brenner 2006a; 
Dumenil & Levy 1993, 2005b; Michl 1988; Moseley 1997; Shaikh & Tonak 1994; Wolff 2003).  The sporadic 
recovery of these rates which did occur from about 1982 made up about half the decline that had taken place in 
the previous period. Wolff (2003), for example, estimates the rate of profit fell by 5.4 per cent from 1966-79 and 
then ‘rebounded’ by 3.6 per cent from 1979-97.  Moseley (1997) puts the recovery at 40 per cent of the earlier 
decline.  Dumenil and Levy  (2005a: 1) found that that the profit rate in 1997 was ‘still only half of its value of 
1948, and between 60 and 75 per cent of its average value for the decade 1956-65’.  
27
  See Cogoy 1977; Garcia 1979; Harman 1977; 2003: 39-43; and Shaikh 1977.   
28
  For arguments about how this growth of unproductive labour has had highly contradictory national and 
international effects see Cliff 1974, Harman 2009 and Kidron 1974.  
29
 Through increasing hours, refining hours of employment, increasing the intensity of labour, cutting real wages, 
or increasing the productivity of labour through technical advances. 
30
 Fine and Harris (1979) consider these factors sufficient to refute the general tendency for profit rates to fall. See 
Harman 2007b for a rejection of this approach.  
31
 Overall, state-supported restructuring in the United States increased from 10 per cent of private investment in 
1970 to 24 per cent in 1990 and had been maintained at about that level prior to the massive expansion due to 
the global financial crisis (Leiva 2007: 12).  In Australia, despite the privatisation of Telstra, QANTAS, the 
Commonwealth Bank, electricity and other bodies in the 1990s, public investment was 30 per cent of private 
investment in 2007 (RBA 2008).  
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‘market clearing’ exercise, the scale of collapses such as the recent Global Financial Crisis 
threatens to drag in previously profitable and stable firms into bankruptcy, creating economic 
‘black holes’ in the heart of the system (Harman 2007b; 2009: 302-304).  The ratcheting up 
effect of these quantitative changes in an increasingly sclerotic system destablises 
geopolitical relationships and the economic relations between states and capitals.32 
 
Accumulation, competition and the changing distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour 
 
Central to understanding the dynamics of contemporary capitalism and the economic 
character of state welfare policy production is the distinction Marx draws between productive 
and unproductive labour: 
 
Productive labour is only a concise term for the whole relationship and the form and manner in 
which labour power figures in the capitalist production process.  The distinction from other 
kinds of labour is however of the greatest importance since this distinction expresses 
precisely the specific form of the labour on which the whole capitalist mode of production and 
capital itself is based. 
(Marx 2000: 7) 
 
However, this necessary difference only becomes analytically sufficient when integrated into 
a theory of the modern state-capital relation, considered in this study as a political-economic 
dialectic – a differentiated unity.  Both sides of this relation are non-reductively held to have 
combined, though uneven, political and economic elements (see pages 46-55).   
 
One aspect of the state-capital relation is theorised below – locating state workfare in the 
production relations of the state-as-capital (Barker, 1978b) as a contradictory productive and 
unproductive relation.  Situating workfare labour in the social relations of production (while 
not reducing state labour to these relations) provides economic and political insights into 
what were the determining and determined relations of the JET program, whether realised or 
potential.    
 
Marx drew on Adam Smith’s distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour for 
early capitalist development to consider (from a politically oppositional pole to Smith) what 
was ‘productive’ in capitalist terms.  In Theories of Surplus Value Marx argued that labour 
creating surplus value was productive since such labour enabled capitalists to accumulate.  
Because the difference between productive and unproductive labour has ‘nothing to 
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 The argument for Australian exceptionalism to these trends has been rejected by Jamie Doughney’s (2002) 
research which showed that Australian private business gross profit rates fell from 24 per cent in 1966-67 to 14 
per cent in 1982-83 and then picked up to around 16 per cent in the early 1990s.  The subsequent decade may 
have temporarily bucked this trend, but again, the current economic crisis is reasserting the broader dynamics 
identified by Moseley, Shaikh, Mohun and Harman.  
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do…with the particular use value in which...[it]…is incorporated’, all surplus-generating 
labour is considered productive regardless of whether material commodities or services are 
produced (Marx 1971b).  According to Dussel (2001: 69), Marx initially assumed that the 
performance of unproductive labours ‘with only minor exceptions’ were broadly clustered 
around the personal services provided to the establishing ruling class.  Included in this model 
was state labour.  From the perspective of ‘industrial capitalists’, the costs of those employed 
to mediate ‘the conflict between private interests and national interests’ was regarded as 
necessary incidental expenses for their pursuit of accumulation (Marx 2000: 7).    
 
When considering the more concrete dynamics of ‘many capitals’ in the third volume of 
Capital, Marx revisited this distinction to examine the development of other forms of 
unproductive labour ‘as the scale of production is extended’ (Marx 1981: 413).  The labour of 
maintaining discipline inside the workplace by managers and supervisors, the chain of 
commercial labour processes bringing previously produced commodities to the market, and 
the financial labour involved in the production and circulation of capital were generally 
considered unproductive.  Confronting Marx was his earlier distinction dealing with an 
individual capitalist (as a simplified abstraction of capital in general), which would require 
defining such labour as productive if one capitalist purchased these services from another 
since surplus value was created.  From an ‘historical’ perspective of capitalism as a 
competitive totality, however, these labours remained unproductive as no new surplus value 
was produced at a systemic level (Freeman & Vandesteeg 1981, 88).  The source of profit 
for the second capitalist came from the surplus value of productive workers employed by the 
first. 
 
This study rejects Bidet’s (2007: 117) claim that Marx’s earlier and later distinctions between 
productive and unproductive labour lack ‘connection’, are ‘contradictory’ and so are not 
theoretically ‘coherent’. As discussed in this chapter’s method section, analysing Marx’s 
differing distinctions as a strategic positioning of new abstractions and not simply as an 
immanent unfolding of a simpler abstraction, creates a method which links Marx’s overall 
investigation of capital.  Harman (2009: 123-124), for example, points to the historical 
context impelling Marx’s initial distinction, which focuses on what advanced and what 
retarded early capitalist development.  In a period of primitive accumulation, of nascent 
capitalist production relations, the wealth used by the heterogeneous sections of the upper 
classes to purchase personal services often tended to come, not from profits accrued from 
surplus value, but from pre-capitalist sources outside these relations.  Marx considered a 
personally engaged servant or teacher as unproductive because such an arrangement 
reflected and reinforced pre-capitalist social relations.  In contrast, emerging personal service 
businesses such as private schools making profits from these sources of wealth employed 
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productive labour because the accumulation of surplus value created reflected and 
reinforced capitalist production relations.  
 
Throughout Capital, as Marx methodologically develops his argument towards competition 
between many capitals, the new distinction he makes between productive and unproductive 
labour remains dialectically connected to its earlier and simpler determination of what 
advances/retards accumulation.  Marx continues to situate his distinction within the larger 
theory of the capitalist mode.  He adds more concrete content to that theory by analysing 
capitalist production relations as they are becoming pervasive, as the dynamics of 
accumulation centre on extracting relative surplus value from labour power.  Marx’s strategic 
repositioning of his earlier abstraction allows him to argue that, because the profits of 
commercial capitalists came from operations within capitalist production relations and so 
within already created surplus value, the labour they employed was not productive since no 
overall furthering of accumulation occurs.  While the outlays of capital circulation costs 
‘appear…as a productive investment’ to the commercial capitalist, and the labour commercial 
capital exploits appears as ‘immediately productive’ (Marx 1981: 296), they are ‘classed as 
unproductive expenses so far as society is concerned’ (Marx 1978: 137).  This later 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour that Marx adopts to explain what 
kind of labour adds to the surplus value available to capitalism (as competition between 
capitals to accumulate and a struggle between capitals and the working class), provides a 
basis to develop his theories of exploitation and the tendency of the falling rate of profit.   
 
Marx stresses the two-fold nature of the capitalist process of production – a social process 
for producing use-values with labourers performing abstract labour creating a commodity’s 
value.  Carchedi elaborates Marx’s argument that prior to a commodity’s value being realised 
as exchange-value, abstract labour (the substance of value) is contained in the commodity 
as it is being produced:  
 
The social nature of the production of use-values is not their being produced for exchange but 
their being produced…by the collective labourer…for the capitalist who, under developed 
capitalism, is the appropriator of surplus value extracted by a complex bureaucracy of many 
individuals each performing a different aspect of the work of exploitation. 
(Carchedi 2009: 156)   
 
That is, the process of producing commodities is the process of producing use-values and 
value, which are subsequently validated through exchange.  Value, therefore is a specific 
social dimension of material reality, a dynamic expression ‘of one identical social substance, 
human labour’ (Marx 1976: 138), which is both physical and social (Carchedi 2009: 154).  
Marx (1976: 1041), therefore, recognised that due to the real subsumption of labour under 
capital into the overall labour processes an ‘ever increasing number of types of labour’ were 
to be included in the ‘immediate concept of productive workers’. Under Marx’s distinction 
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those involved in aiding the realisation or maintenance of the value of a commodity such as 
transport and storage workers perform productive labour.  Some retail labour work, for 
example, is considered productive (such as shelf stackers) and others unproductive (cash 
register operators are necessary only because the products take a commodity form).  
Supervisory labour is productive in its co-ordination role within the labour-process and 
unproductive when such labour ‘merely arises from the antagonistic contradiction between 
capital and labour’ (Marx 1971d).   
 
What remains problematic for a critical understanding of the economic character of JET 
labour is Marx’s lack of integrating the role of the state into his theory of the dynamics of 
capitalism.  As a consequence Marx equivocated whether the labour processes involving 
state workers were productive.  On one hand, he considered that they ‘do not appear as 
productive workers, even though they [may] increase the productive force of capital’.  On the 
other hand, Marx (1973: 533) acknowledged he was on moving ground since ’the specific 
relation of capital to the communal [state], general conditions of social production cannot be 
sharply defined yet at this point’.  
 
If, for Marx, capital is essentially value set in motion in order to expand, then, as David 
Harvey contends, to effectively analyse contemporary capitalism, ‘you have to put the 
question of the state and finance almost up front’ (cited in Choonara 2009).  Jim Kincaid’s 
(2007: 158) observation that value theory is ‘still very much a site under construction’ is 
especially apt to the problematic challenges of analysing the economic character of the state, 
social policy and workfare labour processes.  Marxist debates about state-employed human 
services work often remain stuck in one-sidedly applying a dialectical method which logically 
deduces this labour to be unproductive (Izquierdo 2006; Laibman 1999; Mohun 2002; Savran 
& Tonak 1999) or conclude that the productive-unproductive distinction is meaningless 
(Laibman 1999).  Both views are rejected in this thesis. 
 
Under modern capitalism, Marx’s model, based on competition for markets through the 
accumulation of productive investments seeking to reduce processing costs and commodity 
selling prices, becomes only ‘one dimension of competition’ (Harman 2003: 45).  The 
dynamic creating the collective labourer is an economic and historical dialectic in unity with 
its opposite – the national state-capital relation as a collective capitalist.  This thesis follows 
the positions taken by Callinicos (2009) and Harman (2009) that, firstly, due to the 
competitive interaction of capitalist states since the late 19th century, a central economic role 
of a state has been to politically facilitate or militarily leverage international sources and sites 
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of accumulation for ‘its’ local capitals.33  A relation develops where a state’s international 
interventions, like the competition for surplus value Marx talked about for commercial 
capitals, are productive for local capitals while essentially unproductive at a global, systemic 
level.  Secondly, in its economic aspect, a state acts (in part) as a collective capitalist in its 
internal economic and political interventions.  A state’s revenues may appear as 
unproductive expenses of production for an individual capitalist but may be essentially 
productive for national capitals collectively (Harman 2009: Chapter 5).   
 
Such a summary argument about the economic character of the state-capital relation frames 
two specific questions for this research: what state welfare labour is locally productive or 
unproductive and is all state welfare labour systemically unproductive?  A methodological 
capacity to theorise and thematise the productive-unproductive distinction in state welfare 
labour comes from the few authors who also inductively discern capital’s modern dialectic in 
the state (Carchedi 2009; Freeman 1996: 231; Harman 2009).   
 
This thesis follows the approach taken by Harman, outlined in Chapter 5 of Zombie 
Capitalism (2009).  At the national state-capital relation level of abstraction, Harman 
strategically introduces value-creating state labour power as a determination of the state-as-
capital.  The economic relations of state labour in capitalism occur at systemic and national 
levels.  Distinguishing productive from unproductive state labour is therefore thematised into 
the three possible interactions between the systemic and national economic aspects of the 
state-as-capital’s relation to capitalism: 
 
• Systemically and locally unproductive.  State labour involved in coercion and 
legitimation such as the disciplining of the workforce and ideologically promoting a 
nation’s productive ethos.  Health, education and welfare labour which maintains the 
relations of exploitation in the supplying, training, maintaining and reproducing of 
labour power.  The labour of maintaining national legal and financial interactions 
between capitals; 
• Systemically unproductive and locally productive.  Military labour as part of state-
capital expenditures which, at a systemic level, ‘pulverise values’ but, at a national 
level, may leverage foreign sources and sites of accumulation for some local capitals 
(Grossmann 1992: 157); and  
                                                
33
  A discussion of the theories seeking to explain this form of competition is outside the scope of this 
paper.  For an overview see Callinicos 2009: Chapter 1 and Harman 2009: Part 1. 
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• Systemically and locally productive.  State research and development labour which 
aids capital accumulation.  State labour employed to produce labour power supply, 
training, maintenance and reproduction policies, which further capital accumulation. 
(adapted from Harman, 2009: 127-129) 
 
Harman (2009: 127-139) readily acknowledges unresolved theoretical problems with this 
typology, recognising, for instance, the ongoing debate about whether productive state 
labour is part of variable (Freeman 1996: 231) or constant capital.  Nevertheless, he 
provides a methodologically nuanced and sufficiently stable theoretical basis for an inquiry 
into how JET labour may be productive of capital.   
 
There are three linked reasons why such an analysis is important for this thesis.  Firstly, this 
enriched dialectical method investigates welfare production relations at different levels of 
abstraction – the state-capital relation in global and national capitalism, the state-as-capital, 
the internal labour processes of a state, and workfare labour.  Once theorised in the 
following sections, the work of applying these relational concepts to historically investigate 
JET becomes highly attentive to the contradictory unity of the political and economic aspects 
constituting various production relations.   
 
Secondly, an understanding of how state welfare labour is, in part, productive of capital 
strengthens the research argument that state activities do not lie ‘outside’ capitalist 
production relations, as David Harvey (2003: 141) posits.  Rather than the state expressing a 
‘detachment’ between the ‘economic and political moments of capital’ as Ellen Meiksins 
Wood (2005: 25) argues, I contend that the accumulation and legitimation functions of the 
state express their contradictory unity (see pages 46-55).  Analysing Australian workfare as 
an expression of this dialectic opens the economic and political contradictions of JET to a 
more penetrating analysis.  This method more clearly historically locates the economic 
aspects of the program in a period when the economic weight of the state is increasing in its 
relation with capital (OECD 2009: 77-79) and as welfare costs in Australia continue a 40-
year rise as a proportion of government expenditures (Laurie &McDonald 2008: 36).  Such 
an inquiry also sharply reappraises the neoliberal politics embedded in the Labor and 
Coalition governments’ welfare reform agendas in their conflictual relation to the chronic 
problems of historically lower profit rates, and as more contingent, contradictory responses to 
the business cycles of booms and slumps.   
 
Thirdly, situating an inquiry into the productive and unproductive character of JET labour 
theoretically links the study’s analysis of how welfare labour processes are an aspect of the 
legitimation and accumulation roles of the state.  It will be argued that JET labour was 
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unproductive when JAs were involved in the work of expressing the various ideological 
responses of the Australian state (either to legitimate welfare as a productive requirement for 
capitalism or as a political exercise to secure the state’s relatively autonomous interests).  
However, a more acute historical understanding of JET’s ideological premises (as JET 
turned from a social justice to an openly coercive program) is available by bringing the 
underlying productive aspects of JET into contradictory relation with these legitimation 
elements.  Unlike prison guards, JAs were not simply unproductive.  The JA work involved in 
maintaining or increasing the market-realisable value of a single parent pensioner’s labour 
power is considered in this thesis as part of the production process of the state-as-capital.  
From a systemic perspective, a JA’s labour power is comparable to other productive workers 
involved in commodity maintenance (refrigeration workers), transfer (truck drivers) or market-
readying activities (supermarket shelf-stackers).   
 
However, two particular differences between the work of maintaining or adding to the value 
of this ‘peculiar commodity’ (Marx 1976: 274) and other productive labour are highlighted in 
this study.  Unlike the production of purely physical commodities, economically productive 
human services work in Centrelink (such as the JET program) also involves inter-subjective 
relations between the bearer of the labour power (the single parent pensioner) and the 
labourer (the JA).  The next sub-section outlines why the emotional and affective labour of 
this work is potentially productive of capital and section 2.4 discusses the welfare labour 
process.  Secondly, unlike commodity production in corporations where the labour employed 
may be either productive or unproductive, all state welfare labour is, in part, inherently 
unproductive.  In the following pages I discuss how welfare policy production processes are 
mediated by the (unproductive) legitimation and (productive) accumulation functions of the 
state (see pages 46-50) to argue that the differentiated unity of economics and politics of a 
capitalist state is reflected in welfare policy as productive and unproductive labour. 
 
Reinterpreting the concept of emotional labour  
 
One useful attempt to capture changes in welfare work practices under the rise of 
neoliberalism has been to conceptualise them in terms of a rise of emotional, affective or 
symbolic labour (Maconachie 2005).  The thesis links these concepts to the dynamics of 
accumulation to theoretically and empirically clarify the emergence of workfare within the 
contradictions of the state-capital relation under neoliberalism.  The ideological and 
economic character of workfare, it will be argued, had a specific material expression in the 
growth of emotional and affective labour involved in the production of welfare policy.  The 
rise of ‘emotional’ and ‘affective’ welfare labour processes is investigated as a ‘rational’ and 
‘realistic’ response of a section of political capitalists to new state accumulation and 
legitimation pressures and as a necessary aspect of ‘strenuous welfarism’ – mediating and 
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contradicting these challenges in the actual welfare labour process.  The following chapters 
investigate this growth from different vantage points and levels of abstraction such as how 
JAs’ understood what their work entailed, the dramatic feminisation of the Centrelink frontline 
workforce, and the ideological and economic tension underlying the managerial campaign for 
‘good customer service’.   
 
What remains problematic among most concepts of emotional labour is that they invariably 
abandon Marx’s theory of labour as an outdated, ‘productivist’ concept ill-suited to 
understanding how current work practices are increasingly dominated by ‘immaterial’ labour 
(Benton 1992; Grundmann 1991; Hardt & Negri 2000, 2005; Lazzarato 1996).  For Hardt and 
Negri (2005: 108), neither of the two ‘principle forms’ of work today – ‘symbolic’ (intellectual) 
labour and ‘affective’ (emotional/behavioural) labour – create products nor satisfy material 
needs.  Predictably, low-paid, feminised, ‘affective’ social policy practices – such as those 
conducted by JET workers – are said to typify the immateriality of most labour in the 21st 
century (Hardt & Negri 2000: 410-411; 2005: 111).   
 
I draw support from Sean Sayers, who dismisses such a binary distinction between 
‘immaterial’ and ‘material’ labour as theoretically unfounded: 
 
Just as all ‘immaterial’ labor necessarily involves material activity, so conversely all material 
labor is ‘immaterial’ in the sense that it alters not only the material worked upon but also 
subjectivity and social relations. There is no clear distinction between material and immaterial in 
this respect (Sayers 2007: 448).  
 
The very materiality of work generates the social divisions characterised as ‘symbolic’ or 
‘affective’ social policy practices.  While commerce, administration and service work do not 
have direct material products, Marx included these kinds of work as ‘formative’ activities, and 
brought them under the same theoretical framework as other kinds of work (Sayers 2007: 
442).  In this sense, Hardt and Negri’s position reinforces the split between the state and 
capital and so severs investigating the underlying economic and political connection of policy 
production within which emotional and affective labour practices and processes occur. 
 
The state capital relation and labour power 
 
For an individual capitalist, the taxes paid for state health, education and welfare policies are 
part of the necessary and unproductive costs of production.  Whether the production of 
social policies is productive at a national or systemic level pivots on the economic 
contribution of this state labour to the maintenance or production of labour power for local or 
global accumulation.  Labour power, abstracted as a quantity of value, is determined at an 
aggregate level through the exchange between capital and labour as a whole prior to the 
process of production (Fine, Lapavitsas & Saad-Filho 2004).  Though international 
accumulation dynamics determine competition for certain categories of labour power, this 
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aggregation still principally occurs at a national level and has traditionally been conceived as 
the value of labour power given by the value of a fixed bundle of wage goods influenced by 
‘social, institutional and historical’ factors.  Ben Fine (2004: 11), however, rejects the 
unmediated idea that the value of labour power can be directly attached to a ‘concrete 
outcome’ such a quantity of goods.  Labour power’s more complex form (as money wages 
and commodity purchases) is developed out of the historically and social specific 
consequences of accumulation.  It is in the contradictory tendencies of accumulation (raising 
productivity and wages while lowering the value of labour power; interacting with the 
structures of employment within and across enterprises, sectors and occupations as a 
socioeconomic process of deskilling, reskilling and responding to trade union pressures) that 
differentiates the value of labour power.  State interventions and involvement in the 
production of the value of labour power are therefore centrally situated within the 
contradictory tendencies of accumulation.  As the state’s relation to national capital has 
become an increasingly interconnected and competitive aspect of capital accumulation, the 
state, acting as a collective capitalist, has taken over from both the private family and 
capitalist enterprise more activities associated with the reproduction and maintenance of 
labour power.  
 
Historically, like the state, the capitalist family form was only qualitatively consolidated into 
the contemporary accumulation dynamics of capitalism with labour’s real subsumption a 
century ago.  The requirement for a new and stable set of social relations sufficient to 
reproduce labour power re-shaped both institutions (German 1989: 61-79).  In the early 
phase of capitalism a formal subordination of the family to capitalism occurred.  The 
extension of wage labour throughout the family (most characterised by children becoming, in 
part, an economic asset as potential workers) was ‘moderated’ by the limited levels of 
capitalist productivity and greater opportunities for making money from domestic work in the 
home (Fine 1992).  In contrast a real subordination of the family arose under the impact of 
monopoly capitalism and imperialism at the end of the 19th century, where higher levels of 
productivity increasingly undermined domestic production in the home, and it became the 
norm for children to not work and for women to (eventually) do so.  Fine (1992) attributes the 
‘massive anomaly’ of the initial withdrawal of (married) women from the workforce until after 
World War Two to the ‘establishing phase’ of the modern state-capital relation.   
 
To realise the productive potential of the factory system required state ‘social intervention’ to 
limit the working day and greater state involvement in the supply, training and reproduction 
of durable, initially male, labour power.  Also like the state, women’s withdrawal from the 
labour market at this time is not reducible to this new economic relation, as some Marxist 
feminists have argued (Smith 1977).  The pressure of inadequate family policies to support 
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any alternative was also reflected in the dynamics from below where a woman’s options at 
the time had seemingly narrowed to one in which ‘safer relationships, rather than freer ones, 
were a common goal’ (Taylor 1983: 205).  The middle class ideal of the model family 
campaigned for by a range of church figures, politicians, media and others at the time 
gradually became ‘common sense’ in working class households (Bloodworth 1990), 
ideologically redefining motherhood ‘from procreation to care and vigilance’ (Weeks 2000: 
56).  However, as capitalism’s productivity increased during the 20th century, the real 
subordination of the family, which had initially ‘lagged behind’ that of male wage labour was 
‘generalised’ as married women re-entered labour markets in immense numbers (Fine 1992).   
 
The now generalised struggle to (re)produce a fitter, higher-skilled and more readily 
accessible national workforce than its state competitors has become an integrated aspect of 
the costs of variable capital (Freeman 1996: 231).  States economically intervene to increase 
relative surplus value through policies which either raise the average level of productive 
skills, capacities and capabilities in the workforce (health, welfare, education, immigration) or 
by supporting employers increasing the rate of exploitation (lower minimum wages, longer or 
more flexible work hours etc.).  Absolute surplus value may be expanded through state 
interventions which aim to increase the quantum of labour power available, especially in 
times of economic expansion (welfare to work policies aimed at those previously ‘unattached 
to the labour market’, boosting migration and increasing the age pension age).  The drive by 
the Howard government to do both is exemplified in Chapter 4 in the campaign by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Ken Henry (2005), to promote his ‘three P’s’ – population, 
participation and productivity.  One need for this campaign was that the proportion of 
Australian women in paid work was internationally uncompetitive compared to that in Europe 
and the United States (see 4.2).  This international gap in the rate of activating exploitable 
sources of labour power was exerting unnecessary downward pressures on Australian 
capital accumulation, and resulted in significant political pressures on state managers to 
promote compulsory welfare to work programs, cut pension rates and institute greater 
financial support for work-related childcare programs and family benefits.   
 
Marx (1976: 781, 794) insisted that a critical condition for the expansion of capital was the 
existence of a ‘relative surplus population’, an ‘industrial reserve army’ taking three forms – 
‘latent’, ‘floating’ and ‘stagnant’ workers.  In its first two forms various groups were available 
to meet the shifting sectoral requirements of production.  His assertion that this population 
must proportionally rise as capital expands was not defended ‘seriously’ until the 1970s 
(Barker 1976), when Harry Braverman (1974) analysed how the movement of labour power 
between branches of modern capitalist production had increased both in tempo and spatially, 
particularly into the less skilled, labour-intensive ‘service’ sector.  This was leading to the 
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growth of the ‘floating’ part of the ‘relative surplus production’ and the ‘latent’ part in the form 
of immigrants and especially, as women (Barker 1976).  The maintenance and regulation of 
these labour reserves to ensure they have a close relationship to labour markets is one of 
the most important roles of welfare policy. 
 
As competition cyclically reorganises and concentrates sections of capital into larger units 
labour is shed and rehired differentially.  The shifting pool of unemployed drawn upon by the 
surviving larger units is also a cheap potential source for less efficient producers and so 
prolongs their viability.  In other words, the same processes promoting employment in large-
scale efficient capital also support its antithesis – small-scale, sweated labour, ‘even where 
the two compete in the same markets for output’ (Fine 1998: Ch 7, 5).  Subsequent marxist 
debates about employment and the structuring of labour markets centred on three issues: 
how production relations differentiate the workforce as a tension between de-skilling and 
multi-skilling; as specialisations towards single or multiple tasks (see 2.8); its social 
reproduction; and how this workforce becomes socially differentiated through the provision 
and consumption of the wages bundle (Bowles & Gintis 1977, 1981; Fine 1992, 1998).  It is 
from within these debates that a line of inquiry is opened to empirically investigate, through a 
statistical analysis of the HILDA database (see 4.3), the extent to which single parent 
pensioners are socially differentiated in the Australian labour market by the system of public 
provision they receive.   
 
The state-as-capital minimises its costs in two ways.  As a collective capitalist, the state 
employs productive state labour which operates through the law of value.  The dynamics of 
accumulation exert pressure on the state to produce values cheaper than its competitors – 
other states and local capitals which produce social policy (such as state-contracted welfare 
enterprises managed by Mission Australia and the Salvation Army).  State interventions for 
supporting a greater extraction of relative surplus value by national capitals can, therefore, 
be increased by raising the level of exploitation of state labour (both productive and 
unproductive).  Secondly, the costs of the production of these social policies can be shifted 
to the consumers, primarily the working class, through taxation.   
 
Destabilising and informing such accumulation aims is the political aspect of the state-capital 
relation.  Political competition between capital and labour and conflicts between the state 
and local fractions of capital generate unproductive state activities.  The work conducted to 
produce the state-as-political entity also produces use-values – maintaining ideological 
accommodation to the relations of exploitation, disciplining functions of the workforce, public 
relations, supervisory functions etc.  These unproductive ‘expenses of production’ (Marx 
1973: 310) are necessary (vertical) coercive-legitimising and (horizontal) higgling costs for 
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the political maintenance of the state-capital relation. Disputes arise between those running 
various fractions of capitals, between state managers in different state institutions of the 
state, and within each bureaucracy about what a ‘good policy’ should be.  State managers, in 
acting in the interests of the nation state, politically tailor these accumulation goals within 
each bureaucracy as part of the state’s overall legitimation effort.  Within the apparatus of a 
single state, these politico-economic dynamics create an uneven tension between its 
productive accumulation and unproductive legitimation functions.  The labour of state 
employees is analysed in this study as a relation expressing, often simultaneously, the 
state’s productive-unproductive contradictions.   
 
One historical result of legitimating increased expenditures on variable capital is that the 
level of the ‘moral and historical’ element in the value of labour power tends to increase.  A 
political expectation arises within the working class that the ‘social wage’ it receives from the 
state is part of their overall standard of living (Fine 2008).34  As a ‘socialised’ aspect of the 
costs of variable capital (Freeman 1996: 231), these expenditures for the ‘collective worker’ 
had a wage-like form whether it is paid in money or kind.  Health, education and welfare 
expenditures are realistically perceived to be a ‘social wage’ supplement to the main wage 
received.  Historically, tax expenditures and other productivity measures tended to recoup 
these (re)production costs, resulting in the working class paying for most of the ‘social wage’ 
it received (see 3.4).  Class conflicts over this social wage are not reducible to economic 
considerations.  They are a necessary aspect of the state’s political autonomy within the 
state-capital relation.  Vertical conflicts tend to be sharpest when expectations of a larger 
social wage are higher within the working class.  The election of a social democratic 
government, especially if it is off the back of rising level of trade union activity, tends to 
increase these expectations.  Conflicts may also emerge when new state strategies attempt 
to reconfigure its expenditure on variable capital in competitive responses to changes global 
competition or economic downturns.  ‘Horizontal’ conflicts may emerge between those 
controlling capitals – who seek to keep any increased state expenditures productively 
targeted to specifically support their accumulation, and state managers who also seek to 
politically legitimise changes to reproduction expenditures. 
 
                                                
34
 Fine supports the argument that the moral and historical element accreting to the value of labour power, while 
contingent on the class struggle, is not reducible to it.  How the material standard of living (the ‘wage bundle’) is 
established differs from one commodity to another, and is comprised of different ‘systems of provision’ (such as 
food, health, housing and transport systems) whose types, levels and quality of consumption differ across social 
groups.  As a consequence the reproduction of labour power, within and across segmented labour markets, 
creates differentiated standards of consumption not reducible to a common moral and historical element (Fine 
2009). 
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For example, to support various capitals’ requirements to increase labour supply during a 
period of boom, the state’s specific economic task also has a general accumulation and 
political function.  It needs to develop policies which place maximum economic pressure to 
dampen or contain escalating wage demands due to these labour shortages while at the 
same time devising a general political strategy to justify why it is attempting to reduce or 
deflect the ‘moral and historical expectations’ of those working.  At a schematic level, the 
steadier accumulation occurs, the greater are the prospects for Gramsci’s ‘common sense’ 
or Lukacs’ ‘false consciousness’ to be materially entrenched within workplaces.  The 
legitimation functions of the state are cutting with the economic grain, and so require a 
different set of elaborations to other periods.  The stronger ideological dominance generated 
by the ‘silent compulsion of economic relations’ (Marx 1976: 899) in such a labour market 
requires different state ideological interventions to maximise accumulation and social 
reproduction (to minimise wage demands, increase participation rates for groups not fully 
engaged in paid work, to mount wars etc.).  These functions are politically contestable by 
other fractions of capital and struggles by the working class.  In periods of recession, by 
contrast, where accumulation is severely disrupted, different tensions tend to be expressed 
between its two functions.  States may, for example, sharpen their attacks on some groups, 
enact more coercive measures or resort to different ideological strategies.  Because a ‘state’ 
is a differentiated set of institutions with managers having particular interests to defend and 
promote, these tensions are ideologically contested and connected to accumulation through 
particular, materially mediated relationships.  
 
The interaction between social and economic reproduction therefore generates divergent 
dynamics to labour market differentiation.  Each of these factors, such as sexism, family 
formation, state welfare arrangements, racism and trade unionism vary historically and 
systemically (Fine 1998).  The contributions of the state and the household to social 
reproduction and its interaction with economic reproduction, for example, can only be 
investigated once the changing aspects of these elements (changes to social provision, 
demographic changes to family composition, female labour market participation increases, 
commercial displacement of household production etc.) are analysed and contextualised.  
 
Theoretical challenges to the dialectic of the state-capital relation 
 
Marxist critiques of the state often fail to avoid one of two pitfalls.  Most treat the state-capital 
relation either through its difference or its identity but not as a differentiated unity within 
contemporary capitalism.  I briefly engage with two significant theorists who one-sidedly 
analyse the state through its difference – Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas.  The second 
section briefly summarises how the state-derivationist and ‘logic of capital’ debates one-
sidedly treat the state in its identity with capital.  Finally, a critique of the notion that welfare 
  52
provision can be categorised as either commodified or decommodified is used to clarify how 
the state-capital relation is central to understanding the material dialectic of state labour 
processes involved in welfare production.   
 
Challenge 1: splitting the state from capital  
Miliband’s (1983) powerful sociological critique of the bourgeois myth of the state’s neutrality 
details the close intersubjective relationships between the leading personnel in the state and 
the owners of private capital.  Old boys’ networks, intermarriage, interlocking directorships 
and state committees, and the general intermingling of personnel and the cultivation of 
contacts and mutual support, are ‘concrete complexes of social relationships, in which the 
character of the leading personnel is of enormous importance’ (Harman 1991: 14).35  Fatally 
weakening Miliband’s analysis, however, was his conceptualisation of the state as an 
instrument of the ruling class, a purely political structure, dislocated from rhythms of social 
production relations.  Ignoring the economic connections and contradictions also constitutive 
in the state-capital relation, the ‘elite’ and ‘stratification’ theories Miliband applies deeply 
obscures his investigation (Balbus 1971).  Such a ‘class domination’ sociological model, 
which privileges the capacity to act to only one class, analytically freezes the conflictual 
nature of class relations.  Actions of the ruling class both inside and outside the state 
bureaucracy are passively derived by what they possess (wealth, power) rather than what, 
as capital’s personification, they must do.  Correspondingly, it is an approach relegating the 
working class to the inert category of suffering object (Barker 1979: 89).   
 
Similar to Miliband, there is a one-sided relevance to Poulantzas’ (1975) characterisation of 
the state as a ‘condensate of class forces’, where the political forces it condenses are the 
social production relations of capitalism.  In the Poulantzian ‘economic level’ a technical 
process occurs comprising purely economic ‘factors’ – workers, instruments and objects of 
production and non-workers.  Social relations (classes), however, are only politically 
condensed in the ‘relative autonomy’ of the ‘political-juridical level’ (Barker 1979: 92).  Such 
a functional entity historically developed to politically enable capital’s self-expansion by 
protecting property, policing the dealings between those with effective control of production 
and exchange, providing essential services for the reproduction of the system, and by 
carrying through those reforms which were necessary for other sections of society to accept 
                                                
35
 In the last 20 years, identifying an organisation’s entangled relationships has conceptually drifted into Network 
Theory (Latour 1999; Wachhaus 2009).  Thoroughly caught up in the ‘postmodern turn’ (Calas & Smirchich 1999), 
the psychological and anthropological descriptions of individual social relations are ‘mapped into a structure’ of 
networks which establishes how such relationships with each other are conducted (Mizruchi 2007: 7).  Since such 
an internalised and normative analysis rejects any systemic explanatory theory it offers little in the way of critical 
evaluation (Whittle & Spicer 2008).   
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capitalist rule (Poulantzas 1970, 1976, 1978).  These also are important insights and form 
part of the thesis argument that the state operates through accumulation and legitimation 
strategies.  However, because Poulantzas’ Althusserian-derived critique held that this 
repressive and ideological state politically constitutes the social relations of production, he 
severed the material basis of ideology and political resistance inside production relations.  
Poulantzas implicitly rejects Marx’s argument that production relations are social, never 
simply technical, processes.  If no account is given to the material bases of ideology and 
political ideas inside capitalist production relations (fetishism, alienation, reformism etc.) then 
the objective basis of a marxist theory of the self-emancipatory subject of history is denied.  
Further, by abstracting such an apparatus simply to reflect the ‘needs’ of capital in general, 
Poulantzas cannot specify how state managers actively mediate production relations.   
 
The debate waged between the two authors in the 1980s remained stuck in what Chris 
Harman (1991: 4-5) has termed the ‘state-simply-as-superstructure corner’.  By crudely 
splitting the ‘economic’ from the ‘political’ they analytically evacuated crucial historical and 
systemic content in both by this separation.  The functionalism of Poulantzas was built on an 
ersatz structure – mirroring in this sense the liberal concept of agency found in Miliband.  At 
the heart of both conceptions is an opposition, not of structure and agency as Colin Hay 
posits (2006: 73), but between the state and capital.  Miliband’s essentially neutral 
instrument (the state) is open to be populated with the wills of other ‘conscious actor[s]’ 
(Finegold & Skocpol 1995: 176; Lea 1970).  Similarly, the Poulantzian state perversely 
remains theoretically available to manifest a very different ‘condensate of class forces’ during 
periods of high crisis and struggle – reflectively expressing ruling class and working class 
pressures – by failing to specify the mechanisms which guaranteed that the state would act 
in the interests of the dominant class or class fraction (Giddens 1981; Jessop 1985; Kelly 
1999: 110). 
 
Australian social policy critiques, though operating outside marxist theory, also often tend to 
one-sidedly focus on the words and decisions of state managers in an attempt to capture the 
historical and ideological dynamics of public policy stripped from the economic connection of 
its production.  In this sense their various approaches accord with the Miliband-Poulantzian 
assumption that there is an a priori disconnection between government policy practices and 
other work.  These analyses illegitimately construct a barrier between civil society and the 
state which is then attempted to be bridged with an assortment of ethical (Moss 2002; Watts 
2006b), moral-discursive (Marston & McDonald 2006a) or political-philosophical (Cass 2006; 
Jamrozik 2005; Mendes 2004b) ‘principles’ (see Appendix A).   
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Challenge 2: identifying the state as capital 
The state-derivationist and ‘logic of capital’ debates fall into the second category in their 
attempts to logically derive the state and capital as a unity.  Holloway and Picciotto (2002; 
1977), for example, treat the state as a fetishised form of the capital-relation – an important 
idea employed in this research.  The legal and bureaucratic form state policies take, such as 
the JET program, derives from the commodity-fetish.  Marx contends and, in 1924, 
Pashukanis (1978) more systematically argues, that in the state regulation of human 
behaviour under capitalism ‘the logic of the commodity form is the logic of the legal form’ 
(Mieville 2004: 282).  Formally equal individuals, who ‘must recognise each other as owners 
of private property’ (Marx 1976: 178), socially mediate the exchange of commodities bearing 
equal value.  Because consent in such a formal equality is open to dispute, ‘people acquire 
the quality of legal subjects with rights’ (Arthur 1978: 15).  Pashukanis (1978: 93) locates this 
‘moment of dispute’ – the contract – as the basis of the legal form.  Because state policies 
enact equal rights as part of this ‘endless chain of legal relations’, the ‘legal fetishism’ which 
arises ‘complements commodity fetishism’ (Pashukanis 1978: 85, 117).  The weakness of 
the state-derivationist/capital logic school was in not methodologically integrating the 
historical character of this relation into their analyses (Barker 1978b) such as the geopolitical 
character of states requiring a relative political autonomy to compete against other states 
and act to defend its own interests.  
 
While such an integration is necessary, the important theoretical contribution made by those 
such as Georg Lukacs (1974) in his writings on the ideological logic underpinning the state-
capital relation merits separate analysis.  Lukacs investigated the state’s autonomous 
appearance-form as an extension of his theory of fetishism and reification generated in the 
processes of production.  Reification in labour processes occur as they are ‘progressively 
broken down into abstract, rational and specialized operations’ where workers lose ‘contact 
with the finished product’ and an ‘objectively calculable work-stint…confronts the worker as a 
fixed and established reality’ (Lukacs 1974: 88).  As a result, ‘the human qualities and 
idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as mere sources of error when contrasted 
with these abstract special laws functioning according to rational predictions’ (Lukacs 1974: 
89).   
 
Since the administrative workings of a capitalist state operate within such a reifying calculus, 
state bureaucracies also have a necessary form.  For an aspect of social relations to be 
rationally processed, bureaucracies splinter the concrete social individual into formal, liberal 
categories of personhood – citizen, voter, taxpayer, customer, welfare recipient, commuter, 
migrant etc.  The contradictions of such a rationality (a dialectic of appearance and essence) 
mediate the state-capital relation.  Bureaucracies appear rational.  Yet this logic rests within 
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the chaos of capitalist competition – an economically irrational ‘totality ruled by chance’ 
(Lukacs 1974: 102).  The strength of this form-analysis is that it provides general economic 
grounds for the bureaucratic divisions not only within the state, but between politics and 
economics, law and government, executive and administration, mental and manual labour, 
art and science, and the military and civil institutions in capitalist society.  Their roots are in 
the frenzied economic order, yet the spheres in which they operate have their ‘own’ life and 
therefore cannot be crudely reduced to this structure.  Stathis Kouvelakis, for example, 
describes the contradiction between how a state appears to be an autonomous authority, 
yet: 
 
The state is incapable of substantially affecting the contents of civil society, for it is, precisely, 
a product of civil society's abstraction from itself. Hence the state can overcome social 
differences only in imaginary ways, in the heaven of the equality that prevails between the 
subjects of the law. 
(Kouvelakis 2003: 300) 
 
The normative conception of what social policy is starts to open to a penetrating critique.  
The idea that private, profit-generating work on one hand and state activities on the other 
occupy two very different worlds is taken to be self-evident in most of the local and 
international social policy literature (Bridgman & Davis 2000; Dean 2003; Esping-Anderson 
1990; Jamrozik 2005).  From a classical marxist perspective they are half-right.  The 
appearance that these activities and the social institutions in which this work is occurring 
have very little in common is no mere illusion.  Its appearance-form is an actual division 
which is nevertheless dialectically founded on the reality of their underlying connections with 
each other.   
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that social policy continues to be dominated by the Fabian idea 
initially articulated by Richard Titmuss (1963: 14)36 that ‘the object of the social services… 
[is] the improvement of the conditions of life of the individual’.  More critical and recent 
commentators have added that the object of the social services is also one of social control 
but otherwise basically left intact Titmuss’ proposition (in Australia see Beilharz, Considine & 
Watts 1992; Jamrozik 2005; Kinnear 2002).  This includes the underlying assumptions of 
governmentality studies which treat this liberal contention as an ideological ‘given’ through 
which power-knowledge can be empirically discerned in how the enacted conduct of the 
‘self-governing individual’ shapes their ‘choices’ (Dean 1995: 562; McDonald & Marston 
                                                
36
  Titmuss has been widely credited to be the first to articulate the post-war Beveridge state interventions into the 
fully fledged academic discipline now known as ‘social policy’ (Lavalette & Pratt 1997: 1; Mishra 2002: 747).  
Initially established at the London School of Economics in the early 1950s as ‘social administration’, the discipline 
subsequently developed its own academic life in its more technical, institutional focus on state operations and 
governance arrangements.  Social or public policy today often stresses the political aspects of these 
arrangements (Henman 2006: 211).  Titmuss, however, pragmatically rejected this as an artificial division.  
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2005).  Classical marxism disinters such a conception from its one-sided, positivist 
presumptions.  In its economic relation with capital, social policy’s objective is to produce 
variable capital (Freeman 1996: 231).  In this relation social policy is capital in its state form.  
Its objective is to ‘improve’ capital accumulation.  As capital, therefore, social policy’s object 
is itself – not ‘the individual’, turning the welfare subject into a capitalist abstraction – a 
commensurable, measurable and exchangeable product.  In the circulation of value, social 
policy (as capital) becomes personified, ‘endowed with consciousness and a will’.  Welfare 
policy therefore becomes normatively construed as (im)moral and (un)ethical.  The Titmuss 
maxim reappears not as a ‘false’ but a real contradiction, generated by the occluded social 
relations of production.  A program such as JET becomes open to being analysed as a 
capitalist subject – a zombie-like reification of the ‘manifestation of life’ (Lukacs 1974: 102).  
In this sense, investigating JET becomes an historical materialist project exploring what 
creates the ghostly life JET manifests.   
 
The weakness of Lukacs’ form-analysis is similar to that of the state-derivationists.  While 
such economically-rooted ideological connections are analytically valuable, they also suffer 
from being too abstract and one-sided.  Only by more concretely investigating the political 
economy of JET can these abstractions be connected as specific ideological relations.  They 
also one-sidedly apprehend the state-capital relation simply from the perspective of capital.  
The state and its policies, however, have a political autonomy not logically reducible to 
capital – it is a relation.  The ‘life’ JET manifests is not just a particular reified expression of 
the social relations of production.  It is also an actual expression of an independent state 
bureaucracy responding to the pressures it faces.  The Titmuss maxim is therefore 
potentially real in this sense as well.   
 
Responding to theories of commodification and decommodification 
The idea that state social interventions commodify, decommodify and recommodify labour 
power is widely held among most marxist (and many progressive non-marxist) authors 
(Bashevkin 2002; Brush 2002; Edwards & Magarey 1995; Esping-Anderson 1990; Jessop 
2002; O'Connor, Shaver & Orloff 1999; Sainsbury 1999).  The concept of commodification 
can provide theoretical and sociological insight into the economic and historical processes 
whereby aspects of interpersonal social relations are more immediately brought into the 
capital relation, such as dating services, house cleaning and child care.  In contemporary 
social policy critiques, however, because these concepts mainly operate within social 
democratic, state-derivationist or Poulantzian assumptions, they present a number of 
challenges to the thesis argument of a state-capital relation where welfare and workfare 
policy is produced, and that those who maintain or produce labour power may be 
economically productive of capital accumulation.   
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Bob Jessop’s influential The Future of the Capitalist State (2002) illustrates the scope of 
these challenges.  I compare the approach taken in this paper about the character of state 
welfare labour to Jessop’s Poulantzian-inflected theory of state social policy, particularly in 
his misconceptions of labour power and its commodification.  Central to Jessop’s notion of 
commodification is the idea, sourced from Karl Polanyi’s writings in the 1950s, that labour 
power is a ‘fictitious commodity’ (Jessop 2002: 4).  Polanyi posits in his major work The 
Great Transformation (1957) a functionalist explanation for the changing state-capital relation 
at the end of the 19th century in Britain.  State interventions, he proposed, had become 
crucial because commodity markets were annihilating its social basis – especially its sources 
of labour.  The earlier ‘utopian endeavours of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating 
market system’ were based, he argued, on the laissez-faire illusion that labour (and land and 
money) were ‘genuine’ commodities like all others (Polanyi 1957: 29, 75).  Such a fantasy 
may have been sustainable in the early growth of capitalist markets, but it was this ‘crude 
fiction’ which led to the social and economic crises of the late nineteenth century (Polanyi 
1957: 75-76).  An historic impasse was reached when the social basis of life itself was 
threatened by the actions of the market promoted by this fiction.  A great transformation 
occurred where a 'social restriction' institutionally arose which checked the rampant market 
mechanisms destroying labour.  The continued global extension of the market into the 
twentieth century was thus saved by this very restriction.  This concept of a ‘double 
movement’ where the self-regulating market catalyses a counter-movement in the form of 
protectionism (Dale 2008: 519) was a functional idea that the state acts on the market 
‘mechanism’ (Polanyi 1957: 75).  It was a mechanical method obscuring what Polanyi was 
actually witnessing – the emergence of the modern ‘manifestation’ of world capitalism in the 
form of the new national state-capital relation (Haynes & Husan 1998: 613). 
 
Polanyi presented a significant challenge to the idea that autonomous market activity led to 
social stability.  One assumption undermining his argument, however, was his conception 
that labour power was a ‘fictitious commodity’.  For Marx, because value relations are the 
starting point from which all other economic relations are analysed, labour power is 
investigated as a unique expression of the value relation – of what coercively constitutes 
social relations under capitalism.  As Hilferding (1920) put it, the law of value ‘renders 
us…the service’ that commodities ‘can only be made comprehensible by the discovery of the 
social nexus’.   
 
Polanyi does not investigate capitalism as a system of generalised commodity production 
where all products of labour (including labour power) become alienated (Harman 1999a; 
Molyneux 1998, 1999; Nineham 1999).  Rather, the commodity-fiction of labour (land and 
money) was split from ‘genuine’ commodities.  If state social interventions arose to deal with 
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what an illusory laissez-faire mechanism could not, this then reinforced the positivist notion 
that in the productive sphere of ‘genuine’ commodities the ‘market mechanism’ simply 
remained given, real and necessarily autonomous from the state (Polanyi 1957: 72).   
 
Jessop applied the categories of de/re/commodification which arose from Polanyi’s theories 
to argue that  
 
It is only when labour-power acquires a commodity form that the market-mediated self-
valorization of capital becomes possible…with the fictitious commodification of labour-power, the 
appropriation of surplus labour gains its distinctive capitalist mediation in and through market 
forces. In short, exploitation takes the form of exchange….Commodification turns both the labour 
market and the labour process into sites of class struggle between capital and workers… the 
reproduction of capitalism depends on its achieving an inherently unstable balance among 
market-mediated economic supports and other, extra economic supports whose efficacy 
depends on their location beyond market mechanisms. This excludes the eventual 
commodification of everything, and, a fortiori, rules out a pure capitalist economy. The resulting 
instability explain uneven waves of commodification, decommodification and recommodification 
as the struggle to extend the exchange-value moments of the capital relation encounters real 
structural limits and increasing resistance. 
(Jessop 2002: 14-19) 
 
Esping-Anderson…emphasizes the role of the welfare state in decommodification without noting 
how, by virtue of the contradictory nature of labour-power as a fictitious commodity, such 
intervention could reinforce as well as weaken the logic of capital accumulation…where the 
extension of welfare rights, child care provision, lone parent allowance and similar measures 
serves to facilitate the recommodification of women’s labour-power and their further integration 
into the labour force. 
(Jessop 2002: 147) 
 
In one sense Jessop’s distinguishing fictive (labour power) from genuine commodities 
resonates with the orthodox marxist argument about the special nature of the commodity 
labour power, which tends to be ‘neither capitalistically produced nor reproduced directly’ 
(Fine, Lapavitsas & Saad-Filho 2004: 11, my highlight).  However, it echoes weakly.  
Dichotomising labour power as either commodified or not rests on theoretical assumptions 
which: a) treats the commodification of labour power as a matter of ‘exchange-value 
moments’; b) naturalises decommodified labour power as a form operating outside ‘the logic 
of capital accumulation’, and c) reduces the state to a ‘form-determined condensation of the 
changing balance of [primarily class] forces’ (Jessop 2002: 40).   
 
For an author who applies a broad range of marxist concepts, it is startling that Jessop 
(2002: 14) ‘commonsensically’ holds labour power ‘as a generic human capacity’ rather than 
labour’s social abstraction in capitalism.  This misconception is one reason why Jessop 
distinguishes between labour power (fictitiously) commodified by the ‘market mechanism’ 
and state labour.  State employees, when briefly and vaguely mentioned, ‘are not a class’ or 
seemingly even part of the working class but ‘form a [uncommodified?] social category’ 
divided by ‘market and status position’ (Jessop 2002: 39).  Similarly, the state provision of 
education, health and welfare is not only an unproductive expense of production occurring 
outside the ‘cash nexus’, it is also ‘not organised capitalistically’ (Jessop 2002: 19).  Jessop 
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attempts to repair the connection between the state and capital accumulation occurring 
‘beyond’ it (and state labour power from productively, fictitiously commodified labour power) 
through Poulantzas’ contention that a politically functional relationship exists between the 
state and capital  However, as Fine and Harris (1976: 109) argue, state economic 
interventions are ‘conditioned primarily by the laws of motion of the economy, rather than the 
political balance of class forces alone’. 
 
Such dichotomies are poorly equipped to either identify or analyse the processes involved in 
the production of labour power.  Jessop never uses the terms commodifying and 
decommodifying as verbs to develop his argument.  Such a static method more broadly 
impacts his analysis across other levels of abstraction.  For example, while formally outlining 
the self-valorisation of capital in the process of production, Jessop (2002: 15) stresses a far 
too specific treatment of exploitation as a moment when labour power ‘takes the form of 
exchange’.  Confining exploitation in this manner obscures the inherently conflictual process 
of exploitation within workplaces as one of the political dynamics within the working class.  
For Marx, the relation of exploitation is a relation of reproduction as a whole where ‘each 
individual capitalist, just like the totality of all capitalists in each particular sphere of 
production, participates in the exploitation of the entire working class by capital as a whole’ 
(Marx 1981: 300).  Within the contemporary state-capital relation exploitation is further 
broadened, where markets (including labour markets) are socially structured by ‘a hierarchy 
of domination and dependence that is simultaneously economic and monetary, political and 
military, educational and cultural…imposing a socially necessary abstract time on production’ 
(Bensaid 2002: 168).   
 
Jessop assumes that state interventions may weaken the ‘logic’ of capital accumulation 
rather than being its contemporary expression.  It accords with his view that there is ‘no 
unconditional guarantee that the modern state will always (or ever) be essentially capitalist’ 
(Jessop 2008: 8).  However, under capitalism, the opposite holds.  It is through the 
increasingly imbricated state-capital relation that the relative autonomy of the capitalist state 
exercises its legitimation and geopolitical functions.  This relation is the modern logic of how 
capitalism maximizes the productive capacities of available labour power.  In its 
(re)production of labour power the state bears distinctive ‘overheads’ to maintain capitalism’s 
existence and thus its own.  The commodification-decommodification binary crudely splits 
aspects of social policy into those operating against the logic of capital and those operating 
within it.  Binary views ignore, for instance, that state expenditures on family support 
payments are necessary political and economic ‘social wage’ costs which allow 
contemporary accumulation to have a ‘logic’.  They form part of the collective costs of 
variable capital socially combined.  To hold otherwise would mean, for example, that Family 
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Tax Benefits Payments, when claimed as part of an income tax return are part of the 
commodification of labour power, but when paid as a fortnightly welfare payment 
decommodify labour power.  Such notions also provide little analytical insight into how to 
understand the welfare labour process of JET workers.  For example, a JA’s action involving 
educational or other ‘non-market’ outcomes for single parents would be categorized as 
decommodifying in a short time-frame yet commodifying over a longer period.   
 
Jessop, like Miliband and Poulantzas, consider ideology and politics as essentially state-
centric matters disconnected from the lived experience of paid work.  As a result the capacity 
to actually analyse the political-economy of social policy collapses.  How these policies 
economically and ideologically interact with the accumulation and legitimation strategies of 
the state is effectively obscured.  Those who emphasise the relative autonomy of the state 
but neglect its economic relations with capital accumulation and competition cannot identify 
how the drive by the state to reduce labour-time within the bureaucracy to a socially 
necessary minimum is the action of a collective capitalist operating within the dynamics of 
capitalism. For example, Ian Gough’s (1970s but still commonly held) argument that 
productive and unproductive labour operates within such a split model led him to conclude 
that there is ‘an absence of competitive pressures to reduce costs’ in state production 
(Gough 1976: 76).  
 
Specifically, theories based on commodification deny the value to an analysis of social policy 
which can be found by investigating the contradictions thrown up in welfare workplaces 
between a social policy’s ideology and its production.  These sites are instead given a 
positive, appearance-form of solidity.  They are simply there – a given, static category where 
the voices and actions of those producing these policies are irrelevant.  It is unsurprising to 
find that Jessop devotes only half a page in the 330 pages of The Future of the Capitalist 
State to discuss how social policy may be shaped by class conflict and not one mention of 
the class character of the capitalist state.  Marx’s theories of alienation and commodity 
fetishism are absent in a book about the ‘forms, functions and effectiveness of economic and 
social policy…inspired by Marx’s …critique of political economy’ (Jessop 2002: 1).  If state 
welfare work produces nothing but the social preconditions of maintaining a fictitious 
commodity in an autonomously operative market, why would Jessop even consider that the 
‘form’ of social policy had a materially economic and productive dimension in contemporary 
capitalism?  He is simply agreeing with Polanyi’s (1957: 72) astonishing claim that ‘Marx’s 
assertion of the fetish value of commodities refers to the exchange value of genuine 
commodities and has nothing in common with the fictitious commodities [e.g. labour] 
mentioned in the text’.  Holding that labour power is such a fictitious commodity rips the 
revolutionary and analytical heart out of Marx’s political, economic and philosophical critique.  
  61
The class character of state bureaucracies 
 
If the ‘the state’ is construed as ‘acting’ in the interests of local capital and itself, what 
motivates those who run this apparatus to act in these interests?  That is, what are the 
micro-relationships within a state system that tend to maintain its accumulation and 
legitimation goals?  Fred Block (1987: 54) usefully posits that a division of labour exists in 
the ruling class between state and corporate capitalists, because the latter are insufficiently 
‘conscious’ of what is required to reproduce labour in their pursuit of accumulation.  The 
dependence of state managers on capitalist exploitation tends to be concealed by the 
manner in which the bureaucracy raises its revenue: by taxation of incomes and expenditure 
and by government borrowing or by printing money.  Nevertheless, these ‘political capitalists’ 
(Harman 2009: 115) are ultimately reliant, whatever their political leanings, on the 
maintenance of a reasonable level of economic activity to finance ‘their’ state and stop a 
decline in public support for the state they run.  Since national economic activity significantly 
relies on private capitalists’ investment decisions, a ‘veto’ power over state policies they 
oppose exists in the threat to invest elsewhere or to stage a capital ‘strike’.  Consequently, 
state managers are motivated to ‘orient their programs towards the goal of facilitating and 
encouraging [private] investment’ (Block 1987: 58).  A political and economic incentive to 
align policies which support the profitable accumulation of capital therefore tends to operate.   
 
Historically, geopolitical and local tensions can disrupt such a general predisposition.  In 
military struggles against other states, political capitalists can wrest economic control from 
corporate capitalists, even nationalising a local economy.  However, due to the systemic 
accumulation and competitive pressures within which such interventions occur, the divisions 
of labour within the ruling class continue to operate, even if they take a different range of 
political forms.37  For this research it is in the less historically tumultuous field of Australian 
state-capital micro-relationships that Block’s insights are applied.   
 
This is not the macro-operation of some ‘homeostatic mechanism’, as Robert Brenner 
(2006b: 83) contends.  The micro-foundations of how individual actors create public policy is 
                                                
37
 Historical breaks by those controlling the state from sections of capital (for example in Nazi Germany, in 
Argentina under Peron, in Egypt under Nasser, or in Syria and Iraq under the Ba’athists) remained situated within 
the overall drive to ensure exploitation continued on the most favourable terms for state and private capitals.  The 
interdependence between each element of capital (productive capital requiring the state to ensure ‘free labour’ 
with particular skills, commodity capital to realise surplus value through a reliance on the state to ensure a 
relatively stable national market and strategic capacity to open up foreign markets, money capital to expand 
production etc.) links the independent movements of each element ‘like nerves in a human body, [which] cannot 
escape its dependence upon huge ganglions where it intertwines with all the others’(Harman 1991: 19). The 
‘autonomy’ of the state from capitals, and capitals from the state is therefore constrained by capitalism itself.  
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grounded on competition, where, as Marx (1973: 657) puts it ‘the influence of capitals on one 
another [and, it is argued, the state] has the effect precisely that they must conduct 
themselves as capital; the seemingly independent influence of the individuals, and their 
chaotic collisions’.  The competitive dynamics of capitalism keeps the state-capital relation in 
tension as a differentiated unity which is uneven – where the process of accumulation is 
more determining than the autonomous state.  Accumulation is a potholed process which 
undermines any stable relationship.  The ageing of capitalism and its crisis tendencies create 
ongoing structural conflicts in the state-capital relation: a state’s relative economic ‘weight’ 
mounts; combined, capitals tend to concentrate and centralise, but they do so unevenly; 
economic crises disrupt previously established horizontal and vertical relationships.   
 
If capital as a whole only exists ‘in the ideal sense’ so do local states and their managers 
(Offe 1984: 49).  In ‘rationally’ acting for the interests of the nation, state managers struggle 
to develop policies that actually tend to support capital accumulation.  Disputes arise over 
how to mediate between rival capitals and how to organise the judicial, financial and social 
systems and institutions which support competitive accumulation.  Because of the inherent 
chaos of capitalist competition, the process of defining and redefining what constitutes the 
‘national interest’ often requires a protracted series of interactions, trials and errors, before 
any officially gelled view takes some contingent root.  The adoption of neoliberalism in the 
1970s and 1980s, for example, was a ‘partially blind, partially ideologically directed, 
discovery process’ that, in seeking to restore an amenable environment for capital 
accumulation, continues to significantly redefine the character of the accumulation process 
(Callinicos 2009: 87).  JET’s development and demise was a mediated expression of this 
very tentative process. 
 
Michael Pusey’s (1991: 16) highly influential sociological rendering of how Australian state 
managers became ‘overwhelming’ advocates for ‘economic rationalism’ provides a case 
example of how a positivist theoretical model (which cannot focus empirical attention on 
these tensions) results in highly reductive and schematic conclusions.  His analysis not only 
effectively erases what was a lengthy, highly iterative, conflict-ridden and bureaucratically 
differentiated process but also shears the newly congealing ideology he identifies from its 
economic tensions within capitalism.  In a typical rhetorical flourish, Pusey names one date 
(14 July 1987) as Australia’s economic rationalist ‘Bastille Day’ when, due to a departmental 
restructuring announcement by the Hawke Government, ‘Canberra’s gates burst open from 
the inside and the rightists rushed out’ (Pusey 1991: 146).  His contention that a short, sharp 
and preponderant embrace of these ideas occurred rests on the responses Pusey elicited 
and evaluated from the 215 Senior Executive Service personnel he surveyed in 1986.  Yet in 
‘Enter the Economic Rationalists’ even the numerous graphs he presents belie such 
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reductive claims.  A good third of state managers disagreed that labour markets should be 
further deregulated, and over 60 per cent thought trade unions either had less power than 
business interests or they were in balance (Pusey 1991: 61, 63).  Rather than seeing 
division, disagreement and even a certain opposition to purely market-centric policies, Pusey 
rushes to construct a sociologically normative, ‘lifeless abstracted system cut free from real 
people’ to mount his claims (Marston & Watts 2003a: 38).  By failing to adequately attend to 
how the ideas held and contested by these participants, and their departments, were being 
buffeted by internal disputes within a sharply changing domestic and global politico-
economic environment (a core task for this thesis) only a very partial understanding of their 
‘rationality’ is explorable. 
 
The political economy of each state department differentially expresses the contradictions in 
the state-capital relation as a united aspect of these tensions.  All have a relative autonomy 
through which the overall social relations of production are materially and ideologically 
(re)produced and the legitimacy of the state maintained.  The public administration literature 
rarely, if ever, situates their analyses within such a critical theory of the state (Nickel 2008: 
345).  Michael Pusey’s hierarchy of pre-1987 power relations between departments 
describes how they appear from a typical liberal perspective.  At the apex of his ‘triangle’ are 
three departments – Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Finance.  ‘Market oriented’ 
departments (Trade, Primary Industry, Resources and Energy, and Industry, Technology and 
Commerce) occupy the middle.  At the base are ‘Program and Service’ departments – 
Health, Social Security, Education, Aboriginal Affairs, Veterans Affairs and Community 
Services – a fairly powerless grouping ‘fraying’ under the impact of economic rationalism 
(Pusey 1991: 6).   
 
At one level, such a typology is self-evidently unproblematic.  Fiscal and monetary policy is 
obviously central to the strategic management of the national economy, especially in periods 
such as the recent (and ongoing) global financial crisis.  Treasury’s control of budgetary 
outlays exerts a financial discipline on other departments, imposing, for instance, ‘efficiency 
dividends’ on their staffing overheads during the last 15 years (see Chapter 4).  The 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet oversee institutional compliance with a 
government’s political strategies and tactics.   
 
However, such a straightforward ranking of market orientation to political influence is deeply 
inadequate.  The accumulation (economic) and legitimation (political) elements in each state 
bureaucracy (as in the state as a whole) remain in relation – grading and siloing them in 
Pusey’s positivist fashion obscures this relation.  National accumulation and legitimation 
functions course through even the smallest of ‘service’ departments.  For example, under the 
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Howard government, a massive program of building memorials in various international 
theatres of war was overseen by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (Rechniewski 2007).  
Such fostering of conservative nationalist sentiment helped buttress the electoral viability of a 
government bent on pursuing capitalist interests to ramp up overall exploitation as the 
economy began to recover from the early 1990s recession (Kuhn 2009: 71).  Pusey’s 
classifications also discount that the bulk costs of a state centre on developing social 
(re)production policies to maximise productivity as cheaply as possible.  Expenditures on 
health, education and social security accounted for over two thirds of Australian government 
outlays in 2007 (Laurie & McDonald 2008: 36).  Rather than Pusey’s claim for a greater 
distinction between social and economic policy, the rise of neoliberalism has further 
tightened their relationship.   
 
This is not to accept Ben Spies-Butcher’s left-Keynesian counter-argument that Australian 
neoliberal social policy ‘reforms’ have become ‘more crucial to achieving longer economic 
goals’ than economic policy due to the latter’s ‘levers’ being ‘removed’ by ‘decades of 
deregulation and privatisation’ (2008: 267-267, my highlight).  Muscular fiscal and monetary 
policy levers have been highly evident in recent state responses to the global financial crisis.  
Instead of such juxtapositions, the political economy of social policy needs to be considered 
as an increasingly entwined aspect of the Australian state’s accumulation and legitimation 
effort.  
 
At a ‘whole of state’ level these tensions have been expressed in two key political responses 
Australian governments have had to the profitability challenges generated by the 1970s 
economic crisis.  Under the ALP governments of the 1980s and early 1990s, popular support 
for pursuing increasingly neoliberal economic policies cohered through the Prices and 
Incomes Accord (see Chapter 3).  The Accord delivered some notable benefits for the trade 
union bureaucracy – influence over policy, closer relationships with ministers which raised 
their profile with members, limited state funding for union activities and advisory roles on 
statutory bodies (Hampson 1996).  However, this was at the expense of lowering living 
standards for their members and decreasing their job security.  Under the Howard 
government’s more aggressive neoliberal drive to restore profit rates, popular support was 
garnered through a political strategy of hate mongering: racism towards Aborigines; overt 
and implicit xenophobic interventions against Arabs, Muslims and refugees; and opprobrium 
against dole bludgers (Kuhn 2009).  
 
Reducing welfare policy to an individual’s immediate economic needs, informed by liberal 
conceptions of morality and politics, or considering it as a matter of structural necessity 
(mechanical forms of marxism) erases the historical dialectic of such interventions.  Only 
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narrowed, superficial glimpses are available to explain why, for example, states devote 
massive expenditures on non-productive labour such as the very aged and chronically 
unemployable.  To maintain the existing relations of exploitation for capitalism as a whole 
and the state’s own viability, state managers fund programs for such non-labour as a 
mediated response to moral and historical expectations of the working population and as a 
necessary cost in the drive for accumulation.  It could be said that these political capitalists 
generally attend to Ernest Mandel’s (2002: 250) economic observation that ‘hope’ is both a 
material and ideological category, in that ‘producers devoid of hope are bad producers, 
hence much less productive’.  In this sense, welfare policies are strategies to productively 
foster hope (or, especially under Australian governments, interlace hope with hate of the 
‘other’) inside the broader working class as cheaply and as competitively as possible.   
 
At a day-to-day micro-level, however, state managers actually struggle with their decisions 
within the contradictions of Ernst Bloch’s (1995: 1370) political dialectic of ‘realistic 
expectations’ and ‘wishful’ thinking.  For example, Meredith Edwards (2006), head of Social 
Security’s Social Policy Division in the 1980s and a key architect of the JET Program, ‘never 
thought it was going to be possible’ to immediately roll JET out ‘because the climate…of 
fiscal restraint…was so bad’.  She was ‘elated’ when such wishful thinking proved realistic 
because her Minister, Brian Howe, approved it.  In hindsight, she attributed Howe’s decision 
to the ‘fuss, particularly from the outside’ that had resulted from the ALP’s 1987 Budget 
announcement that single parent pension payments would cease once their youngest child 
turned 16, rather than 25 (Edwards 2006)(see 3.2).  For state managers, turning a policy 
idea into an implemented practice is a tense, politicised process.  It is based on assessing 
(and second-guessing) which particular political or economic pressures make such a 
creation viable or impracticable. Further, implementing a program meets resistances inside 
and outside the agency.  Such assessments and actions become riven by bureaucratic 
differences between departments due to their different legitimation and accumulation 
functions, and divisions within a department due to its specific class and functional 
relationships and networks.  The analysis below of the social relationships between state 
managers, middle managers and workers within welfare institutions is considered in two 
stages – identifying their class composition and their working relationships.  
 
Class relationships of state employees 
 
As capital concentrations have grown, as non-productive labour has disproportionately 
increased, and as national state-capital relations have become more intertwined, the 
character and content of bureaucratic class relations have been reconfigured.  In 
investigating how the class structure of the departments shaped welfare policies such as the 
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JET Program I draw on the definition of class provided by the historian Geoffrey de Ste 
Croix: 
 
Class (essentially a relationship) is the collective expression of the fact of exploitation, the 
way in which exploitation is reflected in the social structure…A class (a particular class) is a 
group of persons in a community identified by their position in the whole system of social 
production, defined above all by their relationship (primarily in terms of the degree of 
ownership or control) to the conditions of production (that is to say, the means and labour of 
production) and to other classes. 
(de Ste Croix 1981: 51) 
 
In the modern conditions of production the increasingly complex way in which (surplus) value 
is reproduced correspondingly requires an increasingly sophisticated understanding of class 
and class relations.  There is greater differentiation of the capitalist class (by sector, 
productivity, by fractions across industrial, commercial, and financial capital), of labour (by 
the same factors as well as by skill and levels of employment), and as a result of changes in 
the social reproduction of the capital-labour relation (involving political, ideological, and other 
socio-economic relations).  Yet, as Fine (2001: 48) argues, ‘value as a class relationship is 
an essential foundation on which to examine other “non-economic” issues and especially 
politics, ideology, and the state’.  Such a ‘classical’ re-modelling of class remains within 
Marx’s earlier premise that class is an objective, antagonistic relationship and that classes 
are ‘common positions within the social relations of production’ (Wright 1979: 17).  Rather 
than pivoting on the legal ‘ownership’ of the means of production, the definition of the 
modern ruling class hinges on its effective possession (Callinicos & Harman 1987: 27) of 
these means – controlling labour power, investments and resource allocation (Wright 1978: 
61).   
 
Senior managers, policy designers and administrators in both private fractions of capitals 
and state institutions who control constant and variable capital are effectively salaried 
members of the capitalist class.  For the large bulk of state and private sector employees 
(productive or otherwise) the ‘fact of exploitation’ dominates their lives as unpaid labour is 
‘extorted from them’ irrespective of whether this is as direct surplus value or as a cost 
reduction for another section of capital’s appropriation of this surplus (Wright 1978: 49).  
Further, these employees are negatively defined as workers because they do not control 
labour power – either their own or others.  Due to the massive rise in routine clerical and 
administrative staff and the ‘lower professions’ (teachers, nurses, draughters, technicians, 
social workers etc.), these groups, under the ‘economic compulsion’ to sell their labour 
power, now form a large component of the modern working class (Mandel 1976: 48).   
 
When more concretely situated, Marx’s dichotomous distinction in the capital-labour relation 
required the theoretical incorporation of other classes.  Appositely, the classical petit-
bourgeoisie was defined as neither fish nor fowl – they were conceptualised as being 
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trapped between and reliant upon the major classes. In modern capitalism, however, a ‘new 
middle class’ has emerged which cannot be typically characterised as self-employed small 
commodity producers or retailers (Carchedi 1975).  Rather, these salaried employees 
contracted by capital occupy ‘objectively contradictory locations within class relations’ 
(Wright 1978: 61).  It is in the non-coincidence of the three dimensions underlying the 
modern capital-labour relationship – control over labour power, investments and resource 
allocation that such contradictory class-relations are located (Wright 1978: 73-74).38  
Managers and supervisors, for example, have varying degrees of control over these three 
processes and these locations need to be empirically analysed before any working 
assessment of the class relationships of these occupying this positions can be developed.  
Semi-autonomous employees occupy a different category as they may have effective control 
of their labour power but little or no control over resource allocation or investment.   
 
Capital, irrespective of which form it takes, has a ‘working’ role in the process of production.  
Those who control capital delegate these tasks to others who work inside their organisations.  
It is within these structures that contradictory class locations occur.  Middle level managers 
and administrators ‘perform the functions of capital’ in the sense that they ‘carry out the work 
of control and surveillance’ (Carchedi 1975: 24).  During the last 30 years, for example, their 
role in selecting those to be retrenched from the Australian public sector and ensuring union 
disruption was kept to a minimum has starkly shown their class (dis)position (Maconachie 
2005).  An important measure of trust is placed in these managers for which they are 
‘accorded conditions of employment…distinctive in the level and kinds of rewards that are 
involved’ (Goldthorpe 1982: 168-169).  A similar distinction has been made by Pahl and 
Winkler (1974: 146) between those running an organisation who hold effective ‘strategic’ or 
‘allocative’ control and those delegated to have ‘operational control over the day-to-day use 
of resources already allocated’.  Those tasked with the latter role occupy contradictory class 
locations.   
 
Wright’s fruitful approach in recognising the complexity of class structure in contemporary 
capitalism has two weaknesses.  While rooting his analysis in these agents’ relation to the 
means of production, his concern to plot out a ‘class map’ of contemporary capitalism 
remains formal and static – it elides the historical character of class relations.  For example, 
the early phase of JAs’ practices included two managerial components.  One was an 
expectation that, as higher-paid frontline workers, they participated in the local office’s 
weekly ‘team leader’ meetings.  The other was their semi-supervisory role of a low-grade, 
                                                
38
 Though Wright subsequently abandoned his theory of contradictory class locations (Wright 1985).  See 
Callinicos 1987b for a rebuttal.  
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part-time JET Support Worker who was administratively assisting them.  Further, JAs had a 
minor degree of control over their labour power – when they booked clients, which days they 
did ‘outreach’ work and how they spent their allocated training budget.  Overall, JA’s 
occupied a working class position in this phase since they lacked control of their and the 
support worker’s labour power, despite some ‘contradictory’ aspects.  In the program’s later 
period, as these ‘contradictory’ roles were gradually phased out, JAs’ class alignment with 
other (lower-paid) workers became more explicit. Since this historical development had 
important ideological consequences, any static ‘mapping’ of JAs occludes analysis.  
 
A more significant flaw is Wright’s Poulantzian apprehension of the state-capital relation that 
he held in the 1970s.  He argued (1978: 91) that state employee’s class positions cannot be 
analysed in their social relations to the means of production, but only externally and 
negatively – that is in their social function to private capital.  Bureaucratic organisations in the 
modern state-capital relation basically possess common structures to those of any large 
corporation, even if the production relations are also shaped by the political aspect of the 
state form.  Top administrators and managers initiate and develop policy.  Middle managers 
and administrators join with them to oversee its implementation.  The mass of those below 
are subject to the first two group’s control in the process of producing the economic and 
political content of these policies.  Wright’s functional analysis disallows directly investigating 
such power-relations in state work.   
 
A ‘first cut’ approximation of these class positions in the state bureaucracy can be discerned 
through its grading and pay structures.  In the Australian Public Service it is Departmental 
Secretaries (who received, on average, $457,000 excluding bonuses in 2007) and those who 
occupy the higher levels of the Senior Executive Service (SES) positions ($186,000 to 
$294,000 median pay across three levels) who are defined in this research as state 
managers or ‘political capitalists’ (APSC 2008b: 95; Harman 2009: 115).  In 2008 there were 
a handful of Secretaries, 139 SES Band 3 and 396 Band 2 managers – less than 0.4 per 
cent of the 148,000 permanent workforce (APSC 2008b: 22).  What proportion of the 1361 
SES Band 1 managers effectively controlled labour power, investments and resource 
allocation is unknown.  They are treated in this research as occupying either contradictory or 
state managerial class locations.   
 
Table 1 details an initiating proposition of what class locations most Centrelink staff occupy.  
In 2008 three Centrelink SES Band 3 and 12 Band 2 (and 63 Band 1) state managers 
oversaw 18,000 women and 8,000 men deliver more than $70 billion of payments to nearly 7 
million ‘customers’, along with a host of legitimation and other accumulation tasks (Centrelink 
2008: 10, 205, 220).  Approximately 18,000 of these staff can be categorised as part of the 
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working class – operational or support workers with little control over their labour power or 
those of others.  
  
Table 1 
Major class locations in Centrelink39 
 
 APS 
equivalent 
Women Men Total Percent 
not in 
NSO* 
Top 
Salary 
Class location 
SES Band 3 Same 2 1 3 0 N/A Ruling 
SES Band 2 Same 5 7 12 N/A 194,250 Ruling 
SES Band 1 Same 24 39 63 N/A 155,824 Ruling/Contradictory 
Centrelink 4 EL 1 &2 934 833 1767 32 103,061 Contradictory 
Centrelink 3 APS 5 & 6 3781 2163 5944 48 70,344 Contradictory/Working 
Professional 2 EL 1 & 2 306 88 394 89 103,061 Contradictory/Working 
Professional 1 APS 5 &6 844 137 981 98 68,648 Working 
Centrelink 2 APS 3 & 4 11784 3869 15653 94 55,169 Working 
 
SES = Senior Executive Service; EL = Executive Level; APS = Australian Public Sector Grade Level 
*NSO = National Support Office 
Source: data derived from Centrelink Annual Report 2007/08: 205-206, 218, 220-221 
 
Centrelink is a far more ‘proletarian’ organisation than most government agencies.  Over 61 
per cent of Centrelink staff were paid at the APS 1 to 4 levels in June 2008 compared to the 
public service average of 38 per cent (APSC 2008b: 22; Centrelink 2008: 205).  This 
approach to class analysis stands in sharp contrast to Craig Matheson’s (2007a: 577) 
analysis of the Australian Public service according to the self-identification of clerical staff.  
His reliance on sociological ‘factors’ such as lifestyles, marriage partner’s occupation and 
‘social origin’ initially led him to speculate that it was ’impossible to assign them to discrete 
classes’ but changed his mind after talking to staff about their class perceptions of their ‘work 
environment’ to conclude most were ‘firmly middle class’ (Matheson 2007a: 595-596). 
 
Ideological consequences 
Against those such as Poulantzas and Althusser who held to the so-called dominant ideology 
thesis (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 1980), classical marxist explanations of class 
consciousness reject their one-sided contention that the ideological levers of capitalism are 
controlled by the ruling class (Rees 1998: 225).  No one controls capitalism.  Only the reified 
rationalities engendered and institutionalised by the process of capitalist production and 
exchange are posited as control – though, of course they have very real effects.  
 
The material reality of working class life generates cultures best understood, according to 
E.P Thompson (1959: 52), not as static ‘ways of life’, but rather as active ‘ways of struggle’ 
                                                
39
 95 per cent of Centrelink staff occupy these positions.  The other 5 per cent – IT workers and managers, public 
relations staff, Passport Information Service Operators, trainee and graduate recruitment grades have been 
stripped out for the sake of clarity (Centrelink 2008: 205). 
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which often tend to foster basic senses of class identification.  The ideological gap between 
politics and economics, however, disaggregates and reifies such an identification to one 
where the industrial work of trade unions and the political work of reformist parties tends to 
be naturalised as a ‘common sense’ division of labour (Gramsci 1971).  The emergence of 
the ALP as a bourgeois workers party seeking to ‘run’ Australian capitalism, for example, 
was made possible by the contradictory features of working class experience and 
consciousness.  The ALP was a product of the strength of the working class movement in 
the late nineteenth century in forming a class-aligned party which attracted mass votes from 
workers.  The ALP was also an organisation which expressed the movement’s weakness 
after the strike defeats in the early 1890s, providing sufficient political space for it to become 
established common sense that reformist union officials and politicians responsibly direct the 
ALP’s agenda for the ‘national interest’ (Bramble 2005a: 78-79). Traditionally within the 
Australian working class, voting for the ALP rather than an explicitly open bourgeois party 
has, to varying and contradictory degrees, reflected a small but conscious class act.40  
 
Australian public servants disproportionately support the ALP.  In the 2004 election 54 per 
cent of public sector workers voted ALP on a two-party preferred basis, compared to 41 per 
cent of those working in the private sector.41   Because Centrelink has large numbers of staff 
occupying lower grades, a higher rate of unionisation (over 50 per cent union density until 
                                                
40
 For the conceptual and political approach adopted in this these about the trade union bureaucracy and the 
politics of reformism see Cliff & Gluckstein 1988.  Inside the working class movement, even during periods of 
struggle, the division between politics and economics has organisational and political consequences.  Lukacs, for 
instance, talks of how the division of labour between trade unions and reformist parties reflect and reinforce this 
separation: ‘unions tend to take on the task of atomizing and depoliticizing the movement and concealing its 
relation from the totality,’ whereas the reformist parties, ‘perform the task of establishing the reification in the 
consciousness of the proletariat both ideologically and on the level of organisation’ (Lukacs 1974: 195).  Those in 
the classical tradition argued for a separate, revolutionary party oriented to these struggles to, in Gramsci’s (1971) 
terms, organisationally cohere the politics of ‘good sense’ against the divisions generated by the politics of 
‘common sense’.  In Australia, especially since the 1980s, Labor’s bedrock electoral support amongst the working 
class has become more volatile and contingent, though at least 59 per cent of those voting for the ALP in the 
2004 election have been (narrowly) identified by their occupations as working class (see Bramble & Kuhn 2009: 
3).  Although union membership in Australia has declined from over half the workforce in 1966 to 22 per cent in 
2004, the proportion of unionists voting Labor has remained relatively steady – averaging 63 per cent in the 
eleven federal elections conducted over this period (Leigh 2006: 541). 
41
  However, given its source, these figures need to be treated with caution.  This analysis of data from the 2004 
Australian Election Study, available from the Australian Social Science Data Archive (ASSDA Study 1079, July 
2005) was conducted by Peter Saunders (2006).  He uses it, as usual, to buttress his attack on the public sector.  
Given that Saunders clearly details his methodology (which appears to be fairly rigorous) and that no other data is 
readily available, it is cited here with this caveat.  
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very recently) and greater class conflict than most agencies, it would be surprising if a larger 
proportion did not vote ALP (Sasha 2006). 
 
What, though, of the very heterogeneous layers occupying contradictory locations?  
Changes to state social policies are highly mediated expressions of the changing 
orientations of the Australian state-capital relation to global and local competition.  The 
specific internal state debates about what ‘rationally’ and what ‘wishfully’ constituted the 
national interest in these policies are outlined in Chapters 3 and 4.  Since policy developers 
and managers were centrally involved in these arguments, and because most occupied 
contradictory class positions, which blurred into either the upper or lower echelons of 
institutions like DSS and Centrelink, to what extent can they be considered as a stratum with 
distinct interests?  That is, what are the ideological and political implications of the 
emergence of this layer?   
 
While an examination of the various social and political attitudes and aesthetic ‘dispositions’ 
(Bourdieu 1984) of this ‘buffer group’ (Westgaard & Resler 1976: 95) is outside the scope of 
this research, some general observations can be made of its class consciousness.  In state 
bureaucracies, recruitment into this group included large numbers of people from working 
class backgrounds.  Even at the state managerial level a six-nation study conducted in the 
1970s found that while about half the top bureaucrats had fathers in similar careers, a 
quarter had fathers in ‘low management or professional’ occupation, while the paternal 
origins of the rest were in the traditional working class jobs (Aderbach, Putnam & Rockman 
1981: 54).  Pusey’s small Australian study, using a 6-band ‘occupational prestige scale’ 
found a ‘more egalitarian’ background among the Senior Executive Service managers he 
surveyed – about 30 per cent had fathers from similar backgrounds, most from the middle 
bands, while about 16 per cent had fathers from ‘lower socio-economic backgrounds’ (Pusey 
1991: 51).42   The one (British) study which specifically investigated state employees in 
contradictory, ‘buffer’ locations below the top managerial level found only 25 per cent had 
fathers from (approximately) similar ‘service class’ backgrounds, while 29 per cent had 
working class fathers (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn & Payne 1980: 42-46).  These figures should 
not be surprising since the rapid post-war increase in the size of the state bureaucracy could 
only be met by recruitment from below (Goldthorpe 1982: 76).  While no Australian study has 
been conducted on the class origins of this layer of public servants, it could be inferred that a 
‘more egalitarian’ background than the British study may also be expected.   
                                                
42
 Pusey’s figures add up to only 90 per cent, so an extra 10 per cent has been proportioned to these figures so 
that they are more comparable to the other studies. 
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John Goldthorpe (1982: 183) suggests that this ‘service class’, in seeking to preserve their 
position of relative power and advantage for themselves and their children, moves them in 
the direction of ‘corporatism’.  It was this movement to a more comprehensively ‘managed’ 
(1982: 184) capitalism which creates a greater receptiveness in this layer for the ideas of the 
British Social Contract.  In the Australian context it would equate to increased support for the 
Prices and Income Accord during the Hawke-Keating Government period.  Barbara and John 
Ehrenreich (1979: 42) make a more extensive claim that a contradictory ‘anti-working class 
radicalism’ exists within this layer which seeks a ‘technocratic transformation of society in 
which all aspects of life would be “rationalized” according to expert knowledge’ – a 
‘technocratic socialism’ which they would run.  It helps clarify why there was a sympathetic 
response within the Department of Trade and Industry for even some of the more radical 
implications of the initial Accord as it was promoted by the Communist Party in the late 
1970s (Hampson 1996).  Such observations also help explain the motivations of Meredith 
Edwards.  It is evident, both in her articles and interviews, that her self-description as a 
‘femocrat’ seeks to translate her activism into a politics suited to her contradictory 
bureaucratic class location (see Chapter 3).  
 
What is missing from the Goldthorpe and Ehrenreich’s analyses, however, is the recognition 
that this very same corporatist ideology remains open to responding to different ideas as new 
state accumulation challenges emerged in the late 1980s.  The rise of New Public 
Management (NPM) in the 1990s, for example, can also be incorporated into this approach 
as an accommodation to neoliberal policies which politically reinvests corporatism with new 
strategic tasks.  This is reflected in the interviews with local office managers.  Most 
rhetorically held onto their ALP politics during the Howard Government period by translating 
and justifying what they did – instituting welfare to work policies and ramping up levels of 
exploitation in the offices they managed – as actions to improve social justice.  
 
 
2.4 Implementing social policy – the welfare labour process 
 
International competition exerts economic pressures on state departments to enact policies 
and internal practices which best further the national accumulation of capital.  Though 
mediated by the state’s relative autonomy within capitalism, the law of value is imposed on 
states to increase the productivity of its workforce (Harman 2009: 119).  From the late 1980s 
neoliberal forms of management techniques to ‘modernise’ the welfare labour process were 
instituted – initially through New Public Management (NPM), which were later incorporated 
into the Whole of Government (WoG) approach adopted from the early 2000s (see Chapters 
3 and 4).   
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Evaluating the productive effects of welfare policy under NPM has become theoretically 
‘colonised’ (Fine 2000) by New Institutional Economics (NIE).  In modelling the ‘behavioural 
responses to policy changes’ of welfare subjects NIE has sought to ‘endogenise’ various 
social and cultural ‘factors’ to better account for the welfare market imperfections earlier 
schools of neoclassical economics had simply relegated to an ‘exogenous’ black box (Kalb 
2002: i).  In tandem, NIE concepts were applied to the implementation these programs.  
Neoliberal theories of managing the productivity of the welfare labour process (minimising 
inputs and maximising outputs) shifted from fundamentalist to more sophisticated notions.  
NIE aimed to deal with false assumptions of organisational efficiency, held by early 
neoclassical economics, that inputs into the production process were rationally consumed.  
Such an idea rested on the expectation that, due to the utility-maximising behaviour of 
individuals, those working in any organisation would rationally react to economic ‘information’ 
(Law & Mooney 2007: 26).  As it became increasingly apparent that the actual behavioural 
micro-foundations for productive activity did not accord with this singular conception of homo 
economicus, new economic theories were developed to account for the complex of individual 
motivational structures that reduced work performance, especially in large organisations. 
 
Shen (1985: 392), for example, discusses how norm-governed effort levels tend to settle into 
lower utility-maximising ‘equilibrium’ levels of performance unless management interventions 
consciously push for their ‘optimal’ realisation.  NIE seeks to minimise these ‘X-
inefficiencies’, that is the ‘sub-optimal’ routines, habits and norms which generate relatively 
unproductive ‘inert areas’ in the idealised labour process (Leibenstein 1966; 1976: 392, 413).  
Barriers to maximising productivity supposedly spring from two sources.  Large 
organisations’ internally complex production and distribution processes engender under-
productive labour practices due to their poorer immediate exposure to market forces than 
those in smaller organisations.  Second, as a consequence, managers confront greater 
difficulties in establishing ‘proper motivation’ in big institutions – a predicament which further 
contributes to producing ‘sub-optimal’ outcomes.   
 
These critics had rejected the view that Weber’s (1958: 214) typology of a modern 
bureaucracy, run by those in an ideal-typical ‘vocation’, epitomised the most X-efficient form 
of public administration.  Rather, NIE contends that state bureaucracies are the epitome of 
how large organisations are riven by institutional and work-process X-inefficiencies.  In the 
welfare sector, for example, they countered that the ‘producer capture’ (Law & Mooney 2007: 
33) which creates these ‘sub-optimal disequilibria’ were caused by the absence of an explicit 
‘price signal’ (Leibenstein 1966: 398).  In the last two decades, Australian welfare sector 
restructuring has embraced this neoliberal economic rationality through privatisations, 
introducing ‘price signal’ surrogates, and pioneering a new managerialist ‘zeitgeist’ (Law & 
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Mooney 2007: 35).  Market proxies have been instituted: purchaser-provider models; inter-
and intra-departmental contractual relationships ‘costing out’ specific tasks associated with 
implementing a policy; detailed measurements specifying reimbursable ‘outcomes’; and 
constructing quasi-marketised job-referral and welfare to work compliance agencies (see 
Chapters 3 and 4).   
 
In implementing the neoliberal Welfare-to-Work agenda, NPM (and its more recent iterations) 
attempt to deal with two, contradictory, legacy problems managers perceive to be holding 
back higher productivity in the welfare workforce.  First, in administering welfare, workers 
ritualistically conform to the decisions of others as a mode of self-protection and career 
advancement, generating a culture of ‘trained incapacity’ (Merton 1949).  Second, that in 
seeing what they do as a professional or para-professional work necessary ‘to get the job 
done’, staff often only pay lip-service to centralised decision-making.  The NIE theories 
accepted by state managers contend that such ‘producer capture’ maintains under-
productive, norm-governed practices (Law & Mooney 2007: 33).   
 
The neoliberal drive for ‘modern’ labour processes expresses these welfare policy 
implementation contradictions.  Since the 1980s there have been massive expenditures on 
computer technologies, thus raising the ratio of constant to variable capital.  New Taylorist 
labour processes supplanted older processes, restructuring the division of labour to 
maximise the productive potential of this fixed capital.  The knowledge and practices 
associated with the more routine aspects of administering welfare policy were broken into a 
range of semi-automated and task-focused processes.  Call centres to deal with ‘day to day 
customer enquiries’ were introduced in Centrelink’s first year of operation, 1997 (Hansard 
1998: 3516).  By 2009 over 19 per cent of Centrelink employees worked in these centres 
(Centrelink 2009a: 242, 244).  Service-users were increasingly expected to self-enter 
payment application details, income updates and other matters on web-based platforms.  
Back-office processing teams were introduced to assess and approve most new claims, 
further dividing what had previously required broader and deeper levels of policy-expertise 
among face-to-face welfare workers.  ‘Inert areas’ of unproductive technical and 
administrative activity shrank as software implementation and new labour divisions created a 
powerful capacity to measure in real-time detail each coalface worker’s assessing, 
compliance, payment, referral and other administrative tasks.  Neo-Taylorist labour 
processes were buttressed by a series of other ‘transparent’ accountability measures 
introduced to reduce ‘producer capture’.  Managers gained new disciplinary powers under 
the 1999 Social Security Act; changes to the ‘Code of Conduct’; and restrictions on union 
activities (see Chapters 3 and 4).   
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Yet the ‘frontier of control’ (Goodrich 2009) of welfare labour was not simply one which could 
be dealt with by maximising routine administrative productivity and strengthening managerial 
prerogatives.  While a necessary precondition for the production of effective outcomes under 
the Welfare-to-Work agenda, they were not sufficient.  For welfare sector managers it was 
not simply a matter of dealing with the behavioural norms of ‘trained incapacity’ through new, 
allocatively-efficient practices and sharper disciplinary procedures.  Welfare workers also 
have necessary professional or para-professional norms of trained capacity.  From a NIE 
perspective, these behavioural norms often distort state managerial policy implementation 
processes and targets and produce X-inefficiencies.   
 
The contradiction faced by welfare managerialism is that it operates in an industry where the 
mercurial, iterative process of producing a market-ready welfare user whose labour power 
can be viably bought and consumed for its distinctive use-value does not fit well into a 
discrete input-output product model.  The development of new welfare policies – a politicised 
and conflictual process between the upper reaches of the bureaucracy and the government, 
attempts to rationally rollout ‘realistic’ programs which attend to the current accumulation and 
legitimation strategies of the state.   
 
Because a welfare policy contains both accumulation and legitimation elements, the 
management involved in implementing a program must attend to both aspects.  Welfare 
workers are not simply told what to do; they must also be sufficiently sold on what to do to 
efficiently implement policy.  Centrelink social workers and psychologists, for example, 
partially conduct their practices through professional rules of behaviour.  That is, they 
operate with a degree of autonomy not fully subsumable to the fiat of NPM.  Others, such as 
JAs, Migrant Liaison Officers and Disability Service Officers, have required para-professional 
attitudes about their role which managerialism constantly seeks to ideologically re-shape to 
meet new policy expectations.  Further, with the general roll-out of activation policies from 
the 1990s, all frontline welfare workers have developed a necessary range of ‘interpersonal 
skills’ to ‘professionally motivate’ welfare users.  Therefore, regulating, calibrating, canalising 
and subordinating welfare work remains in tension with a certain creative autonomy required 
for effective performance.  Campaigns were developed to appropriately ‘motivate the 
motivator’ for the Welfare-to-Work tasks state managers saw as central for attaining higher 
productivity rates.  In the late 1990s this was epitomised by the maxim good customer 
service (see 4.4).   
 
NPM placed a multiplicity of demands on welfare labour to maximise productivity, 
restructuring practices and instituting new behaviouralist approaches to social reproduction.  
It has also met a range of resistances from below.  Gerry Mooney and Alex Law (2007: 26) 
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describe the implicit tensions of this ‘modernisation’ drive to institute new levels of flexible 
intensity of labour in this sector as ‘strenuous welfarism’.  Welfare labour power under 
neoliberalism became subject to a neo-Taylorist process of devalorisation and a welfare 
reform agenda process of revalorisation (Law & Mooney 2007: 45).  On one hand NIE has 
attempted to better establish the market costs of welfare labour to reproduce viable labour 
power as cheaply as possible.  Welfare labour is made commensurable with other branches 
of the economy using marketised measurements, contractual arrangement and other proxy 
measures.  As a result, Centrelink frontline workers’ wages, which had been slightly above 
the average full-time male earnings in the 1970s, had dropped to about 80 per cent of that 
rate by 2004 (Sasha 2006).  On the other hand, the new skills required for social 
reproduction work to effectively encourage or coerce welfare users into the labour market 
meant that the wages of Centrelink welfare workers remained higher than their frontline 
counterparts in bureaucracies such as Medicare.  Similarly, Centrelink Call Centre workers 
tend to receive better pay and conditions than those in other call centres (Sasha 2006).  
Because higher than average levels of union organisation has also prevented wages falling 
to its ‘market’ value, Centrelink staff tend to receive higher wages than those doing 
comparable work in poorly unionised parts of the welfare sector such as the Job Network.    
 
JET work historically emerged as these administrative and professional managerial 
contradictions were intensifying.  In implementing one of the earliest welfare to work 
programs in DSS, JAs had a significant induction and training regime, a relatively greater 
degree of semi-professional autonomy and somewhat higher wages.  This valorisation 
partially reflected the tentative beginnings of a new accumulation and legitimation strategy 
within DSS, of which JET was its leading edge.  By the late 1990s, JET state managers such 
Carmen Zanetti were employed by Centrelink to extract from JET’s legitimation ethos a 
‘customer service’ rationality – ‘realistically’ commensurate for the new motivational tasks 
required by all frontline staff for the Welfare-to-Work agenda.  By the early 2000s, as the 
Welfare-to-Work agenda drew in more groups of service-users, JA training and outreach 
work was effectively abolished, and PAs were temporarily employed (at cheaper rates and 
more strenuous levels of flexibility) to deal with increased workload.  Therefore, the JET work 
conducted by JAs and PAs was as subject to a equivalising, devalorising process as back-
office labour power.  Simultaneously, however, the work of general frontline staff was being 
revalorised.  By 2006 JA and PA positions were abolished.  The Taylorist drive to shift 
administrative and technical work out of the public contact offices had reached a point where 
the remaining frontline staff were deemed sufficiently competent and committed to apply 
these interpersonal, cajoling practices under the now generalised compulsory regime (see 
4.5). 
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2.5 Voicing the ideology of JET practices 
 
While no Australian studies have integrated theories of fetishism into a social policy critique, 
two researchers have applied theories of alienation to investigate work practices inside local 
welfare agencies (Maconachie 1996, 2005; Matheson 2007a, 2007b).  Both, however, tend 
to reduce this concept to a list of observed psychological and behavioural effects, instead of 
articulating these practices as ideological expressions of class production relationships.  As 
a consequence, both draw conclusions which are the polar opposite of a classical marxist 
understanding of alienation by proposing that managers adopt different practices rather than 
sourcing the possibilities of change in the concrete collective activities of frontline staff. 
 
The fetishist ideology of capitalism is not simply a series of general conceptions but real 
material practices.  In the classical tradition there are two important arguments why 
theorising fetishism as a critique of the forms of consciousness tacit in our social relations 
cannot reduce these social relations to any essentialist or seamless ideological form.  Firstly, 
for Lukacs (1974: 51), fetishism ‘imputes’ the ‘typical position in the process of production’ to 
be the logic of capital which is ‘appropriate and rational’ (see pages 54-56).  Yet to 
understand how such a logic enters into the tacit consciousness of those actually working – 
that is, at the level of individuals within any particular social division of labour – requires 
practical and historical analysis of the uneven and contradictory ways in which this occurs.  
The tacit consciousness of fetishism is ‘neither the sum nor the average of what is thought or 
felt by the single individuals who make up the class’ (Lukacs 1974: 51).   
 
Secondly, because the forces of commodity fetishism are generated through the activities of 
work, not just ideologically elaborated and brought from ‘outside’ through the superstructure, 
they are contestable.  Gramsci, like Lukacs, contended that a materialist basis exists inside 
the work process itself, which both entrenches and contradicts the hegemony of capitalist 
ideology.  Work generates: 
 
two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness) one which is implicit in his 
activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of 
the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and 
uncritically absorbed. 
(Gramsci 1988) 
  
To understand how JET workers interviewed for this research empirically expressed these 
ideological contradictions in what they said about their work practices two theoretical 
resources are used – one to identify these tensions and the other to explain how their 
comments may partially reflect these tensions.   
 
Mike Wayne (2003: 219) explores how to thematically disaggregate these ideological 
contradictions by identifying the fetishised ‘fissures and contradictions’ between abstract 
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labour and the forms of appearance of capitalist social relations through four ‘tropes’ (2005: 
198) – immanence, splitting, inversion and repression (see Figure 2).  This study adapts 
these tropes and the concept of alienation in the following chapters to thematically identify 
how JET workers, in their interviews, occasionally express the changing ideological impact of 
producing the program.   
 
Figure 2 
Mapping the four co-ordinates of the contradictions within and between subjects     
 
The Subjectless Subject Wayne 2003: 186 
 
Immanence refers to the process of how reification: 
 
Represses, rubs away and dematerialises the social relations of an activity or commodity and 
just leaves us with its physical materiality, isolated or with its interdependence with everything 
else fading away. 
(Wayne 2003: 194) 
 
Zizek (1989: 24) describes the immanent fetish of autonomy in capitalism as an ethereal 
‘structured effect’, where it ‘appears as if’ independence is ‘an immediate property’ of a 
person or thing apparently dwelling ‘outside…the network of relations’ within which reifying 
processes actually occur.  During a JA’s discussion of her sense of autonomy in the 
voluntary and compulsory phases of the program, glimpses of an immanent ideological fetish 
generated by the processes of JET’s policy production are discernable.  Despite 
experiencing poorly resourced and massive workloads in the program’s early years (see 
Chapter 3) a JA’s ideas of independence were ideologically reinforced while the program 
was apparently at odds with the overall social relations of production in DSS.  Their attitudes 
were far more closely tied to those of the Canberra femocrats than other DSS staff.  The 
central administrative support JAs received was partially derived from the politics of the 
women’s movement and so at odds with neoliberalism.  Feminists working in the 
Subject as  
Commodity 
Immanence 
Splitting  Inversion 
Repression 
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bureaucracy perceived and promoted JET as if it could operate semi-autonomously within 
DSS somehow outside the neoliberal welfare agenda which was unfolding (see Chapter 3).  
The structured effect of JET’s apparent semi-independent production tended to reinforce a 
reified notion among JAs of their sense of autonomy .  From the late 1990s, the managerial 
adaption of JET processes Taylorised to Centrelink’s new workfare production relations 
generated different senses of autonomy among JAs producing an increasingly compulsory 
program.  On one hand, many JAs talked of the specifically unique character of their 
alienation within these relations.  On the other hand, some JAs welcomed the compulsory 
turn because it gave them feelings of greater independence in their work of cajoling single 
parents into the workforce (see Chapter 4).   
 
The ideological split between the subject and the object, most typically between the liberal 
conceptions of is and ought, between an acceptance of an unmediated empirical reality and 
a philosophical requirement for morals and ethics, is a significant ‘trope’ of fetishism (Wayne 
2005: 198).  Isha, a JA, exemplifies such a split when she abstractly talks about how 
compulsory programs create an ethical barrier of ‘barbed wire’ stopping the development of 
trust with her JET clients.  She then concretely mentions not only of ‘going into police mode’ 
with some clients, but also that working in this mode ‘was a little bit more like fun’ (4.13). 
 
When Marx notes (1976: 166) ‘that social relations…appear as what they are…as material 
relations between persons and social relations between things’ this is a dialectical inversion 
generated by capitalist social production relations.  In Chapter 4, an office manager (Harley 
2007) describes how a JA’s emotional labour, knowledge, and skills are ‘tools’ to 
productively facilitate behavioural or attitudinal change in the parent.  Unsurprisingly, 
managerial support for a JA to productively engage a single parent came in the form of a 
computer database called a ‘JET toolbox’.  In section 3.9, Gulzar, a JA, talks of the 
standardised speech she delivered in most single parent interviews: 
 
Okay, so in five years' time where am I going to be?  My children are getting older.  I haven't 
worked for 20 years.  What type of employment am I going to start to undertake? 
 
Gulzar’s constructed script is an articulation of a material relation, speech as a technique 
reified into an object of utility for ‘implanting in people’s minds’ the necessity to ‘be 
encouraged to move forward’.  (see pages 103-118 for a more developed discussion.   
 
Repression of labour as mere factors of production dissolves the concrete sociality of labour.  
It is an equivalising movement where dead labour dominates of the living as labour power 
becomes commensurable to its value.  In this research, elements of social policy are 
analysed through how this trope of fetishism, structurally generated by changes in 
Centrelink’s production processes, was sometimes expressed by the interviewees.  In 
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section 4.10 three examples are given of this displacement process.  The contractual, 
compliance and cultural change policies of Centrelink in the early 2000s ideologically turned 
staff and client into one administratively commensurable category.   
 
This study proposes that through what JET workers sporadically said about aspects of their 
work these varied ideological effects and tropes become sufficiently empirically identifiable to 
be thematised (see pages 132-137; 197-198; 204-219).  The study therefore works within an 
understanding that the ideology materially inscribed in ‘what people do as much as in what 
people think’ is a an investigable relationship (Zizek 1989: 31).  Glimpses of a changing tacit 
consciousness which some discourses signify about a JET worker’s practices provide an 
indicative but valuable contribution to the overall historical critique of the program.  Therefore 
the assumption is that when new forms of practical activity arise, new linguistic expressions 
emerge and, with them, new ways of conceptualising reality.   
 
Theoretical support for this proposition about the relationship between language, practice 
and thought is found in the writings of Voloshinov, Vygotsky and others associated with the 
‘Bakhtin circle’.43  Voloshinov conceived that language develops dialogically in concrete 
social situations: what is uttered is part of the shifting social context within which it is 
expressed.  New words (and old words reinvested with new meaning) thrown up in response 
to this process of interaction with new contexts affects people’s consciousness (Voloshinov 
1987: 21).  Thus the ongoing tensions in capitalism are ideologically mediated by language 
subjectively and socially.  Analysing language-use in its practical, tensile and ideological 
dynamics opens up this semiotically mediated social context to be historically graspable.  For 
example, by foregrounding the social context of JET’s transition from a voluntary to a 
compulsory program, attention is focused on how the interviewee may alter her words, 
intonation and mode of expression to reflect this shift in social policy.   
 
Voloshinov (1987: 88) considered that the official or unofficial social construction of 
language-use reflected societal conflicts.  On one hand there are ‘official’ attempts by the 
ruling class to ‘lend the ideological sign a supraclass, external character’, to make it the 
‘expression of only one, solid and immutable view’ (Voloshinov 1988: 147).  On the other 
hand, there are the multiple ways people in other classes give ‘unofficial’ expression to their 
own tangible interactions with each other.  For example, there are very different and 
historically traceable counter-interpretations among Centrelink staff about what ‘official’ 
                                                
43
 Voloshinov was a member of the intellectual circle associated with Mikhail Bakhtin and Lev Vygotsky (Bakhtin 
1981; Leont'ev 1978; Luria 1976; Voloshinov 1987, 1996; Vygotsky 1978). See also Brandist & Tihanov 2000; 
Clark & Holquist 1984; and Collins 1999, 2000.  
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words such as help, customer, and welfare reform meant to them (see chapter 4).  The 
dialogic nature of speech in a particular social context is manifested in a variety of systematic 
ways or ‘speech genres’ (Voloshinov 1996: 20-22).  Social language, a speech genre riddled 
with class distinctions of intonation and accent, reflects these relations of power (Voloshinov 
1996: 41).  As a result, language is historicised.  Words become ‘multiaccentual’, reflecting 
these shifting social contexts and competing voices.   
 
Such a focus allows the researcher to grasp the ‘social underpinnings’ of the differences and 
changes in language-use (Collins 2000: 44).  If changes to such ‘social underpinnings’ can 
be identified, a potential opens for an analysis of language-use to be conducted on a socio-
historical basis.  The major question this research carefully tackles is whether such 
sufficiently different ‘social underpinnings’ can be historically identified in the arena of 
practices, institutions and ideas surrounding the JET program.  They are found in changes 
wrought to JET workers practices as the program transformed from a feminist-mediated 
voluntary policy to compulsory workfare program, from the workplace effects caused by the 
rise of New Public Management, and in the institutional movement towards strenuous 
welfarism.  These elements of the interviews can be apprehended as ‘a form of history 
writing’ in that they are discourses which reveal traces of the ‘twists and turns, and the 
significant moments of change and reconstitution’ surrounding the JET Program and those 
actively engaged with it (Collins & Jones 2006: 52).  They provide vital prompts and clues to 
the researcher to grasp ‘the intersection of rhetoric…and the real’ (Wayne 2003: 166).   
 
 
2.6 Conclusion: the JET Program as a productive and legitimating 
practice 
 
The history of the JET program in the following chapters aims to show the importance of 
applying the marxist concepts and method discussed above to analyse social policy.  This 
investigation uncovers how the Australian state-as-capital’s accumulation dynamic was in 
tension with its geopolitical and legitimating aspects leading up to and during the period of 
JET’s existence.  Investigating the economic character of JET raises a series of questions.  
What was being produced?  How is the process of JET’s production to be assessed as a 
mediated aspect of capitalist production relations?  Did the program have economic value?  
What was the relation between the economic aspect of JET and its ideological elements?  
 
A marxist method offers a range of concepts which may be applied as real abstractions to 
expose how the class conflicts within the welfare bureaucracies, between state institutions, 
between the Australian state and other fractions of capital historically developed and shaped 
JET.  The program is investigated as a productive and legitimating work-process, as a 
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division of labour within Centrelink and as a site of social provision operating under the NPM 
aegis of ‘strenuous welfarism’.  During the period of JET two major changes to the social 
construction of what it is to be a single parent are identified, both connected to changes in 
the Australian state-capital accumulation strategies of the time.  One is of how Australian 
capitalism responded to the economic crisis of the 1970s by turning public policy sharply 
towards international competition (Bryan 2000b).  The second is how the state-capital 
relation responded to a seemingly opposite problem, the economic boom which had 
gathered pace sufficiently by the turn of this century to reconfigure social policy to address 
emerging labour shortages.  
 
In the last two decades the nuclear familial ideal (one legitimation role of the state) 
problematically confronted the reality of a sharply rising number of single parent families.  
Initially this was dealt with through the voluntary phase of the JET program under the slogan 
‘Now you can go back to work without neglecting your most important job’ – posters of which 
had an iconographic representation of a woman holding a new-born child (see Chapter 3).  
Nuclear parenting could thus be generally reinforced by construing single parenting as a 
welfare problem to be somehow resolved by paid work.  Given the desire by many single 
parents to gain paid work or study, the policy was, by and large, supported by most social 
welfare, women’s groups and single parents.   
 
Yet how the embedded familial ideal continued to marginalise single parents is discussed in 
the historical chapters.  As labour shortages increased mid-way through the Howard 
Government’s reign, these ideological tensions became more explicit as a political and 
ideological campaign was launched against single parents.  They were most sharply 
expressed through changes to social policy, including JET.  The following chapters analyse 
one highly significant aspect of how the state’s accumulation and legitimation strategies in 
social policy  –  the JET program – became expressed in the actions and ideas of state 
managers, policy developers occupying contradictory class locations, and, most importantly, 
by JET workers themselves.  
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3 
 
JET under Labor  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
JET’s voluntary phase was at its strongest under the Hawke-Keating Labor governments 
(1989-1996).  The second section in this chapter places this period in an historical context.  It 
briefly presents an argument that Australian state welfare provision and interventions into the 
lives of mother-headed households, shaped by particular geopolitical, economic and class 
competitive pressures, moved through three stages since Federation – each a lagging 
response to a period of economic crisis in the 1890s, the 1930s and the 1970s.  I offer six 
responses, at different levels of abstraction, to the research question of how the production 
of JET as a policy-practice expressed the contradictions of the state's relatively autonomous 
reproduction relationship with Australian capitalism under Labor.  In 3.3 I analyse a new 
accumulation and legitimation state activism which emerged in response to the economic 
crisis of the 1970s and given a policy expression in the Prices and Incomes Accord.  The 
welfare side of this response – the Social Security Review and the cascade of policy 
changes directed at single parents – is analysed as a contradictory aspect of the state’s new 
activism.  
 
A history of JET’s policy production ‘from above’ highlights the influence of feminist actors in 
DSS is conducted in 3.4.  The relationship between ‘early’ JAs and other coalface workers is 
likened to ‘water and oil’ in an investigation of the administrative and ideological tensions at 
the local office level.  JET’s resource limitations and the industrial possibilities that existed to 
address them are detailed before presenting an analysis of JET’s material and ideological 
production ‘from below’.  The bureaucratic conflicts between the femocrat-influenced Social 
Policy Division of DSS and other sections of the bureaucracy seeking to turn JET into a New 
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Public Management driven workfare program are discussed in 3.5 before a short summary 
concludes the chapter (3.6). 
 
 
3.2 Historical context 
 
Varied geopolitical, economic, and local pressures have historically buffeted Australian state 
policy interventions into mother-headed family arrangements.  The first wave of federal social 
interventions came in the decade after the 1890s depression, partly as a social-democratic 
response by the recently formed ALP, and partly as a state imperialist-economic reaction to 
an impoverishing decade in which birth rates shrank to a colonial low (ABS 2001: 145), to 
become one of the smallest in the industrialising world (Boland 1990: 17).  Geopolitical 
competition led to rabidly pronatalist campaigns against single mothers.  Disproportionately 
suffering high rates of deprivation (O'Brien 1988: 89, 92), unmarried mothers were blamed in 
press campaigns for a rising incidence of infanticide and child abandonment.  The growing 
proportion of single mothers (Howe & Swain 1993) were branded as ‘a very army of 
murderesses’ (Swain 1993: 3) contributing to the ‘race suicide’ of the nation (Lake & 
Reynolds 2008: 158).  Within the raft of social welfare policies enacted during the early years 
of the 20th century,44 in 1912 all non-Indigenous and non-Asian single parents became 
eligible for the Fisher Labor Party’s five pound Maternity Allowance (FaCSIA 2006: 91).  
Their qualification for this payment formed part of a militarised welfare policy approach that 
Renate Howe (1993: 31) terms ‘protecting the child while punishing the mother’.  As welfare 
provision became industrially enmeshed in the supposed ‘family wage’ (Fine 1992) rulings, 
such as the 1907 Harvester Judgement, and ideological acceptance of the nuclear family 
form gradually consolidated (Weeks 2000), the marginality, poverty, and stigma attached to 
being a single parent increased (Thibodeaux 2002).  
 
Belatedly responding to the 1930s depression and more immediately reacting to global war, 
a second spurt of Keynesian-inflected (Coombs 1981: 6) social interventions occurred in the 
1940s as necessary expenses for the state-capital relation to effectively compete on world 
markets and against other states (FaCSIA 2006: 43, 129).  As part of its new found 
commitment to full employment (CoA 1945) the Curtin Labor government extended 
categorical and means tested benefits to those who were unemployed, sick or widowed.  The 
                                                
44
 Old age and invalid pensions were introduced in 1908 with moral and racial provisions (FaCSIA 2006: 1).  
However, the only federal payment to mother-headed households prior to World War Two was to war widows and 
her dependents.  The 1903 Defence Act, the 1914 War Pensions Act, Australian Soldiers Repatriation Acts, the 
Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 and the Seamen's War Pension and Allowances Act of 1940 all in 
various ways provided for the dependants of members of the Forces (Hammond 1980: 3).   
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introduction of the Widow Pension in 1942 reaffirmed the centrality of male labour and the 
nuclear family as it was reserved for husbandless mothers ‘made’ single by morally 
acceptable exogenous circumstances – a husband’s desertion, death or incarceration 
(FaCSIA 2006: 97).  In a 1945 speech, Arthur Calwell (cited in Kemp & Stanton 2004: 120-
121), Minister for Immigration and Information, announced a massive rescaling of 
immigration from 3,000 to 70,000 people per year ‘for reasons of defence and for the fullest 
expansion of our economy’.  However, he insisted that to ‘continue to hold our island 
continent’ the government’s ‘number one priority’ was not white immigration but ‘policies 
directed to stimulating the birth-rate’ and ‘lowering infant mortality’.  As ‘an inducement to 
young Australian couples to have larger families’ in this drive to ‘populate or perish’ the Child 
Endowment45 (introduced by the Menzies government in 1941) was augmented in July 1943 
by quadrupling Maternity Allowance rates and removing its income test (FaCSIA 2006: 93, 
129) (see Watts 1987 for a valuable analysis of the period).  While denied pension rights, 
single mothers qualified for both these child-centric payments.   
 
For the next 30 years the ideological and economic consolidation of the nuclear family was 
reflected in the relentless denial of a welfare payment to women who left their husbands or 
gave birth ex-nuptially.  This successfully reinforced two notions – that having a child out of 
wedlock was wrong and that adoption should be the norm for ‘fallen girls’ (West 1991: 182).  
By the 1960s, the proportion of ex-nuptial births reached a near century low (see Figure 3), 
and most single mothers were relinquishing their new-born to their coupled counterparts – a 
tragic and pointed change from the period 1850-1915 when seven of every ten children 
stayed in their care (Swain 1993: 6).   
 
Figure 3 
Ex-nuptial births per thousand in Australia: 1900 to 1970 
 
30
40
50
60
70
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
 
Source: data derived from ABS Year Book 2000: 89 
                                                
45
 Child endowment was a small universal, non-means tested payment to women caring for children (though 
many indigenous mothers remained excluded until 1966) (FaCSIA 2006: 97, 101). 
  86
The rapid subsumption of married women’s labour power in the 1960s across most 
industrialised countries intensified a range of ideological, social, and political tensions within 
society and rapidly melted the normative expectations of adoption.  The expanding 
opportunities for women to gain work and education clashed against the restrictive social and 
economic boundaries placed around them.  Domestic stereotypes were destabilised as 
capitalism’s requirement for maternal waged labour came into sharper contradiction with an 
enduring expectation for women’s unwaged reproductive labour. A small loosening of this 
tension occurred as some unpaid work was socialised (such as childcare), marketised (such 
as the rise of take away food) or reduced due to technological improvements in household 
appliances.46  Within the social and class movements of the period second wave feminism’s 
challenging of societal attitudes to work-gender relationships and family forms opened 
greater political space for mother-headed families to grow, especially after the relaxation of 
divorce laws in 1975.47     
 
It was primarily through campaigns led by activists in the Council of Single Mothers and their 
Children (CSMC) that single mothers won their pension rights in 1973 (and single fathers six 
years later).  A national self-help, single parent only group which arose out of the Melbourne 
women’s movement in 1969, the CSMC’s main political slogan was to ‘ensure that any child 
born out of wedlock had a fair start in life’ (CSMC 2002).  At the height of their campaign, the 
organisation had over 1,700 members in Victoria and affiliates in most other states.  
Innovative political lobbying techniques included ‘picnics’ with their children inside ministerial 
electoral offices (West 1991) and a media campaign promoting the decision by Pam 
Rosenhain, ‘a former Miss Australia’, to ‘keep my baby’ despite the financial problems she 
would face (The Herald, 15/1/71: 1) (see Figure 4).  As a consequence of these various 
political, social, legal and administrative changes ‘shotgun marriages’ of pregnant teenagers 
plummeted from about 13,000 in 1971 to 1,100 in 1991, and adoptions dropped from 8500 
babies in 1973 to less than 2500 in 1985, despite a massive rise in ex-nuptial births (Gilding 
1997: 88).  The proportion of families with dependent children headed by a single parent 
rose from less than 7 per cent in the 1960s to about 22 per cent in 2005 (ABS 2007a: 48; 
Gray et al. 2003).  Within one year of the start of the pension (July 1974), 26,000 single 
mothers were in receipt of the payment, and numbers kept rising to 449,000 in 2004 before 
slightly declining to 433,000 in 2006 (ABS 2007a: 52; DSS 1987: 158).  85 per cent of 
parents eligible for this payment had a marriage or relationship break-up, rather than having 
a child when single (Gilding 1997: 88). 
                                                
46
 For example, one (highly mechanical) cross-country study claimed that the 20 per cent decrease in the relative 
price of appliances between 1975 to 1999 had ‘led’ to a 2 to 3 per cent annual increase in the labour force 
participation of married women (Cavalcanti & Tavares 2006: 7) 
47
 The divorce rate in 1976 was seven times that of 1960 before it again began to stabilise (Burns 1983: 59) 
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Figure 4 
 
Source: The Herald, 15 January 1971 
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It appeared that the vigorous re-entry of mother-headed households into the 1970s’ political 
and social landscape was upending established social provisioning arrangements.  
Essentially, however, single parents were incorporated into the old model.  Nuclear parenting 
remained at the ideological centre of the state-capital social (re)production relationship.  To 
accommodate the 1973 securing of their pension rights (and single father’s in 1979) the state 
administratively cast single parent pensioners as quasi widows, as misfortunately deserving 
due to the lack of a husband (or wife).  While a still relatively small proportion of households 
in the 1970s, the 1940s tenets of social provisioning could be kept normatively intact by 
consigning single parents to the administrative marginalia of welfare widowhood.   
 
One positive consequence of such a social construction was to assign single parents into an 
administrative provisioning pedigree securing their pension entitlements for life.  For a 
decade, single parents could move from Sole Parent Pension to Class B widow’s pension 
when their children left home or reached 25 years of age, and then onto the Age Pension 
(Shaver 1993).  The 1980s dismantling of Widows Class A, B and C Pensions 
administratively removed the ideological plank upon which single parents pensioners were 
standing.  Their mainstreaming into temporary payment streams conditional on their labour 
market efforts sources from this period.  To account for how the changing economic, political 
and ideological grounds led to this third historical shift in Australian social welfare 
arrangements (and the rise of JET), the next two sections analyses these relationships as an 
aspect of the state-capital relation and as an aspect of the state’s social reproduction role. 
 
The 1970s crisis and the new accumulation activism 
 
The collapse of profit rates triggered by the economic crisis in the early 1970s continued to 
intensify global economic competition while tempering open geopolitical confrontation 
between the major powers (Callinicos 2009).  US military hegemony rose as the soviet bloc 
imploded in the 1980s, and Japanese and European states focused more on economic, 
rather than armed competition (Rees 2001).  In Germany, Japan and the US profit rates fell 
until the early 1980s and have since only made up about half that decline during this 
extended ‘long downturn’ (Harman 2007b).  The underlying global economic imperative 
conditioning the various political strategies, calculations and interactions of nation state 
managers has been the attempt to support local capitals clawing back profit rates to pre-
crisis levels.   
 
Bill Dunn (2009: 7) notes that the economic trajectory in Australia since the 1960s tracked 
these leading capitalist economies while experiencing slightly higher average profit rates.  
Phillip O’Hara (2008: 100) calculates that Australian annual average profit rates declined 
from a high of 5.5 per cent in the 1960s to 3 per cent in the 1980s before partially recovering 
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to 4 per cent in the 1990s and 4.5 per cent in the period 2000-2007.  A recent Australian 
Productivity Commission report highlighted that Australian annual productivity growth rates 
have struggled to remain internationally competitive since the 1970s economic crisis (see 
Table 2).  Within Australia, labour productivity growth rates have failed to reach the annual 
rate of 3 per cent achieved in the 1960s.  International comparisons with the EU(15) 
countries and the USA show that only in one decade out of the last five (1990-2000) were 
Australian labour productivity growth rates higher than both its competitors.  
 
Table 2 
Annual average growth rates of labour productivity, 
Australia, EU and the USA: 1960-2007 
 
 Australia EU15a USA 
1960-1970 3.1 5.4 2.6 
1970-1980 1.8 3.8 1.6 
1980-1990 1.1 2.1 1.4 
1990-2000 2.3 1.9 1.6 
2000-2007 1.7 1.2 2.0 
a
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
Source: data derived from Productivity Commission (2010) 
International productivity comparisons, Table 1, accessed 25 June 2010 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/productivity/estimates-trends/international-comparisons 
 
Attempts to tackle this challenge to accumulation confronting the Australian state-capital 
relation occurred on three fronts.  Firstly, the national share of profits against wages needed 
to be increased.  Boosting the level of labour productivity would yield such a greater share 
only if it exceeded the level of real wage increases.  Economic pressure was therefore 
exerted on the state to politically limit real wage growth and on firms to increase the intensity 
of their own capital productivity through investment and job cuts (Mohun 2003a: 102).  
Secondly, whether profit rates recovered depended on the interaction of profit share, capital 
and labour productivity, and the resulting relative competiveness against other capitals in the 
world and local markets.  Thirdly, state interventions could accelerate capital destruction and 
support the preconditions of higher profit rates for surviving companies.  For example, the 
tariff reductions initiated by the Whitlam and Fraser governments in the 1970s effectively 
obliterated the chronically low-profit end of the textile, clothing and footwear industry.  The 
small minority of firms that responded with new investment were then given various tax and 
export breaks in the subsequent decade (Belcher 1992: 94).  The resulting relatively high 
rates of unemployment strategically strengthened the state’s and employers’ arms as it 
tended to weaken overall trade union capacity to mount claims for real wage increases.  
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Neoliberalism fitfully arose in the 1980s as a strategic and ideological response to these 
accumulation challenges exerted on the Australian state-capital relation.  Since the post-war 
period, the concept of national comparative advantage had provided an economic 
justification for state managers’ reproduction strategies.  Comparative advantage is derived 
from the theory that international economic efficiencies result from state policies which allow 
exchange rates to reflect the prices of a nation’s material and social endowments (factors of 
production) (for an explanation see Bryan 2000a).  Even though Australian state regulation 
had historically operated through protectionism and Keynesian ideas of aggregate demand, 
state interventions remained framed within a default notion of seeking to maximise the 
potential of what a nation ‘does best’ (Bryan & Rafferty 1999b: 62).  By the 1970s, a 
resurfacing monetarism stayed within this framework as state managers initially attempted to 
reinvigorate the comparative advantage of these endowments through notions of minimal 
national regulation, supply-side economics and ‘free trade’ (Bryan 2000a: 3).  However, the 
continuing crisis of profitability and the ongoing intensification of global competition began to 
undermine such passively parochial policy-presumptions.  
 
By the mid-1980s debates surrounding a national state-capital relation’s new accumulation 
strategy had shifted into what Michael Porter (1990) and Robert Reich (1991) have called the 
model of competitive advantage.  In a call to arms for the US state, Porter (1990: 6) warned, 
‘there is more to being competitive in international markets than specialising in line with 
[national] factor costs’.  Rather than presupposing that the operations of the global ‘free 
market’ resulted in local individual industries or companies being ‘trapped’ by their local 
comparative strengths or weaknesses, the debates surrounding competitive advantage 
implied that states must become more actively interventionist in supporting local fractions of 
capital and individual companies.  If international competition was about individual 
companies competing with each other across nation-states, then the state’s function was to 
support increasing the productivity of as many companies as possible to meet or preferably, 
to exceed, the constantly rising international standards of productivity in that industry (Porter 
1990: 6).   
 
In Australia the historical articulation of this new ‘competitiveness agenda’ was complex and 
contradictory (Bell 1993; Capling & Gilligan 1992; Kuhn 1986).  State managers struggled to 
develop policies which reconceived the nation as a competitive economic entity requiring 
closer and more active state policy intervention.  The floating of the Australian dollar and 
changes to the regulation of financial markets in the early 1980s were quickly followed by 
new regulations once the consequences of purely monetarist formulae failed to meet 
expectations (Belcher 1992: 115).  Alongside this uncertain economic activism, state 
managers sought to reshape cultural and social expectations to more successfully confront 
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the changing global economic environment.  The Hawke-Keating ALP Government (1983-
1996) and the Howard Liberal Government (1996-2007) had differing, and changing, political 
responses to enacting the competitiveness agenda.  Both, however, shared a fierce 
commitment to the ‘race to the top’ in a range of increasingly internationally exposed 
industries.  The overall task of the state was to increase labour productivity nationally to 
ensure that competitive advantage could be maximised in as many sectors as possible, to 
ditch firms deemed unsalvageable, and to provide extra incentives to attract and build the 
‘right’ industries (Bryan 2000a).   
 
State interventions to increase relative surplus value (supporting the potential for increasing 
profit rates) required, in part, political strategies to keep real wage rate advances below 
fluctuating productivity growth rates.  Simon Mohun (2003a) attributes the success of state 
interventions from the early 1980s which began to achieve this objective (Figure 5).48 
 
Figure 5 
Changes in the percentage of annual growth rates of Australian 
labour productivity and real wages: 1965-2001 
 
 
Source (Mohun 2003a: 93) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
48
 More recent OECD figures support Mohun’s thesis that productivity rates bottomed out in the 1980s and then 
rose in the 1990s (OECD 2006: 33).  The overall effect has been that real labour costs have trended downward 
since the mid-1970s and wages share, as a proportion of GDP, has dropped to its lowest level for 50 years (ABS 
2009b: Table 38 Unit Labour Costs; Mitchell & Muysken 2008: 6).  
ALP elected 
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3.3 Labor’s new accumulation and legitimation activism in the 1980s 
 
In the 1970s the Whitlam and Fraser governments attempted to change the direction of 
industrial development by means of tariff reductions, but low profitability meant that industry 
did not respond with new investment.  Fraser’s main goal was to attack the persistently high 
rate of inflation through ‘tight expenditure restraint’ (John Stone in INDECS Economics 1984: 
216) and partial wage indexation.  Yet real wages at the end of 1981 were 5 per cent higher 
than they had been in 1975 (Belcher 1992: 94).  Fraser’s desperate tactic of a 12 month 
wage freeze in 1982 was bound to be temporary.  When the Hawke government was elected 
in March 1983 the ALP presented a more sophisticated mechanism to keep wages down – 
the Prices and Incomes Accord.  
 
The Accord was a tripartite ‘social contract’ between the ALP Government, the trade union 
movement and peak employer groups (Beilharz, Considine & Watts 1992: 92), supporting the 
politically nebulous ‘goal of maintaining and gradually improving the living standards of all 
Australians’ (ALP & ACTU 1983: 288).  Sections of the ALP and the ACTU had been 
promoting such a compact since the mid-1970s, calling on the Australian union movement to 
break out of its ‘labourist straitjacket’ and adopt what they saw as the closer, more influential 
institutional ties with employers and the state operating in German and Scandinavian social 
democratic states (Bramble 2005b).  State activism for the competitiveness agenda was 
endorsed by sections of the trade union bureaucracy as these officials saw an opportunity to 
become a more integral part of the new strategic role for Australian laborism.49   
 
Crucial left-wing support came from manufacturing and construction union officials affiliated 
to the Communist Party of Australia (CPA).  French Regulationist ideas that advanced 
economies had entered a ‘post-Fordist’ period ‘caught the imagination of left-oriented writers 
and trade-union activists’ (Hampson & Morgan 1999: 747).  For Amalgamated Metal Workers 
Union (AMWU) officials this meant increasingly pinning the future viability of local 
manufacturing onto the state’s competitiveness agenda.  Publishing a series of pamphlets 
primarily aimed at their delegate base they urged a ‘greater willingness’ to shift from 
industrial action ‘in pursuit of a broader political agenda’ (Bramble 2000: 246).  Their core 
argument was that industry restructuring could take a ‘high road’ to global competitiveness 
through the union movement collaborating in a tripartite body with employers and 
government.  The initial radicalism of these publications, which argued that such compact 
tactics now formed part of the road to socialism, gradually fell away as each new pamphlet 
called for an increasingly orthodox ‘productivist’ strategy simply aimed at defending living 
                                                
49
 See Burford 1983; Clegg, Boreham & Dow 1986; Hartnett 1980; Higgins 1978, 1980, 1985; Hughes 1981; 
Mathews 1986; Ogden 1984; and Stilwell 1982.   
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standard and jobs (Hampson & Morgan 1999: 749).50  The early socialist hopes were ill-
founded since the Accord’s tripartite body (the Economic Planning Advisory Council) had 
little power to meet the AMWU’s expectations.  EPAC was mere ‘window dressing’ because 
the state’s core economic levers – Treasury, the Reserve Bank, and the Industry Assistance 
Commission – remained outside its remit (Bramble 2000: 249; see also Buchanan & Briggs 
2004: 10; Hampson & Morgan 1999: 767).  Those on the right of the ALP never held any 
illusions that the Accord was progressive.  Paul Keating, for example, was dismissing the 
promises of Accord Mark 1 to be ‘just for the election’ (cited in Hampson & Morgan 1999: 
767) 
 
The most mature articulation of what the Accord meant was Australia Reconstructed, a joint 
ACTU-Department of Trade report published in the mid-1980s (ACTU/TDC 1987).  Co-
authored by a social democratic amalgam of ALP figures and ex-CPA officials, such Laurie 
Carmichael,51 they contended that a ‘full employment objective as the pivotal element of 
macroeconomic policy’ could only be maintained by a ‘high degree of labour mobility and the 
phasing out of less profitable industries’.  A keystone was ‘an active labour market policy’ 
where the term active ‘emphasises skill formation, job placement and a reduction in labour 
market segmentation’ to distinguish it from the now defunct ‘passive strategy which relies 
mainly on cash support to the unemployed’.  A politically palatable consequence would be 
that: 
 
Rapid structural change can then become an avenue to increased career opportunities rather 
than a threat.  Destructive opposition born of increasing insecurity is thereby minimised. 
(ACTU/TDC 1987: 103, 105) 
 
The few on the left who were critical of this social contract argued that, instead of self-
activism in the workplace which was central to the revolutionary politics of ‘socialism from 
below’ (Draper 1966), the Accord further concentrated leadership of industrial disputes ‘from 
above’, central to the politics of reformism.  As the quantity of days ‘lost’ through strikes in 
the 1980s eased back to 1960’s levels (ABS 2005c: 2006), a more historically significant, 
qualitative transformation occurred.  John Minns (1989), for example, describes how locally-
led ‘hot-shop’ disputes in the early 1970s metals industry were replaced by one-off set-piece 
affairs orchestrated by trade union officialdom.  In dampening the self-activity of local 
                                                
50
 Rick Kuhn (1986) has closely followed this transition in the Australian Metal Workers Union (AMWU) 
publications leading up to the Accord.  The 1977 pamphlet, Australia Uprooted, combined arguments for greater 
planning and even nationalisation of large corporations with an orthodox left nationalist call for greater control 
over interest rates, foreign investment and credit.  Australia Ripped Off (1979) and Australia on the Rack (1982) 
became increasingly social democratic in tone and content, dropping proposals for mass nationalisations and 
class struggle for promoting the political profiles of ALP shadow ministers.  
51
 David McKnight (1987: 17) characterised Carmichael as a person who had shifted from ‘left-wing oppositionist’ 
to one who embraced a ‘strategy of working through and with institutions’.   
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delegates and union members, the Accord undermined the power of the trade union 
movement by separating the ‘political’ from the ‘economic’.  Outside election periods, politics 
was consigned to union officials.  Economic reforms was reduced to members increasing 
their individual productivity, maximising their multi-skilling capabilities, and forging new 
workplace relationships with employers to cope with the cold winds of international 
competition. While small sections of the trade movement opposed this approach (see Kuhn & 
O'Lincoln 1996) the historical dialectic of the Accord was a de-basing movement for labour – 
institutionally, economically and ideologically.  
 
As a strategy for the union movement but of the union bureaucracy and the state, the 
Accord’s ideological connection with the aspirations of union members was mediated by 
these officials and state managers.  Social democratic appeals for ‘wage restraint’ only made 
such Gramscian ‘common sense’ inside the labour movement by a concomitant call for an 
expansion of the ‘social wage’.  The Accord Mark 1 (1983-1984) presented the social wage 
as a self-evidently robust concept defined as the ‘expenditure by governments that affect the 
living standards of the people by direct transfers or provisions of services’ (ALP & ACTU 
1983: 289).  Education, housing, welfare (including superannuation) and health policies 
became the Accord’s stated bargaining chips (ALP & ACTU 1983: 394), objects to be placed 
on the table in the wage trade-off negotiations between the parties.  The responsibility for 
meeting social reproduction costs in health, education, and welfare focused on the supposed 
political interests of the organised working class to show wage restraint.  For example, 
neoliberal, user-pay policies such as the 1989 Higher Education Contribution Scheme were 
justified by Dawkins, the then Education Minister, who argued that ‘free’ higher education 
was ‘middle-class welfare’ opposed to working class interests (Edwards 2001: 111). 
 
Conforming the ‘social wage’ to meet this political/bartering function required the 
(unacknowledged) negation of how it had historically been incarnated.  Since the Harvester 
decision the social wage had been industrially framed as a state-mediated ‘living’ or ‘family’ 
wage.  As the industrial aspects of the Accord process transformed into enterprise bargaining 
by the early 1990s, the declining economic significance of these ‘living wage’ cases was 
stripped of this ideological content.52  In its stead the Accord introduced the newly hegemonic 
idea that state social service provisioning per se was the ‘social wage’.53  All these elements 
– high unemployment, a movement from self-activity to corporatist solutions, the political 
                                                
52
  By 2004 only the lowest-paid (20 per cent of the workforce) were eligible for a ‘living wage’ determination 
(Buchanan, Watson & Meagher 2004: 137).   
53
 The earlier, always tenuous, idea that the ‘social wage’ was embodied inside (male) paid wage rates was being 
materially undermined well prior to the Accord.  The mass entry of married women into paid work from the 1960s, 
even if often only on a part-time basis, had been eroding the broader premises of the ‘living wage’ for many years.   
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retreat of the left, demographic changes, etc. – meant that the ideas of the Accord fell on 
fertile ground. 
 
However, the Accord’s new elaboration of the ‘social wage’ was historically and politically 
highly fragile.  Gaining acceptance that social policies were now ‘wage offset-able’ products 
best dealt with in discussions between the trade union officials, employers and the 
government was one thing.  Delivering on this promise was another.  This study focuses on 
the first rounds of the Accord since this was the period real wages were dropping at their 
fastest rate (Mohun 2003a: 93) and the amount of ‘social wage’ elements were at their 
greatest (Hampson & Morgan 1999: 765).  Two analyses – one comparing the early years of 
the Hawke government to the Fraser period, the other to the Howard period – give empirical 
support that the answer was no.   
 
From his five-country comparative analysis between 1960 and 1987, Shaikh (2003: 537) 
draws the conclusion that ‘taxes paid by wage and salary earners closely parallel social 
expenditures directed to them’.  The difference between the value of total social benefits 
received54 and total taxes directly paid (the ‘net social wage’) remained at 1–2 per cent GDP 
almost every year, implying a positive but ‘clearly small’ benefit to workers (Shaikh 2003: 
538).  The thrust of Shaikh’s analysis is that wage and salary earners paid for nearly all their 
state social provisioning, with minor variations across countries.  Interestingly, the net social 
wage in Sweden (the country to which the Accord authors most looked for inspiration) was 
‘roughly zero’ over this period, whereas Australia’s net social wage during the 1980s hovered 
in the 3 and 5 per cent range (Shaikh 2003: 538).  This was very similar to the average 
received during the period the of the Fraser government of 4.5 per cent.   
 
If there is little evidence that the Accord delivered an appreciably larger ‘net social wage’ 
than Fraser, the Howard government delivered a far greater ‘gross social wage’.  A recent 
Treasury paper details federal government expenditures, broken into policy areas, for the 
last 40 years (Laurie & McDonald 2008).  If health, education and welfare expenditures are 
taken as a proxy for the ‘social wage’, the Hawke government outlaid 12.1 per cent of GDP 
in 1984-85, the year that the social wage component of the Accord was at its height 
(Hampson & Morgan 1999: 765).  By 2006-07 social wage outlays had increased by a third 
to 16.1 per cent of GDP under the Howard Government’s (data derived from Laurie & 
McDonald 2008: charts 1, 10 and 11). 
                                                
54
 Shaikh (2003: 531-540) estimated the ‘worker’s share’ of the following items: labour training and services, 
housing and community services, income support, social security and welfare, education, health and hospitals, 
recreational and cultural activities, postal services, natural resources and passenger transport. 
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Such studies lend empirical support to the argument that labour reproduction costs generally 
tend to rise as the state-capital relation increasingly fuses in late capitalism.  By the 1980s 
social wage transfer payments had become the largest single category of state economic 
expenditure in most industrialised countries (Shaikh 2003: 532).  In the succeeding quarter 
century up to 2005 these state social security and welfare expenditures (as a percentage of 
GDP) kept rising – by 3 per cent in the US, 5 per cent in the OECD and 6 per cent in 
Australia (OECD 2009).  Further, state social welfare costs in Australia have been 
disproportionately increasing at the expense of other outlays (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 
Changing proportion of Australian government spending 
on social security and welfare: 1972-2005 
 
 
Source: adapted from Kirsty Laurie and Jason McDonald 
A perspective on trends in Australian Government spending Australian Treasury 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1352/PDF/03_spending_growth.pdf 
 
Politically repressing or accelerating state responses to these international competitive 
accumulation pressures is the balance of class forces, raising the prospect of a shift to their 
‘moral and historical’ groundings to the left or right.  What contingent changes were possible 
in the overall determination of the social wage in the 1980s?  Political evaluation shows how 
it changed.  In the 1980s the ALP and trade union officials sought to rally their base through 
two contradictory strategies – the Accord’s negation of collective self-activity in the labour 
movement and the neoliberal OECD slogan of the Active Society (2006: 68)  By inverting 
what was ‘active’ from the social to the individual, greater political space opened for a new 
‘market’ activity and morality to be promoted among its ranks. 
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The Accord’s role in keeping real wage costs down was an outstanding success and a 
conscious strategy from the beginning (Green & Wilson 2000: 113; Rowse 2004: 51).  
Hawke’s early promise that wage rises under the Accord would be less over the following 
three years than they would have been under the Liberals was met (Australian Business, 2 
November 1983).  By 1991, just before he became Prime Minister, Keating crowed in his last 
Treasurer’s Budget Speech:  
 
Real wage restraint…in Australia since 1982-83 has been unprecedented in the post-war 
period…the Accord made a significant contribution to moderating real wage behaviour…The 
effect of real wage restraint on profitability meant that the gross corporate profit share in the 
1980s exceeded the levels of the late 1960s. 
(CoA 1991) 
 
For most, real wages fell throughout the period and well into the 1990s.  Significantly, only 
those in the top 20 per cent of households witnessed a rise in their real disposable incomes 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Increasing inequality under the Accord: 1984-94 
 
Income 
quintile 
Share of total 
household disposable 
income (%) 
Change in real 
household disposable 
incomes (%) 
 1984 1994 1984-94 
Lowest 6.3 5.8 -9.0 
Second 12.1 11.4 -7.0 
Third 17.9 17.4 -4.7 
Fourth 24.8 25.0 -0.7 
Highest 38.8 40.4 2.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 -1.4 
Source: data compiled from ABS 
Australian Social Trends 1997: Cat. No. 4120.0, 117 and 118 
 
After several years of growth in the late 1980s, the world economy slid back into recession in 
1990, as excess capacity and low profitability continued to dog the system.  Far less capital 
stock was modernised and expanded in the 1980s than anticipated (Belcher 1992: 115).  
Keating blamed the ‘large sections of the private economy [which] squandered the 7 per cent 
of GDP or $30 billion a year we gave them to invest’ (The Australian, 14 May 1991: 1).  
These meagre results had come at a cost: large foreign debt, weakened balance of 
payments, high inflation and soaring interest rates (Bramble 2005b).  Keating had lifted 
interest rates sharply in 1989-90, triggering what he described as ‘the recession we had to 
have’ (NAA 2009).  Manufacturing output fell by 8 per cent and profits by 40 per cent 
(Bramble 2008: 159).   
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This sharp jolt brought to a head the underlying fragility of the bureaucratic contractualism 
underpinning the Accord’s turn to a productivity-driven wages system.  The very success of 
the tripartite model – winning political and industrial acceptance that wage rates were tied to 
workplace productivity gains – led to its undoing.  When, in 1989, the Business Council of 
Australia called for decentralised wage negotiations at the enterprise level it fell on receptive 
union ears.  ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty and Paul Keating ‘came to accept’ this move ‘as an 
inevitable development of the Australian [industrial relations] system’ (Hampson & Morgan 
1999: 773).  Enterprise agreements were endorsed in the 1990 Accord Mark VI.  By 1993, 
the bureaucratic contractualist basis of the Accord was reduced to a shell under Labor’s 
Industrial Relations Reform Act, which legislated that employers could arrange non-union 
agreements and shrank awards to mere ‘safety nets’ (CoA 1993). 
 
The industrial cost of accepting the Accord’s strategy was a further political and economic 
subordination of labour to the logic of accumulation, cannibalising the labour movement’s 
capacity for left-wing or mainstream independent action.  The ACTU belatedly acknowledged 
that the Accord had inverted the labour movement’s aims when it later sought to reinvigorate 
its delegate base through campaigns such as unions@work, launched in 1999 (Burrow 
2003).  By the early 1990s such a trajectory, driven by this logic, had exhausted itself as 
enterprise and individual-based contractual arrangements came to the fore.  One political 
cost of this collapse of confidence in the Accord’s strategy to maintain real wages and jobs 
was the ascendancy of the Howard government in 1996 (see Chapter 4).  Most significantly, 
the Accord laid the ideological and political grounds for enacting the third historical wave of 
welfare interventions.  
 
Activating’ single parents – the Social Security Review and welfare policy 
 
The Accord’s inversion of what constituted activism was also found in its social wage 
elaborations.  Paralleling, and driven by what was expected inside the 1980s workplace, a 
new ‘market’ activity and morality profoundly transformed welfare provision.  Claiming a 
social security payment, once socially accepted as a necessary act due to economic 
downturn, age, disablement or caring responsibilities, became its ideological opposite – a 
stagnant pool of individual passivity.  Brian Howe, who took over the Social Security Ministry 
in 1984, soon publicly opposed the ‘old approach’ to social policy that had concerned itself 
with Keynesian-style ‘aggregate levels of social expenditure’ (cited in Gunn 1995: 26).  In a 
1985 ANZAAS conference speech to policy actors in the welfare sector he castigated: 
 
The political rhetoric of welfare reformers [who] insist that 120% or 150% of the poverty line 
would represent social justice for their constituents.  Repeated for over a decade, this rhetoric 
has become more of straightjacket than a cutting edge to social change.  The result has been 
expectations and political demands that no government could meet. 
(Howe 1985: 11-12) 
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Howe kept his word that the ALP would resist these demands as much as any Liberal 
government.  While welfare expenditures continued to rise as a proportion of GDP by 0.12 
per cent annually, the ALP’s attempts to rein in these costs during its period in power 
matched those averaged by the Howard government to 2006 (data derived from Laurie & 
McDonald 2008).  To ‘face reality’, Howe (1988: 8-9) called for ‘converting’ welfare from a 
‘safety net into a springboard’ through the state moving from ‘passive to active and 
interventionist policies’.   
 
At one level of analysis such a distinction between active and passive interventions is 
meaningless.  As an aspect of social reproduction, state welfare and labour market policy 
interventions are never in a passive relationship with capitalism.  Both labour market ‘safety 
net’ and family related welfare payments have been an inherently active aspect of the state-
capital relation’s competition in world markets and with other states.  For example, the 
establishment of the Department of Labour and National Service in October 1940 had unified 
the governance of Australian labour supply and industrial relations into one organisation.  
This was a political and economic intervention ‘necessary for the war effort’ (PMD 1940).  
Firstly, it provided an entity better able to counter possible disruptions to the production and 
distribution of materiel and war services posed by the ACTU Congress’ early (though tepid) 
support for the right to strike during wartime, and the more specific strike threats posed by 
the union pushing this agenda – the militant Federated Ironworkers Association (Douglas 
2003; Gollan 1972: 24-25).  Secondly, it cohered into one body state institutional 
management for the national provision of labour power.  At this general level, understanding 
particular state reproduction policies through Howe’s distinction between ‘old’ and new 
approaches to social welfare provision lacks analytical bite.  Rather, it is at a more specific 
historical level – as the political expression of the new state activist welfare response to 
global competition and crisis, that Howe’s distinction becomes significant.  Earlier labour 
market programs tended to be pragmatic, one-off responses by particular states to specific 
crises with narrowly defined aims or economic objectives.55  The neoliberal sensibility 
promoting the new ALMPs as ‘active’ was different in scale, scope and intent.  It was only 
after the economic crisis of the 1970s that most countries, urgently prompted by the OECD, 
developed ‘a fully-fledged arsenal’ of ALMPs in the 1980s linking the new state activism 
                                                
55
  For example, state responses to the Great Depression of the 1930s (the public works programs initiated by 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, Hitler’s work schemes and Joseph Lyons’ requiring men on sustenance to build, for 
example, the Victorian Shrine of Remembrance) were autarchic, internally focused programs pragmatically 
dealing with world trade collapsing to a third of what it had been in 1928 (Auer, Efendioglu & Leschke 2008: 7; 
Fox 2000: 5; Harman 1999b: 470). In the 1950s and 1960s, Swedish programs aimed at ‘enhancing structural 
change from low-productivity to high productivity sectors’ or the Australian Training Scheme for Widow 
Pensioners (see 3.3) had nationally unique economic or welfare aims. 
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required to compete in an expanding world market with individual market outcomes (Auer, 
Efendioglu & Leschke 2008: 7).  By 1994, the OECD (2006: 68) gelled the disparate 
elements of this arsenal into a Jobs Strategy to ‘emphasise’ that ALMPs needed to have 
more ‘co-ordinated’ and ‘active measures’ if a ‘coherent activation strategy’ for the 
unemployed was to be cost-effectively implemented by state managers.  
 
Working class women bore the economic and political brunt of the attack.  In the 1980s they 
were already more likely to be in receipt of social security payments than men and such 
payments have become increasingly feminised (Tseng & Wilkins 2003: 197, 206).  By 2007 
women received 90 per cent of family payments, 60 per cent of all pensions, and 54 per cent 
of Centrelink allowances (Harmer 2008).  In the mid-1980s Howe recognised that forging 
new political alliances with the women’s movement would help secure acceptance of this 
new turn:  
 
Women’s groups have put particular emphasis on the need to improve work incentives and 
job opportunities, not only because work disincentives can trap women in poverty, but also 
because employment can represent a major step to sex equality.  Workfare rather than 
welfare has also been a major preoccupation of the new right.  But the emphasis has been 
critically different.  Welfare and women’s groups have sought increased child care, lower 
effective marginal tax rates and improved training and employment opportunities. 
(Howe 1985: 14, my highlight) 
 
Howe put that the ALP’s welfare to work strategy was progressive because ALMPs would 
address what welfare and women’s groups sought.  It was in the new activation policies 
directed at single parent pensioners that the contradictions of attempting to shrink the 
welfare divide between the demands of the women’s movement and competitive strictures of 
neoliberalism to one of ‘emphasis’ were most sharply expressed.  On one hand, Howe 
(Hansard 1988a, my highlight) wishfully (Bloch 1995) held the reactionary notion that it would 
better if mother headed households did not exist, considering their ‘explosion’ in the 1970s 
and 1980s as ‘the great social tragedy of Australia’.  On the other hand, Howe realistically 
knew that political path to institute an active labour market program for single parents would 
require the imprimatur of a second wave women’s movement which had historically 
campaigned against the normative privileging of the nuclear family.  Public resistance to the 
notion that single parent pensioners should be forced to work was also high (see section 
4.3). 
 
Within this economic and political context Howe established the Social Security Review 
(SSR) in February 1986 as a vehicle to win further political support for this turn.  He 
appointed the self-described ‘democratic socialist’ feminist Bettina Cass to be the Review’s 
Consultant Director (Cass 1989: 3).  Over the next three years the Review assisted in the 
recalibration of social security policy based on the ‘fundamental perspective…that social 
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security policies constitute a key component of the ‘social wage’ as identified in the 
ACTU/government Accord’ (Cass 1987: 169).  
 
Cass argued that the ‘dual strategy’ of intervening in labour markets and improving the social 
wage required paid wage negotiations to be ‘linked with…a log of “social wage” 
claims…unprecedented in post-war Australian trade union politics’ (Cass 1989: 6).  The SSR 
never presented any such log, nor was it expected to do so.  The Review had commonalities 
with Australia Reconstructed.  Each elaborated the Accord’s Janus-faced politics – one from 
the welfare side of the wage-social wage relation, the other from its industrial side.  Each 
garnered crucial left backing – socialist feminists for the SSR, communist officials for the 
Accord.  Helping secure acceptance in their movements required the respect from activists 
which had primarily been won when the movements were at their height.56  In this sense the 
Accord necessitated that these officials and feminists working in the state and trade union 
bureaucracies had a left and right face if they were to win support for this project.   
 
On one hand Cass (1993) specifically stated that ‘the voluntary nature of the JET 
programme’ was ‘crucial to its effectiveness, since it is consistent with the principle that sole 
parent social security policy should provide choice for sole parents to remain outside of paid 
work’.  On the other hand, she generally argued against women’s dependency and poverty 
by promoting public policy that had ‘the idea that women should assume the responsibilities 
and earn the equal rewards of labour force participation’ (Cass 1994a: 111).  Cass 
recognised a ‘policy dilemma’ existed between ‘choice’ and ‘responsibility’ since the ‘idea’ of 
women’s independence was problematic ‘until men accept their full social obligations and 
responsibilities for care-giving work’ (Cass 1994a: 121).  As a socialist feminist, Cass should 
have also argued that such a policy dilemma was irresolvable until at least the basic class 
demands of the women’s movement – fertility rights, universal and free child care, flexible 
and well-paid work which suited women’s dual role, and an equal economic capacity to raise 
children outside marriage – had been met.  Crucially, it may have led her to politically 
recognise that she had posed the wrong policy dilemma.  In a rising tide of neoliberalism, 
framing the problem of what constituted a progressive welfare policy intervention as a 
question of individual choice and responsibility was politically disastrous.  Cass’ insistence of 
the voluntary character of JET was in contradiction with her overall argument supporting 
increased state compulsion in programs targeted at women without children and men, such 
as Newstart.  JET provided a single parent with childcare and other financial, educational 
and emotional resources within this political context.  The extent JET was a reform lay in the 
                                                
56
  Cass (1983, 1986b, 2006) particularly campaigned for better childcare provision and enhanced family 
payments. 
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potential of the movements to politically resist the SSR and the Labor government framing 
such provisions as ALMPs.  The dilemma Cass actually faced was political – how to support 
the demands of the movements against the state welfare attacks she was involved in 
leading.   
 
Such demands were deemed to be part of what Howe termed ‘expectations and political 
demands that no government could meet’ – an example of Bloch’s (1995) ‘wishful thinking’.  
The Review’s supposedly feminist solution – a political logic drawn from the contradictory 
class location occupied by Cass – was that state activation policies would not only come first, 
but should come first.  That is, feminist responses to encourage women’s independence 
could be primarily driven by policies designed by mid-level state actors representing these 
interests – a specific political ‘state radicalism’ caught between the women’s movement and 
the state’s accumulation and legitimation relation to Australian capital. Welfare policies that 
promoted or enforced the idea of labour market responsibility were a necessary aspect of the 
ALP’s competition agenda for Australian capitalism.  Such a rationality had a left and feminist 
face. Tightening pension rules and introducing activation policies were necessary if the social 
security system in Australia was to quickly move ‘from the logic of gender difference to 
gender sameness’ (Shaver 1993: 5-6).   
 
The ‘left’ contractual premises underlying the connection between activation policies, their 
attendant payments and women’s ‘freedom’ were damagingly given intellectual support by 
the liberal feminist philosopher Anna Yeatman. She considered these activated payments to 
be the start of a ‘new contractualism’ in Australian welfare services which would transform 
recipients into ‘customers’ with ‘choice and voice’ compared to the paternalism of the old 
arrangements (Yeatman 1994).  Framing welfare as an individualized, contractual 
relationship with the state (or its proxies) gave a radical feminist gloss to what were rightward 
moving policies.  In asserting such a potential in the SSR, both liberal and socialist feminism 
added to the heightened expectations being raised by the left of the union movement in the 
Accord.  Its left-feminist edge idealised the social compact as an arrangement which held 
within it the promise of a ‘transition to gender equality’ while its left-union edge abstracted it 
as a ‘transition to socialism’ – with equally disarming consequences.   
 
The ‘interactive’ purpose of the Review’s six issues papers (informed by 30 background 
papers) was ‘to generate…public debate’ by proposing ‘directions for reform’ in each of the 
policy areas they addressed: income support for families with children, policies for sole 
parents, for the unemployed, people with disabilities and retirement incomes policy (Cass 
1989: 2, 4; Raymond 1987: iii, 111).  The ALP used Howe’s three-year Review process to 
politically test, adapt and adopt welfare policies to incrementally entrench the Active Society 
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premises of the Accord.  Parliament offered little resistance – none of the 585 submissions to 
the Review came from Liberal-National Party Opposition (Hansard 1988b).  The SSR’s 
documents tended to keep their proposals tactically open to allow the timing and specific 
content of these decisions to be elaborated by the Minister.  Key Review authors closest to 
Howe, such as Judy Raymond who worked within DSS, could more finely tailor their papers, 
and so their proposals.  Her Issues Paper Number 3 – Bringing up Children Alone: Policies 
for Sole Parents, became one of the more detailed and concrete documents produced for the 
Review and was often used throughout the SSR to justify a range of incremental policy 
changes directed at mother-headed households, including JET (Raymond 1987).   
 
The 1986 Budget instituted a series of entitlement reviews for single parent pensioners.  A 
lengthy Sole Parent Review (SPR) form now needed to be completed at the four, eight and 
12 week point following a grant of pension and 12 weeks thereafter (Wannan 1996: 65).  A 
JA describes the SPR process from ‘both sides of the counter’.  Before working at DSS she 
had been receiving a single parent pension: 
 
The 12-weekly forms, the pink forms, SPRs, there is something that's embedded in my brain; 
on both sides of the counter because I used to have to go in every 12 weeks and I hated 
it…You just stood in the queue until you got there.  It was very much like the bank 
systems…very much an "us and them" type of thing.  The person did not really make any eye 
contact with you.  They just checked through the form.  "Thanks.  See you later.  See you in 
12 weeks."  When I did have…[previous] particular reviews…I saw the same officer each 
time…and he always joked around, made it a bit more relaxed, and the fact that I had worked 
there as a temp once I had been there for the three months, it was a little bit more human but 
if I hadn't have done that temp period it was just, "You're a number," because you would walk 
in, take a ticket … be seated, and I used to sit there thinking, "What if someone can't read?  
What if someone is deaf?"  And I just thought that was a shocking way to run a business; take 
a ticket and be seated because you're not really a person.  [Laughs] 
(Gulzar 2006) 
 
After starting ongoing work at DSS in the early 1990s she had to process the forms: 
 
It [the SPR] was about a 10-page little booklet and it questioned parents in terms of whether 
they had had any income, what their assets were, if they had sold anything; if they had any 
other type of income whatsoever; whether their living arrangements had changed; if they were 
residing with people of the opposite sex; the entire gambit of a person's relationship.  About 
the only thing it didn't ask was the colour of their underwear.  I would go through those and 
update all of the details on the customer's record when they came in.  There would be 
thousands of those each week that I was processing…You coded [any earnings] up and they 
ended up with a debt which seemed inequitable.  If they had have been aware, and 
sometimes there would be a backlog of forms because there were so many of them, so it 
might be a little way off, before they ended up actually being coded, and so that person might 
be financially disadvantaged in that process. 
(Gulzar 2006)  
 
The government’s proposal to have a compulsory employment scheme was endorsed by the 
ACTU in October 1986 (Gunn 1995: 83).  In November 1986 changes to Section 43 and 44 
of the Social Security Act gave DSS legal authority for the first time to impose ‘a minimum 
postponement period’ of two weeks for a person not taking ‘reasonable steps’ to obtain 
employment (Dapre 2006a: 67).  By June 1987 the department was given broad powers 
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implement workfare (Gunn 1995: 87).  Within two years, assorted single parent pensions 
were whittled down to one payment and stripped back to cease when their youngest child 
turned 16.  This denied many the option of a pension payment if their child (up to age 25) 
was studying and a bridging pension until they qualified for the Age pension (see Dapre 
2006a: 80, 117).  By 1989 all sole parents who hit this new child-age barrier were transferred 
to Unemployment Benefit, requiring them to seek work while receiving a lower ‘allowance’ 
payment with a far steeper taper rate.  Various policy carrots were offered to orient sole 
parents to paid work before this stick was wielded.  The Review advocated a looser pension 
income test to make part-time, casual or seasonal work more attractive.  Family allowances 
and rent assistance were marginally increased and redirected to poorer households (Cass 
1989: 22).  However, Cass (1994b: 16) admitted most of the SSR’s proposals were ‘either 
displaced or diluted’ due to the government’s fiscal constraints. 
 
The cascade of incremental welfare policy changes generated by the Accord-SSR process 
was qualitatively transformed by Keating’s 1988 Budget announcement that two ALMPs 
would commence within six months.  JET’s birth, Keating declared, came with a ‘counterpart’ 
program New-Start, to assist ‘single parents’ and long-term unemployed adults ‘into paid 
work’ (Brownlee 1991: 14).  Tom McDonald (BWIU) and Greg Harrison (AMWU) supported 
the welfare measures if they ‘improved real living standards’, pointing out that Keating had 
long stopped consulting the ACTU wages committee about the Budget’s welfare-wage trade-
off (SMH 1988).  ACOSS (1989: 22) endorsed the welfare package but expressed 
‘concerns’.  At face value defining a compulsory (Newstart) and a voluntary (JET) program 
as ‘parallel policies’ (OSW 1988: 227) seemed more political flourish than a substantive 
claim.  From February 1989 continuing receipt of Unemployment Benefit (UB) for all 21-54 
year olds was conditional on meeting two new ‘obligations’: signing a New-Start Activity 
Agreement at a 12-month interview and carrying out such activities (ACOSS 1989: 9).57   
When JET was rolled out in March 1989 those on the Single Parent Pension faced no 
equivalent obligations.   
 
An ideological chasm between coercion and choice seemingly emerged between the two 
policy approaches.  For two years the programs were co-run by DSS and the CES.  
Crucially, the further subordination of unemployed welfare recipients came with the passage 
of the new Social Security Act in 1991 which inaugurated the Accord’s fully blown articulation 
of welfare under Labor – the Active Employment Strategy (DSS & DEET 1993: 5).  The 
resulting implementation of Newstart Allowance (NSA) was an historically significant 
neoliberal moment, where the last ‘static’ rights-based residues of unemployment payments 
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  18 to 20 year olds were to be swiftly integrated into the policy within 11 months (DSS & DEET 1993: 6). 
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were effectively expunged.  A dynamic relationship of conditionality was legislated in which 
the ‘jobseeker’ was required to march to an increasingly faster tempo of administrative, 
payment and activity workfare obligations.  All subsequent policy changes and strategies for 
NSA recipients, from the ALP’s Working Nation (CoA 1994) to the Howard government’s 
Work First policies (Hockey 2005), only increased the quantity, pulse and compliance 
intensity of these obligations.  If single parents initially retained their pension rights outside 
this strategy, Keating’s original claim that JET was a counterpart to Newstart was eventually 
proved correct.  What appeared to be a deep-seated difference gradually dissolved over the 
next 15 years, ultimately confirming that both programs had been strategically minted out of 
a common neoliberal coinage (CoA 2005b).  What tangibly separated them was time, or 
more precisely political timing: Newstart anticipated what JET would become.  
 
Though women receiving Social Security payments in the early 1990s were considered to be 
moving towards the ‘logic of gender sameness’, welfare provision seemed to entrench 
gender difference.  Not only were there clear payment and program divisions between 
Newstart  (mainly male) and Sole Parent Pension (overwhelmingly female) recipients, new 
gender distinctions emerged in other payments bureaucratically applying this logic.  This was 
because payments had to be ‘individualised’ if any future activation contract was to apply.  In 
1993 the ALP government’s ‘Families Package’ transferred all child-related payments and 
Rental Assistance to the primary carer in a two parent family (Foreman 1995).  Prior to 1995, 
adult benefit payments at the ‘combined married rate’ were normally paid to the husband – 
under the social presumption that half would be given to his wife (Dapre 2006b: 309).  In 
1995, the policies implemented under the 1994 Working Nation (The White Paper on 
Employment and Growth) split this rate, paying the ‘primary carer’ a new ‘income support 
payment’ Parenting Allowance (CoA 1994: 147).  Coupled mothers receiving their own DSS 
payment was a ‘logical’ and progressive move towards gender sameness, but it came with 
the cost of turning it into an income support payment, implicitly conditional on paid work.  
When Keating announced the The White Paper he initially argued that Parenting Allowance 
sought to ‘markedly improve the incentive for couples to seek and accept full time jobs by 
treating them as individuals’ yet tempered this: 
 
For those whose primary activity is looking after dependent children below the age of 16…it is 
not reasonable to expect these people to look for full time work…The Parenting Allowance will 
provide increased choice for parents balancing work and family responsibilities. 
(CoA 1994: 147)  
 
In legally separating these payments the subsequent Social Security (Parenting Allowance 
and Other Measures) Legislation Amendment Act 1994 introduced a qualitatively new 
contradiction.  Parenting Allowance seemingly met feminist calls for an individualised 
payment tailored to treat men and women with ‘sameness’ only by a commensurable  policy 
movement which reduced each to an ‘activated’ unemployed couple.  Welfare provision now 
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normatively framed both parents by their lack of paid work, full-time for the father (NSA) and 
part-time for the mother (Parenting Allowance).  A new allowance income test introduced at 
this time provided greater incentives to take up part-time work (Carberry, Chan & Heyworth 
1996).  The contradiction of embedding Parenting Allowance (and the primary carer) within 
an unemployment (and coupled) framework increased the possibility of compulsion.   
 
It was part of a gradual process of re-framing parents with primary care responsibilities to 
more clearly have an individual relationship with DSS and a concomitant responsibility for 
payment receipt.  No activity test yet applied, but Parenting Allowance recipients were now 
required to inform DSS fortnightly of any earnings either had received plus all other usual 
‘notifiable events’58  Such incremental changes were construed to be progressive insofar as 
they gave primary carers a welfare personhood denied by the earlier married rate 
‘breadwinner’ model (Yeatman 1996).  DSS policy researchers at the time considered a 
welfare alignment had occurred:  
 
The rationale for both the Sole Parent Pension and PgA [Parenting Allowance] were therefore 
the same: an entitlement to automatically receive assistance because of their income and 
caring status (Carberry, Chan & Heyworth 1996).   
 
It was equally contingent, however, on according a labour-market identity to these parents.  
Lois Bryson (1995: 63-64), in supporting such a move, argued that such changes marked a 
ideological break (held since Curtin’s introduction of the Widow Pension) that ‘motherhood 
and the capacity to seek one’s own support on the open market were antithetical’.  Yet in the 
absence of a wide social campaign for these changes such an abstracted ‘top down’ reform 
was inevitably dominated by the concrete politics of neoliberalism sweeping most OECD 
countries.  Politically isolated from those it purported to support, it helped usher in an attack 
on primary carers.   
 
The contradiction in individualising and making commensurable these unstable quasi 
parenting-unemployment payments created the administrative preconditions to apply a 
universal work test of both single and coupled mothers when a further lurch to the right 
occurred under the Howard Government in 1996.  While these manoeuvres were being 
played out partnered parents remained excluded from JET.  Their access to the program 
only came in 1998.  The early phase of JET was therefore solely directed to single parents.   
Table 4 provides a one-page timeline detailing the state’s overall social policy and 
institutional interventions discussed in this study and how they affected single parents and 
the JET program.   
 
                                                
58
 The normal 14 day notification period applied to ‘events’ such as change of address, marital status, study loads, 
income and assets, residency, rent etc.  
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Table 4  
 Social policy interventions Institutional interventions JET changes 
Pre-
1989 
Supporting Mother’s Benefit introduced (1973). 
Supporting Mother’s Benefit changed to Supporting Parents 
Benefit to include single fathers (1977). 
Supporting Parent Payment ceases once youngest child turns 
16 rather than 25 (1987). 
Machinery of government changes reduced the number of departments 
from 28 to 18 to support the drive towards managerialism (1987).  
DSS remained focused on technical processing high numbers of 
claimants. 
Social Security Review established (1986). 
 
1989 Supporting Parents Benefit and Class A Widows Pension 
amalgamated into Sole Parent Pension.  
ACOSS recommends JET be strengthened and JAs have a caseload 
cap of 50 clients. 
JET introduced as a voluntary program open to all sole parent 
pensioners. 
JET Advisers given a yearly target of 900 new single parent interviews 
and a small budget to pay for a parent’s education expenses. 
35 JET Advisers initially employed.  
12 week JET Child Care subsidy introduced for sole parent pensioners 
starting work.  Longer term subsidies for study introduced. 
1990  A Departmental Interim Evaluation Report of JET leads to increases in 
JET Adviser numbers and lowering of yearly interview targets.  
JET Advisers increased to 80 with a reduced yearly interview target of 
650. 
1991  Alan Jordan publishes the first NPM critique of JET Two Years of the 
Jobs, Education and Training Program for Sole Parents: Response, 
Activity and Outcomes. 
Part-time JET Clerical Assistants employed. 
Sole parent pensioners gain access to the $100 Employment Entry 
Payment. 
1992  The Social Policy Division of DSS responds in the JET Evaluation 
Report.  
Sole parent pensioners gain access to the $200 Education Entry 
Payment. 
JET Adviser numbers increased to 80. 
1993  ANAO Audit Report resumes the NPM attack on JET. JET Child Care Fee Assistance extended from 12 to 26 weeks for sole 
parents starting work. Long term subsidies for study remain. 
Widow Class B & Carer pensioners gain JET access. 
1995 Parenting Allowance introduced as a separate payment for a 
partnered mother rather than one joint Unemployment Benefit 
to her husband.  
 Widow Allowees gain access to JET. 
1997  Centrelink established. 
Last JET Evaluation Report published. 
Carmen Zanetti (ex-head of JET) employed to institute strenuous 
welfarism and introduces a range of cultural change programs. 
Partner Allowees gain access to JET 
1998 Sole Parent Pension and Parenting Allowance replaced with 
Parenting Payment Single (PPS) and Partnered (PPP). 
 Parenting Payment Partnered customers gain access to JET 
1999  Pech and McCoull publish first version of Transgenerational welfare 
dependence: myth or reality? 
Reference Group on Welfare Reform established by Minister of Social 
Security.  
 
2000 Working single parents receive lower Parenting Payment Single 
as pension taper rate is reduced from 50 to 40 per cent 
Pearse publishes The Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot. 
Reference Group on Welfare Reform’s Report tabled by McClure. 
Family Assistance Offices established. 
JA’s $40,000 yearly training budgets for parents start to be centralised 
into Area offices 
2002  Phase 1 of the AWT measures yet to be passed in parliament but 
begun to be rolled out in Centrelink.  Working-age income support 
recipients divided into ‘AWT target groups’.  Pending passage of the 
AWT legislation only the yearly interview was compulsory at this stage 
for PP recipients. 
500 PAs recruited to interview ‘AWT target groups’ 
In the Parenting Measures of AWT phase 1 the ‘single parent target 
group’ was broken into those whose youngest child was 13-15 
(interviewed by a JA) and those whose youngest child was 5-12 
(interviewed by a PA).   
2003 Australians Working Together (AWT) Package passed in 
parliament.  Under AWT Phase 1 measures PP recipients with 
a child aged 6-15 years required to attend annual Centrelink 
participation interview and those whose youngest child was 13-
15 required to undertake 150 hours of activity in a six month 
period. 
Uhrig Review lambasts Centrelink governance arrangements and 
Howard government starts to take direct political control over the 
agency 
 
JAs were required to ensure that the parents they were interviewing met 
the extra compliance measures of Phase 1 
JET training budgets for parents reduced 
 
 
2004 $5000 Maternity Payment introduced 
Base rate of FTB increased by 63 per cent. 
DHS-DEWR launch a job-agency referral campaign leading to 600,000 
contacts of PP and DSP recipients by front-line staff in the 12 months 
ending June 2006 
 
2005  Centrelink Board abolished and agency absorbed into DEWR, then 
DHS. 
Work First and Rapid Connect campaigns launched by Minister Hockey 
to drive through a new cultural change program in Centrelink. 
 
2006 Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment 
(Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Act passed.  Under 
Welfare to Work Phase 2 PP entitlements ceased for a single 
parent once their youngest child turned 8 and for a partnered 
parent once their child turned 6.  Both sets of parents placed on 
NSA. 
 JET Child Care Fee Assistance reduced from up to 8 years to a 
maximum of 12 months. 
JA and PA roles subsumed into general frontline work. 
All parents in the AWT ‘target groups’ required to work a minimum of 30 
hours a fortnight. 
JET program abolished. 
Sources: Carney 2006b; Hansard 2004a; RN 2004; SCARC 2002 
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3.4 Initiating JET 
 
  
The 1988-89 Budget Paper No. 1 stated JET had two objectives – to ‘improve the labour 
force participation of sole parents’, and to reduce ‘outlays on social security pensions and 
benefits’ (CoA 1988: 160).  Launched in March 1989, the legislative basis for the program 
was achieved through the Parliament passing the machinery of government provisions of the 
Budget – the Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Bill 1988-89.  The 1988-89 Budget 
Statement by the Office of the Status of Women said JET aimed to be more than just 
another program but rather a ‘comprehensive strategy….to assist the special needs of sole 
parents’ (OSW 1988: 226).  The first departmental evaluation of JET in July 1990 reiterated 
the OSW’s position, calling JET an ‘integrated program of assistance providing individual 
advice, access to child care and education, training and employment opportunities’ (DSS, 
DEET & DCSH 1990: 66, my highlight).  Similarly, DSS (1991) promoted JET as a way 
single parents could ‘better themselves’.   
 
Funding of $22 million in 1989-90 for JET’s start-up costs was allocated to the three 
departments jointly administering the program – Social Security; Employment, Education and 
Training; and Community Services and Health (DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990: 7).  While a 
Steering Committee comprising senior representatives of the three departments officially 
oversaw the program, the National Program Manager of DSS took primary responsibility for 
‘running JET’ (Zanetti 2009).  Key elements of the program include:  
 
 JET was a voluntary program which a participant could leave at any time 
 JET was open to all single parent pensioners.  There were three main ‘target groups’ 
JET workers were expected to focus upon: 
o Single parents who had been in receipt of a pension for at least 12 months 
and whose youngest child was over the age of six years; 
o Pensioners who would lose their pension within the next two years due to 
their youngest child turning 16 years of age; and 
o Teenage single parents. 
 JET Child Care Fee Assistance allowed a participant to engage in a broadly defined 
set of labour market related activities at a nominal cost ($2 per day in the 1990s). 
This included studying for up to eight years and for the first 12 weeks after a single 
parent gained paid work (ACOSS 1989: 6). JET workers in DCSH liaised with the JAs 
in DSS to organise placements of children in long day care, family day care or out of 
school hours care when requested by a single parent.  
 JA s in DSS had the primary responsibility for assessing a client’s ‘employment 
aspirations, needs and readiness to enter the labour market’ and referring them to a 
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range of services (DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990: 4).  Formulating and revisiting plans 
for a client to meet their employment aspirations usually required multiple interviews 
over months and frequently years.  A JA was expected to interview at least 900 new 
single parents a year and promote the program in the community (DSS, DEET, 
DHHCS 1992: 70).  A $40,000 yearly budget allowed the JA to fund courses for 
clients if a TAFE option was not available or attracted a significant fee.  
 JET Contact Officers in DEET primarily placed clients referred by JAs into labour 
market programs such as: 
o vocational training (Jobtrain); 
o subsidised employment (Jobstart); 
o job searching techniques (Job Search Training Program) ; and  
o skills training, personal support and enterprise activities delivered by the 
Skillshare Program (DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990: 24).   
 
In most social policy literature JET’s genesis is directly credited to the SSR (Briggs 1996: 5; 
Brownlee 1991; Cass 1989: 31; Cook 2008: 6; Gardiner 1999: 43; McHugh & Millar 1996: 
20).  On one hand, empirical support for this view can be found in the SSR 
Background/Discussion Paper No 12 which questioned whether single parents should 
‘continue to be treated’ as ‘largely outside the workforce’, raising as an ‘issue’ the need for 
‘more responsive training programs…to encourage sole parents to explore avenues of 
training and employment’ (Frey 1986: 14-15).  Issues Paper No. 3 explicitly recommended a 
JET-like program (Raymond 1987: iii, 111).  On the other hand, the politically iterative nature 
of the SSR meant that much of the detailed policy development for JET occurred outside the 
official Cass road show even though its Active Society premises thoroughly invest the 
program.   
 
However, neither the broadly-held view that the SSR created JET nor a clear separation 
between the SSR and JET’s policy development is accurate.  What linked both was Howe’s 
newly appointed head of the Social Policy Division of Social Security, Meredith Edwards.  
She had the dual role of internally managing the Review for DSS (as a key bureaucratic 
player within the SSR) and developing JET into a viable program (as the central figure within 
DSS).  She alone straddled the apparent distinction between JET as an Accord expression 
of the SSR and as a DSS-produced policy.  Edwards traced the specific initiative for JET to 
the Secretary of DSS: 
 
It was Derek Volker whose pistol had started it.  Derek Volker was in America and…came 
back and handed me a few pamphlets on their ET program…and he said "This looks pretty 
terrific, Meredith.  You might want to explore this”…Brian Howe went [next] and he came back 
pretty impressed with what they were doing.  So Derek is on side, the Minister is on side, and 
then I go across and…come back convinced that we should have something similar…Brian 
said, "Well, can't we be a bit more adventurous and do it as a budget option? Of course I was 
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elated.  I never thought it was going to be possible because the climate was so bad…and so 
then we started to – we, within the division, started to develop a proposal 
(Edwards 2006)59 
 
Edwards (2006) argued that a ‘little Mafia’ of ‘femocrats’ was critical to securing JET’s 
successful passage through the machinations of government.60  Lesley Lynch expressed the 
highly ambivalent attitude of the women’s movement to the femocrats of the 1980s:   
 
One of the big questions is, of course, whether or not this strategy constitutes a healthy phase 
in an ongoing radical movement. Is it a strategic transference of the struggle to the infiltration 
of a key arena of influence or an undermining of the Women’s Movement, or at least a 
significant section of it, as a radical force in the Australian social and political scene? 
(Lynch 1984: 38) 
 
Sawer notes Lynch’s response to her own question: 
 
Her answer was that the increased pragmatism and accommodation within state structures of 
radical feminists must be understood in terms of wariness and lack of perceived radical 
alternatives – “‘our wings have been clipped, our options closed, our energies depleted’’ 
(Sawer 1993: 15) 
 
Lynch’s ambivalence partially captures how divided the ‘progressive’ consciousness of those 
occupying contradictory class locations were inside the 1980s Australian state, which 
extended even some departmental Division heads such as Meredith Edwards who occupied 
a more openly ruling class location with the bureaucracy.  They also point to an underlying 
logic of support for the supposedly pragmatic politics of the Accord and the SSR.  Anne 
Summers’ (1990: 17) call ‘to settle for half a loaf rather than no bread at all’ expresses what 
Bloch termed the ‘realistic expectations’ of this bureaucratic layer.  Margaret Levi and, 
pertinently, Meredith Edwards give an evaluative criterion to assess if such ‘pragmatism and 
accommodation’ harms the movement they represent – ‘femocrats can be adjudged to be 
coopted if they gain the semblance rather than the reality of power over decision-making’ 
(Levi & Edwards 1989: 6-7).   
 
 
                                                
59
 Started in 1983, ET was a Massachusetts ALMP targeting single parents who received Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC).  By 1988 the ET program had placed over 55,000 sole parents in jobs resulting in 
75 per cent of these women losing their AFDC benefits (DSS 1989).  A 1987 study concluded that ET Choices 
has ‘contributed significantly to the drop in the welfare caseload in Massachusetts’ (MTF 1987: 1) but, like all 
ALMP evaluations, others were less positive (Garasky 1990; Nightingale, Bawden & Burbidge 1987).  Garasky 
cited the ‘numerous econometric problems’ associated with the Taxpayers Foundation Report.  His study found 
that the first 18 months of the program were ‘successful’ but then ‘had little effect’ on reducing caseloads 
(Garasky 1990: 701). 
60
 The term ‘femocrat’ was coined by second wave activists in Australia and New Zealand due to the close 
relations of certain feminists with national legislative reform since the 1880s (Levi & Edwards 1989: 2; Sawer 
1993: 2).   
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Levi and Edwards explain the ‘constraints’ they faced between their dual roles as ‘state 
actors’ and ‘representatives of a social movement’:  
 
Sometimes, a considerably diluted policy bargain – from the perspective of the femocrat – is 
the only way to achieve any programmatic change or to prevent a deterioration of previous 
feminist gains.  Moreover she may find herself making deals that bring support on a particular 
proposal in return for her support on some treasured proposal of a non-feminist ally.  Over 
time, such a network of interdependence may transform the goals of all parties’. 
(Levi & Edwards 1990: 151) 
 
Such deeply contradictory comments echo the bargaining attitude of trade union officials in 
the 1980s.  Aiming for a better social wage by piecemeal negotiations within the Accord’s 
wage restraint (union officials) or activation terms (feminist officers) cruelled viable political 
action to the extent that the social goal both sought became illusory.  Ironically, this was 
especially so because small wins were possible.  JET is an example of the contradictions 
embedded in such small victories.   
 
Levi and Edwards (1989: 28) describe JET as a ‘femocratic reform’ – an example of a 
feminist proposal to ‘promote the interests of women…that depend[s] on femocrats for their 
initiation, maintenance or implementation’ (see pages 229-232 for my response). Despite the 
‘tight budgetary circumstances’ (Levi & Edwards 1990: 164) JET was a ‘relatively easy 
program to develop…[because] it had Ministerial and high-ranking bureaucratic support and 
little significant opposition’ (Levi & Edwards 1989: 28):  
 
I knew Frances [Davies at DEET – the Department of Employment, Education and Training]… 
we used to work together, and I did know her through WEL, Women's Electoral Lobby…the 
other key person was in whatever it was called at the time, Health and Community Services, 
or whatever it was called, and that was Mary Minnane, who I didn't know so well but I admired 
greatly.  She was important because of the childcare that we needed for the JET Program; 
you know, having modelled it on the ET one, we needed housing, childcare, a labour market.  
So we three were pretty important in this and I reflect in my paper (Levi & Edwards 1989) on 
what would have happened if guys at that senior level had been involved.  Would we have got 
it up?  Because several around me in Social Security they didn't see it as a priority and 
thought it was a bit too feminist, you know, but the support we got, so this is where the actors 
are important, it was the Secretary and the Minister, so it was having that support that enabled 
it to happen.  
(Edwards 2006) 
 
JET was launched with what was, for a public service department, ‘a lot of bureaucratic 
fanfare…to sell the program’ (Deniz 2006).  Area management ‘outreach’ positions were 
created to promote DSS’s first active welfare program.  They organised local media 
coverage, shopping centre promotions and formal state launches which had ‘a swag of 
luminaries…from Canberra’ (Harley 2007).  In the upper levels of DSS the initial 
implementation of JET was considered to be politically and institutionally highly significant.  
For the ‘first time’ JET ‘involved us in negotiation with other agencies to achieve an 
outcome’, and therefore ‘started to open up things for us in terms of our linkages into other 
organisations’(Harley 2007).   
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One National Office middle manager put it in these terms: 
 
At a higher level the people responsible for this new program that dealt with sole parent there 
was a lot of external political brownie points with having a successful JET program and a lot of 
bureaucratic brownie points within the central agencies in Canberra of being a successful 
program manager for this JET program. …It was a bit of a crowning achievement that DSS 
got to have these people [JAs] in their patch so it was very important that it was a success. 
(Deniz 2006) 
  
The National Co-ordinator of the program, Jenny Stafford, explained in a staff video that DSS 
had to be ‘the main focus’ because ‘traditionally single parents haven’t seen themselves as 
part of the workforce’ (DSS 1989).   
 
According to one social worker who worked in DSS in the 1970s and 1980s, JET simply 
adopted the key features an earlier program run by the department – the Training Scheme 
for Widow Pensioners (TSWP 1968-1974) (SW 2005).  A fascinating ‘social documentary’ in 
the Ken Loach ‘kitchen sink’ realist tradition entitled Women Alone (Kingsbury, 1973, Film 
Australia) promoted this scheme in its last years.  Played by a mix of professional actors and 
DSS staff the 27 minute film follows a deserted wife and a widow through a series of 
domestic events, discussions with social workers about the scheme, and how their eventual 
employment opened possibilities of a ‘new start’ in life.  Despite surface similarities with JET, 
the Training Scheme for Widow Pensioners was not an ALMP infused with an individually 
competitive neoliberal rationality.  Rather it was a program based on the broad welfare ‘aim 
to motivate women’ infrequently used by social workers when they could carve time out of 
their normal workload (DSS 1973: 78).  The Training Scheme involved assessing Class A 
and B widows under the age of 45 for training courses (FaCSIA 2006: 57, 62).  Those 
deemed suitable had tuition, fares and fees paid and, in 1969, received up to $80 for books 
and equipment and a training allowance of $4 a week (DSS 1969: 7).  In the four years to 
July 1972 some 6211 women had undertaken typing, dressmaking, reception and secretarial 
type courses, 2047 subsequently gaining paid work (DSS 1969: 23; 1972: 34).  The policy 
focus shifted away from widows in October 1974 when the Training Scheme was subsumed 
into the new National Employment and Training Scheme (FaCSIA 2006: 62).  
 
JET was different in scale, scope, content and intent to the Training Scheme for Widow 
Pensioners.  It was the first ‘collaborative program’ which operated in a ‘new co-operative 
mode’ across a number of departments (Zanetti 2009).  JAs interviewed nearly 300,000 
single parents in its first seven years, resulting in approximately 200,000 (mainly women) 
securing paid work, training or study (DSS 1997a: 14, vi).  All sole parent pensioners had 
access to the program, compared to the highly restrictive criteria of the Training Scheme for 
Widow Pensioners.   
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JET was not a welfare program to encourage labour market participation ‘on the side’ when 
time allowed, as with the earlier Training Scheme.  The 80 JAs who were eventually 
deployed in DSS regional offices by 1993 had only one role – to promote and institute the 
JET program.  They were supported by a similar number of part-time CES counterparts, JET 
Contact Officers, whose role was to promote JET, identify eligible clients who may not know 
about the program and advise them of JET services, book those interested for a JA interview 
and link those interested to CES employment programs (CES 1996). A smaller group of JET 
Child Care Workers in the Department of Community Services and Health supported the JAs 
and single parents by finding and paying for family day care, occasional care and long day 
care places for children whose parents were studying, working or training through JET.  It 
was, therefore, an institutionally and politically integrated mass workfare program aimed at a 
much larger target group, even if delivered by a relatively small number of staff.   
 
Edwards recollects what led to the Massachusetts ET program (see note 58) being adapted 
to the Australian context and implemented in DSS:  
 
But what did happen…which I thought was brilliant…is [that] Derek Volker named it JET.  I 
remember him saying one afternoon, "What are we going to call this thing?"  I went, "Ah, ah," 
thought hard, hard, you know, "What are we going to"– and come in the next morning and he 
said, "I've got it – JET!"  And I was so pleased he had got it because it meant he owned it and 
that was really, really important. 
(Edwards 2006)  
 
After Volker’s acronym was ‘readily accepted by the Minister’, a ‘very rapid policy 
development’ was led by DSS Policy Division ‘in conjunction with femocrats working in the 
area of childcare in DCSH and the Women’s Bureau in DEET’(Levi & Edwards 1990: 164).  
One reason Edwards mentions for JET’s fast progress was that there had been ‘a lot of fuss, 
particularly from the outside’ over the ‘punitive’ and ‘horrible’ 1986 Budget decision to deny 
pension entitlements to single parents whose youngest child had reached 16 years of age.  
A social worker interviewed gave an example, recalling how a single parent self-help group 
responded to the Budget announcement: 
 
They were outraged that their rights to a Widows B pension were being withdrawn.  They 
campaigned against it to the local member [of parliament] and wrote leaflets and handed out 
petitions at the --– office.  They built such a strong organisation out of it that that group still 
continues to this day, while many other groups faded away.’ 
(SW 2005.   
 
Politically, the ‘climate was right to do something for sole parents’ (Edwards 2006).  Chuck 
Atkins from the Department of Welfare in Massachusetts, toured Australia in JET’s inaugural 
year, stressing that the main ‘message’ of the ET program was that ‘any job won’t do’ if 
parents were to take seriously ET’s slogan “Your future is in your hands” (DSS 1989).  In the 
‘JET Community video’ DSS (1991) released, starring prominent Australian actor Noni 
Hazelhurst, emphasis was placed on single parents using JET ‘to better themselves’ and 
‘become self-sufficient’.  An Indigenous version was produced along the same themes (DSS 
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1993).  JET publicity material, particularly the main campaign poster, received a mixed 
response among JAs and community organisations (see Figure 7).  Typical comments 
elicited in a 1991 evaluation (Brewer 1991: 58) of the program were:  
 
The poster must have been designed by a man. It’s conservative, traditional and emotive. It 
looks like a mother farewelling her child at a child care centre’ 
 
Why are you singled out to go back to work by the government if you’re already doing an 
important job? 
 
Those representing migrant, indigenous and low income groups pointed out ‘that the image 
in the poster was of a well presented, mature age, Anglo-Saxon woman with whom [our] 
clients would not identify’.  This was reinforced by the JET advertising campaign in Cleo 
magazine which was ‘only read by upwardly mobile, middle class women’. They thought 
advertising should stress that JET was a voluntary program, and that such an emphasis was 
further ‘hampered’ by locating it inside a DSS office (Brewer 1991: 58-59, 84). 
 
Meredith Edwards’ original conception of the ideal role JAs should play seemed to be 
coming to fruition:  
 
The JET Adviser was absolute[ly] key because she, or he, was the person who would be, in 
our view originally, because you always have your ideal, interviewing the sole parent and 
saying things like, "How's your housing?  What do you need in child care?"  And then very 
importantly our ideal was, "Ask them about what they really want to do with their life," because 
they may not be able to work right now, but say someone said, "Well, I always wanted to be a 
maths teacher or I wanted to be a mechanic," or whatever and they never made it, this might 
be the opportunity with the help of Austudy [sic] to get them to spend two or three years doing 
what they wanted which would help their income stream into the future. 
(Edwards 2006) 
 
JET remained a creation of femocrats.  Its backing from ‘non-governmental feminists was not 
much in evidence’ due ‘more to the malaise in the women’s movement than lack of support’ 
(Levi & Edwards 1990: 164).  Writing in 1990, Levi and Edwards speculated how JET would 
have evolved if femocrats had not been ‘strongly involved’ in its development: 
 
A likely scenario would be that the program would have been introduced which was 
mandatory for certain sole parents (e.g., where their youngest child was over the age of 10 or 
12); would have had much less emphasis on the importance of child care; and would have 
operated out of DEET rather than DSS, reflecting an emphasis on the labour market rather 
than on the social aspects of JET. 
(Levi & Edwards 1990: 165) 
 
Levi and Edwards (1990: 166) warned ‘the scheme is most vulnerable…given the relative 
scarcity of femocrats [and]…could be changed in the punitive direction’.  However, their top 
down analysis of JET’s fragile, but promising early development barely examined the 
institutional and economic contexts within which the program was produced.   
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Figure 7 
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 ‘Like water and oil’: JAs and other frontline workers 
 
A determined push to restructure public administration paralleled the Accord agenda of 
furthering individualised, market connections into workplace and welfare relationships.  For a 
period, institutionally re-structuring the bureaucracy towards a more market-oriented 
management model focusing on outcomes, did not institutionally bond with the other reform 
agenda of delivering a new active welfare to work strategy.  JET (and Newstart) were 
implemented when this contradiction inside DSS was at its sharpest.  Hawke’s administrative 
restructuring aimed to ensure that state bureaucrats had ‘regard to the best private sector 
practice’ (cited in Maconachie 1996: 129).  The 1983 Financial Management Improvement 
Plan (FMIP) imposed program budgeting requirements on managers to strategically re-focus 
their activities towards results rather than simply the department’s detailed procedures 
(Rowlands 2002: 79).  This movement from process to outcomes was institutionally 
reinforced by the 1987 ‘machinery of government’ changes, reducing the number of 
departments from 28 to 18 (Rowlands 2002: 79).  A newly formed Management Advisory 
Board composed of all Departmental Secretaries oversaw this drive to increase management 
prerogative and program accountability.  This initial turn ‘to improve management’ focused 
on decentralization and commercialization of services and devolved budgetary administration 
(Halligan 2007: 219-220).   
 
In DSS the logic of managerialism and activation policies expressed a specific contradictory 
moment mediating the state-capital relation.  State managers produced these strategies to 
‘legitimately’ minimise the state-as-capital’s internal production costs, (re)produce 
internationally competitive variable capital in the form of welfare-readied labour power and 
place further political pressure on dampening class expectations for state outlays on 
unproductive welfare expenses.  Yet the economic, political and institutional merits of such a 
neoliberal logic remained resting on the irrational chaos of capitalist competition.  Even in its 
own terms, in its surface form, the idea that Hawke and Howe could quickly roll out this dual 
strategy in DSS was flawed.  Unemployment may have been falling under the ALP 
government in the seven years leading up to these confident welfare industry interventions 
but because it was coming off such an historically high and sharp spike DSS was 
institutionally struggling to respond.  Between 1981 and 1983 the number of people receiving 
Unemployment Benefit had doubled from 313,000 to 633,000 (ABS 1994).  By the late 1980s 
DSS was still in the throes of gearing up its means of production to more effectively process 
these extra claimants even if the immediate pressure to do so seemed to be easing, as those 
on Unemployment Benefit fell from 553,000 in 1987 to 390,000 in 1989 (ABS 1994).   
 
At this ‘obvious’ level of rationality it is therefore unsurprising to find liberal public sector 
analysts noting that DSS was ‘left virtually unaffected’ by the Hawke government’s 
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restructure because senior managers were focused on tooling up the organisation’s 
capabilities to deal with this spike in unemployment (Rowlands 2002: 79).  However, such 
judgments fail to capture how these new production processes and relations in DSS were an 
active countermovement against managerialism and its institutional embrace of a welfare 
activation policy-logic.  Instead, with rising unemployment the delivery of Australian welfare 
services reverted to old process models and practices.  Volker (cited in Reynoldson 2000: 
93) pointed out that DSS senior managers had ‘adopted’ a ‘production line approach’ in the 
late 1980s in an ‘attempt to obtain greater efficiency and to cope with the large volume of 
work’.  Management strategies to inculcate in staff the emotional and affective labour 
required to activate recipients was not even on the horizon: ‘the culture of DSS changed as 
the emphasis, by necessity, moved from client contact to process’ (Reynoldson 2000: 93).   
 
Staff numbers were doubled in the decade up to the mid 1980s and had jumped a further 40 
per cent to 23,000 by 1992 (DSS Annual Reports 1975-1993).  Processing practices had 
only just begun to be rationalised from the 1970s when a typical application for payment was 
‘transported twenty-seven times between different parts of the office before a decision [was] 
reached and conveyed to the individual concerned’ (Coombs 1976; cited in Tulloch 1979: 
241).  An IT roll-out policy ‘Stratplan’, had just installed one of the world’s largest computer 
networks for this ‘production line’ (Reynoldson 2000: 94).  However, the chaos of 
international competition more fundamentally destabilised the confident, neoliberal logic of 
the ALP’s dual strategies for DSS in the late 1980s.  If unemployment had eased in its first 
seven years in government, it rocketed in the following six years just as the ALP began to 
implement JET and New-Start (see Figure 8).  The policy-presumption that ALMPs could be 
neatly incorporated into the state’s accumulation strategy foundered at the first hurdle.  
 
Figure 8 
Total unemployed persons (thousands): 1978-2010 
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
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An understanding of the initial historical underpinnings of the bureaucratic, economic, and 
ideological contradictions within which JET was produced has come through applying 
different concepts at varying levels of abstraction.  JET was an aspect of changes occurring 
in the Australian state-capital relation due the economic crisis of the 1970s.  The program 
was a ‘social justice’ policy response by the ALP seeking to secure the state’s accumulation 
challenges.  JET was a bureaucratically-mediated act by femocrats but treated at the local 
staff as an organisationally marginal product.  These contradictions are also apparent in the 
interviews with JET Workers and other frontline staff.   
 
They often sharply expressed how these administrative and ideological tensions were played 
out in local offices.  In conjuring up these memories they expressly or implicitly compared 
their current to earlier work practices, as did the other interviewed staff members who were 
working during this period.  Most ‘early’ JAs talked about their current circumstances in grim, 
despairing or angry terms, while a minority were positive about the effects the compulsory 
turn had for ‘their’ customers and workplaces.  All, though, tended to recollect their early 
experiences of JET through two distinctly different rhetorical ‘strategies’ which 
correspondingly intersected with their more mediated or concrete relationships with the 
program (Wayne 2003: 166).  For example, when JET’s overall social welfare program 
content was discussed it was generally in melancholy language.  Frequently punctuating this 
largely nostalgic rhetoric were lively recollections of the concrete work JAs had done during 
their early years.  Their general historical views of DSS and Centrelink, however, were more 
mixed, tending to depend on their particular work experiences, class locations, and political 
outlook.   
 
As DSS began fully decentralising into suburban and country offices during the 1980s, staff 
frequently still found themselves working in places ‘dominated’ by ‘ex-air force guys’: 
 
They were tough, hard men, and you didn't call them by their first names.  They were Mr So 
and So.  And I found without exception they were incredibly fair.  They didn't play games.  
There were no mind games.  They were just tough hard men.  There was no such thing as 
worker participation.  There were no staff meetings.  You did what – the manager made the 
decision and that was it…that was, "Yes, sir." 
(Hamilton 2006) 
 
The three interviewees who had worked in the ‘Green Latrine’ in the 1980s (Melbourne’s sole 
metropolitan office at the time) described its division of labour and what such managers 
expected.  Productive welfare work was institutionally split into a ‘typing stream, the CA 
[Clerical Assistant] stream or the clerk stream’ where very little staff movement occurred 
between them (Jessie 2007).  One interviewee who had been a CA in the Green Latrine 
could only secure a JA position once she had passed the ‘clerks test’ – an obstacle few 
hurdled at the time.  These labour divisions became institutionally reflected in the structure of 
the 1980s’ Regional Office, which initially had ‘at least 13 levels below the senior manager 
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level’ (Harley 2007).  It was only in 1987 that DSS applied the government’s ‘structural 
efficiency principle’ to abolish a wide range of clerical assistant and middle management 
positions, reducing in-office classifications to six (O'Donnell, O'Brien & Junor 2005: 409).  
Removing the division between one officer assessing a claim and another granting it 
(Maconachie 1996: 265) proceeded at a glacial pace, eventually leading to the introduction 
of a Single Officer Determining model in 1997 (Briggs 1996: 6).   
 
In the late 1980s the ‘entire work’ of DSS centred on ‘the assessment and maintenance of 
people's payments’ (Hamilton 2006).  A Regional Manager thought one consequence of 
having such a work ‘focus’ was that frontline staff and management operated with the notion 
of ‘set and forget’.  Notification for any change of circumstances largely resided with the 
social security recipient, whereas DSS response was ‘we'll just park you now’ (Harley 2007).  
Frontline staff seeking to reach a higher classification were ‘valorised’ by managers if they 
could display their deep ‘knowledge and expertise’ of the Social Security Act (Andrews 
2006).  Job interviews centred on testing an applicant’s familiarity with policy and legislation 
– they were ‘never, ever’ asked to give an example of how they ‘demonstrate empathy…or 
compassion’ in their ‘engagement with social security recipients’ (Andrews 2006).   
 
Such a view was common among those interviewed and seems to cast some doubt on 
Glenda Maconachie’s thesis in Invading the Spaces (1996) that this period experienced a 
rise of ‘regulated empathy’ in DSS operational staff work practices.  Maconachie (1996: ii) 
identifies regulated empathy as a ‘new type of managerial control in the public sector, 
incorporating aspects of the worker’s personality into the wage-effort bargain’.  She usefully 
connects the economic/ideological effects of the ‘Active Society’ to the newly emerging 
requirement that CES and DSS workers develop an empathic ‘active partnership’ with their 
clients.  Through the ‘commercial application of the emotion and by organisationally 
prescribed norms’, three characteristics of empathy become subject to managerial regulation 
– emotional labour, people skills and interpersonal skills (Maconachie 1996: 296).  While the 
interviews with those who had previously worked in the CES provided some support for 
Maconachie’s claims in that organisation, there was little evidence of DSS frontline staff 
shifting their work practices or ideas.  In the late 1980s DSS had officially renamed those 
receiving social security payments clients rather than beneficiaries (Ira 2007).  Yet the slang 
form of beneficiary, benno, remained in general usage for many years, especially when staff 
‘got the shits’ – then it was ‘nearly always…bloody bennos’ (Andrews 2006).  It only faded 
with the introduction of Centrelink and Single Officer Determining work practices in the late 
1990s which ‘signalled the idea’ that frontline staff required a new degree of ‘professional 
judgement’ (Andrews 2006).  Investing this extra ‘authority’ into staff was ‘intended as a 
cultural shift’ towards a greater ‘professional kind of understanding’ about their work roles 
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(Andrews 2006).  In DSS of the late 1980s, however, empathy – regulated or otherwise, was 
not an institutionally valued or even recognised component of coalface work practices.  
Frontline staff continued to operate with a ‘compliance hostile prove-everything-before-I'll-
believe-you kind of an attitude’ (Ira 2007).  Unless ‘you were looking at numbers of pensions, 
numbers of benefits granted…if you weren't contributing to that you were just a bludger’ 
(Hamilton 2006).   
 
Compared to the main production processes in a regional office, the new JA work was ‘like 
water and oil’ (Andrews 2006).  Many front line workers not only perceived that these new 
staff had been placed on a ‘pedestal’, but that JAs had also ‘fractured the structure’ of local 
practices and processes (Deniz 2006).  Senior policy managers were aware of these 
divisions but considered them to be a necessary consequence for JET’s successful 
implementation.  For those offices which gained a JA – a position paid at one level above 
most staff, tensions were immediately created because it tended to be filled by an outside 
recruitment process.  A mid-level National Office manager supported these external 
appointments as reflecting Canberra’s ‘lack of confidence’ that existing staff had the 
necessary ‘level of entrepreneurial thinking’ for the role (Deniz 2006).  This manager 
acknowledged that at the local level not having this ‘wherewithal’ generated ‘a bit of 
resentment’ among frontline workers who felt management’s attitude was ‘we don’t want this 
bunch of grunts doing the job’ (Deniz 2006).   
 
As a consequence of how JAs were recruited, and what it was generally perceived that they 
did, ‘almost a separation’ occurred between the JAs and the rest of the ‘general clerical staff’’ 
(Deniz 2006).  JAs became viewed as ‘soft-cocks’ who did not have to do the ‘heavy lifting’ of 
telling social security recipients ‘bad news stories’ such as they would not be receiving a 
payment for another week, or they could not receive a ‘counter-cheque’ that day (Deniz 
2006).  They were seen as being ‘a soft touch…naïve, gullible…somebody who just didn’t 
know reality’ (Andrews 2006).  
 
Both senior and middle-level managers exacerbated these divisions.  Because many saw 
little operational need to integrate the work of JAs into the daily running of the office, ‘there 
wasn't a lot of discussion around the value of the program or anything like that’ (Isha 2006).  
One frontline worker (Ira 2007) vaguely recalled a training session where she was given 
some ‘JET handouts’ to find out what her role was if a single parent said ‘my youngest child 
is about to turn 16.  What do I do next?’  The ‘answer’ was to give the parent one of the 
brochures she had just issued in that session.  While laughing about such ‘limited’ training (‘I 
mean, that’s DSS’) JET stayed ‘a bit of a black box’ for most operational staff (Ira 2007).   
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JAs also reflected these divisions.  All considered they offered the paraprofessional 
‘wherewithal’ lacking among most DSS workers of the time.  Geoff Hamilton, whose 
employment in the CES during the 1980s was sandwiched between two periods working at 
DSS, was part of the second intake of JAs in 1990: 
 
Now, the first lot of JET Advisers, I think most of them came from the CES because the 
criteria could have almost been written for someone who knew about the labour market, knew 
about the education system.  I looked at the key selection criteria and thought, "I couldn't have 
written it more substantially for myself."  But at that stage I think the powers that be had said, 
"Okay, we've got enough of these CES types.  They don't sort of – they're square pegs in a 
round hole.  We'll try and get a few of our existing staff in," and I think it went downhill from 
there. 
 
Two approaches can be discerned among this early group’s relationships with other staff.  
Half tended to side with management and half with operational staff.  One JA, who 
subsequently moved into middle management was at pains to centre her personal qualities 
into her purposive understanding of leadership – ‘I’ve always had a very strong leadership 
role and I don’t think all JET Advisers took that up or exploited that’ (Cameron 2006).  To be 
socially underpinned by the structures of leadership gave this JA a relational mechanism to 
‘exploit’ her role – a positioning through which she (and the JET program role which she 
embodied) could be ‘taken seriously’ by other staff:  
 
Being on the leadership team, probably ensured you had a good profile and were taken 
seriously.  Particularly because it [JET] was new and they had to explain the value of it.  But I 
think just interacting with the relevant teams and going to team meetings and talking about it 
and giving them some involvement. 
(Cameron 2006) 
 
When asked why most JAs did not involve themselves as deeply in the local leadership 
teams as she had, her view reaffirmed the tight connection between who she was and what 
she did: ‘I think it came down to individual personalities.  That involvement, that leadership 
expectation was always part of your duty statement’ (Cameron 2006).  Cameron’s way of 
connecting with staff was: 
 
To talk…about the value of it [JET] and what the long-term plan was – that every interaction 
would hopefully get one more person out of that queue and into employment.  So you had to 
show them that it had value – demonstrate that rather than just interviewing people– having a 
nice chat and you weren’t contributing to generating payments, you know, or processing a 
19U [a Newstart fortnightly claim form], or you didn’t have to answer to the ‘can I have a 
counter cheque?’ ‘no you can’t’  – those sort of ramifications…so they could see it was a 
value job for them as well.   
 
Others, such as Geoff Hamilton, had a very different perspective of what was ‘a value job’.  
When asked what was his measure of success he commented: ‘This will sound ridiculous but 
I get a whole heap of Christmas cards every year and, you know, "Thank you for your 
help”…and people who would send me a Christmas card telling me what they are doing that 
year.  They had to be succeeding.’  His relationship to management and operational staff 
was poles apart from the previous JA.  He talked about an altercation he had with one 
manager in these terms: 
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It was always a hassle when you were called into the office of this guy, and you had the 
staffing sheet there.  "I see we're paying you as an ASO 5."  "Yeah, that's right."  "Why can't 
we get a good [ASO] 2-3 to do the same job and we would save, you know, $25,000 for the 
office."[I said] "Yeah, they could – you could do that."  And I leaned over and I looked at the 
[pause] I said, "We're paying you as ASO B."  I said, "We could probably get a good ASO 5 to 
do that and we would save even more money."  He said, "No need to get personal.  Get out of 
the office."  You know, you were battling that sort of crap all the time with that manager. 
(Hamilton 2006)  
 
Hamilton’s words convey a strong class stand common among frontline staff.  His telling of 
the episode is constructed as reportage – as a union member explaining to his delegate (me) 
what just happened.  At the core of the telling is a series of sentences – ‘he said’ I said’ 
which are, from his view, ‘the facts’.  The altercation is reported in this fashion to a local 
delegate because most members know they could easily be ‘written up’ by a manager and 
face some charge and sanction.  Hamilton therefore constructs his recollection to me as if I 
was still an active union delegate and he a union member in the foreknowledge that I would 
then say to him that he needed to make a detailed diary entry of what was said in the 
manager’s office.  His words not only convey that that he an experienced union member and 
that he respects my ‘union’ opinion, but that he generally will take the side of operational staff 
against management.  When talking of this manager he pluralised ‘he’ to ‘they’ at one point, 
underpinning the class differentiation and conflict he wanted to impart – and the side he was 
taking within it.   
 
Hamilton sought to overcome the divisions of labour inside his office in Shepparton by 
getting the occasional permission from his manager to take a staff member on one of his two 
to three day trips interviewing parents in outlying Northern Victorian communities.  He also 
put a notice in the tea room offering a chocolate frog to anyone who referred a single parent 
to him but became ‘trapped by my own success’: 
 
I was buying bags of chocolate frogs every month…Some of the straight-laced individuals 
would come up to your desk with a referral and they would stand there patiently waiting for 
their chocolate frog… I know that sounds very trivial but little things like that…you have to 
acknowledge that with a "Thank you". 
(Hamilton 2006). 
 
The other two ‘early’ JAs interviewed were internal recruits.  The extensive personal and 
work connections they had with other ‘coalface’ staff meant that, when they donned the JA 
‘hat’, the tensions described above were less acute, but still evident.  Again, sides were 
taken: 
 
I’m not in management level.  I never aspired to be in management level from the JET 
program… I don’t go to the team leaders meetings [and] I don’t know what goes on there 
(Jessie 2007). 
 
Jessie talked of ‘we’ as a relation with other JAs or operational staff.  Gulzar, on the other 
hand, spoke of staff as ‘them’ and the organisation as ‘us’.  The ‘official’, management 
language (Voloshinov 1987: 88) was evident throughout her interview.  Gulzar’s staff were 
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‘supported to the best of their ability’ and informed of the significance JAs.  She summarised 
her JET work with single parents as ‘that type of supportive role that coaches people to move 
forward [and so] is very important for a very large percentage of people who are in 
transitional phases’.   
 
 
DSS and JET:  under-resourcing tensions 
 
During the five years DSS managers struggled to implement the Hawke government’s 1987 
‘machinery of government’ reforms, 380 welfare policy changes rained down on the 
organisation as it began to roll out the ALP’s active employment programs (Volker 1992: v).  
In late 1992 Derek Volker ruminated:  
 
In the Australian Public Service managers at all levels speak a different language now 
compared with even five years ago.  At some of our management meetings in Social Security 
I sometimes wonder whether I am at a séance with all the talk about visions which now 
prevails. (Volker 1992: 5) 
 
Rapid staff increases and changes wrought by the dual turn towards managerialism and the 
Active Employment Strategy met with significant industrial responses by the staff unions in 
the early 1990s.  The mass influx and strains faced by new staff caused industrial disputes to 
sharply rise, on occasion even moving out of the union officials’ control (O'Donnell, O'Brien & 
Junor 2005).  The influx of young, often university educated, staff in the last decade had 
transformed the unions covering DSS, especially the Administrative and Clerical Officers 
Association (ACOA), representing the payment and assessment clerks.  Activists had formed 
the ACOA Reform Group in the late 1970s to kick out the old, rightwing ‘Grouper’ leadership.  
They aligned with the clerical assistants union, the Public Service Association, to mount a 
series of strikes throughout the period (O'Donnell et al 2005).   
 
Senior managers, of course, were highly sensitive to this militancy.  David Rosalky, for 
example, who ran the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations and Small 
Business in the mid-1990s, considered the federal departmental industrial relations context 
‘quite polarised and adversarial’ (cited in Scott 1999: 8).  DSS ‘stood out even in this largely 
hostile labor climate…[as] as a very militant environment’ (Scott 1999: 8).  Sue Vardon, 
Centrelink’s first CEO, held similar apprehensions about the industrial environment she was 
to enter in 1997: 
 
If there was something wrong in an area they would have a snap shutting of an office, just to 
make a point.  Or they would put a ban on a certain form of [activity] – [such as] a particular 
form of payment – as a way of getting management’s attention. 
(Vardon cited in Scott 1999: 8)   
 
Such comments should not be taken at face value.  Leading departmental figures had a 
vested interest to colour the industrial relations scene in a lurid light as a technique to better 
promote themselves as savvy, resourceful and resilient.  Nevertheless, industrial strength in 
  125
both DSS and CES had been developing during the 1980s through a series of disputes 
mainly centred around understaffing issues.  In late 1981, for example, a bitter national two 
month dispute in DSS about jobs resulted in hundreds of ACOA members being ‘stood down’ 
for up to six weeks for refusing to work as ‘directed’ by their local manager.  Furthermore, a 
small group of regional managers themselves were stood down for refusing to implement 
these ‘directions’ (Grey Collar 1982).   
 
The most militant response centred in NSW where the dispute was led by the Sydney 
Delegate’s committee, often in opposition to the officials’ more bureaucratic tactics.  They 
used radical tactics, such as flying pickets on DSS offices, and insisted that regular mass 
meetings guide the campaign.  Peaking in a three day strike (9-11 December 1981) by NSW 
members, large sections of the Department were paralysed (O'Lincoln 1993: 216).  On the 
surface the dispute ended in defeat, but within a year over 700 jobs were added to DSS and, 
even more importantly, it built union membership and helped forge a fighting tradition inside 
the department (Grey Collar 1982).   
 
Similar disputes occurred inside CES.  In the lead up to the implementation of Newstart in 
June 1991, the CPSU had placed a national boycott on the program’s activity test.  Sue 
Mountford, the Victorian Branch Assistant Secretary, denounced the test as ‘punitive’ and 
because of the recession, ‘unworkable’ (Milburn & Easterbrook 1991).  The national launch 
of Newstart at the Southern Cross Hotel in Melbourne on 25th June was met by a 
demonstration of over 500 building workers, activists from the Unemployed Workers Union; 
CES/DSS left delegates; Public Sector Union and Trades Hall Council officials such as John 
Halfpenny, and Phillip Hudson from VCOSS.  I received strong support when I evaded 
security staff to address the 1000 mainly CES workers sitting inside the hotel as their 
National Delegate about the unconditional right of clients to a welfare payment (McLeod 
1991).  David Bunn, the National Secretary, quashed any threat to ban the test the next day 
(Lewis 1991).  However, the union continued to industrially agitate for greater resources for 
the next few months.  To cope with the increased workloads being imposed on CES staff a 
series of national walkouts were authorised and followed by well-observed bans on public 
contact before 10.00am and after 3pm.  Similar official and semi-official actions continued 
until the election of the Howard government in 1996.  For example, Austudy staff in 
Melbourne, led by a group of socialists, joined the bans on Contracted Case Management in 
April 1995 as part of the overall campaign to resist the move to Agency Bargaining (Stewart 
1994). 
 
Within this heightened industrial context a possibility existed for resisting the massive 
workloads being imposed on JAs (see pages 110 and 129). One potential source of support 
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was the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS).  ACOSS accepted to the overall 
thrust of the two new ALMPs but had some pragmatic reservations about JET’s limited 
resources.  In its first evaluation of these activation programs three months after JET’s 
launch, ACOSS (1989: 22) had made 31 recommendations to ‘strengthen’ their effective 
delivery.  The report’s tactic of pragmatically restricting its recommendations to those the 
authors deemed politically feasible backfired, resulting in the ALP accepting only a few of 
their more marginal and less costly proposals.  Sole parent pensioners, for example, gained 
access to an Employment Entry Payment of $100 in January 1991, an Education Entry 
Payment of $200 the following year and a slight extension for those who were working to 
their childcare subsidy in 1993 (Dapre 2006a: 200, 222). 
 
The hesitant approach that ACOSS took to promote its core arguments (applying a case-
management approach, limiting these caseloads to 50 people, ongoing childcare subsidies 
after the program was finished and creating the space and resources for JAs to more closely 
work with other agencies) widened the political space for the ALP to either water down or 
ignore them.  It is not as if the report had not devoted substantial space explaining how a 
‘major barrier’ for single parents was that JET subsidies for childcare ceased after 12 weeks 
of employment (ACOSS 1989: 6).  The report warned that an evaluation of the ET program 
had found that over a third of single parents starting paid work subsequently resigned once 
ET’s even longer 12-month childcare subsidies ran out.  Though ACOSS (1989: 6-7) 
contended childcare subsidies should be provided ‘in an ongoing way to sole parents 
throughout their working lives’ it shied away from raising this as a recommendation, focusing 
instead on nine germane but far narrower proposals dealing with the quality, funding, access 
and a variety of childcare provision.  While the government extended access to JET Child 
Care Fee Assistance from 12 to 26 weeks in 1993, this only delayed the financial hardship 
ACOSS identified to be causing many working single parents to resign.   
 
The political contradictions of the ACOSS report were most stark on the issue of staffing 
resources.  ACOSS proposed that JAs should case manage 50 single parents rather than 
fulfil the heavy, process-driven yearly target of 800 single parent interviews 
(Recommendation No. 6 ACOSS 1989: 4).  This far ‘too high’ target would not allow a JA to 
maintain the confidence of a single parent to jointly navigate a sequence of pre-vocational, 
training and employment-seeking activities (p. 2).  Instead, a JA’s workload should have 
parity with the 50-client Newstart caseloads then managed by Employment Counsellors in 
the CES since both were involved in comparable work (p. 2).  Yet simply arguing that the 
quality of a JA’s work would suffer unless DSS impose a caseload cap of 50 was insufficient.  
It remained disconnected from any proposal, or even recognition, that dealt with the 
quantitative reality of the massive demand for this open access program.  ACOSS had three 
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possible positions it could have put to DSS to deal with these interconnected problems: 
employ more JAs; ‘park’ prospective applicants until there was available space within the 
caseload; or place policy restrictions limiting who could access JET.  It recommended none. 
 
However, the lead author of the report, Victorian Council of Social Services President Robert 
Hudson, had partially identified one alternative course of action ACOSS could have taken.  A 
series of CES industrial disputes, centred in Melbourne, are noted: 
 
An area of concern which was brought to the attention of the working party on several 
occasions is the current shortfall in personnel for this work, particularly in CES offices.  At one 
stage last year every CES office was one to one and a half staff down on the agreed staffing 
formula.  This has resulted in an initial ban on the JET and Newstart programs and a ban on 
liaison with DSS imposed by ACOA because of workload problems.  Clearly these issues 
need to be addressed if the resource intensive assistance envisaged under JET and Newstart 
is to be effectively provided. 
(ACOSS 1989: 16)  
 
Such insights seemed lost on the conservative national ACOSS leadership.  Criticisms 
ACOSS made of ALP government policies had become more muted from 1985 under the 
newly-elected ‘pragmatic leadership’ of Julian Disney (Mendes 2004a: 155).  ACOSS policy 
challenges were restricted to jockeying with the government ‘from within its defined 
economic rationalist parameters’ (Mendes 2004a: 155).  To win a 50-caseload claim would 
have meant a sharply different strategic orientation – to become actively involved in the 
ACOA staffing campaign in the CES and support its extension into DSS.   
 
The question of whether the industrial and political potential existed in the welfare sector to 
do so was contradictory and complex.  An often conflictual relationship existed between 
ACOSS and ACTU officials about which organisation represented low-income earners in 
Canberra (Mendes 2004a: 156). These tensions were reflected at the lower levels in both 
bureaucracies – meaning that a Chinese wall was normally erected between welfare and 
industrial campaigns in the social welfare sector. On the other hand a significant layer of left 
activists had emerged in both DSS and the CES in Melbourne and Sydney who were 
attempting to link industrial activity in the sector to broader political issues (Grey Collar 1982; 
White 1986).  A successful campaign initiated by CES staff in Melbourne, led by some of 
these activists, and supported by their state union officials, had recently fought off national 
attempts to increase the caseloads of Employment Counsellors from 50 to 400.   
A similar campaign to increase the quality of welfare support provided to single parents (by 
restricting caseloads to 50) would have meant, in practice, a claim for more JAs to meet the 
demand for JET in the community.  One industrial barrier in DSS was that JAs were often 
‘resented by the grunts on the frontline…because they only had good news stories to tell to 
their clients’ (Deniz 2006).  The potential to break down such views was possible if a joint 
ACOA-ACOSS cross-departmental campaign had clearly framed JET caseloads as a staffing 
issue.  This would have fallen on receptive ears at DSS coalface, cutting through the 
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parochial or disengaged attitudes to be seen as another important aspect of their ongoing 
staffing disputes.  Such an approach was possible if CES delegates had linked with their 
DSS counterparts, and had drawn in the Melbourne-based ACOSS working party who had 
written the paper.  The potential to include JET along with other major staffing demands 
could then have been taken up by other delegates committees across the country – a 
method used by activists in other campaigns of the time.   
 
Whether such an initiative would have had the traction necessary to put sufficient pressure 
on the ALP government to increase the $40 million budget for JET was never tested.  
Hudson never sent JAs, CES workers, ACOA officials and delegates nor the ACTU the 
report, so they had no opportunity to industrially consider Hudson’s argument for reducing 
the caseload cap from 800 to 50.  JAs’ horrendous workloads would have provided critical 
evidence for such considerations:  
 
There would be queues of people waiting on a bench so you would be interviewing one and 
you could see that there would be five people with all their kids waiting to see you next; and 
because I realised how desperately in need a lot of these people were, of the kinds of things 
the JET Program could offer, I felt like I had to see them all. I couldn't turn them back or delay 
them or – because it was to do with child care and there was a waiting list for child care and 
things like that, you would have to try and fit them all in somehow. 
(Alex 2006)  
 
Such experiences stood in sharp contrast to the high expectations JAs had for the program.  
A joint ACOSS-ACOA information campaign might have challenged the general frontline 
conception (equally held by JAs) that JET was not simply another part of daily working life.  
JET had not been set-up under a caseload model, yet it was publicly marketed as an 
inclusive program offering as much of the JA’s time as was needed to work through single 
parents’ hesitations and concerns (DSS 1989, DSS, 1991 #1745; 1993).  High demand for 
JET and severe understaffing meant that the stripping down of contact to the bare minimum 
was only resolvable through introducing a caseload model.  
 
One year after the start of the program DSS reported that JAs had helped to significantly 
increase sole parent participation in vocational training (Jobtrain), subsidised employment 
(Jobstart), job searching techniques (Job Search Training Program) and skills training, 
personal support and enterprise activities delivered by the Skillshare Program (DSS, DEET & 
DCSH 1990: 24).  In the first 12 months of JET 10,842 sole parents participated in labour 
market programs organised by the CES, compared to 3,275 in the previous 12 month period.  
The majority (6,165) had been referred by JAs in DSS.   The major programs participated in 
were vocational training (JOBTRAIN), work under subsidized employment arrangements 
(JOBSTART), two-week courses to improve their job-hunting techniques (Job Search 
Training Program) and skills training, personal support and enterprise activities delivered by 
the SKILLSHARE Program. Overall, there was a 231 per cent increase in the number of sole 
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parents involved in labour market programs, compared to the year leading up to JET (DSS, 
DEET & DCSH 1990: 23-24).  Little data was available on the employment outcomes of 
those involved in JET as no collection methods had been developed except by the JAs 
themselves.  Because they lacked the time and resources to ‘follow up’ these clients the 
proportions involved in paid work were unknown (DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990: 63).   
 
More significantly, JET work was done with only about half the planned 67 JAs (DSS, DEET 
& DCSH 1990: 5, 65).  DSS had initially estimated that JAs would interview 60,000 sole 
parents annually once the program was fully implemented – nearly 900 interviews per year 
(not the 800 as originally mooted).  The report noted that because JA work was more 
complex than first thought, DSS had planned to increase the number of JAs to 80 and 
reduce the yearly interview target to 52,000 clients (or 650 per JA), marginally conceding to 
the earlier ACOSS criticism that the target was too high (DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 70).  
In an attempt to cope with the massive demand for JET, many JAs organised group 
interviews of up to 20 sole parents per session to handle the influx (DSS, DEET & DCSH 
1990: 6).  Instead of increasing the number of JAs, DSS trialled the use of part-time clerical 
assistant support at some sites.  This was rolled out across the network, establishing a 
tradition where local JAs would cherry-pick a single parent whom they met through the 
program and offer them this role (JA, 2006).  A number of staff interviewed for this research 
gained employment in DSS/Centrelink via this route.   
 
Producing JET in early 1990s 
 
The lost opportunity for industrially linking the JAs’ staffing issues with the broader demands 
of DSS workforce resulted in widening the division between JAs and other frontline staff.  In 
the early 1990s staffing tensions occurred within a department doubly tasked to deliver the 
Active Employment Strategy and cope with an unexpected surge in claims for unemployment 
benefits.  The overall legitimating rationale for a nationally Active Society was still urgent – to 
boost international competitiveness and maximise productivity.  However, these 
accumulation pressures were not as tightly expressed in the functions of the early 1990s 
welfare workplace as they would be within the next half decade.  In a period of rising 
unemployment the neoliberal activation logic in the state’s welfare interventions was partially 
undercut.  Greater political space opened for a question to be posed: activation for what?   
The research gaze of governmentality critiques of the aesthetics of welfare subjectivity, such 
as Marston (2002) and McDonald (2003) make greater sense in the early 1990s, even if they 
remain dislocated from the political and economic underpinnings which were generating this 
ideological production.  
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In welfare, the relationship between the social reproduction and maintenance functions of the 
state tilted towards building its social maintenance capacity through a number of political and 
economic interventions.  Politically, the general Active Society merits of ALMPs were 
promoted to ‘sustain a pro-work ethic’ (Bessant et al. 2006: 106).  This campaign was 
buttressed by an ‘upward trend’ in the media and government to disparage those becoming 
unemployed as ‘welfare dependent’ (Engels 2006: 8).  The economic maintenance of the 
unemployed required new, more productive, managerial and processing capabilities in DSS.   
 
Because accumulation pressures in the welfare workplace were in a looser relationship to 
the legitimation functions of the state due to rising unemployment, DSS senior managers 
focused on the second maintenance element, relegating the Active Employment Strategy to 
a veneer.  Activation programs were highlighted in every brochure and duly referred to at the 
beginning of most staff training sessions, but not integrated into staff work practices at this 
stage.  Institutionally reinforcing this separation was that in the division of labour producing 
the major ALMP, Newstart’s affective and emotional work was allocated to the CES.  In the 
new production linkages between the two departments, DSS managed Newstart as a 
technical task incorporated within their more pressing goal of boosting the department’s 
overall claim processing capabilities.   
 
JET was distinct on two grounds.  It was voluntary and the emotional and affective labour 
primarily occurred in DSS workplaces, even if JET, like Newstart, had a superficially similar 
referral conduit to the CES for people seeking work.  JAs may have been overwhelmed by 
the demand of the program but had greater administrative space within which to conduct 
their work compared to other frontline staff.  In this historically specific division of labour, JAs' 
relationships with national and area managers and with JAs in other offices overlaid their 
coalface relationships with local managers and staff.  For a period these other bureaucratic 
relationships reinforced a JA’s capacity to produce the social, feminist-inflected aspect of 
JET because of being located in a DSS workplace where local managerial energies directly 
discounted such work.  Geoff Hamilton, for example, talked about the actions taken by a JET 
national manager, Carmen Zanetti, when she was told his office manager had decided to 
leave his JA position unstaffed while on annual leave:  
 
Zanetti actually caught a plane down to the Area office… and ripped strips off the program 
delivery manager.  I was called in just before I was leaving on the Friday afternoon and told by 
this manager that he had had a change of mind and the job would be relieved for the four 
weeks, but without…someone like Zanetti with that clout, these characters could do that sort 
of thing, and they did do it.   
(Hamilton 2006) 
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JET and the politics of feminism 
 
JET’s political intent ‘energised and polarised’ national staff (Orion 2009).  Meredith 
Edwards, who as head of the Social Policy Division (1987-1990) oversaw JET, considered 
the Division a progressive bastion operating in the midst of a ‘very anti-sole parent, anti-
feminist culture’ within DSS.  One of the Division’s mid-level managers agreed.  I interviewed 
Orion (a politically active socialist in the early 1990s) in 2009 when an acting CEO of a 
national welfare agency.  Initially involved in recruiting the first rounds of JAs in Sydney, she 
returned to DSS national office to oversee policy liaison between her department and DCSH 
JET childcare staff.  Orion stressed how committed staff were to the program’s success by 
pointing out how one senior executive from another Division commented that ‘all JET people 
are on a mission from God’.  For a short period in the early 1990s, the connections between 
local JAs and national managers strengthened.  All new recruits were required to attend a 
national ‘intense and hard’ two-week training course (going till 9 or 10 at night) in South 
Australia (Hamilton 2006).  The feminist political underpinnings of this course seemed to be 
gradually lost as it got progressively ‘cut down’ during the 1990s:  
 
It went less and less and less and finally I think they did a two-day training course which was 
absolutely ridiculous because if you don't have the background how can you instil the velocity, 
the background, the history, the politics.  How can you teach people that sort of thing? 
(Hamilton 2006) 
 
Frontline JAs tended to give hesitant and contradictory responses when I specifically asked 
them did JET have feminist principles?  One likely reason was the changing political and 
ideological meaning of the term ‘feminist’ in the last two decades.61  A JA who was a 
manager at the time of the interview used an ironic tone to talk of the ‘brave early days’ when 
asked about JET’s underlying politics, but agreed: 
 
You could see that it had that feminist side.  Here’s a maligned female group and let’s do 
something to give them opportunities.  I could see how that could be the case…one of the 
things you really had to do setting up this program  and getting people on board with it  was to 
try and help dispel the myths around single parents and that was part of the  talk I used to do 
at community groups and with our own staff.  We had good management information I can 
say to you.  
(Cameron 2006)   
 
                                                
61
 A declining women’s movement meant that its gains were more readily incorporated into capitalist commodity 
relations.  In the 1990s third wave feminism rejected what it considered to be the overly proscriptive second wave 
women’s liberationist perception that activities such as lap dancing, breast implants or wearing Playboy bunny 
logos epitomised women’s oppression, arguing for the liberatory potential for these activities to express the 
diversity of women’s sexuality (Orr 2010).  As second wave feminism became seen as ‘intolerant’ the term 
feminist more broadly became associated with ‘with a rather sullen kind of political correctness or Puritanism’ 
(German 2007; see also Orr 2010; Walter 1998: 36).  However, because these ‘liberatory’ activities were rapidly 
subsumed by commodity relations into ‘empowering’ products to be bought and sold as part of a ‘raunch culture’ 
(Levy 2005, 3), they instead simply reflected the rise of a ‘new sexism’ (Banyard 2010).   
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Geoff Hamilton felt that he had ‘failed if a woman had been, let's say, a cleaner all her life, 
and I sent her to the JET Contact Officer [in the CES] and she got herself another job as a 
cleaner, which would just continue the cycle of poverty – I don't think the program was ever 
meant for that’.  His practices drew him to the conclusion that ‘when single mums get 
together that's one of the most powerful things that can happen, I reckon.’   
 
Jessie, another early JA interviewed seemingly rejected any labeling of JET as feminist.  She 
frequently used the metaphor ‘empowering’ but stressed ‘it was never about that’ [feminism], 
it was not about ‘sympathising and holding their hand’. Jessie talked of the ‘spiel’ she ‘often 
gave’ to ‘empower’ a single parent.  When recollecting ‘the sell I often used’, this JA’s tone 
and manner altered, reflecting in how the ‘official language’ (Voloshinov 1987: 88) she 
adopted, the departmental ‘we’ replaced ‘I’.   
 
I think I was a bit more brutal – that's not the word – a bit more up-front with the single 
parents.  It's just like, "You've got to do something about" – not "got to" – but, "This is the 
time," … "And under the JET Program we can help you to get into training courses.  If you're 
on a Newstart allowance or if you weren't, if you had a partner and you were just sitting at 
home these chances weren't happening to you.  We can tell you where all the programs are.  
We can tell you where all the education is, you know.  We can tell you about VTAC62  We can 
tell you about the universities.  We can help you to go through and get that degree.  We can 
talk about PES [Pension Education Supplement]s, all of those things, but it's time for you to 
start doing something for you, your future and your children's future," and we used to use that 
a lot. 
(Jessie 2007) 
 
Yet Jessie’s official NPM-speak that ‘it was all about the sell’ was contradicted when 
describing her involvement in the Horn of Africa Pilot (Silkstone & Peard 1996) (see 3.9).  
Jessie’s most animated recollections centred on her conversations with various Somalian 
refugees during the four months that she went to ‘all their morning teas and coffees’.  By 
gradually starting to talk about the JET Program with them she had realised these women 
would ‘never get into Centrelink to do that’.  Instead, after some months, she conducted the 
initial JET interviews in the homes of these women with a Somalian-Arabic interpreter and a 
JET Contact Officer from the CES.  Through these socially situated and constructed 
interviews she discovered that most single mothers wanted to attend Somali-specific English 
classes, but only if all their children could be looked after together.  This led to what Jessie 
considered her most important initiative, which was decidedly feminist in practice – a 
departmental agreement to have the first Non English Speaking Background child care 
program in Australia.   
 
 
                                                
62
 The Victorian Tertiary Admissions Centre (VTAC) manages applications and approvals to higher educational 
course in Victoria. 
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Most JAs reported that they spent about four days a week interviewing in the early 1990s 
and all considered that what they did was more professional, used a greater variety of skills 
and knowledge, had more autonomy and was more outward-focused than later expressions 
of the program.  Each of the 600-700 new interviews that they conducted every year 
translated, on average, into another three or four contacts with that parent. They saw the 
unique quality of their labour as ‘affective’ but also requiring program and labour market 
knowledge, plus resources necessary to support the ‘pathways’ single parents sought to 
pursue: 
 
The one-on-one conversation and time to have it was integral to its success.  The notion that 
people could take their time to move along their pathway was also critical, and the fact that there 
was a budget.  I mean, you couldn't run it without the fact that you could pay for books and 
courses and things like that.  That was also critical.  And the fact that at that time the JET had 
the financial delegation. 
(Alex 2006) 
 
Even though their massive workload was a marginal and denigrated part of the productive 
processes of DSS, a JA was producing use-value and value – a ‘work-ready’ parent for the 
labour market.  This work generated a variety of ideological displacements into the JA’s self-
perceptions of their work.  Compared to the later, especially compulsory, phases of JET 
(under Centrelink and Howard), these fetishising dynamics were less acute as the work 
practices generating them were less integrated into the overall productive processes of DSS 
in the early 1990s.  JET was not only ALMP ‘oil’ in DSS ‘water’, its feminist political 
colourings had yet to fade.  Alienation, and the tropes of inversion, fragmentation, 
equalisation, autonomy and repression (Wayne 2005: 198) which arose through these 
practices, are less discernable in this phase of the program.  For those JAs who attempted to 
hold on to JET’s ‘velocity, background, history and politics’, as Geoff Hamilton put it, the 
social justice and feminist elements of the program provided a certain counterweight to the 
homogenizing rhythms being imposed upon JAs by their massive workloads.  In discussions 
of the work JAs did in the later, compulsory, phases of the program there were clear 
indications and expressions of an increasing alienation in their working lives, turning them 
inward and immobile.   
 
Alex, a more recent JET worker, described how an ‘almost visionary’ veteran JA would 
always come to JET area-wide meetings holding a ‘big folder’ containing ‘every single minute 
from every single meeting’.  Alex thought this JA’s folder was ‘like a symbol’: 
 
Of almost of how she felt about the JET Program and she would get very distressed and 
almost not be able to move into doing JET in a new way because the way they had been 
doing it was so effective… We had seen people from domestic violence and their generation-
type situations go through courses gaining confidence, get part-time work and then full-time 
work, and believe that what they had done was the right thing themselves, to believe that that 
was right for them and they were happy and confident and so because people had seen that it 
worked so well they feared that that wouldn't be possible in the same way with the changes. 
(Alex 2006) 
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All early JAs talked about the autonomy of their role, using definitive rhetoric such as ‘it was 
very much on your own conscience’ (Hamilton 2006), ‘you pretty much ran your own show in 
your site’ (Cameron 2006) or ‘I was doing it all on my own’ (Gulzar 2006).  The JA work had 
some similarities with social workers, but was much more in line with the practices of those 
working in the CES.  Yet DSS femocrats had opposed placing the program in the CES since 
this would have one-sidedly focused on ‘the labour market rather than on the social aspects 
of JET’ (Levi & Edwards 1990, 165).  Paradoxically, producing the ‘social aspects of JET’ 
was more likely to occur inside an organisation still focussed on processing social security 
payments and ensuring an active compliance to seek work.   
 
In the early phase of JET, JAs considered that they were far more self-active in developing 
new initiatives with community agencies (for example, initiating a TAFE course specifically 
tailored for a group of single parents, helping broker new services to deliver child care 
services, and forging links with community groups involving single parents which had 
previously little contact with DSS), with publicising and promoting the program (such as 
designing new publications for their local area and conducting media interviews) and liaising 
with policy and operational managers in Canberra to deal with various implementation issues 
associated with the new program.   
 
JAs discussed their interviews with parents as a work practice in which they used their 
emotional labour, knowledge, skills and even their role as an ‘agent for change’ as tools to 
productively facilitate behavioural or attitudinal change in the parent.  For the large number of 
single parents who required long day care, family day care or an out of school hours care 
program to allow them to pursue a non home-based activity, the JET Child Care provisions 
were structurally biased against paid work.  Each education, training and other non-work 
activity attracted long-term subsidies of up to 8 years – effectively allowing a parent unlimited 
access to these core provisions.  Therefore, the emerging NPM campaign for clearly defined 
work outcomes (see 3.9) tended to be an abstraction that cut little concrete ice among most 
JAs.  Not only did all consider such childcare provisions ‘integral to JET’s success’ (Alex 
2006), the question of what was a success was usually framed around unpaid, non-work 
activities.  This policy faultline ideologically reinforced a bias in JAs’ practices against the 
labour market side of the program and towards its social side.   
 
Nevertheless, single parents were still quantified into ‘work ready’ and ‘other’ categories by 
most JAs.  There was an overall program necessity for the JA to inculcate confidence to 
eventually ‘sell’ oneself at job-interviews.  The program itself needed to be ‘sold’ to do so.  All 
the JAs talked of the ‘knack’ or ‘tricks’ they developed to identify ‘barriers’ a parent may be 
facing in order to ‘motivate’ them effectively.   
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Geoff Hamilton devised a now anachronistic looking sheet (reproduced as Figure 9) he gave 
out at regional interviews listing the ‘valued’ labour market characteristics already embodied 
in most single parents. This handout helped ‘start them on the journey’ from the ‘comfort 
zone’ they had been in: 
 
Here they were, they had been getting the pension for five years.  They knew when the 
specials were on at the grocery store.  They knew how to get cheap clothing for the kids.  The 
houses – 99 per cent of the cases were immaculate.  They were very poor but they were just 
– they were coping brilliantly on low incomes so here this JET Adviser comes along to tell 
them about the JET Program and that was a bit of a trick, yes…to get people off welfare 
eventually and into the workforce at a higher level. 
(Hamilton 2006). 
 
Figure 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUST A HOUSEWIFE 
 
 
 
In today’s technological world, many women in the home may be unsure what 
skills they have which are of value in the employment market place.  Below is a 
listing of skills practised daily by many women in the home.  These skills are 
valued by employers. 
 
 
 
 Ability to work unsupervised. 
 
 Ability to supervise others. 
 
 Ability to set and achieve short, intermediate and long term goals. 
 
 Financial management skills. 
 
 Ability to oversee and/or be involved in more than one task at a time. 
 
 Personnel management and co-ordination skills. 
 
 Ability to co-ordinate and complete both complex and routine mundane 
duties. 
 
 Interpersonal relationship skills. 
 
 Ability to co-ordinate and co-operate with others sharing a common work 
environment. 
 
 Consumer goods purchasing and negotiation skills. 
 
 Ability to self-motivate. 
 
 Ability to motivate others. 
 
……………………… 
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The JA who used the ‘this is the time’ speech that she had crafted over many interviews 
described her younger single parent version: 
 
Like, you're 22 years old.  By the time you get to retirement age it's going to be 65 for women 
the same as it is now.  If you don't go and get some training now while you've got the 
opportunity to do that, because the JET Program can help you, you might go back and get a 
factory job or whatever, you might start working again by the time you're 25.  That means 
you're in the workforce for 40 years before you can retire". 
(Jessie 2007).  
 
For Jessie, the need to ‘bring up their education’ was ‘the thing’ and ‘you could spend hours 
talking them into it’.  As a consequence, her speech techniques became objects – 
instruments of welfare production.   
 
In a highly emotional interview, one JA talked of the sexual violence both she and her 
children had experienced.  As an unemployed single parent she had met with a JA in the 
early 1990s who told her ‘You actually get quite good child support.  Why would you want to 
go back to work?  You should stay home and look after your children’ (Gulzar 2006).  This 
interviewee was so ‘shocked’ she ‘vowed’ that ‘if ever I get on the other side of that desk I 
would do that job so much differently’.  Within 12 months she had got a job in Centrelink, and 
within another two years, she had taken on the JA role.  Like other JAs she talked about the 
speech she had constructed in the first person singular which was delivered to a single 
parent: 
 
Okay, so in five years' time where am I going to be?  My children are getting older.  I haven't 
worked for 20 years.  What type of employment am I going to start to undertake? 
(Gulzar 2006) 
 
Again this was a tool used for the purposes of ‘implanting in people’s minds’ the necessity to 
‘be encouraged to move forward’.  Gulzar also wove her own experience as a single mother 
into her interviews.  Because this became a technique – a skill deployed over and over again 
rather than just a simple expression of solidarity, her use of her life to produce an ‘outcome’ 
was inverted into a reified object.  In giving an example of such a success she concluded, 
‘that's what I want to be able to achieve – to help people to achieve what they want’.  Such a 
commensuration of her aspirations with those of the single parent she was describing was a 
deeply fetishising practice.  It repressed the JA’s understanding minutes before that her work 
involved ‘implanting’ certain ideas and inverted this into a reified understanding that her 
achievement and the single parent’s achievement were unified – a trope of equalisation.  In 
using a fragment of her life as a work product, it fragmented her – and turned the single 
parent into a welfare object to be laboured upon.   
 
In later stages of the program JET workers talking about their autonomy discussed it in terms 
of maintaining relationships, rather than forging new ones.  By the time JET became 
compulsory for certain groups of single parents, the highly contradictory autonomy they had 
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was further reduced to a shell.  This was expressed in terms of what scope still existed to 
‘turn a blind eye’ when a single parent pensioner mentioned that they had a cash-in-hand 
job, or were potentially in a marriage-like relationship, or how a JA would avoid ‘breaching’ 
an income support recipient (Kelly 2006; Robin 2006).   
 
 
3.5 The bureaucratic battle to turn JET into a New Public Management 
program 
 
JET’s feminist-inclined orientation towards voluntary, long-term strategies for single parents 
to enable them to ‘punch above their weight’ in the labour market as Robin, a JA, put it soon 
came under increasing attack.  Critical assessments of the effectiveness of JET, its purpose 
and even policy rationale started to emerge from the early-adopters of NPM techniques and 
arguments in the Australian state bureaucracy, those departments most closely connected to 
finance capital.  However, in the lead-up to the election of the Howard government, internal 
state contestation about JET’s legitimacy remained marginal while the state’s accumulation 
functions, tempered by the recessionary impact of the early 1990s, muted employers’ 
demands for ‘maternal labour’.  Therefore, although the debates were fierce, they remained 
internal, ideological policy disputes in the upper reaches of the bureaucracy with few 
subsidiary impacts below.  The fight centred on what JET was supposed to achieve.  The 
tension between the social and economic aims of the program was already evident in the 
1988-89 Budget papers which initiated JET.  Treasury considered the ALMP to have two 
market objectives, to ‘improve the labour force participation of sole parents’ and to reduce 
‘outlays on social security pensions and benefits’ (CoA 1988 : 160).  Included in the papers, 
however, was the Women's Budget Statement by the Office of the Status of Women, which 
stressed the social aims of JET as:  
 
A comprehensive strategy…of information provision and counselling, assistance with child 
care, training and education and publicity directed at change in attitudes…to assist the special 
needs of sole parents’. 
(OSW 1988: 226-7)   
 
Because the Social Policy Division of DSS controlled the first studies and evaluations of JET, 
the latter view prevailed for the period Meredith Edwards headed the section (until 1990) and 
through to the election of the Howard government in 1996.  The Division had ‘prime 
responsibility’ of the first inter-departmental (Social Security; Employment, Education and 
Training, and Community Services and Health) evaluation of JET (DSS, DEET & DCSH 
1990: 68).  While the report duly reiterated the ‘disadvantaged status’ of single parents to be 
an Accord-defined problem of a ‘high level of dependency on income support’ due to 
‘relatively low participation in the labour force’, it pragmatically focused on recommendations 
to support JET’s social objectives (DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990: i).  For example, it stressed 
that because ‘many clients seek on-going support and encouragement from JAs’ immediate 
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labour market outcomes were often unrealistic, and a lengthier social intervention was 
involved ‘as they progress to training, education and finally employment’ (DSS, DEET & 
DCSH 1990: iv). It was in this context that the report raised (if not actually addressed) JAs’ 
unsustainable workloads.   
 
The political orientation of the Division can be seen by how it dealt with one of the report’s 
recommendations – to assess the effectiveness of the publicity campaign promoting JET.  
The Division commissioned Graeme Brewer, a close associate of ACOSS and the 
Brotherhood of Laurence, to research and write-up the study.  His recommendation that a 
‘high level, expert steering committee’ be appointed to oversee the study was accepted 
(Brewer 1991: appendix 2).  All were social or liberal feminists – Alison McClelland, Merle 
Mitchell (President of ACOSS), Ann Callanan (Council of Single Mothers and their Children) 
and Bettina Cass.  Brewer’s report was a mild addendum to the earlier ACOSS paper shorn 
of any recommendations or awkward references to industrial action.  His main 
recommendation was that there needed to be a greater awareness of the program among 
employers (Brewer 1991: 84). 
 
In 1991 the first internal political cracks within the Division appeared in Two Years of the 
Jobs, Education and Training Program for Sole Parents: Response, Activity and Outcomes, 
by Alan Jordan (1991).  Jordan had been the Department’s most prolific and influential 
analyst of social provisioning policy in the previous decade and had written or co-written 
three of the background/discussion papers for the Social Security Review (Carson, 
Fitzgerald & Jordan 1989; Jordan 1987, 1989).  By 1991 he had been won over to a New 
Public Management analysis of policy.  He argued that there was a core weakness in JET’s 
objectives, ‘an absence of any defined criterion of successful outcome’ (Jordan 1991: 118).  
From a NPM perspective this meant that ‘technically’ JET was ‘not…a [active labour market] 
program’ (Jordan 1991: 5).  If it could not be ‘demonstrated’ that JET outcomes had a linear, 
empirically measurable relationship with their objectives which ‘can be shown to lead 
regularly to a substantial result’ then ‘the only realistic alternative’ was to ‘abandon the 
attempt or try again on rather different principles’ (Jordan 1991: 3, 123).   
 
Jordan was clearly frustrated that such a ‘substantial result’, an outcome, had not been 
specified in the program design or objectives.  The fatal problem, as he saw it, was that JET 
was an ‘open door’ program dominated by educational, childcare and training outputs rather 
than clear work outcomes:  
 
Adoption of such a criterion would help maintain clarity of purpose and the vital distinction, 
continually threatened with obliteration, between process and outcome.  Field staff have been 
held responsible for what they do – filling quotas of interviews, referrals and placements – not 
for the end result. 
(Jordan 1991: 115). 
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He argued that no statistically valid basis existed to assess the effectiveness of the program 
because there was no separate and comparable control group of sole parents who had not 
accessed JET.  Jordan (1991: 4) therefore reasoned that ‘rigorous, conclusive proof [that 
JET assisted sole parents into paid work] is impossible’.   A sharper ‘specification of 
minimum acceptable outcomes, in terms of hours of work and levels of earnings’ also 
needed to be adopted to quantitatively assess the impact of JET (Jordan 1991: 115). Noting 
that no ‘figure has been adopted as an official standard’, Jordan (1991: 3) proposed: 
 
An arbitrarily chosen figure corresponding  perhaps to 25 hours a week or more in a fairly 
well-paid occupation, where pension entitlement would have been reduced substantially and 
disposable income…considerably increased’. 
 
Analysed against such criteria JET ‘has been relatively ineffective in its initial phase’ and 
‘unless it can be shown that the program returns a profit on the resources invested in it, 
however success may be measured, it may not survive and certainly will not grow’ (Jordan 
1991: 111, 116).  Jordan (1991: 119-122) proposed that JET be turned into a compulsory 
‘obligation’ program with highly restricted and time delimited access to its services and 
funding.  Such process/outcome criticisms travel through the history of JET.  By the late 
1990s they had become a major angle of attack on the program – that JET had no rational 
justification for its existence. 
 
Jordan’s one-sided rendering of JET as a program simply to be assessed against particular 
economic criteria ignored its social justice character.  Cutting against Jordan’s economically 
reductionist assumptions about JET were the social-democratic politics of the Accord, 
mediated by social-feminism.  JET had labour market aims as ‘key elements’.  However, the 
program’s ‘overall objective’ was based on the social wage notion that JET was ‘an 
integrated program of assistance providing individual advice, access to child care and 
education, training and employment opportunities’ (DSS, DEET & DCSH 1990: 66: my 
highlight).  As a consequence, the early iteration of JET was necessarily about social welfare 
‘processes’ required by many single parents if they were to overcome the emotional, 
technical, educational, familial and economic obstacles to securing a decent (probably part-
time) job.  From a social justice perspective, the ‘outcome’ is the process since the larger 
‘objective’ is the delivery of JET services.  However, JET (like the Accord), was riven by a 
market-centred premise that contradicted its quasi-social justice elaboration.  Outcomes 
become fetishised — objects-in-themselves.  For JET, gaining a job was the only Accord 
market-mediated outcome.  The un-clarity of the program’s objectives was necessary in that 
it congealed these historical contradictions.  The NPM precision sought by Jordan was, 
therefore, an unacknowledged attack on the social justice elements within JET which had 
been politically inscribed by the social democratic politics of the women’s and labour 
movements of the 1980s.  
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The Social Policy Division of DSS implicitly hit back at Jordan’s argument in the 1992 
evaluation of JET by stressing that the program’s role was ‘concentrating’ on four ‘outcomes’ 
– training, education, employment and child care (DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992, i).  The 
Division tried to bureaucratically shore up its position by recommending that JET’s social 
aims be made more explicit in official policy: 
 
In view of the importance of the JET program in contributing to the Government’s access and 
equity and social justice aims, the objectives of the JET program be amended to refer to these 
aims and to ensuring that sole parent pensioners have access to child care and to education, 
training and employment opportunities. 
(DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 75) 
 
Various recommendations were made to reduce costs and free up access for those on the 
program, yet no mention is made of the problem identified in the ACOSS Report that sole 
parents needed ongoing child care support once they left JET.  Assorted successes were 
noted, such as an increase in the labour force participation rate of sole parents from 48 per 
cent in 1988 to 55 per cent in 1991, which was linked to the proportion of those receiving a 
full-rate pension declining from 71 per cent to 59 per cent (DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 1).  
Child care access and fees were a major concern expressed by JET clients and JAs.  A sole 
parent pensioner with one child in full-time care had to pay a minimum $15 per week plus a 
‘gap fee’ which ranged at the time from $9 to $38 per week, depending on the child care 
centre (DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 41).  The difficulty of finding a place for children less 
than 2 years of age was noted, as well as the total lack of funded care for those over 12.  
The report called on JET Contact Officers’ classification level to be raised to that of JA’s and 
become full-time (9.10.0.3), for clients to register at either DSS or CES (9.9.0.1) and for the 
departmental computer systems to be upgraded (10.2.3)(DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 55, 
59).  One major reason given for the last recommendation was that because of the heavy 
workload of JET staff and the cumbersome systems they worked with, no job placement 
details had been recorded in  87 per cent of all JET client records (DSS, DEET & DHHCS 
1992: 61).  Systems upgrades would make such completions ‘mandatory’ (DSS, DEET & 
DHHCS 1992: 62).  The report (3.6.0.1) recommended conducting: 
 
Pilots…to identify strategies to ensure that sole parent pensioners ‘most at risk’ of long-term 
dependency on income support and inter-generational poverty could access JET. 
(DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 18). 
 
Justification came from ‘anecdotal evidence from DSS officers’ that ‘several generations of 
families are dependent on social security payments’ (DSS, DEET & DHHCS 1992: 17). 
Funding for these pilots was quickly secured in the subsequent 1992-93 Budget (ANAO 
1993: xix).  By the late 1990s it was these reports, and the associated departmental 
interpretations of them, which formed the major research plank to introduce compulsory 
measures for the whole sole parent pensioner population, and changes to the payments they 
received.   
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Within a year the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO 1993: 13) Efficiency Audit of JET 
resumed the NPM attack, tabling in Parliament its ‘major’ finding that ‘the results desired 
from the program’ rested on ‘a number of uncertainties…[it] was unable to satisfactorily 
resolve’.  An audit of the political/social aspects of JET was unresolvable because these 
aspects were not economically measurable within its neoliberal rationality.  A dry, NPM 
functionalism courses through the ANAO’s complaint that ‘as a general rule the objectives of 
a program should identify the purpose, as opposed to the nature, of the activities within a 
program’ (ANAO 1993: 8).  Through a series of blatantly deceptive manoeuvres the ANAO 
cobbled together from out of date policies a constructed purpose for JET which better fitted 
its auditing requirements.   
 
Firstly, the ANAO simply claimed it was the government’s initial intent in 1988 for JET to only 
have economic, and therefore measurable, objectives (ANAO 1993: x).  It was forced to 
retreat from this position because the Office of the Status of Women and Treasury papers 
gave conflicting accounts of JET’s purpose in the 1998-99 Budget papers.  The second line 
of attack was to promote a different ‘authoritative source’ – the annual DSS Program 
Performance Statement (ANAO 1993: 8).  Unfortunately for the ANAO, the Social Policy 
Division had just successfully amended these Program Performance Statements so that by 
1992-93 ‘explicit reference to increasing the numbers and proportion of sole parents in 
employment is no longer included’ (ANAO 1993: 11).  The third manoeuvre the ANAO took 
to find the JET-purpose they sought was to opt to assess the program against the defunct 
1991-92 Statement.  A purely political reason was given, dressed in bland technical 
language, that the current version introduced ‘ambiguity’ in ‘modifying the focus of the 
program’ (ANAO 1993: 10-11).  The earlier 1991-92 Performance Statement JET had: 
 
 a primary objective – ‘to improve the financial circumstances of sole parent pensioners 
by aiding their entry or re-entry into the workforce’ and 
 two subsidiary objectives – ‘to increase sole parent pensioners’ access to child care 
and to educational, training and employment opportunities’ and ‘to reduce outlays on 
sole parent pension’ (ANAO 1993: 9). 
 
In the current 1992-93 Program Performance Statement, the notion of primary and 
subsidiary objectives was abolished leaving only the ‘aims’ of the program (ANAO 1993: 9).  
For an organisation committed to NPM evaluations this was not only a retrograde move, it 
was analytically useless.  The earlier Program Performance Statement was therefore used to 
craft (1) a general argument for the rationality of NPM, and (2) a specific argument against 
JET.   
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By using a defunct DSS document a rational distinction was now able to be made between 
ends (the ‘the key elements’ of the objective), work and a reduction in government outlays, 
and means (‘the strategies adopted to achieve these objectives’) (ANAO 1993: 8, x).  
Measuring the success of JET, the ANAO argued, must be conducted through applying this 
‘principle’ (ANAO 1993: 10).  Only JET’s ‘two key elements’ (work and reduced DSS outlays) 
could be properly considered outcomes.  Involvement in courses or gaining a child care 
place were consigned to ‘processes’ or ‘outputs’.  JET’s success could only be ‘objectively’ 
measured against ’outcomes’.  Therefore, the report recommended: 
 
That action be taken to review the objectives of the JET program so as to ensure the 
expectations of the Government in terms of the desired results, the priorities for achieving 
them, and the accountability and respective responsibilities of each Department  
(Recommendation No.1); and 
 
That the performance indicators for the JET program more explicitly identify those measures 
which relate to the desired results of the program (outcomes) and those which relate to the 
means of achieving them (Recommendation No.2). 
(ANAO 1993: 14) 
 
Despite garnering Department of Finance (DoF) backing,63 the ANAO’s recommendations to 
construct JET along explicit NPM business practices, along with other proposals to restrict 
access to the program were initially rejected by both DSS and DEET (ANAO 1993: xvi).  
However, such bureaucratic resistance, led by the Social Policy Division in DSS, gradually 
evaporated during the next few years as NPM notions gradually took stronger hold within the 
state and became hegemonic after the election of the Howard government in 1996. 
 
 
3.6 JET at the end of the Labor governments 
 
JET’s unique position at the end of the Labor period as the only welfare to work program 
inside DSS was soon to have a role far outweighing its size in the implementation of 
strenuous welfarism.  In a department still fixated by the headlights that its technocratic 
raison d’être was ‘consistency of process’, JET was seen by senior managers as a rare 
resource which could be mined in the drive to restructure frontline welfare practices to 
produce labour market ‘outcomes’ (Vardon cited in Scott 1999: 7).  By 1996, as the 
economic recovery began to gather pace in Australia, breaking the old departmental mold 
became urgent.  The Australian state-capital relation’s competitive and accumulation 
requirements to maximise the availability of cheaply exploitable labour power demanded a 
                                                
63
 The DoF supported the earlier, 1991-92 iteration of DSS Program Performance Statement in these arcane 
terms: 
[this] earlier form combines in the objective an outcome  (improved financial circumstances of sole parents 
by aiding there [sic] entry into the labour market) with an output  (advice and counselling, access to child 
care and education, training and employment opportunities), and the revised objective has the advantage of 
isolating the desired outcome in the key element, with the outputs being subsidiary objectives or “key result 
areas” (DoF cited in ANAO 1993: 11, highlights in original). 
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greater productive effort from a state body expending more money than defence, 
infrastructure, transport, energy, health and education combined (Laurie & McDonald 2008: 
36).   
 
On the surface, JET seemed ill-placed to lead a neoliberal productivity drive to refurbish 
welfare labour practices.  At the end of the Labor’s reign JET remained a voluntary program 
riddled with social justice ideas.  JAs tended to focus on increasing the value of a single 
parent’s labour power rather than working to realise its immediate potential.  Yet managers 
soon tasked to prosecute the Howard Government’s welfare reform agenda understood that 
the essential productive character of JET lay in its emotional and affective labour.   
 
Analysed at the level of national ‘capital in general’, JAs were modern equivalents of Marx’s 
storage and transport workers.  JET labour was productively maintaining the value of a 
single parent’s labour power from various social degradations and adding to its value through 
an educational or training conveying process prior to its market realisation.  New 
managerialism seized upon JET as the only internally available program which could be 
used to move social security practices ‘from passive to active intervention’ (Vardon 2006). 
How it did so is the subject of the next chapter.   
 
Rather than assessing the significance of applying marxist methods and concepts to 
investigate the history of JET and welfare policy production under Labor, followed by a 
similar exercise for the Howard government period, the final chapter draws the many threads 
of the inquiry together to present the study’s overall conclusions. 
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4 
 
JET under Howard 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
From the mid-1990s, as the voluntary, Accord-mediated premises of JET began to be white-
anted by the Howard Government’s welfare reform agenda, those working in the program 
experienced a series of contradictory pressures.  The imperative underpinning the state’s 
competiveness agenda – attempting to respond to still chronically poor profit rates – 
increasingly occurred in a period of economic growth and falling unemployment rates.  State 
measures were taken to ramp up the level of exploitation in the workplace and minimise the 
‘underutilisation rates’ (PC 2008: 8) of various groups of the population, particularly women 
with dependent children.  Section 4.2 outlines how this revamped accumulation and 
legitimation strategy was expressed in the state’s social welfare interventions. The policy 
debates driving, resisting or reflecting the newly unfolding relationship between single 
parents, the welfare reform agenda and JET are critically discussed in 4.3.  The institutional 
restructuring to produce strenuous welfarism details two administrative phases required to 
institute the managerial prerogatives expected by the Howard Government as it gained the 
confidence to tightly direct its welfare interventions (4.4).  Equipping those producing these 
interventions to meet this accumulation and legitimation strategy required an institutional and 
labour process overhaul.  Section 4.5 analyses how the tensions of this ‘modernisation’ drive 
to increase workfare productivity led to a restructuring of the division of labour and an 
intensification of coercive work practices.  The legislative movement which fully transformed 
JET into a compulsory program for a period prior to its abolition, union responses to this 
transformation and changes to staff perceptions of their work and the program are detailed 
(4.6) before some concluding comments (4.7).  
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4.2 Changes to the state’s accumulation and legitimation strategy 
 
From the mid-1990s the competitiveness agenda of the newly elected conservative Howard 
Government continued to develop policies to boost local profit rates.  By 2007, prior to the 
Global Financial Crisis causing a hiatus in the Australian economy’s 15-year period of 
relatively rapid expansion, profit share of GDP had reached 28 per cent, the highest level 
since records began in 1959 (Workplace Express 2008).  Modest real wage growth had 
occurred from the early 1990s to 2005, but because labour productivity outstripped this 
growth, the wage share of GDP was lower than at any time since 1964 (ABS 2008e; Mitchell 
& Muysken 2008: 5).   
 
Overall, however, Australian capital remained faced with a rate of profit lower than three 
decades earlier (Mohun 2003a: 88; O'Hara 2008: 100).  Compared to many OECD countries, 
greater productive investment had occurred in Australia during the early 2000s (especially in 
mining and construction) but not on a sufficient scale to absorb all the surplus value 
produced in previous rounds of production (Bramble 2004: 8).  Phillip O’Hara (2008: 100) 
notes profit rates began to rise with the start of the 1990s economic recovery due to a higher 
rate of exploitation (increasing relative surplus value) and a reduction in the costs of new 
technology (a slightly lower organic composition of capital) (see Table 5).   
 
Table 5 
Profit rate, organic composition, surplus value and GDP per capita* 
Decade annual averages, Australia: 1960-2006 
Source: Phillip O’Hara (2008) A social structure of accumulation for long wave upswing in Australia? 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, Issue 61, page 100 
Where v is variable capital (socially necessary labour time or the value of labour power), 
s is the surplus labour time and c is constant capital.64 
 
As capital-in-general, overall demands on and for labour intensified in Australia.  However, 
differing requirements emerged in sections of capital for cheap, skilled or flexible ‘just-in-time’ 
casual workers, depending on an employer’s location, industry and international exposure to 
labour and capital mobility (Bryan & Rafferty 1999a).  By the early 2000s even lower-skilled 
farm, retail and office labour started to become less readily available (McDonald & Withers 
2008).  The Howard Government deployed a number of strategies to expand the total 
                                                
64
 Extending surplus labour time increases absolute surplus value.  Reducing socially necessary labour time 
increases relative surplus value (MIA 2009). 
 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Rate of profit 5.5% 3.3% 3.0% 4.0% 4.5% 
Organic composition of capital (c/v)      1.73 1.94 2.32 2.29 2.21 
Rate of surplus value (s/v) x 100 15.0% 10.1% 10.1% 13.3% 13.6% 
GDP Growth per capita 3.44 1.43 1.93 2.15 1.78 
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surplus value generated for Australian capital as part of the state’s accumulation-intent to 
increase the rate of profit.  While ‘apolitically’ posed as free market ideology, the central 
purpose of neoliberalism was ‘to wage class struggle’ (Harvey 2006).  Promoting the idea of 
small government was a highly influential, but ‘largely rhetorical’ smokescreen behind which 
a new ‘culture of regulation’ (Bryan 2000b: 334) was instituted to meet the coalition 
government’s practical aim of ‘more directly’ serving ‘the interests of capital’ (Stilwell 2000: 
25). Immigration, industrial relations, education and welfare were recast into more coercive 
and regulated policies to both boost productivity and address issues of labour availability.  
Howard’s ongoing industrial assault on unions aimed to restrain workers’ capacity to ‘realise 
real wage growth commensurate with their contribution to production’ (Mitchell & Muysken 
2008: 5-6).  If by the mid-2000s unionisation rates were half that of two decades earlier 
(West & Davis 2008), the problem remained that most unionists still received significantly 
higher wages than non-union workers (Cai & Waddoups 2008; Peetz & Preston 2007: 31).  
Recognising in 2005 that ‘we do not believe the lemon has been squeezed dry in industrial 
relations reform’ the Coalition Government rolled out another round of legislation – 
WorkChoices: to further ratchet up exploitation in the workplaces (Howard 2005).   
 
JET and other ALMPs were particular expressions of how such strains were impacting on the 
state-capital relation.  In their accumulation function ALMPs are ‘active’ in addressing 
demand or supply side pressures as either an income replacement vehicle or a ‘labour 
market integration’ measure (Auer, Efendioglu & Leschke 2008: 8).  ALMPs are a component 
of capitalism’s ongoing requirement to keep a ‘reserve army’ work-ready and to keep a 
downward pressure on wages.  Working Nation (CoA 1994), for example, worried that ‘if 
there is a large number of long term unemployed people who are not effective competitors 
for jobs, pressure for wage increases will emerge’.  Eight years later the Productivity 
Commission (2002a: 2.6) reiterated that the role of labour market programs was to increase 
‘effective’ competition for work to constrain ‘wage pressure’ and thereby drive wages down to 
their market clearing equilibrium.  Treasury (1999) stressed that if the prime objective of 
labour market policies to improve ‘productivity growth’ was to be achieved it had to be part of 
the government’s ‘broad, integrated reforms’ of reducing the award system to a ‘safety net’, 
pursuing its attack on the industrial relations system, making ‘mutual obligation 
arrangements’ more coercive, reducing taxation on low wages and increasing education and 
training to meet skills shortages.   
 
State measures to boost absolute and relative surplus value were given some intellectual 
gloss of policy-coherence by Ken Henry, the Treasury Secretary.  His influential rationale for 
which interventions constituted the state’s core accumulation functions centred on what he 
coined as the three ‘P’s’ boosting – Population, Participation and Productivity (Henry 2005).  
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He castigated his contemporary neoclassical peers for seeking to restrict state economic 
policies to the singular ‘principle…to promote and enlarge economic freedom…for their own 
sake’ (Henry 2001).  Ironically, while terming them ‘old heritage’, Henry invoked the even 
earlier political economy traditions of this heritage:   
 
The liberal, or non-interference, principles of the classical (Smithian or Ricardian) economists 
were not, in the first place, economic principles; they were an application to economics of 
principles that were thought to apply to a much wider field.  The contention that economic 
freedom made for economic efficiency was no more than a secondary support 
(Henry 2001, my highlight). 
 
This ‘much wider field’ of modern capitalism encompassed an active state for ‘economic 
efficiency’.  State policies to enhance competitive advantage were vital – not only in practice 
but in ‘principle’.  State managers such as Henry recognised that because the state-capital 
relation is the dynamic of modern capitalism then whether economics was clothed in 
neoliberal or social liberal garb was a purely tactical, ‘secondary’ issue.  What mattered for 
Treasury was that this rhetoric, whatever its political colouring, pragmatically maximised 
international competitive advantages for the nation state.  
 
In one sense the state’s accumulation function took on a ‘primitive’ characteristic in that 
labour not already subsumed into directly productive work for Australian capital came under 
sharper policy focus.  The government reinstituted higher immigration targets to .  Annual net 
permanent migration was boosted from 45,300 in 1997 to 72,400 by 2008, temporary 
migrants on Working Holiday visas nearly doubled and those holding longer-term Business 
visas tripled (ABS 2009c; DIAC 2009).  Policy restrictions to accessing student income 
support payments (Dapre 2006b: 462-477) led to a 7 per cent increase in the proportion of 
full-time undergraduates in paid work from 2001 to 2006 (James et al. 2007: 38; Oliver 2006: 
17). Specific geopolitical competitive pressures to lift employment rates among working-age 
women had been building as the world economy expanded.  The 2000 Lisbon European 
Council employment target for women of 60 per cent by 2010, for example, looked ‘close’ to 
being exceeded just prior to the global economic crisis (EC 2009: 8).  In the USA over 59 per 
cent of women were in the labour force by 2007 (BLS 2009).  Australia, by contrast, was a 
relative laggard with only 56 per cent of women in the labour market in 2004 (ABS 2005b).  
The international gap in maternal employment rates was twice as large.  Despite a rapid 
increase in the previous two decades,65 only 50 per cent of women caring for a child under 
six were in paid work, compared to the OECD average of 59 per cent (ABS 2007d).   
 
Such seemingly minor differences had vital economic ramifications for the local state-capital 
relation.  Each percentage point gap in participation rates seriously weakened the 
                                                
65
 In 1983 32 per cent of single and 42 per cent of Australian coupled mothers were in paid work.  By 2002 this 
had increased to 48 per cent and 63 per cent respectively (Gray et al. 2003: 3). 
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competitive capacity of Australian capitalism.  Kay Patterson (2003), a FaCS Minister under 
the Howard Government, claimed that by raising the overall participation rate by 2 per cent, 
national output would be increased by 9 per cent.  A more sober Productivity Commission 
report (Abhayaratna & Lattimore 2006: 72) estimated that such a rate increase would add 
1.75 per cent to GDP per capita.  Both these claims, however, oversimplify the dynamics that 
increased participation rates may have in an expanding economy.  During the 1990s rising 
participation rates had the effect, according to the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), of 
slightly lowering productivity (Davis & Rahman 2006: 1).  The tendency for the declining 
proportion of more experienced and productive male labour to be rapidly replaced by new 
female labour entering lower-skilled occupations initially dampened overall productivity 
(Abhayaratna & Lattimore 2006: 72).  By 2002, however, as men’s participation rates began 
to edge up again and the rate of increase of women working steadied (ABS 2008f: 223), the 
in-work experience of those employed in the earlier round of expansion increased, thus 
tending to raise productivity.   
 
The significance of the RBA’s caveat was not lost on state managers – any policy-push to 
raise participation rates needed to be politically ‘locked in’ if the consequential productivity 
increases were to flow.  Concomitantly this meant that new workfare policies to boost 
participation rates had to be framed as an enduring and paradigmatic change of direction.  
This new orientation to the state’s accumulation role was given urgent political expression in 
Costello’s 2002 Budget paper The Intergenerational Report – forecasting dire economic 
consequences if participation rates were not permanently ramped up (CoA 2002).66  Henry 
articulated what this sea change in the state’s social accumulation strategy was to be in a 
speech to labour market and welfare economists:  
 
For the last 40 years our principal macroeconomic challenge concerned the unemployment 
rate.  For the next 40 our principal economic challenge will be the participation rate’. 
(Henry 2003: 9) 
  
This was a ‘task’, he argued, ‘not without hope’ as three particular sources of potential labour 
had been already been publicly identified by the Treasury Secretary in the early 2000s – 
‘mature aged, income support recipients and females’ – each of which had ‘considerable 
scope to boost the labour force participation rates of Australians of working age’ (Henry 
2003: 11).  The ruling class confidence that such an accumulation ‘challenge’ could be driven 
by state welfare policies was founded on the ideological and political groundwork which had 
been conducted in the 1990s.  
 
 
                                                
66
 Devastating criticisms of the Report’s assumptions and methods made by left academics such as Bill Mitchell 
(2003) and James Doughney (2006) were consigned to the political margins. 
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Legitimising the new competitiveness agenda 
 
Peter Costello, in a speech about his geopolitical aspirations for the state to boost the 
competitive advantage of Australian capitalism and its own power, described how the state’s 
accumulation and legitimation role were intimately connected: 
 
Influence is not simply based on population or economic size but also…military power, 
technological leadership, the shape and focus of global institutions, the robustness of 
alliances, social cohesion, human skills, cultural influence, and financial weight also need to 
be taken into account. 
(Costello 2005: 9) 
 
Social policy’s contribution to ‘social cohesion, human skills and cultural influence’ was a 
thoroughly imbricated aspect of economic policy to compete on world markets – and treated 
as such by the Howard Government.  International competition continually required new 
national ‘reforms’ to boost accumulation and profit rates:   
 
The reform task is never-ending. I invoke again the metaphor of the race towards the ever 
receding finishing line.  It’s frustrating, it’s maddening, you keep going but it keeps 
disappearing. Why do you keep going?  You keep going because you know that if you don’t 
keep going, the other blokes in the race are going to go past you. 
(Howard 2007: 7, my highlight) 
 
In the mid-1990s the collapse of the Accord had created the political space for a full-blown 
expression of neoliberalism.  By the 2000s, however, the government’s market mantra began 
to be destablised by the ‘burgeoning disparity’ between its rhetoric to act for the ‘well-being 
of all’ and the one-sided rise of ruling class power (Harvey 2005: 79).  As wage inequality 
continued to increase under the Howard Government67 more than 4 out of 5 people agreed 
that the gap between high and low incomes was too great (Wilson & Meagher 2007: 273).  
The proportion of those who considered that the demands of work were negatively impacting 
on their family or personal lives had risen from 40 per cent in 2003 to 64 per cent in 2007 
(ASSDA 2009).  Negative public perceptions that ‘big business’ had too much power began 
rising as did positive views of unions and a greater expenditure of social provisioning 
(McAllister & Clark 2008: 9, 29).  Australian state strategies to attempt to address the public 
perceptions of a growing contradiction between its laissez faire talk and its requirement to be 
an ‘activist in creating a good business climate’ took ameliorating and coercive forms 
(Harvey 2005: 79).   
 
Amelioration 
Public opposition was divided by the government’s splitting of social policy into a ‘two tiered’ 
system (Spies-Butcher 2009).  Those on low incomes received one set of increasingly fragile 
or conditional benefits – Medicare, public education and Centrelink payments.  Those on 
                                                
67
 The ratio of the top 10 per cent of disposable incomes to the lowest 10 per cent of incomes worsened during 
the period of the Howard government from 3.66 in 1996/97 to 3.92 in 2005/06 (ABS 2007b: 11). 
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high incomes received subsidised ‘tax breaks’ for private health care, education and 
superannuation.  In a sense the changes to family-related payments partially bridged this 
divide by offering a Child Tax Rebate to all in the labour market (and so disproportionately 
benefiting the rich) and Family Tax Benefits (FTB) to the majority of the working class.  Mark 
Sullivan, a FaCS Secretary and Centrelink Board member, talked of how the Liberal 
Government ‘had expanded its programs around children dramatically’ (cited in Malone 
2006: 69).  The Productivity Commission solidly supported these ‘family’ programs to help 
address the ‘underutilisation rates’ of women with dependent children (2008: 8).  As a result 
‘in-work’ benefits for maternal employment rose to become the highest in the OECD (ACOSS 
2008: 20) under the expectation this would act as an incentive to increase the labour supply 
of single and low income partnered mothers with young children (Doiron 2004; Kalb 2006; 
though Rammohan & Whelan 2006, reject this argument; Toohey 2005).   
 
Child Care Benefit (CCB), for example, was increased to partially alleviate the rising net cost 
of long day care, but access beyond two days a week became conditional on active 
engagement in the labour or education markets (AIHW 2006).  The base rate of Family Tax 
Benefit (FTB) was increased by 63 per cent in 2004, accompanied by a more generous 
income threshold.  In the same year the staggered introduction of a $5000 non-means tested 
Maternity Payment was announced (Costello 2004).  This type of payment was considered 
by feminists such as Anne Summers (2004) to be ‘a welfare measure, not a work-related 
one’.  Summers’ distinction not only misses the general policy-intent to boost labour 
reproduction rates but the specific objective of encouraging prompt maternal returns to the 
labour market.  This second aim was made more explicit in 2009 when the measure was 
broken into 13 fortnightly payments – plainly anticipating the forthcoming 18-week Paid 
Parental Leave provisions (Centrelink 2009b: 8) (CoA 2009: 1).  Such ameliorating social 
wage ‘transfer’ payments seemed to mostly advantage mothers who were working or 
studying to meet their ‘out of pocket’ childcare expenses (Redmond 1999; Toohey 2005).  In 
reality, the state and employers were the real beneficiaries – these were highly geared 
outlays which boosted accumulation.  Jay Martin (2004: 9), a FaCS researcher, estimated 
that in 2001- 02, each dollar outlaid by the government for formal child care leveraged $8.11 
of ‘economic benefits’ of which $1.86 was returned ‘directly to the Government’s bottom line, 
in the form of increased taxation and reduced government outlays’.   
 
The Howard Government spent considerable political energy de-centring these core ‘in work 
transfers’ from its Welfare-to-Work agenda.  Family Assistance Offices (FAOs) were 
established in Australian Taxation and Medicare premises to drive home that this funding 
should be normatively perceived as a yearly tax rebate disconnected from the ominous 
drumbeats further down the road at Centrelink.  Family Allowance was therefore re-branded 
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as Family Tax Benefit in July 2000 to be delivered through a de-politicised ‘virtual 
organisation’ (Dapre 2006b: 241; Medicare Australia 2003: 110).  The strategic intent of 
Cabinet, which closely oversaw the implementation of the FAO, was clear to the Centrelink 
senior managers I interviewed (CM1 2002)(CM2 2002).  In a tense discussion with CM2 I put 
to him that the overall purpose of the FAO was not simply to re-frame family payments as 
non-welfare rebates but to politically separate the FAO from the space occupied by those 
now denoted to be receiving workfare payments.  CM2 elliptically agreed.  In a carefully 
couched response he conceded that the ‘principles, thoughts and ideas’ surrounding the 
establishment of the FAO had ‘taken things up a few more notches’.  CM2 had every reason 
to be reticent.  These ideological and institutional attempts by the government to separate 
the deserving public from the undeserving welfare subject were indeed modest.  The aim to 
turn a fortnightly payment into a yearly tax rebate continued to be confronted by the reality 
that less than 5 per cent of parents could afford to wait and claim these payments as a lump 
sum (FaCS 2002: 26).  Most still had to front up to their local Centrelink office to arrange for 
these ‘transfers’ to be delivered either as fortnightly cash payments (FTB) or deductions 
(CCB)   
 
Coercion 
In an attempt to deflect this growing public discontent onto the unemployed, government 
welfare ministers launched campaigns of ‘flushing out the dole cheats’ (Brough 2001: 13) 
and ‘dob in a dole bludger’ (Vanstone 2002) while politically ‘wedging’ (Wilson & Turnbull 
2001) an opposition ALP which essentially supported Howard’s overall strategy.  These 
tactics were shored up by lurid media campaigns against the ‘alarming numbers’ (Today 
Tonight 2005) and dubious character of single parent pensioners as they gave full-throated 
support for the government’s new coercive measures which ‘put parents on notice, warning 
them they will have to look for work sooner under looming changes’ (Frenkel 2005: 13).   
 
These campaigns assisted in increasing the coercive character of ALMPs.  Critics of 
workfare argued that this movement from ‘citizenship to supervision’ (Shaver 2002: 331) 
denied civil rights (Bainbridge 1997: 5), and reduced the ‘ethical basis of social policy’ 
(Bessant et al. 2006: 200).  They tended to assume that the prime target of these political 
witch-hunts, which helped pave the way for more draconian mutual obligation policies, was 
the unemployed (Carney 2006b; Dean 1999; Henman 2001; Marston & McDonald 2006a).  
However, compulsory ALMPs were also particular contemporary legitimation expressions of 
the state-capital relation to boost accumulation in the workplace.  Raising participation rates 
was only one goal of this accumulation strategy.  Welfare policies and their associated 
ideological smear campaigns were not simply or even primarily directed to this unemployed 
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periphery – they had the larger strategic intent to boost productivity where capital is created 
– at the centre of the system by the employed.   
 
Sharon Beder (2000) aptly describes how the work ethic changed in the more precarious, 
casualised work environment of the 1990s away from the ‘jobs-for-life’ expectations of the 
previous generation.  The ethical idea of work, she argued, had shifted from one of personal 
betterment to the betterment of society as a whole.  Beder discusses that because the ‘Mc 
Jobs’ work of the 1990s was something Generation X could no longer be positively proud to 
do, a concerted campaign was developed for them to found their pride more negatively – on 
not being a drain on the welfare state (Beder 2000).  Tighter political attention to both the 
state’s legitimation and accumulation roles, therefore, became necessary for either to 
effectively meet its competitiveness agenda. 
 
Specific companies were directly advantaged as new labour became available at a state-
subsidised rate.  More importantly, the supply-side efforts of the government were designed 
so that broader sections of capital would reap the reward of compulsory ALMPs (Dixon & 
Rimmer 2006: S40).  Economists such as Peck and Theodore (2000: 132) argued that the 
‘downward pay pressure’ of ‘workfarist measures do not so much raise the level of 
employability across the labour market as a whole as increase the rate of exploitation in its 
lower reaches’. The Productivity Commission (2002b: 2.6) agreed that programs ‘raising the 
substitutability of the unemployed’ for the employed ‘increases the downward pressure that 
unemployment has on wage determination’.   
 
To beat the ‘other blokes in the race’, in 2007 Howard stressed that the government’s 
welfare policy changes were at the ideological centre of their overall strategy:  
 
No reform agenda that this Government has pursued has been more significant than the quiet 
revolution in Australia’s welfare system in the last decade to tackle the scourge of passive 
welfare and to reinforce responsible behaviour…well-functioning families are the building 
blocks of a good society. Indeed mankind has devised no better social welfare system than a 
united, caring, loving family, providing…the mainstream of moral compass [sic] that people 
have during their lives’. 
(Howard 2007: 2-3) 
 
Single parents fell outside the ‘moral compass’ test of ‘well-functioning’ nuclear-familial 
welfare on two counts – their households were not ‘united’ and they were reliant on state 
welfare.  Dredging up a spurious FaCS study (see 4.3) to claim that the children of parents 
on income support payments were ‘five times more likely to become long-term unemployed’, 
Howard drew a new line in the sand by effectively arguing that their only ‘responsible 
behaviour’ to avoid this ‘scourge’ was to not receive a Parenting Payment (Howard 2007: 2-
3, 4).  His attitude towards families consequently had two increasingly harsh caveats during 
the 2000s – they had to be nuclear and not on welfare.  The ongoing high rates of single 
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parental poverty meant they failed both these tests, and thus the residual shreds left of the 
political rationale for pension rights in the 1970s needed to be fully expunged – even if it 
meant entrenching this poverty.  By the mid-2000s, single parents had the lowest economic 
resources of any household type in Australia (ABS 2007a: 165), and the highest levels of 
financial stress (Harmer 2008, 48) and mental health issues (Loxton, Mooney & Young 
2006).  Poverty rates of children in single parent households remained above the OECD 
average (Whiteford & Adema 2007: 13). 
 
 
4.3 Policy debates about single parents, welfare reform and JET: 
1996-2006 
 
Senator Jocelyn Newman, the first Minister for Social Security in the Howard Government, 
had begun framing the voluntary nature of JET as a problem in 1996.  Her logic seemed 
watertight: because single parents choosing to use the program already ‘have a high degree 
of motivation and achievement’ they did not actually require JET to pursue paid work 
(Newman 1996: 9).  The open and voluntary premises of the program, Newman argued, 
were diverting resources away from where it was needed most – to the less motivated, to 
those who must be compelled.  The small minority of JAs who supported the compulsory turn 
held similar ideas.  While the program was ‘helping people to self-actualise, talking about 
Maslow's thingy’ these parents ‘would most likely find other ways to do stuff that they needed 
to do anyway…even if the JET program wasn’t there’ (Isha 2006).  
 
At a ministerial level, however, it was not considered political viable to bluntly compel all 
single parents to work in the mid-1990s.  An OECD survey of the time found a very split 
response among Australians ‘disapproving of voluntary sole motherhood’ (51 per cent, 
compared to 43 per cent in Anglophone countries and an OECD average of 39 per cent).68  
The government was also acutely aware that ‘very little’ was known about actual social 
attitudes to single parent pensioners being required to work (Eardley & Matheson 1999: 3).  
Three surveys conducted in 1999, 2000 and 2004 showed that public support for compulsion 
remained soft – rising from 51 per cent to 58 per cent, so causing the government to very 
carefully raise workfare pressures on single parents (Eardley, Saunders & Evans 2000: 28; 
SRC 2005a: 32).  Even by 2004 only a minority (45 per cent) agreed that penalties should be 
applied on those parents who failed to seek work (SRC 2005a: 25).  This was far lower than 
the 98 per cent of people who thought unemployed people under 50 years of age should be 
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  The OECD World Values Survey of the late 1990s asked ‘If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent 
but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?’(Chapple 2009: 
23). 
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required to seek work, and the 73 per cent who wanted penalties imposed on those who did 
not (SRC 2005a: 16, 25).   
 
Newman helped hoe the ground for a change in this perception by starting to frame JET in a 
way which would make it more amenable to later criticism.  Her department generated a 
number of studies to support the late 1990s agenda.  In May 1995, at the cusp of these 
changes, the freshly established JET Evaluation Steering Committee (JETESC) first met to 
plan and manage what turned out to be the last full evaluation of the program – a report 
finally delivered in December 1997 (DSS 1997a: 10).  The JETESC structure diluted the hold 
the social liberal DSS Policy Division had in the 1992 evaluation steering committee.  An 
Assistant Secretary from the Department of Finance now had equal weight with his 
counterparts from the three program delivery departments (DSS, DEETYA and HFS).  The 
report’s findings were eventually published in December 1997.  Even a cursory analysis of 
what was produced shows an unresolved bureaucratic conflict among the authors about how 
JET sat within the newly elected Howard Government’s welfare agenda.  For JETESC to 
come to an ‘official’ view about JET in such a rapidly shifting policy environment was 
politically fraught.   
 
On the one hand continuing to fund a small voluntary welfare to work program cut against 
the political grain of implementing the Welfare-to-Work Agenda. On the other hand, 
insufficient work had been done to shift popular opinion away from the attitude that single 
parents deserved stable entitlements to raise their children.  By 1997 this contradiction was 
intensifying.  JETESC’s attempts to deal with these pressures generated a tentative report 
riddled with prevarications.  What most tellingly underscores the report’s political paralysis 
was that no overall summary was given, no conclusion ever reached, and no 
recommendations made.  
 
JETESC noted that by June 1996 nearly 300,000 JET participants had been interviewed by 
JAs, resulting in a total outlay reduction of Sole Parent Pension costs of $342 million (DSS 
1997a: 14).  44 per cent of the current sole parent pensioner population were JET 
participants, one third of whom were in paid work, another third looking for work and over 21 
per cent training or studying (DSS 1997a: vi).  Most of those working had part-time jobs 
‘because of child care responsibilities’(DSS 1997a: viii), yet no survey was conducted to find 
out if childcare costs or availability caused JET participants to either cease work or not start 
work.  80 per cent of eligible participants were aware of the program and a similar 
percentage would recommend JET to others (AGB McNair 1996).   
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JETESC argued that a series of JET ‘Pilot’ programs, tasked to explore 'innovative strategies 
for disadvantaged groups', had come to the same conclusion reached by the 1989 ACOSS 
report – that case management worked (Silkstone & Peard 1996: 92).  The evaluation made 
short shrift of the ANAO’s dispute over JET’s objectives, relegating it to a mere four 
sentences in an appendix (DSS 1997a: 129).  This was because the ANAO’s NPM market-
outcomes argument had finally won out by 1995 yet JETESC did not want to trumpet this 
fact.  JET now had a pure labour market purpose, namely reducing government costs by 
aiding eligible customers into paid work.   
 
However, the report also resisted fully embracing the Welfare Reform agenda.  A growing 
tension was evident between the Accord-derived elements of the program and the more 
explicit neoliberal welfare environment it was operating within.  Rather than embracing any 
welfare dependency thesis the report stressed that the ‘cycle of income support and 
employment could be viewed as a progression through a continuum of activities…a 
structured pathway to employment…[which] is not incompatible with the program’s 
objectives’ (DSS 1997a: ix-x).  The positive finding that access to JET was ‘high’ (AGB 
McNair 1996) was then defensively framed as ‘measured in the context of it being a 
voluntary program’.  A social justice-type statement was raised that ‘it must be accepted that 
[many] SPP customers …will elect to remain at home with their children, particularly while 
the children are young’ (DSS 1997a: xi).   
 
Such tensions resulted in confusion and stasis.  A discussion on the cost effectiveness of the 
program captures the marooned nature of the evaluation by concluding it could not ‘prove 
that JET has or has not provided a specific financial advantage for participants’ (DSS 1997a: 
91). Stranded upon this uncertain terrain the report nevertheless used the data available to 
contend that JET participants were 1.34 times more likely to earn income and twice as likely 
to be studying when compared to their non-JET counterparts (AGB McNair 1996; DSS 
1997a: 88, 91-97).   
 
The JETESC report admitted, however, that the long-term effect of JET: 
 
Is unlikely ever to be resolved because the further away from the original event (i.e. joining the 
JET program) the more other factors will have contributed to the customer’s circumstances 
and any attempt to quantify or create a formula to take account of such factors would only 
further compromise the methodology.’ 
(DSS 1997a: 98) 
 
JET’s Accord-based legitimacy, embodying a highly mediated social feminist-democratic 
relationship to the ALP’s accumulation strategy, therefore came into increasing contradiction 
with the workfarist accumulation strategies of the Howard Government.  In the middle of a 
policy maelstrom the JETESC report reflected this tension as paralysis – uncertain of its 
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grounds or purpose.  The authors of the 1997 evaluation may have tactically retreated from 
using the phrase social justice yet could only weakly engage with the ideology of workfare.  It 
was a significant moment in the metamorphosis of JET because it was passive and mute, 
awaiting the transforming energy of Howard’s broader welfare agenda to find its voice to 
openly attack the program.  
 
JETESC’s argument that the ‘long term effect’ of JET was ‘unlikely ever to be resolved’ did 
little to cut through the widely held perception within Centrelink National Office that: 
 
The JET program into the 90s spent a lot of time congratulating itself about how successful it 
was and I think the way they evaluated that success was always a bit questionable…. It’s like 
saying with movies, that 60 million Australians have gone to see a movie this year.  And you 
say no, some of us have probably gone twice because we don’t have that many people. 
(Deniz 2006)   
 
However, JETESC’s reiteration of the argument put forward by earlier reports that it was 
‘impossible’ (Jordan 1991: 4) to ‘satisfactorily resolve’ (ANAO 1993: 13) what impact the 
program had on the labour market outcomes of single parents was wrong.  The rise of 
neoliberalism had, in the state bureaucracy and universities, brought to the fore not only 
NPM but new econometric methods (Fine 2000) theoretically based on New Institutional 
Economics (Benham 2009; North 1992).  Such a multi-disciplinary ‘information-theoretic 
approach’ could have been applied to welfare programs such as JET to account for its 
‘informational imperfections’ as it had become common practice in Australia since the early 
1990s (Andersen, Moene & Sandmo 1995; Creedy 1994; Dee 1994; Hertel 1992; Industry 
Commission 1991).  Evaluations of similar universal or ‘open’ programs have been 
conducted internationally.   
 
For example, the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) programme, implemented soon after 
the British Labour Government was elected in 1997, had essentially taken JET as its 
template.  According to Frank Castles (2002: 696-7), JET’s ‘key elements’ – an open 
voluntary program, dedicated case management, financial support for child care, education 
and work transitions – had been adopted as British Labour Party policy in the early 1990s.  
Therefore, JET was considered to be an ‘equivalent programme to NDLP’ (Lessof et al. 
2003: 11).  Two NIE-style evaluations have been conducted into the specific labour market 
effectiveness of the NDLP (Dolton, Azevedo & Smith 2006; Lessof et al. 2003).  The 2003 
evaluation concluded that ‘24 per cent of lone parent participants had found work who would 
not otherwise have done so’ (Lessof et al. 2003: 2-3), while the 2006 study reported a lower, 
but still considerable ‘positive mean impact’ of 14.24 per cent (Dolton, Azevedo & Smith 
2006: 4).  Given that a recent meta-analysis of 97 evaluations of European ALMPs 
implemented since the 1990s suggested they had a marginally negative ‘treatment effect’ on 
participants, the NDLP results were highly significant (Kluve et al. 2007: Table 21, 187).   
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Therefore, the unresolved issue of evaluating JET’s labour market outcomes, which had 
dogged its evaluations throughout the 1990s, was not a technical matter but a political issue. 
When the evaluations were controlled by state managers in the Social Policy Division of 
DSS, their campaign to hold onto the Accord-mediated contradictions of JET would have 
been destabilised if it was discovered that the program had little effect on a participant’s 
employment chances – the social justice side of JET’s existence was at stake.  Conversely, 
when the evaluations were controlled by NPM advocates of the compulsory turn in welfare, 
their campaign would have been destabilised if an empirical study found that a voluntary 
program such as JET significantly increased a single parent’s work prospects.  The labour 
market side of JET would have supported JET’s continued existence.  Either way a NIE-type 
empirical investigation into JET’s effectiveness entailed a political gamble neither side was 
willing to take.   
 
What occurred instead between 1997 and 2000 was a series of highly politicised pseudo-
studies and reports by DSS policy research staff which incrementally undermined the 
voluntary underpinnings of parent’s payments and programs (Landt & Pech 2000; Pech 
1997; Pech & Innes 1998; Pech & McCoull 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000; Wilson, Pech & 
Bates 1999).  A critique of the two pieces of research which had the most impact on the 
policy debates of the time is presented below.  Transgenerational welfare dependence: 
myths and realities by Jocelyn Pech and Frances McCoull and The Parenting Payment 
Intervention Pilot by Vic Pearse were relentlessly cited by academics and welfare policy 
actors as objective and moral evidence of why single (and partnered) parents needed to be 
mainstreamed into the Welfare-to-Work agenda (Gregory & Klug 2003; Hancock, Howe & 
Considine 2006: 104; RGWR 2000a; Saunders 2004: 3-4).  This is followed by a discussion 
of the government-commissioned report which forcefully cohered the ‘findings’ of these 
studies to meet the Howard Government’s political objectives in welfare, the ironically 
entitled Participation Support for a More Equitable Society (RGWR 2000a),.  
 
Transgenerational welfare dependence: myths and realities 
 
Pech and McCoull were early converts to the argument that social welfare needed to 
embrace a compulsory ‘contractualism.’69  Pech, for example, argued that the term client 
must be rejected as it ‘carries a flavour of dependency and/or passivity’, whereas customer 
‘implies a potentially more equal relationship…between DSS and the people it serves’ (Pech 
1997: 7-8).  Even under a compulsory welfare regime a positive, contractual relationship is 
possible if: 
                                                
69
 Pech and McCoull (1997) drew on Peter Travers’ (1995) comments on welfare contractualism, which 
were similar to Yeatman’s. 
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customers recognise that their obligations are clearly related to the goals they have agreed 
are reasonable and that sanctions are aimed at achieving compliance, rather than penalising 
non-compliance’ 
(Pech 1997: 37). 
 
Punishments are fair because the customer recognises them to be a reasonable 
consequence of not meeting their goals.  At first glance, Pech’s paternalistic position seems 
to stand awkwardly against her comments in the same paper that single parents’ high 
voluntary engagement in programs such as JET makes the need for compulsion less 
pressing: 
 
A key difference between sole parents and other unemployed income support recipients is 
that sole parents participate in programs voluntarily and outperform other groups consistently 
in the full range of DEETYA programs, achieving better results than any other 'disadvantaged' 
group…and  outperform women in general  (Pech 1997: 24) 
 
For Pech, however, this very success logically reinforced her primary argument that single 
parents not involved in the JET program were more likely to gain work if compelled to do so 
than other ‘disadvantaged’ social security recipients.  What Pech misrecognises is that it 
was the voluntary and open character of JET which primarily attracted single parents in the 
first place.  Such a view would have led her to argue to extend these types of programs to 
other groups of income support recipients, rather than close them down. 
 
The welfare campaign that Parenting Payment recipients should be in paid work received 
media support in the 1990s through stories of unemployed families being ‘threatened’ by a 
cycle of intergenerational welfare dependency.70  Citing such media campaigns as raising ‘a 
number of important issues for policy-makers and governments’, Pech and McCoull began 
departmental research into these ‘problems’ by asking, ‘If the children of income support 
recipients are more likely to experience unemployment or early parenthood, what factors 
might reduce these risks?’ (Pech & McCoull 1998a: 1; 1998b: 167).  The most detailed 
account of their study, commissioned with Newman’s support (1999b: 40) was published in 
2000.  The Transgenerational Welfare Dependence paper (Pech & McCoull 2000) reported 
on a longitudinal analysis of the FaCS Transgenerational Data Set by selecting the records 
of 53,000 children (of 92,000 parents) due to turn 16 in the first quarter of 1996 and tracking 
their income support over the following three years.  This cohort of children comprised about 
85 per cent of all Australians turning 16 in that quarter (i.e. all 16 year-olds except those 
from the richest 15 per cent of families).  Thirteen ‘snapshots’ of these young people were 
taken at quarterly intervals until January 1999, recording income support (except student) 
                                                
70
 For example, in 1996 a story in the Channel Nine program A Current Affair ‘exposed’ the intergenerational 
welfare dependency of a Melbourne family from the western suburbs by offering three of the Paxton children 
employment in various occupations and ‘finding’ they refused to change their appearances or move interstate to 
meet employers’ requirements  (Beder 2000: 151; Wilson & Turnbull 2001: 15) 
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payments (2000: 45).  Pech and McCoull had two hypotheses.  Firstly, that young people 
whose parents received income support would also be more likely to receive income support 
than other teenagers.  Secondly, the probability of income support receipt (and some other 
outcomes such as homelessness, pregnancy and early school departure) would increase ‘as 
the degree of parental disadvantage and income support dependence increases’ (Pech & 
McCoull 2000: 45).  The families of these children were divided into 6 groups (see Table 6), 
depending on their social security status at 1 January 1996, on the assumption that there 
was a high correlation between disadvantage and income support.  
 
Table 6 
Social security status of families 
 
 
 
The research investigated in how many of the 13 quarters young people had received an 
income support payment, and then analysed these cohorts against the 6 family groups.  The 
degree of income support ‘dependence’ of young people was based on a scale reproduced 
in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Measures of income support dependence 
 
Degree of income support 
dependence 
Number of times recorded as receiving 
income support 
Nil 0 
Low 1 to 3 
Moderate 4 to 6 
High 7 to 11 
Maximum 12 to 13 
 
 
Middle to high income families 
 
 Group 0 families had received Family Allowance for the young person at some time but it 
had stopped because their income or assets became too high 
 Group 1 families received Family Allowance at the minimum rate (middle income families) 
 
Working poor families 
 
 Group 2 families received Family Allowance at more than the minimum rate but no income 
support payment (low-income working families) 
 Group 3 families were couple families with one parent in paid work and the other receiving 
an income support payment (usually Parenting Payment) 
 
Income support recipient families 
 
• Group 4 families consisted of short-term income support single and partnered families; 
 Group 5 families had one or both parents receiving an income support payments for at least 
two years. 
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A young person who was receiving an income support payment in more than half the 
quarterly ‘snapshots’ was described as having a ‘high’ or ‘maximum’ income support 
dependence.  Using these criteria the authors found that:  
 
Even among those young people whose parents were apparently the most disadvantaged 
and income support dependent, only a small minority (about one in six) could be categorised 
as having been highly income support dependent themselves between the ages of 16 and 18. 
(Pech & McCoull 2000: 63).  
 
In other words, about one in six children of Group 5 parents received an income support 
payment in at least 7 of the 13 quarters investigated.  This rate of receipt, if ‘compared to the 
norm’ across the whole sample of one in 15, led the authors to argue that Group 5 young 
people were ‘more than twice as likely’ to be ‘at risk’ of becoming ‘highly income support 
dependent’ (Pech & McCoull 2000: 63).  A similar ratio was attributed to children of sole 
parents.  Any comparison to a ‘norm’, however, was methodological nonsense.  No norm 
existed.  Few of the 38,336 children from Group 0, 1 or 2 families (73 per cent of the 
sample) were ever eligible for an income support payment because their parents worked.  A 
stringent parental income and asset test precluded over two thirds of otherwise eligible 
young people from receipt of an unemployment payment (Birrell, Dobson & Smith 1999: 23; 
Dapre 2006b: 406: 471-474).71   
 
Claiming such ‘data on income support receipt allow us to infer something about relative 
rates of unemployment’ was, therefore, a purely ideological exercise (Pech & McCoull 2000: 
57), directly contradicting the authors earlier position when introducing the ‘research’: 
 
The paper is not about who or what causes some young people to enter the income support 
system in their teens.  Even if it proves possible to do so, we have not yet analysed the data 
in the depth that would enable us to draw any inferences about causal relationships.  
(Pech & McCoull 2000: 43, my highlight).   
 
 
The Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot 
 
Left critics of the compulsory turn in welfare also failed to spot that the second major piece 
of welfare ‘research’ was a similarly substandard political hatchet job.  Between September 
1999 and March 2000 FaCS conducted a randomised ‘social experiment’ – the Parenting 
Payment Intervention Pilot (PPIP).  Involving approximately 5000 Parenting Payment 
recipients, the subsequent evaluations of this intervention supposedly provided powerful 
evidentiary resources to support the Federal Government’s campaign against voluntary 
ALMPs such as JET (Barrett & Cobb-Clark 2000; Dockery & Stromback 2005; Pearse 
2000b).  Vic Pearse (2000b: 90), a FaCS policy researcher, was tasked to ‘test the 
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 Newstart and then Youth Allowance when it was introduced in January 1997 (Dapre 2006b: 406, 471-474).  
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effectiveness of compulsory versus voluntary participation in a [JET] interview’ in changing 
the ‘activities and aspirations’ of these parents.   
 
Pearce divided the overall sample into two ‘treatment groups’: 
 
 Voluntary interview – parents who were invited to attend an preliminary JET 
interview, and who accepted the invitation;  
 Compulsory interview – parents who were required to attend an entitlement review 
and then agreed to stay on for a preliminary JET interview. 
 
JAs who worked in one of the eleven Centrelink office ‘pilot sites’ conducted interviews over 
seven months.  Parents in the voluntary group were sent a short, vaguely-worded letter from 
a ‘specialist adviser’ asking them ‘to come and talk to me soon about developing your future 
plans’(cited in Barrett & Cobb-Clark 2000: 196).  No mention was made that the parent 
would have access to generous child care subsidies or any of the other financial and 
educational supports available through the JET program.  Instead it simply stressed that 
‘your participation is strictly voluntary’(cited in Barrett & Cobb-Clark 2000: 196).  Parents in 
the compulsory group were sent a threatening letter: 
 
I have arranged an interview with you at Centrelink (address of office) at (time) on (day and 
date).  At the interview I will check your entitlements to make sure you are getting the right 
amount of Parenting Payment.  I will discuss with you, if you wish, any plans you may have 
for the future and how I can help you.  The request for you to attend the office at the time 
stated above is made under section 1304 of the Social Security Act 1991.  Please remember, 
if you do not attend this interview your Parenting Payment may be stopped. 
(cited in Barrett & Cobb-Clark 2000: 196) 
 
Three months after the interview JAs were asked to make a 15-minute follow-up call to 
record what ‘outcomes’ (increases in earnings and exits from payment) had occurred 
(Pearse 2000b: 94).  The one major difference – an ‘important finding’ according to Pearse 
(2000b: 97) – was that 81 per cent of the compulsory group attended the JET interview 
compared to 17 per cent of the voluntary group.  Positive evidence for the ‘feasibility of a 
compulsory interview’ had therefore been provided!  Compulsion was both ‘more effective in 
getting customers to an interview’ and generated the same ‘positive benefits on the short-
term outcome measures’ (Pearse 2000b: 105).  Further, purely political claims were made 
that a one-off compulsory interview would not be sufficient to change attitudes and activity 
as ‘many customers are constrained in their ability to act on their intentions’, requiring, 
therefore, ongoing compulsion (Pearse 2000b: 105).  The same conclusion was reached by 
all evaluations of the PPIP – parents should be compelled to join and stay with JET (Barrett 
& Cobb-Clark 2000: 204; Dockery & Stromback 2005: 441; Pearse 2000b: 105). 
 
The straight-faced acceptance of the PPIP as a valuable piece of research says more about 
the political nature of the period than the content of the research.  No academic or welfare 
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group criticised the patent ideological intent of the Pilot or its many faulty methodological 
assumptions.  Two are mentioned here.  Firstly, compulsory and voluntary interview data in 
the 11 sites varied so widely (6 per cent to 47 per cent for voluntary interviews, half to 98 per 
cent for compulsory interviews) that drawing any conclusion about interview take up-rates 
was futile beyond the self-evident observation that parents were more likely to attend if 
threatened with a suspension of their payments if they did not (Pearse 2000b: 101).  
‘Additional factors’ were said to have ‘contributed significantly to the large differences in 
interview take-up across sites’ (Barrett & Cobb-Clark 2000: 199).  Dockery and Stromback 
(2005: 439) observed that an analysis of the PPIP data-set ‘suffers from the limitation…that 
the site had a large influence on a number of variables in the study’.  Pearse speculated that 
some ‘local office management’ were less than enthusiastic supporters of the Pilot and that 
‘individual JET Advisers work styles’ affected site response rates (2000b: 102).  Barrett and 
Cobb-Clark (2000: 198) thought it was caused by ‘the way in which JET Advisers 
themselves influenced interview participation’.   
 
Secondly, the subjective variability across sites meant that any comparative ‘evaluation’ of 
changes in the ‘activities and aspirations’ of these parents via these two types of 
‘interventions’ was rendered meaningless (Pearse 2000b: 90).  Pearse acknowledged that 
‘the research was unable to uncover how much impact the individual JET Adviser has on 
interview outcomes’ (Pearse 2000b: 102).  The Pilot’s technically poor (if politically rich) 
design contributed to the irrelevance of the evaluation of behavioural change.  A one-off 
interview, followed by a phone call three months later may have been framed as a valid 
method to examine behavioural ‘impacts’ but it was never likely to generate significant 
‘outcomes’.  JET existed because such practices did not work.  Pearse could formally claim 
that there ‘was no significant difference between the voluntary and compulsory customers in 
terms of increased economic activity’ (2000b: 98) between the initial and follow-up 
interviews only because little of significance had actually occurred!  Less than 6 per cent of 
parents were vaguely described as having ‘increased their …activities such as work or job 
search’ but as Pearse admits ‘it is too early to look at actual outcomes for voluntary versus 
compulsory customers’ (Pearse 2000b: 98, my highlight).  This, however, allowed a 
politically expedient (if empirically ungrounded) pilot finding that each group of parents 
experienced the same ‘positive benefits on the short-term outcome measures’ (Pearse 
2000b: 105).  Unsurprisingly every evaluation argued for compulsion because little 
difference was ‘found’ between these two styles of ‘intervention’ (Pearse 2000b: 105).72     
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  Dockery and Stromback (2005: 436) thought it ‘does not seem to matter whether participation in the program 
is voluntary or compulsory’.  Barrett and Cobb-Clark (2000: 204) found ‘little evidence that individual responses 
to the JET interview…differ significantly between those voluntarily participating and those compelled to 
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Participation Support for a More Equitable Society – the McClure Report 
 
By 2000, these quasi studies had facilitated a greater acceptance of the Howard 
Government’s main welfare agenda arguments.  Firstly, they helped ingrain the idea that 
most parents in receipt of social security payments did not understand (Romaniuk, Sharp & 
Wright 1998) that they were now considered to be unemployed (Wilson, Pech & Bates 1999).  
Secondly, they framed single parents as ‘encumbered’ by a ‘dependency on welfare’ 
(Newman 1999b: 40) within which they and their children were destined to be trapped into 
the same cycle of poverty (Pech & McCoull 2000).  Finally, the legacy of the Australian 
welfare system left by Labor was to blame for these ‘dysfunctional parents’ (Mead 1999: 15) 
so the poverty they were experiencing meant that compelling them to seek work was not only 
an effective strategy (Pearse 2000a), it was in their best interests (Saunders 2000b; 
Yeatman 1999).  Couched in the clement welfare language of ‘encouragement’ and ‘support’ 
was a firm defence of a new paternalistic governmental authority to ‘judge individual 
interests…to tell its dependents how to live’ (Mead 1997: 4).   
 
Newman seized the findings of the Pech and McCoull study to argue that the government 
needed to ‘develop positive steps to intervene so that children are able to overcome the 
economic and social disadvantages that encumber their parents’ (Newman 1999b: 40). Her 
most significant ‘positive step’ was to set up the Reference Group on Welfare Reform in 
October 1999 (RGWR 2000a) as the political vehicle to ‘tackle the problems of increasing 
dependence on Parenting Payment…of lone parents’ and those on Disability Support 
Pension (Newman 1999a). Its final report, Participation Support for a More Equitable Society, 
was tabled in the same month Lawrence Mead was invited to launch the Pearse findings at 
an Australian Institute of Family Studies conference in July 2000.  He supported the general 
thrust of the PPIP by tactically attacking its recommendations from the right, arguing that the 
PPIP did not go far enough.  Australia had too much ‘cream on its welfare rolls’ because the 
eligibility rules were too lax.  Welfare reforms ‘needed to tear the house down’ to force single 
parents off welfare (The Age 25/7/00: 2).   
 
The McClure Report met Newman’s expectations, and eventually led to meeting some of 
Mead’s.  Patrick McClure, the Chairperson of the Group, had run Social Security’s social 
work section in West Australia before becoming CEO of Mission Australia – one of the 
organisations which had most financially benefited from the privatisation of the CES.  The 
‘McClure Report’ was the Howard Government’s neoliberal update of the ALP’s Social 
Security Review.  Relying solely on the Pech and McCoull study and the (then unpublished) 
                                                                                                                                                   
participate’.  Pearse (2000b: 105) concluded that ‘customers who attended a compulsory interview did not report 
any less favourable reaction to an interview than customers who attended voluntarily’. 
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findings of the PPIP, McClure aped the government line that because large numbers of 
single parents lacked ‘participation goals’, and were threatening their children to ‘an 
intergenerational cycle of significant joblessness’, they should be obligated to seek work and 
JET needed to ‘refocus’ into a compulsory active labour market program(RGWR 2000a: 3-4, 
15, 42, 65).  Yeatman’s (1999) views were cited to justify that such a turn to compulsion was 
morally defensible, ‘just and appropriate’ (RGWR 2000a: 34). 
 
The central contribution of the 2000 McClure Report was that it legitimated the government’s 
hegemonising rhetoric that no-one, in principle and as far as practicable, should be in receipt 
of an income support payment.73  Political enthusiasm for McClure’s recommendations were 
sufficiently widespread for The Sydney Morning Herald (2000b: 4) to report that a general 
‘consensus’ existed within welfare and political circles for this new round of mutual obligation.  
The government’s intensified attack on Single Parent (and Disability Support) Pensioners 
(Bessant et al. 2006: 111-113; Bryan 2000b: 333-348; Thibodeaux 2002) met some political 
resistance from the Greens and Australian Democrats (Stephen 2000).  ALP opposition 
leader Kim Beazley, however, ‘welcomed the report in principle’ (Hewett 2000: 24).  The 
ACTU was more interested in ensuring that the new work generated by the next stage 
towards compulsion was carried out by public sector workers (Burrow 2001).  ACOSS called 
on the government ‘to take up the report in its entirety’ (Macdonald 2000: 2), a position which 
had some public dissenters among its members affiliates: the Western Australian Council of 
Social Service; the Uniting Church; the St Vincent de Paul Society; Catholic Social Services 
and some disability groups (CSS 2000; Grattan 2000a: 3; Stephen 2000).  Only the Council 
for Single Mothers and their Children and the Sole Parents Union unambiguously opposed 
JET becoming compulsory (Allard & O'Loughlin 2000: 2; CSMC 1999).   
 
There was a material basis for the generally positive support ACOSS gave to the McClure 
report’s recommendations: by 2000 many large affiliates were being heavily financed by the 
government to deliver Job Network services.  Plain political opposition to the new (and 
potentially lucrative) compulsory turn would risk weakening their competitive capacity to 
seize an opportunity to ‘grow’ their welfare businesses (Gager 1998; Rapson 2006).  Open 
cheerleaders for the changes, such as McClure’s Mission Australia, were more guardedly 
joined by most other affiliates in pursuit of this latest workfare gold rush.  In an attempt to 
gain a modicum of political cover in 2002, ACOSS (supported by the CPSU) initiated an 
‘independent review’ of the ‘unduly harsh’ breaching and penalties rules (Pearce, Disney & 
Ridout 2002: 80).  Given the political complexion of the three authors – Julian Disney (see 
Chapter 3), Heather Ridout (from the peak employer body the Australian Industry Group) and 
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 Those on Carer Payment were effectively ignored under this general rhetoric. 
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Dennis Pearce (a former Commonwealth Ombudsman working for the law firm Phillips Fox), 
it is unsurprising they placed squarely on the first page of their review that such new rules 
were ‘inevitable’ (Pearce, Disney & Ridout 2002: 1).  Operating within this constraint they 
recommended some minor softening of breaches and penalties (see below).  Addressing an 
anti-Work Choices meeting three years later, Andrew McCallum, an ACOSS President in the 
early 2000s, was finally moved to characterise his members’ political accommodation to the 
Howard Government’s Welfare-to-Work agenda at the time as a gradual process, akin to 
slowing ‘boiling a frog’ from cold water.  ACOSS’s craven acceptance of the McClure Report, 
he reflected, was 'the most shameful episode' in the organisation's history (McCallum 2005).   
 
The liberal reflex of most progressive social policy academics was to find some basis of 
agreement with elements of the McClure Report from which to launch their particular 
disagreements.  Peter Gordon Saunders (2001b: 100), for example, found ‘much of value’ in 
the report as he centred on the ‘practical details of policy design and service delivery’ to 
outline his misgivings.  Others noted there was ‘much to recommend’ in the report 
(Braithwaite, Gatens & Mitchell 2002: 225), and that the general concept of Mutual Obligation 
was ‘desirable’ (Howard 2003: 129) or ‘supportable’ if the ‘philosophy’ was ‘seen more 
broadly’ as a state-community (not individual) contract (Macintyre 1999: 113, 115).  
Tweaking of the rules was required to ‘improve’ (Eardley et al. 2005: 143), ‘limit’ (Shaver 
2002: 340) or ‘reduce’ (Ziguras & Flowers 2002: 9) ‘inappropriate breaches’ (Lackner & 
Marston 2003: 37).  Compulsion, however, was ‘supportable and reconcilable’ (Howard 
2003: 126) so long as the goal was to increase  ‘reciprocity’ (Mendes 2003: 94) through the 
state offering ‘real material opportunities’ (Considine 2001: 183) to ‘develop the capacity’ 
(McClelland 2002: 220) of welfare recipients such as single parents to be ‘actively engaged 
in this process of learning to be an individual’ (Yeatman 2000c: 168).  Terry Carney and 
Gaby Ramia lauded the McClure ‘vision of social and personal development’ but thought it 
had been highjacked by Howard and turned into an ‘agenda for social control’ because it 
contained ‘disciplinary excesses’ (Carney 2006b: 40; Carney & Ramia 2002: 294).  Similarly 
conflicted sentiments were expressed by Dean (2002b: 127), Shaver (2000) and Cass (2002: 
259-60) as they wrestled with, and criticised many, of the assumptions behind the Report yet 
failed to take a clear, public stand rejecting its new compulsory turn in toto.   
 
A sizeable group of academics unequivocally opposed the political or ideological content and 
consequences of the McClure Report (Beder 2001; Bessant 2002; Bryan 2000b; Castles 
2001; Fox 2000; Goodin 2000: 2; Harris 2001; Kinnear 2003: 119; Mitchell 2002; Moss 2001; 
Thibodeaux 2002; Tomlinson 2008; Watts 2006b).  However, it is an astounding indictment 
on the state of the Australian academy that this thesis contains the first critical analysis of the 
self-evidently absurd local studies McClure exclusively relied upon to make his two core 
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claims for expanding coercion – that it worked (the Pearse study), and that it was urgently 
needed (the Pech and McCoull study).  Perhaps the neoliberal ‘drip, drip, drip’ (Callinicos 
2006: 34) degrading universities into ‘open-cast mines for the knowledge economy’ 
(Leadbeater 2000: 114) had exerted such time and capacity pressures on these academics74 
to cause their responses to be under-researched and too immediately abstract or concrete.  
Perhaps it was also due to their generally discursive or philosophical predilections.  The 
political upshot, at least, was clear.  By foregoing such a gold-plated opportunity to attack the 
‘evidentiary’ basis used by the Howard Government to group many of these 
recommendations together in the 2001-02 Budget under the Australians Working Together 
(AWT) title, progressive academics impaired their own political and intellectual capacity to 
support those they sought to defend.   
 
A gamut of bureaucratic, academic, think tank, political, union and media bodies and 
individuals were caught up in the Howard Government’s campaign.75  One example is given 
here of how extensive international and local debates about the interaction between welfare 
policies and ‘maternal labour market engagements’ helped shape the campaign.  An 
authoritative Australian paper (Harding et al. 2005) provides a very typical table detailing how 
participation rates of mothers caring for children under 15 years were considered within state 
social policy circles (see Table 8).   
 
Table 8 
Labour force characteristics of women with children aged 0-14 years 
1995-96 to 2002-03 
 1995-96 2002-03 
Work 
Full-
time 
Work 
Part-
time 
Work 
Full-
time 
Work 
Part-time 
Partnered mothers 28 33 25 34 
All sole parents 28 20 25 24 
Sole parents receiving PPS 4 25 8 27 
Source:  (Harding et al. 2005) 
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 For example, see Bessant 2002; Dean 2002b; Goodin 2000; Harris 2001; Henman 2001; Marston & McDonald 
2006a; Moss 2001; and Watts 2006b. 
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  The more significant organisations included: the National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling (University 
of Canberra); the Social Policy Research Centre, a heavily FaCS-funded body (University of NSW); the 
Melbourne Institute (University of Melbourne); the Australia Institute (Australian National University); the Centre 
for Full Employment and Equity (University of Western Sydney); the  Australian Institute of Family Studies, a 
government body based in Melbourne, and explicitly hard right organisations such as the Institute of Public Affairs 
(Melbourne) and the Centre for Independent Studies (Sydney). 
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From these figures one was expected to conclude that the proportion of all sole parents in 
paid work was 13 per cent less than partnered mothers in 1995-96 and had narrowed to 10 
per cent by 2002-03.  Those on PPS had a larger labour market ‘gap’ to ‘close’ since it was 
32 per cent in 1995-96, narrowing to 24 per cent in 2002-03, mainly due to their low full-time 
work rate.  These findings are broadly consistent with other studies which disaggregated the 
‘gap’ against the age of the youngest child to confirm that the ‘labour engagement deficits’ 
which existed between single and partnered mothers in each age cohort tended to close by 
the time the youngest child turned 16 (Alexander 2005: 4; Gray & Renda 2006). 
 
Based on such comparative methods, a welfare ‘policy problem’ was created in the 1990s 
that linked sole parental poverty to lower labour market engagement, compared to their 
partnered counterparts (Bacchi 1999).  Comparative policy studies of this type all presumed 
that the very different familial relationships these women had in and with the social and 
economic circumstances of Australian capitalism could be quantitatively reduced to the rubric 
of ‘maternal employment’.  By 2008, in 63 per cent of couple families with dependent 
children, both parents worked (ABS 2008c), most commonly as ‘one and a half’ 
breadwinners (DPMC 2008: 82).  The policy-presumption that single parents could somehow 
be normatively corralled as the female ‘half’ or even the male ‘one’ of a coupled family 
ignored the socially distinctive, qualitative ‘gap’ that structurally existed between these two 
forms of family (Boland 1990; Crass 2009; German 2007; Gimenez 2005; Jools 1983; Mason 
2003; Probert 1999; Smith 1999; Thibodeaux 2002).  Leaving to one side that this type of 
research compares the incommensurable – do these studies within their own terms provide 
sufficient empirical grounds to claim that a significant paid work differentiation exists between 
single and partnered mothers, particularly for those in receipt of an income support 
payment?   
 
Because single parents’ paid work is disproportionately episodic, any data derived from 
point-in-time interviews (used by all the research above) fails to capture what paid work 
those on PPS had actually done over a period of time.  Paul Flatau and Michael Dockery 
(2001) analysed the 1995 FaCS Longitudinal Data Set to tease out these engagements.  
They arrived at a similar point-in-time figure (26 per cent) to Harding’s 29 per cent.  However, 
over the year twice as many (53 per cent) single mothers on PPS worked (Flatau & Dockery 
2001: 45).  The participation rates of all groups, of course, would increase if a yearly, rather 
than ‘one day snapshot’ method was applied.  However, because PPS recipients were three 
times more likely to be working casually than others in the ‘official’ social policy data sets, the 
political bias these studies lent to the government’s welfare agenda becomes clear.   
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In the pursuit of new welfare policies to leverage higher participation rates two possibilities 
were seemingly open.  Each would have had diametrically opposite effects on the lives of 
single parents and their children, and on the work practices and attitudes of JET-related 
workers inside Centrelink .  One avenue was to devise policies aimed at ameliorating the 
familial and gendered oppression of single parents, the other at entrenching their economic 
and social disadvantage.  The first approach would have supported longer-term policies to 
increase the value of their labour power – to enable single parents to strengthen their ‘punch’ 
in the labour market.  Expanding the number and financial resources of JAs, for example, 
would have maximised access to the training and educational options open for single parents 
– increasing their participation rates and potential productivity, and so raising total absolute 
and relative surplus value in Australian capitalism over time.  It would have raised parental 
expectations of their ‘reservation wage’ beyond the miserly minimum wage plus $3 per hour 
premium they attached to their labour in the early 2000s (Gray & Renda 2006: x).   
 
However, in the absence of an effective social movement or strong public opposition to 
extending compulsory programs, the international and internal competitive pressures exerted 
on the state-capital relation made such an option politically ‘impossible’.  It necessitated what 
was always central in the McClure Report – (1) to force more single parents to take any job, 
and (2) to cut access to pension payments and their more generous taper rates.  
Implementing the report’s’ recommendations would meet needs of those sections of 
Australian capital immediately demanding casualised, lower-value labour power, expanding 
absolute surplus value through access to cheaper new labour and increases in productivity 
over time through training on the job, and reduce state welfare outlays.  This approach, of 
course, was at the expense of the longer-term financial and social viability of the single-
parent household, and the possibility of JET workers offering practical support for these 
parents.  The hypocritical posturing by the Howard Government expressing concern about 
the poverty rates of single parents every time a study was released confirming this particular 
fact76 seemed politically sufficient to deflect attention away from the more problematic fact 
that the government’s new workfare welfare policies were entrenching their poverty.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
76
 Identification of ‘problems’ faced by low-income parents with dependent children continued to state the obvious. 
Vic Pearse (2005: 3), the author of the PPIP, duly noted that the most pressing issue identified in a survey 
conducted by FaCS was ‘financial difficulties’ and that those who had more money because they ‘were in paid 
employment had a far lower incidence’ of this and other difficulties  
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PPS versus paid work as a workfare contradiction 
 
The history of Australian welfare ‘reform’ has been a political struggle to deny pension rights 
to single parents.  In 1989 access was restricted by reducing the child age qualification from 
25 to 16 years (Dapre 2006a: 80, 117).  In 2006 this was reduced to 8 years (Centrelink 
2009c: 1).  Within Centrelink it was an open secret that the Coalition government planned to 
reduce this to 3 years if it had been re-elected in 2007 (Sasha 2006).  For state managers 
such as the FaCS Secretary Michael Keating (2005), the reasons for this were clear – single 
parents caring for young children were prime labour ‘stock’.   
 
To boost single parents’ labour market ‘participation’ to an internationally competitive level a 
two-pronged policy intervention aimed to increase their employment and unemployment 
rates.  This apparently paradoxical approach had its own bureaucratic logic.  Because labour 
force participation is measured by adding those employed and unemployed, increasing either 
raises the participation rate.  Since 2000 the employment rate of all single parents with a 
dependent child increased from 46 per cent to 53 per cent in 2007 through a combination of 
policies which made paid work more viable, necessary and compulsory.  During this period 
the same policies resulted in more single parents being re-categorised as unemployed (ABS 
2009a), so it appeared that only a slight easing of their unemployment rate from 12.7 per 
cent to 11.2 per cent occurred (ABS 2001: 219; 2008f: 226).  For single mothers with 
dependent children the effect of these policies was to raise their participation rate from 56 
per cent in 2000 to 63 per cent in 2007 (ABS 2001: 219; 2008f: 225).   
 
For the two decades prior to 1996 more employed single parents worked full-time than part-
time (Gray et al. 2003: 3).  The effect of the push-pull policy changes under the Howard 
government reversed this tendency between 1996 and 2007 (ABS 2008f: 226).  If no specific 
Australian research has been conducted into why more single parents in the late 1990s to 
2000s took on part-time rather than full-time work, the general dynamics are reasonably 
clear.  Almost half of all new work available since the early 1990s had been in non-full-time 
work, pole-vaulting the Australian labour market to the second highest rate of this work in the 
OECD – from 16 per cent in 1984 to 28 per cent in 2008 (ACOSS 2008: 20; Betts, Connolly 
& Orsmond 2007: 1).  In 2002, the highest concentrations of casual work were in the less-
skilled areas of the labour market most open to single parents – accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants (56 per cent) and retail (45 per cent) (Pocock, Buchanan & Campbell 2004: 18).  
The most significant sources of labour for these industries came from the ‘outliers’ of the 
labour market – young people, often students, those over 55 and female workers with 
dependent children –  that is, similar target groups to those identified by Ken Henry 
(Buddelmeyer, Mourre & Ward 2004: 5).   
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Early policy changes, such as the July 2000 decision to reduce the pension taper rate from 
50 to 40 per cent and raise its income free area threshold, had also tended to reinforce a 
welfare-parental orientation towards part-time work (Dapre 2006b: 530).  Yet, because the 
work was more likely to be precarious and intermittent, single parents tended to retain an 
ongoing or ‘cycling’ connection to the pension (Gregory & Klug 2003; Pocock, Buchanan & 
Campbell 2004).  For the quarter of single mothers who were seeking full-time employment 
(SRC 2005a: 28), gaining casual work first actually harmed their chances.  Women’s casual 
employment in Australia is ‘a more sticky state than unemployment’ since unemployed 
women are more likely to secure full-time work than those who are already working casually 
(Buddelmeyer & Wooden 2007: 24).  In these circumstances it is unsurprising that the 
security of being able to rely on having a pension was extremely important (Branigan 2007; 
CSMC 1999).  These ‘moral and historical’ elements of their pension entitlements needed to 
be politically contested by the state – and this required a medium term strategy of 
undermining these rights.   
 
However, as the boom continued, the very success in ramping up maternal part-time 
employment rates was augmented with a drive to increase full-time rates where possible.  
New policies, which relocated many single parents onto the cheaper Newstart Allowance 
aimed not only to reduce state welfare costs but to place greater labour-forcing measures on 
single parents to take up full-time work. This was the position taken by the McClure Report.  
A coercive, ‘full-time…work first approach…for a broad range of recipients’ had become a 
necessity as McClure criticised: 
 
past…deliberate policy to encourage part-time work…[since] such incentives need to be 
balanced against the danger that some people may choose to remain on income support, topped 
up with some earnings, and not seek full-time work. 
(RGWR 2000b: 100)   
 
Implementation of McClure’s recommendations meant that by 2007, and for the first time in a 
decade, more single parents were working full-time than part-time (ABS 2008f: 226).  
 
One change to welfare policy was required to realise the Report’s argument that full-time 
work would disentangle single parents from the ‘danger’ of ‘welfare dependency’ – the loss of 
a right to the pension and a forced transferral onto NSA.  Because PPS had a higher rate of 
payment and a more generous taper test than NSA it was almost a moot point if the work a 
single parent did was full- or part-time.  Neither work was likely to deny her continuing 
entitlement to a part-pension.  Compulsion may have meant ‘you don't even have a choice 
any more’ (Robin 2006) to seek, or even gain work but, by itself, it did not address McClure’s 
‘concern’ that a single parent ‘may choose to remain on income support’ since work and 
welfare became the norm for a single parent while she remained entitled to a pension 
(Branigan 2007).   
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To fully maximise this potential labour, the state needed to extinguish the victory in the early 
1970s by the women’s movement to secure pension entitlements for single mothers.  By 
2004 nearly half PPS recipients were in paid work – a far higher rate than any other group of 
income support recipients (ACOSS 2005; Harmer 2008).77  A major reason for this disparity 
was due to the nature of the pension itself.  In June 2007, for example, when the weekly 
minimum wage was $522.15, a single parent with one child needed to earn above $757.68 in 
each week of a three-month period for her Parenting Payment to be cancelled (AFPC 2007; 
Centrelink 2007b).78  Given that full-time median weekly earnings of all employed single 
parents was $642 in 2007 most continued to receive PPS (ABS 2008b: 18).   
 
Disaggregating the median wage into the major occupational groups used by the ABS sheds 
further light on why paid employment was unlikely to extricate a single parent from the 
Centrelink income support system, so long as she remained entitled to a pension-type 
payment.  Full-time median earnings for women in six of these occupations were either 
below the pension cut-off figure or within about $40 of it.  In contrast, all occupations had a 
median wage higher than the cut-off limit for a single parent on Newstart Allowance (see 
Table 9). 
 
Table 9 
Median weekly earnings of women working full-time 
and income support cut-off limits due to earnings for a single parent with one child 
August 2007 
 
(NSA disqualification – earnings cut-off amount) (484) 
Labourers   640 
Sales workers   650 
Machinery operators and drivers   684 
Technicians and trades workers   700 
Community and personal service workers   709 
(PPS disqualification – earnings cut-off amount) (758) 
Clerical and administrative support workers   800 
Managers   1093 
Professionals   1096 
 
Source: data derived from (ABS 2008b: 24; Centrelink 2007b: 20) 
 
                                                
77
 Of the other half a large majority (74 per cent) wanted to work, preferably part-time, citing child-related or family 
‘barriers’ as the main (78 per cent) reasons why they were not (SRC 2005a: 28). 
78
 Weekly figures are for illustrative purposes.  The actual assessment of income for PPS recipients under the 
Social Security Act is on a fortnightly basis – a single parent would need to earn over $1515.35 for six 
consecutive fortnights before her payments ceased due to income.  
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Given that single parents tend to have significantly lower and fewer educational qualifications 
than either partnered parents79 or women with no child care responsibilities, a single parent’s 
capacity to gain a better rate of pay than most women working in the occupations tabled 
above would be difficult.  A small analysis I conducted of the occupations of working single 
parents in 2007, derived from Wave 7 of the HILDA database, supports such a contention.  
At the one-digit ASCO level, nine major occupational categories are identified. 80   In that 
year 46 per cent of single parents stated they were employed casually or on fixed term 
contracts, compared to 34 per cent of the total sample.  By grouping the three ‘lowest’ 
categories (7: intermediate production and transport workers; 8: elementary clerical, sales 
and service workers; and 9: labourers and related workers) two comparisons can be made.  
Firstly, that 55 per cent of single parents work in these three occupations compared to 34 per 
cent of coupled parents, and 35 per cent in the overall sample.  Secondly, of those working 
in these three occupational categories, 79 per cent of single parents said they were 
employed casually – a far higher proportion than the 68 per cent of couple parents and the 
overall casual rate of 64 per cent.   
 
The JET program, of course, was designed to support those single parents seeking training 
or education to improve their earning capacity, and it was not unsurprising that twice as 
many single parents studied compared to partnered parents (ABS 2007a: 50).  Following a 
similar trajectory to the employment patterns discussed in the previous chapter, by the time a 
single parent’s youngest child turned 15 her educational profile again aligned with her 
partnered counterpart (de Vaus 2004: 50).81   
 
A workfare policy contradiction emerged: securing full-time work was often unlikely to ‘free’ a 
single parent from Parenting Payment, especially while she had young children.  In many 
senses, however, this was a positive and defensible situation in that the gains made by the 
women’s movement in the early 1970s to secure a pension entitlement for single parents 
allowed a part-pension top-up at the median-wage level of most occupations.  By contrast, if 
in late 2007 a parent with one child had been on an Allowance-type payment such as 
Newstart, she had only to earn $434.08 per week before her payments ceased (Centrelink 
                                                
79
 Single parents are 60 per cent more likely to have left school prior to year 12 and half as likely to 
hold at least a bachelor degree compared to partnered parents (ABS 2007a: 49). 
80
 For an explanation of what was then termed the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations 
see ABS 1997.  
81
 Such an alignment is consistent with international studies which show that employment ‘lock-in 
effects’ of those participating in longer retraining schemes, such as those involving substantial 
educational components, are more likely to achieve employment outcomes than those on shorter 
programmes (Stephan & Pahnke 2008: 20) 
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2007b: 20).  As one interviewee (Robin 2006) put it, for a mother-headed family to realise 
anywhere near a comparable wage to a two-adult family a single parent therefore had to 
‘punch above their weight’ in the labour market. 
 
 
4.4 Institutional restructuring to produce strenuous welfarism 
 
Echoing Ken Henry, Howard (1999) insisted that how a government delivered its programs 
was less of an ideological matter than being ‘critically’ conditioned by the state’s overall 
competitiveness strategy.  However, unlike postmodern critiques of welfare reform held in 
thrall by the supposed illuminating hermeneutics of (neo)liberal ‘rationalities’ (Dean 2002b: 
134; Harris 2003: 5), Howard never held himself hostage to his own ideological rhetoric:  
 
Policy mechanisms or fashions are never ends in themselves.  In defining the right 
approach to both economic and social policies, we should always remember that it is the 
goals of national policy which are the critically important factor, and not the mechanism for 
implementing policies or the ideologies that may support them. 
(Howard 1999) 
 
In the first half of the Coalition government’s period in office stress was placed on furthering 
a ‘modern’ business culture within the public sector.  A New Public Management ‘market 
emphasis’ on performance measurements, deregulation, a disaggregated and competitive 
approach to public sector management, fiscal constraint, and the importation of private 
sector business practices was established (Hood 1990: 9-10).  However, claims by public 
administration academics such as O’Flynn (2007: 353) that this period of neoliberalism 
resulted in a ‘paradigmatic’ break from the earlier managerialism of the 1980s overreach 
themselves.   
 
On one hand it was a period of ‘intensive reform’ (Vardon 2001: 30) resulting in the 
‘agencification’ of welfare delivery – the dismemberment of the CES, the pervasive rise of 
Job Network agencies and the creation of Centrelink in 1997 (Rowlands 2002).  Australia 
was one of the first OECD countries to institute such ‘market mechanisms into its 
employment service framework’ (OECD 2001: 87) and it was ‘being closely watched by 
employment ministers around the world’ (House of Commons 1999: para. 18). On the other 
hand, this ‘slash and burn’ (Summers 2007: 7) public sector agenda was such an innately 
political and ideological strategy that the expectation this would result in a neoliberal 
‘downsizing of the public sector’ (Shaver 1998: 27) was more significant than its actual result.  
The proportion of federal, state and local government employees may have eased from 22 
per cent to 19 per cent of the total workforce during this period of quasi-boom yet, by the end 
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of the Howard Government there were significantly more public servants directly employed in 
each three levels of government than at its beginning (ABS 2008a; APSC 2008b: 16).82  
 
This is not to downplay the material effects NPM practices, restructurings and privatisation 
had on state social provisioning, but to highlight how state strategies to deal with the 
changing accumulation pressures faced by Australian capitalism tended to more tightly 
shape its legitimation functions.  At an institutional level, such neoliberal tightening towards 
strenuous welfarism was historically enacted in two steps.  Firstly, in a sense, the 
government applied Lenin’s (1922) political aphorism of ‘bending the stick’ to stress (and 
institutionally ram through) the business-like character of the public sector in its first years in 
office.  Secondly, by the early 2000s, NPM was ditched in favour of more politically alacritous 
‘whole of government’ tactics better suited to address how the government could continue to 
pursue its competitiveness agenda in the face of new accumulation challenges, particularly 
the acute labour shortages starting to be experienced among fractions of capital.  This 
change of tack was evident in the two-stage relationship the Howard government had with 
the institutional delivery of it its welfare reform agenda.  
 
Administrative restructuring: 1996-2002  
Within 24 hours of taking power in 1996 Howard appointed Bob Officer, an influential 
member of the right wing think tank the Institute of Public Affairs, to chair a National 
Commission of Audit (NCA) into federal public administration (Officer et al. 1996).  Aping the 
familiar political tactic used by all incoming Liberal state governments in the preceding 
period, the NCA was a vehicle to deal with the spurious ‘discovery’ made one day earlier that 
a massive ‘black hole’ existed in the outgoing ALP government’s finances (AEU 1996; 
Hayward 1993; Walker 1996).  By fabricating this ‘fiscal crisis’ Howard upped the tempo for a 
neoliberal reorganisation of industrial relations and public sector management (Quiggin 
1996).   
 
Welfare delivery, and its political and moral elaborations, was deeply connected to this 
reorganisation.  Here the NCA used Treasury demographic projections 65 years into the 
future to instil public alarm about the ‘unaffordability’ of current social provisioning (Mitchell 
1996).  This tactic was an early example of the more systematic welfare retrenchment 
                                                
82
 Federal public servants, defined by the Australian Public Service Commission as ongoing and non-ongoing 
staff employed under the Public Service Act  (1922 and 1999)(APSC 2008b: 15) numbered 145,000 staff in June 
1996.  A sharp decline occurred until 1999 (down to 118,000).  Then numbers more than recovered to reach 
155,000 by June 2007 (APSC 2008b: 16).  Directly employed state and local public servants increased in number 
from 154,700 in May 1996 to 168,000 in February 2007 (ABS 2007e).  These figures do not include those 
indirectly employed by the government such as the 10,000 staff in the Job Network (DEWR 2006b: 7). 
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campaigns the government later conducted using Treasury’s 2002 and 2007 
Intergenerational Reports.  Officer’s argument about what to do contained little that was new.  
He basically summarised the Department of Finance arguments for marketising reform inside 
the public sector it had been making since the 1980s, simply calling for its pace to be 
quickened (Mitchell 1996).  In social policy Officer took up the recommendations of Tony 
Blunn and Sandy Holloway, the two key departmental Secretaries who had been ‘falling over 
each other’ (Rowlands 2002: 104) to argue that some CES services be privatised and the 
rest be amalgamated with DSS into a new, NPM-based ‘one-stop-shop’ welfare organisation 
(Halligan 2004: 151).   
 
As a result, in ‘one of the biggest corporate mergers in recent Australian history’ Centrelink 
was established as a statutory agency on 1 July 1997 (Scott 1999: 6).  Blunn considered 
Centrelink had three years ‘to settle down’ to deliver the new agenda ‘or be ‘scrapped…[and] 
we’ll go out to talk to other people’ (cited in Scott 1999: 1).  This touched new heights of 
neoliberal fantasy.  The complexity of what staff did and the means of production required to 
do it meant there was little interest among private capitals to take over its operations.  The 
political importance of retaining tight control on the largest component of its expenditure 
meant that the government saw no value in actually pursuing this route (though talk of doing 
so kept sweeping around Centrelink offices).  Instead the quasi-market idea predominated 
that the agency would ‘sell’ its package of services to those who wanted to ‘buy’ them. The 
$50 million cost of subsuming some CES and most DSS functions into Centrelink and 
allowing the rest to be dealt with through the newly established Job Network would be 
recovered in two ways (Scott 1999: 10).  An annual 10 per cent ‘efficiency dividend’ was 
imposed on Centrelink for the following three years (Halligan 2004: 151).   
 
Secondly, massive savings were made in the Job Network by employing staff at annual 
wages $10,000 below that paid in the CES (Sasha 2006).  Yet even this ersatz market was 
soon found wanting.  Centrelink was the sole provider available for the two big social welfare 
and employment departments (Mulgan 2002: 48).  Control of the ‘product design’ of policy 
and how it was costed was retained by the purchasing department (Halligan 2004: 151).  In 
the subsequent years Centrelink may have signed an increasing number of Business 
Partnership Agreements with other agencies and some private sector organisations, but by 
2008 these amounted to a mere 4 per cent of its annual budget (Centrelink 2008: 134).   
 
Due to its gigantic IT infrastructure Centrelink held local ‘leadership in the electronic 
marketplace’ and had become a major international player (Treadwell 2002).  Growing at 15 
per cent per annum, and with a computer system holding the ninth largest amount of data 
and the third largest transaction rates in the world, Centrelink had become a ‘maxim for 
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digital business’ by the early 2000s (Treadwell 2002).  To oversee this public enterprise, the 
government appointed a Board to set Centrelink’s ‘goals, priorities, policies and strategies’ 
and to ensure its functions were ‘effectively delivered’ (Centrelink 2006a: 12).  However, the 
Cabinet’s ‘real intervention’, according to Sue Vardon, was its ‘decision to put business 
people on the board not social security types’ (Vardon 2006).  Here the state-capital relation 
was concretely expressed in the state managers cum corporate CEOs who introduced NPM 
practices to manage Centrelink’s contracts.  The two chairs of the board during this period – 
Robin Marrett and John Pascoe, are telling examples of how the state’s accumulation 
priorities trumped its welfare rhetoric.  Marrett was a seasoned class warrior,83 however his 
over-tendency to ‘bang heads’ (Halligan & Wills 2008: 109) led to his replacement by Pascoe 
in 2000.  Presumably it was thought Pascoe’s technical expertise could ‘grow’ Centrelink as 
a business.84   
 
It could be said with little exaggeration that Centrelink was being run as an offshoot of the St 
George Bank, with three Board members – John Thame, Christine Gillies and Pascoe 
holding executive positions within the organisation (Centrelink 1999: 99; 2004: 28, 30).  
However the multiple directorships of the earlier Board members meant that they 
represented most key sections of Australian capitalism (see Table 10).  Supporting them 
were Peter Shergold and David Rosalky, the Secretaries of the two main departments 
funding Centrelink to ensure ‘that ‘implementation is… driven hard’ (Shergold 2004).   
 
Until 2007 Centrelink was rationalised along a series of ‘business lines’ to manage and 
deliver income support payments separately from the ‘participation’ side of its operations 
(Harley 2007).  For frontline staff the bewildering parade of models and goals which flowed 
from Canberra were invariably perceived to have little connection with the work they did.  
What linked all these changes was a drive to impose on frontline staff more Taylorised work 
processes, restricted knowledge requirements and new behaviours required to efficiently 
produce workfare policies.  A Centrelink trainee at the Darlinghurst Office who had spent the 
last ten years ‘running fast food restaurants’ found Centrelink work practices ‘a big 
                                                
83
 As General Manager of the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA), Marrett’s political ‘light on the hill’ (cited 
in Linn 2000: 65) was to turn ETSA into Australia’s first privatised electrical wholesaler.  This vision was achieved 
in the mid-1990s, resulting in 5000 job losses after breaking ‘the union monopoly’ power supposedly held by the 
Communication, Electrical and Plumbing Union (Benbow 1998; Porter 1991). 
84
 Despite decrying the ‘frightening…penetration’ of poker machines into ‘the easy access’ of suburban hotels at 
this time (Peter Costello cited in Hudson & Rollins 2000: 10), it was Pascoe’s ‘acumen’ of turning his father’s 
dental equipment business into the world’s second largest gaming machine company, Aristocrat Leisure, that 
caught the government’s eye (Fundinguniverse.com 2006). 
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surprise…that it’s run in the sort of way that say McDonalds would be’ (ABC Radio National 
2002: 5). 
 
Centrelink became an increasingly integrated business entity within Australian capitalism.  
Real-time or overnight connectivity with government departments, sections of capital and its 
‘customer’ base had risen sharply.  International travel checks of Centrelink customers 
immediately suspended their payments if prior approval had not been granted.  Direct 
payments to landlords, utility companies and debt collectors became available, as did 
updated payment advices from Centrelink to state housing authorities. An interface was 
established with companies such as Myer and Woolworths to upload the fortnightly pay 
details of income support recipients directly onto their Centrelink records   – a productivity 
measure which saved thousands of hours labour in the pay sections of these companies and 
Centrelink (Centrelink 2008: 190-91; Ira 2007).  Whether this was instigated by the Board is 
unknown, but there was ample capacity to do so since three members of the Board had held 
senior positions in these companies (see Appendix E).  Software upgrades more finely 
categorised the ‘risk profile’ of a Centrelink customer to develop a business model which 
would more accurately denote their level of dollar-value for job network agencies, and more 
finely focus the interviewing work of frontline staff to those most ‘at risk’.  Programs such as 
the felicitously-named Total View (purchased from Coca Cola) instituted a panopticon-like 
surveillance of staff – alerting team leaders in Call Centres (and later regional offices) to 
poorly performing staff and when they were absent from their workstation (Quinn 2005).   
 
Client information was viewed on a web-based platform called a ‘customer account’, 
connoting the ‘shopping’ ideas central to the ideology of NPM.  A ‘Balanced Scorecard’ was 
kept – a ‘strategically focused management performance system’ – which disaggregated all 
Centrelink’s business interactions into ‘a comprehensive set of performance measures’ 
(Centrelink 1999: 211). The question of who a Centrelink customer was within this business 
framework came to the market-logical conclusion that there were ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
customers – clients and staff.  Each, therefore, had their own ‘customer charter’ (Centrelink 
2002c) through which Centrelink’s performance was evaluated by periodically surveying the 
level of satisfaction each ‘customer base’ had with the very different ‘service offers’ they had 
accepted (Centrelink 1999: 22).  Its annual reports claimed performance was improving 
because those surveyed were becoming more satisfied.  For example, the proportion of 
income support recipients surveyed who ranked Centrelink’s ‘overall quality of service’ as 
either ‘good’ or ‘very good’ had risen from 65 per cent in 1997 to 88 per cent in 2008 
(Centrelink 1999: 37; 2008: 57). Similarly, various ‘findings’ were cited to show that the 
percentage of staff satisfied with their ‘work’ or ‘job’ had hovered in the low to mid 60s 
between 1997 and 2004, and had then risen to 77 per cent by 2008 (Centrelink 1999: 15; 
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2004: 156; 2008: 109).  Even if taken at face value, it still meant that in 2004 over 2 million 
‘external’ customers and nearly 9000 staff remained dissatisfied (derived from data in 
Centrelink 2005a: 11).  Essentially, however, these were self-serving statistics, often 
confected to display how NPM welfare-business practices were somehow people-centric.  
They clash relentlessly against other empirical studies and the views of most interviewees in 
this research.  A 2007 ANAO report (2007: 74), for example, found that 84 per cent of 
Centrelink payment recipients ‘did not know…about Centrelink’s commitments/promises 
regarding customer service’ and they therefore were in no position to rate the level of service 
actually delivered.   
 
Administrative restructuring: 2002-2006 
By 2002, however, the very successes Vardon and the Board had achieved began to be 
overtaken by the new ‘joined up government’ (Harley 2007) approach needed to beef up the 
state’s accumulation strategy.  The Board’s increasing irrelevance was clearly seen in the 
appointments made to it from 2002 by the Minister, Amanda Vanstone.  The final Chair of the 
Board, Elizabeth Montano had held no private sector leadership positions.85  She was a state 
manager – a Director of Corporate Regulation at the Australian Securities Commission, the 
CEO of AUSTRAC (an anti-money laundering body) and Manager of the Board overseeing 
the Australian Federal Police (AUSTRAC 2009; Centrelink 2003a).  Susan Rapley may have 
been described in a Centrelink Annual Report as a ‘CEO’ of two companies but this can be 
dismissed as boosterism (Centrelink 2004: 30).  The first, Laincot Fabrics, was a tiny 
Tasmanian textile company with fewer than 10 employees and the second, Harrington 
Homes, was a family-run housing construction business operating out of Horsham in country 
Victoria (Biztas 2009; Harrington Homes 2009).  David de Carvalho and David Deans 
managed welfare bodies – the National Catholic Education Commission and the National 
Seniors Association respectively.  These were not the heavy-hitting captains of industry 
which initially populated the Board to drive through NPM practices and leverage business 
opportunities on the way.  The most telling indication that the Agency structure had reached 
its political use-by date was the 2002 decision by Howard’s Departmental Secretary, Peter 
Shergold, to leave the Board he had helped set up.   
 
Due to the tightening labour market, firmer political control over key government social 
service agencies became an increasingly apparent competitive prerequisite if their 
productive contributions for Australian capitalism were to be quickly and fully realised.  
                                                
85
 Rapley replaced Pascoe as Board Chair in 2004 after the ‘surprise announcement’ by the Attorney-General, 
Philip Ruddock, that he had appointed Pascoe as Chief Magistrate of the Federal Magistrates Court (Chessell 
2004). 
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Treasury’s drive for ‘economic efficiency’ in the 2000s required nimble and coherent 
attentiveness within the ‘machinery of government’ to respond to the changing political 
opportunities and problems confronting the social accumulation strategy of the state.  A 
review by John Uhrig (2003: 6), a recently retired Chairman of Westpac and Santos, 
lambasted the governance arrangements of ‘service delivery agencies’ such as Centrelink on 
two grounds.  Firstly, Business Partnership Agreements wasted ‘considerable resources’ and 
‘greater leverage over price and quality of services…can be achieved through direct 
accountability of the authority to the Minister’ (2003: 47).  More importantly the structure had 
‘the effect of limiting flexibility in responding to changing government …priorities’ (2003: 58).  
Howard (2004b) found Uhrig’s report to be ‘very sensible’ and Shergold (2006) agreed it was 
becoming ‘increasingly…apparent that the pathway to better implementation…be 
consciously driven from the top down’.  By 2005, the Board was abolished as Centrelink was 
‘de-agencified’ and ‘re-absorbed’ into mainstream departments – initially DEWR and then 
into the newly formed Department of Human Services (DHS) (Wettenhall 2007: 66).   
 
Strenuous welfarism and the political imperatives of ‘joined up government’ 
 
Under the pressure of the boom, the government did not wait for parliament to give DHS 
legislative authority to intervene in Centrelink’s operations.  ‘From day one’, Joe Hockey, the 
DHS Minister, began to implement the ‘Prime Minister’s first priority’ which was ‘to give clear 
instructions to Centrelink…to increase the number of people referred…to the Job Network’ 
(DHS 2005: 12).   
 
It was not as if the Job Network was in a financial position to offer a viable alternative to JET.  
Up to the time of JET’s demise DEWR paid the Job Network a token $300 to ‘service’ a 
voluntary parent and therefore, predictably, little time or resources were spent on this group 
(Harley 2007).  Most single parents simply attended a group interview, were shown how to 
use the touch screen facilities found in the public areas of both Centrelink and the Job 
Network offices, and sometimes given a photocopied guide to writing a  resume (Alex 2006).  
One PA became very agitated when asked about the value of referring ‘voluntary’ parents 
seeking work to the Job Network.  Parents came back to her saying they ‘won’t help 
because…I’m a parent and I don’t have to do anything’: 
 
And then I get angry…does that mean they don't get any money or points or whatever it is?  If 
that's why – well, then there you go…I get returns.  I get parents coming back angry because 
they [the Job Network] say, "Look, there's the touch screen".  Yes, exactly [snorts].  [Loudly] 
They don't want to know… so you get, you know [long pause, wave of hands], angry. 
(Rahat 2006) 
  
Hockey’s drive to increase participation rates anticipated the full compulsory turn that was to 
come, increasingly pressuring JET labour to simply be a labour market-forcing activity.  
Centrelink frontline work with a more generally, with a machine-like character.  The 
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neoliberal politics of this campaign also attempted to obscure that Centrelink operations were 
being severely degraded at the same time.  Because people had ‘given up on trying to call 
through on the phone’, the influx into regional offices was so great that some staff only half-
jokingly told those they were to see ‘to bring a packed lunch’ (Rahat 2006).  Between 
January 2004 and August 2006, for example, over 6 million connected calls to Centrelink 
went unanswered and an even ‘larger’ number were greeted by a busy signal (Thomson 
2006).  Low staff morale was clearly indicated in the ‘internal’ surveys.  The percentage of 
staff who indicated positive support for the question Centrelink is committed to you was 
‘always in the twenties or low thirties right up to the time they finally realised they should stop 
asking that silly question [laughs] in 2004 I think’ (Alex 2006).   
 
Ira, a frontline officer, talked of how daily staff bulletins published in his Area (16 offices) 
were full of 20 or so ‘feel good quotes from customers’.  She knew many of these officers 
personally and was sure they were ‘well deserved’ but: 
 
Let's be honest, 20 compliments a morning?  Mate, 500 people walk through just the --- office 
alone every day.  Right?  And when you look on a mass scale like that, mate, it's not about 
finding people work.  We're now in a situation where every day there's a staffing crisis [raises 
voice] every single day, and the managers and team leaders were always running round 
trying to fill rosters and get the queues down and get everyone seen…Centrelink is always 
carrying the rhetoric of simplifying processes while in practice making things more 
complicated.  
(Ira 2007) 
  
She gave an instance of how ‘to get efficiencies of scale’, Centrelink claims which were 
previously processed ‘in office’ were split so that ‘every single payment stream has a 
different processing team located in a different office’.  This resulted in a deskilling of 
frontline staff and an administrative setup where the ‘paper is flying’ and no-one knew if all 
the required documents had reached the processing team: 
 
At the back of [his office] there's a pigeonhole bay where, at the end of the day, someone has 
got to sort the work as to which team it goes to process it.  There are 12 different places in 
that pigeonholing bay, and what's going to generate queries from our customer base isn't 
whether or not they have got a job because, mate, if they get a job and leave us, well, we 
don't see them ever again, but if their payment stops and they don't understand why, they will 
be straight back in our faces. 
(Ira 2007) 
  
One historical example is given to more concretely illustrate how this closer connection 
between the Howard Government and Centrelink continued entrenching NPM practices on 
the ground while further politicising them.  A DHS-DEWR mini-campaign was launched in 
November 2004, 19 month’s prior to the official Welfare-to-Work Phase 2 policy roll out in 
July 2006 (RN 2004).  Under ‘government directions’ Patricia Scott, Secretary of DHS 
directed Centrelink to give high priority to ‘the government imperative of  ‘connecting working 
age customers to employment opportunities at every opportunity’ (Hansard 2004b: 48).  She 
directed Centrelink regional office staff working on front counters to start mouthing, puppet-
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like, a telemarketing style script to every Parenting Payment and DSP customer they saw 
(see Figure 10).  
 
This crude dragooning into the job network had mixed results.  Single parent referrals 
skyrocketed well before the compulsory noose actually tightened in July 2006, but it proved 
something of a flop for partnered parents and DSP recipients.  Results from the first eight 
months of the campaign are illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10 
November 2004 version of Centrelink front counter script 
 
 
     Job Network Rapid Connection Script for CSOs 
 
 
Have you heard about the Job Network? 
It is a network of private and community organisations, funded by 
the Commonwealth Government, dedicated to helping you find and 
keep a job. 
 
Did you know that the Job Network have got a great range of 
programs that can help you find a job? 
If you don't have the right skills or equipment the Job Network can 
buy these for you, for example if you need a fork life licence or work 
boots they can pay for these. 
 
Did you know that most people are better of [sic] working, whether 
the work is part time or full time work, and depending on how much 
you earn you can keep your Centrelink benefits? Outline relevant 
income cut-off levels and if appropriate run the Centrelink Rate 
Estimator. 
 
Now, we will just get some basic details to send across to them as 
an introduction for you, and then we can get a good appointment 
time in the next couple of days 
Source: Sasha 2006 
 
Figure 11 
Monthly referrals to the Job Network, 2004-05 
 
Source: DHS 2005: 43 
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The campaign only fully hit its straps in the year leading up to the actual inauguration of the 
Welfare-to-Work Phase 2 changes when 600,000 parents and DSP recipients were 
contacted by Centrelink ‘to offer Job Network referrals’ (Centrelink 2006a: 2). The Parenting 
Payment referral rate (mainly single parents) had stabilised at over 8200 per month – that is 
at around the rate which had been reached by June 2005 (DHS 2006 2102: 9).  This DHS-
DEWR drive was hailed as an outstanding success, with the Job Network placing 52,000 
customers (again mainly single parents) into a job in the 12 months to July 2006 (Centrelink 
2006a: 2).   
 
Because the effects of general labour market conditions for single parents seeking paid work 
are not examined, only tentative observations and responses are made.  An examination of 
ABS data in its annual Job Search Experience Survey (Cat. No. 6222.0) (see Figure 12) 
finds little support for the claim that the Centrelink referral drive was particularly successful.86   
The ABS survey details the total number of unemployed single parents who started their 
current job in the previous 12 months.  During the 2005-06 period, at the height of Hockey’s 
campaign, 18 per cent less single parents started a job (44,100) compared to the previous 
financial year (54,000) – hardly grounds for any hubris (ABS 2005a: 9; 2006b: 9).   
 
Figure 12 
Unemployed single parents who started their current job in the previous 12 months  
2001-02 to 2007-08 – number and trend  
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Source: data derived from ABS ‘Job Search Experience’ Cat. No. 6222.0 
2002: 7; 2003: 8; 2004a: 6; 2005a: 9; 2006a: 9; 2007c: 12; and 2008d: 12 
 
                                                
86
 A supplementary report to the Labour Force Survey (Cat. No. 6202.0) which uses a third of its data set.  
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An argument could possibly be constructed that the initial effects of the campaign from 
November 2004 to June 2005 may have lead to an increase in single parents starting a job.  
The period when the bulk of parents were contacted and referred to the Job Network (2005-
06) saw a significant decrease in job starts.  However, the 7-year trend suggests that the 
period when the JET Program was most active (2001-02 to 2004-05 – before JAs and PAs 
were gradually withdrawn in the year leading up to June 2006) unemployed single parents 
were more likely to start a new job compared to the subsequent two years.  This therefore 
strongly suggests that the compulsory turn was less effective in its intent than the voluntary 
JET program was in its.  
 
One indication of the level of fervour attached to this campaign was Hockey’s demand that 
each local manager be held personally responsible for notifying DHS-DEWR on their office’s 
referral rate each week.  Another was the compulsory tone of the first script and the blanket 
offer committing a JN provider to pay for items such as boots and licences, neglecting to 
mention Centrelink had no authority to do so.  The contents of the script caused something of 
a political mêlée in the Senate on the 7 December.  Brian Greig, an Australian Democrat, 
queried Kay Patterson, the FaCS Minister, whether Centrelink staff only mentioned that 
participation was ‘not compulsory unless asked’ and if these referrals were necessarily the 
most suitable out of the range of services available (Hansard 2004a: 39).  The Minister 
responded the next day, after seeking a response from Hockey, that ‘participation is 
completely voluntary for Parenting Payment and DSP customers’ and ‘that there will be an 
increased focus on offering a range of services to all customers able to participate in the 
workforce’ (Hansard 2004b: 48).  In a minor concession DHS issued a less gung ho script, 
which included a voluntary clause.  Yet the browbeating hardly slackened as the key policy 
actually able to expand the ‘range of services’ available for most of these customers, the JET 
program, continued to be omitted from the fast food style entreaties being churned out at the 
front counter.   
 
 
4.5 Recomposing the division of welfare labour and work practices: 
1996-2006 
 
During the late 1990s the work of frontline staff in Centrelink regional offices became 
increasingly focused on encouraging, cajoling and coercing income support recipients into 
paid work.  Responding to the ‘most radical changes to labour market assistance since the 
establishment of the CES in 1946’ (Vanstone 1996: vii), Vardon campaigned to turn 
Centrelink from a bare payment factory into a welfare interventionist organisation.  Jocelyn 
Newman, the FaCS Minister, enthusiastically endorsed Vardon’s appointment because ‘she 
sounded like the sort of person who could change a culture’ (cited in Scott 1999: 6).  3,500 
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ex-CES staff had transferred to Centrelink.  For Vardon, their approach of ‘finding solutions’ 
for customers fitted with the direction she wanted Centrelink to head: 
 
They’d [ex-CES workers] change the rules according to the person – the outcome was more 
important than the process [whereas] the social security culture was one of consistency of 
process…you do it by the rules. 
(Vardon cited in Scott 1999: 7)  
 
This approach was echoed by a team leader of a case management section who recalled 
that ‘if one of my case Managers came up to me and said “I’ve got this person who doesn’t 
really fit the eligibility criteria, but I think would do really good”, the assumption was that we’d 
look at how can we make them fit, rather than how we can go on denying them’ (Andrews 
2006).  Centrelink was re-branded as The Human Face of the Australian Government – a 
slogan which had the explicit backing of Howard (Centrelink 2004: 18; Howard 1997).  
Managers were told by the new head of strategy, Carmen Zanetti, ‘to stop thinking about 
being a welfare organisation’ and instead see that Centrelink’s ‘downstream’ business 
opportunities were to capture ‘a whole range of programs, many of which might be non-
welfare’ (Zanetti, cited in Scott 1999: 10).  ‘Customer friendly’ open plan offices were 
introduced in an attempt to make a cultural break from treating income support recipients 
‘like cattle’ (Scott 1999: 11).  National Managers talked of having ‘inverted the hierarchical 
pyramid’ to promote ‘teamwork principles that emphasise taking ownership and responsibility 
for customer outcomes’ where the role of NSO staff was in ‘supporting our Service Centres’ 
(Browne 1999: 69).  ‘Innovative cultural change interventions’ were introduced, such as 
customer-feedback focus groups, to sensitise the workforce for the more ‘active’ emotional 
and empathic labour required for their own welfare interventions under government’s mutual 
obligation agenda (Centrelink 1999: 52). 
 
It is only from this time that Glenda Maconachie’s (1996) premature detection of a rise of 
‘regulated empathy’ in DSS frontline practices actually flowers.  The changing gender 
composition of these frontline staff suggests that such emotional and affective labour was 
institutionally reinforced through an increasing feminisation of the workforce.  This study 
proposes that one response by state managers to the welfare reform agenda was to increase 
the proportion of women hired by Centrelink.  In institutionally moving from an ‘expert’, 
technically focused payment organisation into a welfare interventionist agency, the new 
emotional and empathetic labour now required for strenuous welfarism was implicitly 
understood to be ‘women’s work’.  With over 26,000 staff in 2008, Centrelink was the biggest 
organisation in the Australian Public Service (APS)(APSC 2008b: 20).  It was also one of the 
most proletarian (see Table 1) and feminised.  While the trend in the total APS workforce has 
been towards gender equity in the last two decades, the overall movement in the Centrelink 
workforce (despite the exception in National Office) has been the opposite – towards greater 
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gender disparity (see Figure 13)87  The proportion of women in DSS/Centrelink rose from 55 
per cent in 1980, to 62 per cent at the time Centrelink was formed, to 70 per cent of the 
workforce by 2008.88  Disaggregating these overall figures shows that the gender disparity 
increased most sharply at the frontline.89   
Figure 13 
Changes in the proportion of women in DSS/Centrelink 
National Support Office (NSO) and frontline staff 1993-2007 – percentage and trend  
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87
 If Centrelink staffing figures are stripped out of the total APS workforce, then between 1999 and 2007 the 
percentage of female public servants rose from 44 per cent to 54 per cent – a higher yearly increase (1.25%) than 
any of the Centrelink groups analysed above.  The proposition being put here is that such a conclusion is 
misplaced.  Firstly, the APS workforce (minus Centrelink) was less sex-differentiated as a whole by 2007 (4 per 
cent more women than men) than it was in 1999 (6 per cent less women than men)(data derived from APSC 
2007: 15; Centrelink 1999: 152; 2007a: 193; and PSMPC 1999: 8).  Other federal organisations now linked to the 
Department of Human Services such as Medicare and the Child Support Agency (both with regional office 
networks) have experienced no change in the gender composition of their workforces in the last decade or so.  
Women working at the Australian Taxation Office (the other major federal agency with a significant number of 
suburban and country workplaces) have had a stable share of ASO4 level or below positions over the same 
period.  Between 1998 and 2007, the proportion of women employed at the ASO4 level or below in the ATO only 
edged up from 61 per cent to 63 per cent (ATO 1998: 75; 2007: 236). 
88
 All data in this section is derived from analysing DSS and Centrelink Annual Reports. 
89As would be expected from the broader research into women’s labour market disadvantage (Broomhill & Sharp 
2004; Pocock, Buchanan & Campbell 2004; Probert et al. 1998), women were relatively less heavily concentrated 
in NSO compared to the rest of Centrelink.  In 1999, for example, 45 per cent of all NSO staff were women, rising 
to 49 per cent by 2007.  In contrast most operational (Band 2) staff in Call Centres and local Centrelink offices 
were women.  In 1999 women comprised 74 per cent of these staff in Call Centres and by 2007 this had 
increased to 78 per cent.  Over the same period the proportion of women employed as Band 2 public contact, 
‘coal-face’ workers in local Centrelink offices rose from 67 per cent to 74 per cent. These figures include a 
relatively small number of Band 2 staff working at Area offices as the Centrelink Annual Report data does not 
disaggregate these staff from those working in local offices.  
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Centrelink work of frontline staff experienced something which was quite unique in Australia 
– an already feminised non-professional occupation that most disproportionately intensified 
its gender disparity in the late 1990s and early 2000s (for an explanation of the empirical 
sources and methods used to make this claim, see Appendix D).  There are some indications 
which suggest Centrelink management began to recruit women specifically for the Howard 
Government’s Welfare-to-Work agenda.  For example, to meet the Australians Working 
Together initiative, 500 Band 2 PAs were recruited in 2002 and 2003 to conduct some of the 
compulsory Welfare-to-Work interviews for single parents plus other newly designated 
groups, leaving JAs with the more complex single parent interviews (see 4.9).  78 per cent of 
PAs employed were women.  This gender profile was remarkably similar to other distinctively 
emotionally ascribed labour in local offices, such as the Band 3 JAs (81 per cent) and 
Professional Level social workers and psychologists (84 per cent).  All were significantly 
higher than the overall 70 per cent rate among operational staff in 2002 (Barns & Preston 
2003: 29; Centrelink 2008: 65, 70: 205-206).   
 
One PA’s recollection of the recruitment and training process she went through in 2003 
clearly describes the new type of motivational labour required by Centrelink managers.  The 
recruitment agency initially put her in a ‘silly’ all-day, 20-person group exercise where she 
had to imagine how to escape from a cave with injured people to support (Robin 2006).  
Each was given a character to play and ‘we all had to talk about how we…would get them 
out… while there were people sitting round the room taking notes on us’.  When I asked how 
she got out of the cave, she laughed: ‘I don't imagine I would have been first.  I tend to try 
and play the person in that situation that does the most helping and, you know, planning and 
not to get out first tends to work in your favour’ (Robin 2006).  In the intensive three month 
training which followed, Robin recalled that stress was placed on the qualities that ‘set us 
apart’ from the frontline staff working on claim processing:  
 
It was very much about, "We have chosen you."  They called it the X factor with our group, 
"Because you've all got the X factor, and that's because you can communicate, you're caring, 
people feel confident when they're talking to you.   
 
Trainers linked this x-factor (a provocatively similar term to x-efficiencies discussed in  2.8) to 
the welfare reform agenda through small motivation speeches:   
 
 “There is a change happening with the organisation and it's more customer focused and it's 
about getting things done”, all that kind of stuff, and it's not about those old attitudes of 
thinking “customers are all dirt and they don't want jobs”…It's a very much a huge focus in PA 
training.  
(Robin 2006)  
 
Training for other operational staff was far more peremptory, and the on-the-job support they 
received was ‘pretty shocking’ since it was delivered by ‘people with really negative attitudes 
towards customers’.  This resulted in new staff at reception speaking ‘to people like dirt’ and 
so causing ‘many fights’.  Robin thought managers did not ‘really care’ about this mind-set – 
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‘it's not people's attitude they really give a rats about’ but rather the factory-need for a worker 
who will ‘handle their four-hour reception stint and not cause too much trouble’.  The 
dissonance this PA expressed between the ‘caring customer-focussed’ role she was 
recruited to perform and the moralising attitudes of others she worked with was institutionally 
inscribed in Centrelink from day one.  
 
Vardon’s overall ‘vision’ for Centrelink rang hollow.  The overwhelming dominance of 
processing claims left little space or time to establish the neoliberal rapport with customers 
she was seeking.  During the 1998-99 financial year, for example, the work of most 
operational staff was dominated by assessing 3.6 million new claims, processing 22 million 
Newstart and Youth Allowance fortnightly continuation forms, and answering 20 million 
phone calls from the 6.1 million customers on its books (Centrelink 1999: 7).  Cuts in the first 
two years of Centrelink operations meant that this work was being done by 1360 less staff 
(ANAO 1997a: xiii; Centrelink 1999: 152).  The costings of each Business Partnership 
Agreement was derived from a Cabinet-endorsed model which allocated a dollar value to the 
‘transaction costs’ of a highly detailed set of work practices (ANAO 2008: 73).  These tasks 
were broken into 5-minute ‘process points’, each of which had its own contracted price 
(ANAO 2008: 78).  Such factory tempos and NPM business measures placed severe limits 
on the efficicacy of the various cultural change programs Centrelink mounted over the years.  
For example, Centrelink’s 2005-06 Business Partnership Agreement with the employment 
department of the time had the following two clauses: 
 
DEEWR and Centrelink will work collaboratively to drive cultural change within Centrelink to 
support the rapid and successful implementation of a systematic and sensitive Welfare to 
Work focus for all clients.  At the same time DEEWR and Centrelink will work collaboratively 
to increase referrals of job-seekers to employment services, in particular parents and people 
with disabilities, in a managed way. 
(DEEWR-Centrelink BPA 2005-06: clauses 2.3 and 2.4; cited in ANAO 2008: 143)  
 
On the ground, the contradictory contractual underpinnings of such Business Partnership 
Agreements to be both ‘systematic and sensitive’ were considered to be a ‘nonsense’ 
(Harley 2007).  Vardon’s cultural campaign to reorient work practices to better suit what was 
needed by government’s welfare reform agenda constantly clashed against the business 
costings allocated for this work.  The broader economic contradiction between the state’s 
accumulation goal to create more skilled labour while denying the necessary economic 
resources required to realise its aim was played out in local Centrelink offices.  An archetypal 
example is given by a Regional Manager who oversaw a trial seeking to increase the 
‘effectiveness’ of Participation Contact Interviews at a number of offices in 2006.  The idea 
was that rather than a ‘cursory tick and flick’ process, the interviewer would be trained to 
have a ‘greater knowledge of the local labour market’ and programs and so have a more 
empathetic and productive ‘sit-down discussion’ about a person’s ‘circumstances’.  The 
problem was that, because the Business Partnership Agreement allocated cost of doing this, 
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determined by DEEWR, was a ‘gross underestimation’, it only allowed time for a three 
minute ‘interaction’.  To ‘achieve…the philosophy that we thought we were going to embrace’ 
an ‘eight or nine minute interaction’ was required and so the project was ‘scuttled’ (Harley 
2007).  If Centrelink Managers held that the ‘philosophy’ of welfare reform pragmatically 
pivoted on such seemingly minor differences in labour-time, many operational staff 
practically adapted the official NPM speech genre of ‘customer service’ to their ‘social 
purview’ (Voloshinov 1996: 41) of what such work practices entailed (see next page).  
 
One JA considered that the basic attitude a majority of staff had to ‘customers’ simply was 
‘you really do want to help them’ (Robin 2006).  This coalface expectation hit similar 
business barriers to those in contradictory class locations.  Team leaders would regularly 
castigate frontline workers for ‘overservicing’ customers, using the Business Partnership 
Agreement to argue ‘we’re not funded to provide that level of service’ (Kelly 2006).  Those on 
reception were told ‘to keep the line moving’ by restricting interactions to less than three 
minutes (Rahat 2006).  The rest were asked to await a ‘sit down’ interview conducted by 
other staff who worked off the ‘virtual queue’ onto which these customers had been placed, 
and were ‘told off’ if these interactions took ‘too long’ (Isha 2006).  The ‘stats’ on this queue 
were ‘fudged’ by team leaders since they were ‘getting too many “please explains” from 
Canberra’ (Ira 2007). The 90-minute wait-time rule for this virtual queue was often 
circumvented.  Team Leaders would falsely record a customer had been taken out of the 
queue to be interviewed and then re-book the customer to start the queue clock running 
again.  This would stop their office appearing on a NSO-issued ‘walk-in black list’ (Ira 2007).  
Similar tactics were used to meet Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the claim processing 
area.  For example, a Business Partnership Agreement which required 80 per cent of 
Newstart claims to be finalised within 16 days was avoided by ‘fooling the system’.  When 
the claim was eventually completed the date of receipt was recorded to be the same as the 
date of finalisation, and then backdated on other screens to ensure correct payment.  From 
Canberra’s perspective the claim was assessed on the same day the claimant first came in.   
 
The upshot of these practices was twofold.  Fudging the claim processing figures increased 
stress on both sides of the counter by raising work pressures on staff and disregarding timely 
payments for claimants.  As Robin (2006 ) reported, pretending long queues did not exist 
resulted in a ‘huge amount of moral pressure’ on staff to quicken their pace – especially in an 
open plan office – because those who were waiting for ‘two to three hours’ were sitting and 
watching ‘only metres away’.  Team leaders also ‘got in your face’ by ‘driving you crazy’ to 
finish an interview.  This cajoling could be done without Team Leaders leaving their desks.  
The introduction of Same Time Connect software allowed ‘stupid’ flash messages telling a 
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CSO they were taking ‘too long’ to conduct an interview.  It created a ‘feeling like a whip is 
being cracked’. 
 
During an average day, frontline workers often became ‘caught up’ helping a range of more 
‘complex’ clients who had multiple needs for material aid or other welfare referrals, such as 
cash, payment advice, program referrals, chasing up of delayed claims, filling out forms, 
restoring payments and sorting out breaches.  It was in being ‘caught up’ that the cattle-
customer contradiction was at its most concrete (Alex 2006).  Arguments between staff 
occurred about what work constituted ‘good customer service’ and what work unnecessarily 
‘blew the line out’ for those waiting to be seen (Rahat 2006).  When was it necessary to help 
a person fill in a form?  Should you ring the designated chemist listed on an out of date 
internal welfare list to see if they still provided a free inhaler needed for the customer’s 
asthmatic child, or do you simply send them down (Ira 2007)?  Should you ring the social 
work section assessing the homeless status of a student who has been waiting 8 weeks for a 
payment or tell them they just have to wait (Ira 2007)?  What level of assistance should be 
provided to an indigenous person wanting to attend an interstate funeral?  Do you insist they 
provide a death notice out of the paper or should you contact the funeral home yourself 
(Robin 2006)?  These types of issues were internally divisive.  A majority of operational staff 
generally wanted to opt for a higher level of ‘help’ (Isha 2006).  Many tried to ‘box clever’ to 
garner the energy necessary to navigate around the business constraints being imposed 
upon them and to argue with others why they were justified in doing so (Kelly 2006).  
Because the Business Partnership Agreements allocated insufficient time for these tasks, 
those seeking assistance (with those wanting to help) were caught up in two processes, one 
culturally reconstructing them as ‘welfare customers’; the other economically reconstructing 
them as ‘cattle’.  
 
 
4.6 JET – from compulsion to abolition: 2002-2006 
 
Ramping up and broadening welfare compulsion in the 2000s was largely accomplished in 
two legislative tranches (see Table 4).  The first stage was termed the Australians Working 
Together (AWT) Package and the key legislation – The Family and Community Services 
Legislation Amendment (Australians Working Together and Other 2001 Budget Measures) 
Act 2003 No 35 – was passed in March 2003 and started that July.  Adopting 
recommendation D12 of the McClure Report, Parenting Payment recipients with a child aged 
6-15 years were required to attend an annual Centrelink participation interview, and those 
with a youngest child aged 13-15 years needed to undertake 150 hours of an activity (job 
search, education, training or community work) in a six month period.  Penalty for non-
compliance rose from an 18 per cent reduction of Parenting Payment for the first breach to 
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24 per cent for the second, each to be applied for 26 weeks.  A third breach attracted a 100 
per cent non-payment period for 8 weeks (Parliamentary Library 2004).  
 
The second phase was introduced through the passage of the Employment and Workplace 
Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and Other Measures) Bill 2005.  From 
July 2006, new claims for Parenting Payment were restricted to single parents whose 
youngest child was under 8 years of age and partnered parents whose youngest child was 
under 6 years old (Centrelink 2006b: 17). Those falling outside these criteria generally had to 
rely on Newstart Allowance as did new Parenting Payment recipients once their child 
reached these age limits.  Those already on Parenting Payment prior to the changes were 
‘grandfathered’ (retaining eligibility so long as they continuously stayed on the payment).  All 
Newstart and Youth Allowance claimants, including parents who were ‘principal carers’ and 
not eligible for Parenting Payment, were subject to the ‘Rapid Connect’ policy requiring them 
to register and have an interview with a Job Network Provider prior to coming into Centrelink 
to lodge the details of their claim.  Participation requirements and penalties became 
increasingly aligned between Parenting Payment and NSA, with the major difference being 
that parents who were ‘principal carers’ were required to work 15 hours a week compared to 
30 hours for other NSA recipients. Tactically clustered around, and strategically structured 
by, these two legislative instruments were three administrative and policy changes which 
anticipated or delayed, and sharpened or mitigated their practical delivery within Centrelink.90   
 
In September 2002, ten months before the AWT legislation was passed, Phase 1 of this 
policy was rolled out in Centrelink.  An ALP dominated committee had stymied its immediate 
passage through the Senate to conduct a review of the new breaching rules contained in the 
Bill (Eardley et al. 2005: 1). Tabled in September 2002, the review recommended some 
softening of penalties (SCARC 2002).  For those on Parenting Payment, it aligned its 
recommendations to those of the ‘independent enquiry’ set up by ACOSS-CPSU for a 
‘reduction in the rate and duration of breaches’ for those on Parenting Payment (Pearce, 
Disney & Ridout 2002: recommendation 9; SCARC 2002: vii-viii).  Only minor amendments 
were made, such as allowing a parent to recoup any lost payments due to a breach once 
they were again meeting their ‘participation requirements’.  It was agreed that a small 
qualitative study of 60 parents would be conducted to evaluate the ‘impact’ of these new 
                                                
90
  The other significant legislation dealing with the Welfare-to-Work changes for single parents was the Family 
and Community Services Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work) Bill 2005, which transferred JET Child Care 
Fees Assistance from FaCS to DEEWR, who then authorised Job Network agencies to have access to this 
program.  
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measures (Alexander et al. 2005)91  as part of an evaluation report to be tabled in 2005 
(DEWR 2005). For the Howard Government these amounted to trivial distractions which only 
slightly modified the tempo of the Welfare-to-Work roll-out in the next few years.   
 
Working-age income support recipients were divided into a range of ‘AWT target groups’ who 
discussed their ‘participation requirements’ mainly with a newly recruited Band 2 level PA 
(Centrelink 2003a: 1).  In the Parenting Measure of this first phase, single parents were 
broken into a number of groups.  JAs were restricted to interviewing the Parenting Payment 
recipients whose youngest child had turned 13 – the initial cohort targeted for compulsory 
activities.  At this stage only an annual interview was mandatory. PAs interviewed parents 
with a youngest child aged between 5 and 12.  The question of who interviewed those with a 
child under 5 was pragmatically sorted out at the local level and usually pivoted on allocating 
them to the officer least overwhelmed by workload pressures. JAs also provided services for 
a small number of parents receiving other payments who were interested in the JET Program 
and not part of an AWT target group.92  Therefore the JET Program continued to operate but 
its production was split between these two adviser roles. 
 
A consolidation of these processes and divisions occurred in September 2003, after the 
passage of AWT Phase 1, when the 150 hours of activity requirements became binding for a 
range of AWT ‘target groups’, including parents with a child over 12 (see Table 4).  JA 
interviews centred on developing a Participation Plan with the parent detailing what 
compulsory activities they would do.  PAs had to fit the 6-12 year old youngest child 
‘voluntary’ parent group (and often the 0-5 group as well) into a hectic schedule of servicing 
Mature Age, Newstart customers who were temporarily incapacitated, and those recently 
released from prison.  JET Child Care Rebate work now resided with both the PAs and JAs, 
and PAs only tended to refer ‘their’ Parenting Payment customers to a JA if they thought 
they could benefit from access to some funds still controlled by the JA. A survey by the 
CSMC had found that 95 per cent of single mothers were ‘working, studying or helping out at 
places like the school tuckshop’ (Northey 2002).  Margo Northey, a Victorian co-ordinator of 
the CSMC, acidly remarked that: 
 
AWT is just another way of saying single mothers are lazy and they need John Howard to 
push them around’.  Our survey has found that 95 per cent of single mothers are already 
working, studying or helping out at places like the local school tuck shop.  I’ve told the FaCS 
policy people (Department of Family and Community Services) “You’re bringing this [AWT] in 
for five per cent of single mothers?  What are you doing?” 
(Northey 2002) 
                                                
91
 Since most parents in this study had commenced work prior to signing their Participation Agreement the overall 
value of the research was methodologically empty (Alexander et al. 2005).  
92
  Those on Carer Payment, Widows B Pension, Widow Allowance and Partner Allowance (where not serviced 
under the Mature Age measure by a PA). 
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The Welfare-to-Work changes announced in the 2005 federal budget – and legislated soon 
after – split the JET Child Care Fee funding from the rest of the program’s funds.  JET Child 
Care Fee Assistance initially remained with FaCS,93 while the funding dollars for the rest of 
JET were ‘converted’ into the Transition to Work program run by DEWR, which ceased in 
June 2006 (CoA 2005a: 182).  DEWR’s funding for PAs also ceased on this date (CoA 
2005a: 178). PAs, therefore, only existed for 3 years and 9 months before both their role and 
that of the JA were abolished in July 2006.  All participation interviews, including those of 
Parenting Payment recipients, were then mainstreamed into a generic pool and this work 
was conducted by Customer Service Officers (see Table 4).   
 
Because the primary economic value of ALMPs and neoliberal welfare delivery is in their 
productive effects within workplaces, a tension was exacerbated in social provisioning as the 
economy recovered.  What was ‘effective’ service provision in Centrelink and the Job 
Network?  Cheap, poor quality service enhanced the productive ‘teeth’ of mutual obligation.  
Long waits in queues, endless contacts with a local office, delayed payments and frequent 
suspensions made moral and thus economic sense.   
 
Similarly, what constituted an ‘effective’ labour market program?  Welfare-to-Work policies 
became increasingly coercive as they served the dual accumulation purpose of quickly 
activating different reserve ‘stocks’ to internationally competitive utilisation rates and 
encouraging those already employed to work harder and be thankful for the job they had 
(DSS 1997a: 104).  One Centrelink office manager put it this way: 
 
If you looked at something like Newstart, does the Australian community care less about the 
number of people that we pay in 14 days?  So to them is that a measure of our success?...Or 
are they more fussed about the number of those people that reduced their average duration of 
receipt of payment?...our role, I think over time, had changed to one where increasingly the 
government started to look to us to actually be able to intervene in relation to people's 
circumstances. 
(Harley 2007) 
 
Yet, by 1997, JET, a relatively obscure program, had become the aspirational motif of 
Centrelink’s internal cultural change campaign for all frontline staff – the model for ‘customer 
friendly’ strenuous welfare practices necessary for the successful implementation of the 
Howard Government’s Welfare-to-Work agenda.  Sue Vardon considered JET’s ‘success’ so 
fully met Centrelink’s requirement to move ‘from passive to active intervention’ that it ‘formed 
the basis for the future role of Centrelink in helping people into the work environment’ 
(Vardon 2006).   
                                                
93
  In 2011 the Department of Employment, Education and Workplace Relations managed JET Child Care 
Assistance, having similar subsidies to those outlined in the thesis (26 weeks when starting work and currently up 
to 24 months for study, if approved by their Jobs Services Australia service provider (DEEWR 2011)  
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Inverting and displacing JET practices 
 
The individuated and contractualist notions of NPM were not simply a shallow management 
façade of re-labelling clients as customers and staff as Customer Service Officers (and from 
2006, Customer Service Advisers).  The dynamics of NPM business practices layered the 
displaced and inverted idea ‘customer’ into these two relationships.  As one Regional 
Manager put it, Centrelink had started to ‘up the ante’ of the ‘expectations we made of staff 
that were dealing with Newstart customers’.  For her, the question of how to change ‘the 
mind-set of the customer’ became the ‘whole issue’ across all income support recipients – 
how to ‘prompt’ people in any ‘pool…to give them some impetus to move out’ (Harley 2007).  
The small JET program played a pivotal role in this movement.   
 
As the only extant welfare to work program at the time which applied an (albeit reformist 
version) of a customer-focussed approach, the techniques of JET could be appropriated by 
management, shed of its (then) voluntary skin, and generalised across the network as a 
compulsory caricature of its earlier content.  JET’s obvious candidacy for promoting the new 
notion of ‘customer’ to boost staff productivity was not lost among Centrelink state Managers.  
Carmen Zanetti, DSS’ long-term National Program Manager, who had been ‘running JET’ for 
five years (Zanetti 2009), became Centrelink’s first national ‘head of strategy’ in 1997 (Scott 
1999: 6).  An ‘extremely successful’ business-cultural shift to a ‘customer oriented’ 
organisation was implemented (Zanetti 2009).  The following three examples illustrate how 
these contractual-welfare notions tended to institutionally corral and displace staff and client 
practices into the same ‘customer’ rubric.   
 
Contractual displacements 
By the late 1990s all staff and income support recipients were required to sign contracts, 
Performance Agreements and Participation Agreements, respectively.  Both were time-
delineated, task focussed and sanctionable.  Staff met annually with their team leader to 
discuss what tasks they must do, the level of accuracy needed in these tasks, the extra work 
they needed to perform well if they were to receive an incremental pay rise and the training 
required to meet their Agreement.  Three-monthly meetings were planned to assess 
progress in meeting goals, though they rarely happened in practice.  Similarly, one obligation 
of income support recipients with participation requirements was to meet with staff annually 
(or sometimes six-monthly) to review what tasks they must do, the level of accuracy they 
needed to sustain in these tasks (earnings reporting, attendance at a training course, 
notification of rent changes, changes in relationship status, job search activities etc.), the 
extra activities needed to receive a higher rate of payment (such as an accredited course to 
receive Pensioner Education Supplement, an Education Entry Payment or the Language, 
Literacy and Numeracy Supplement) and the training required to meet this agreement.   
  195
Sanctions could be imposed on staff for not abiding by their Performance Agreement.  These 
ranged from counselling to a 12-week Performance Improvement Plan at the end of which 
staff either met and continued working or, more commonly, were sacked.  Sanctions for 
clients not abiding by Participation Agreement ranged from counselling to (until 2008) partial 
loss of payments for a set number of months to an 8-week non-payment period.   
 
Compliance displacements 
Compliance with Centrelink management’s expectations on a day-to-day basis saw similar 
displacements.  The Supporting Regular Attendance policy required team leaders to 
‘engage’ with staff who had had two absences in a two month period (irrespective of what 
leave entitlements they may have held) and develop a ‘support plan to resolve any health, 
personal, regular or back-up child care, domestic or financial issues’ (Sasha 2006).  This thin 
cloak of care covering the intimidatory intent of management was shed if a third absence 
occurred in three months.  A staff member needed to sign an attendance document to 
‘reduce the risk of any further absences’ and was commonly directed to the Commonwealth 
Medical Officer for their work capacity to be assessed. Five absences in 5 months were 
deemed a breach of the Centrelink Code of Conduct, resulting in a range of sanctions from a 
fine, a reduction in a CSO’s classification (and pay) level, through to dismissal.  By 2006, 
local management in some offices took the initiative of suspending the pay of staff who failed 
to attend work on a particular day unless they were satisfied the CSO had a ‘genuine’ reason 
(Ira 2007).  
 
Similarly, income support recipients who did not attend a Centrelink interview or lodge a 
fortnightly form had their payments suspended until they gave a ‘genuine’ reason.  Being in 
paid work on lodgement day was not a genuine reason.  For example, a single parent who 
had found some casual or temporary work, and was meeting all her activity requirements, 
still needed to personally lodge her form unless she had organised a different arrangement 
prior to that day.  Payment suspensions caused a cancellation of a client’s Health Care Card, 
and placed her at risk of transferring to Newstart Allowance.94  If they performed poorly, for 
example by handing in a form without the sufficient quota of employer contacts noted in their 
Participation Agreement, a medical certificate was required before payment could be made.  
If a second medical certificate was presented within the next month or two, a ‘support plan’ 
was triggered, and the client was referred to a Job Capacity Assessor to assess their ability 
to work.  This thin cloak of care covering the intimidatory intent of Centrelink was shed if the 
                                                
94
 After an uproar from the National Welfare Rights Coalition and the CSMC, Hockey intervened in April 2007 and 
claimed that even though ‘single parents would not be inconvenienced by the welfare to work changes’ (Karvelas 
2007: 5), activity-tested parents were still required to lodge their ‘SU19’ forms over the counter unless they had 12 
continuous weeks of stable earnings (Gulzar 2006). 
  196 
Job Capacity Assessor decided that the client still had to meet a certain quota of employer 
contacts.  Any subsequent handing in of a form which showed they had missed completing 
their job search efforts resulted in payment suspension, even if another medical certificate 
was provided.  
 
Cultural commensuration 
The sharpest ideological expression of the equivalising dynamics between clients and staff 
was Centrelink’s Cultural Change Program – an integral part of the Welfare-to-Work roll-out.  
Politically it commenced with the Work First policy launch in August 2005 at the Australian 
National Museum.  Marketed as the ‘Big Day In’ it was broadcast live across Centrelink.  
Hockey addressed Centrelink staff in military terms: 
 
You’re the corporals and sergeants out in the field who are going to help reshape Australia’s 
demographic, and you’re going to do  that by calling on this enormous army of workers that 
have never had the opportunity to work, who in some  cases have never thought about 
working and who in other cases simply don’t want to work. So today is a very important day. 
(Hockey 2005, 3) 
 
Carmel McGregor, General Manager of the Employment, Disability and Education Division of 
Centrelink, picked up on Hockey’s theme in her speech entitled ‘Call to Arms’, urging staff to 
‘keep up referral streams of non activity tested customers’, which had been underway since 
the start of DHS-DEWR campaign the previous November (McGregor 2005). Local 
Managers blu-tacked posters promoting Rapid Connect to the inside of staff toilet doors 
beside the cartoons advising staff to take personal responsibility for their stress levels by 
eating healthy food and exercising (Alex 2006). 
 
As part of its Business Partnership Agreement with DEEWR ‘to drive cultural change within 
Centrelink to support…Welfare to Work’, all operational staff were directed to attend a local, 
three-day training session (DEEWR-Centrelink BPA 2005-06: section 2.3; cited in (ANAO 
2008: 143).  Staggered over a number of months to ease workload pressures, ‘the program 
focused on building the capability of frontline staff in the Working Age Participation Business 
Line and on addressing cultural, change management and core skills’ (Centrelink 2006a: 
100).  Staff ‘workshopped’ how the compulsory turn required new behaviours for them to 
respond effectively to the ‘change management process’ which was about to occur 
(Centrelink 2006a: 11).  On day one they were presented an overhead (see Figure 14). 
According to this pop-behavioural change model: 
 
Denial occurs when we reject or refuse to accept change; Resistance occurs when we are 
reluctant to accept change; the Exploration stage… is the point we are willing to consider 
possibilities the change will bring and what directions this change may take us…[in] the 
Commitment stage we accept change. 
(Scott & Jaffe 1995: 35) 
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Figure 14 
The four stages in the cultural change process 
 
 
Source: (Scott & Jaffe 1995: 35) 
 
Staff were encouraged to discuss the implications of Welfare-to-Work through this model – 
the pre-existing attitudes they had to compulsory programs, what they thought the best ways 
may be to work within them, and how they thought customers may respond in the interviews 
they were about to conduct.  Robin, a JA, remembered the confusion in her workshop about 
this model, particularly to whom it was actually directed:  
 
It was sort of like the seven stages of the grieving process we had talked about at a JETties’ 
meeting once.  Yes![laughs]  I remember some Newstart person asking in the workshop 
whether…it was to do with us or the customers?...And the person from the crowd running 
the session said something like “it didn’t matter” or “wasn’t it both?” something like that! 
[laughs] I suppose they were right. 
(Robin 2006) 
 
This ‘integration’ of the JA-type ‘customer service’ attitudes with some of ‘the more common 
clerical practices’ was considered by a NSO middle-level Manager to be an undiluted 
positive process since it was ‘a bit of the culture merging together’ (Deniz 2006).  Such a 
process was reinforced by other management initiatives, such as staff-of-the-month/year 
prizes for good customer service, Value Creation Workshops between staff and income 
support and the short dalliance with ‘self managed teams’ in the early 2000s.  These were 
NPM measures aimed to garner and regulate the emotional labour of staff and change the 
behavioural characteristics of clients.  However, the extent to which such ‘top down’ 
ideological layerings of contractual-cultural commensurations penetrated and shaped day-to-
day work practices and frontline officers’ perceptions of their roles was quite variable.   
 
For one JA, who subsequently became a Team Leader by the time she was interviewed, the 
extent of this commensuration was palpable.  She commonly applied the same welfare 
Denial Commitment 
Resistance Exploration 
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agenda language when describing her management of staff and her role as a JA.  As a 
Team Leader, she considered frontline staff: 
 
Needed someone to guide them, to steer them, and encourage them to move in the direction 
the government wished and it was a very hard task. 
(Gulzar 2006) 
 
As a JA, she talked about single parents in analogous terms: 
 
The government could see… people need to be encouraged to move forward to…in effect 
counsel and coach people to move back into the workforce… I sometimes found it very 
difficult. 
(Gulzar 2006) 
 
Another JA who had delivered aspects of this training in many workshops recollected that 
staff were often ‘quite negative’ about the Welfare to Work ‘stuff’.  The training package had 
an ‘official spiel’ she was required to read out – telling staff to ‘just deliver’ the government’s 
agenda because ‘we don’t make policy’.  It was ‘obviously…more controversial’ than ‘other 
stuff’ since this was the first time she had to deliver this ‘message’, and so the spiel’s 
purpose was to ‘curtail any debate on the morality or otherwise’ of the welfare agenda.  
Nevertheless, somebody would ‘invariably…for a minute or two…make some comments 
about how they don't agree’ – a practice she supported ‘because I do it myself! Yes’ (Isha 
2006).   
 
A CPSU activist working in a Regional office considered the government’s ‘rank prejudice’ 
against single parents was often articulated by frontline staff as ‘they were somehow getting 
something for nothing’.  She was ‘constantly’ told by compliance officers that ‘they've just 
had another kid…so they can stay on the sole parent pension’.  The government’s ‘logical 
policy conclusion’ was to ‘tighten the compliance measures while withdrawing the support 
measures’ (Ira 2007).  Most JET workers criticised the assorted labour-forcing policies 
imposed on single parents in the 2000s as ‘ruining’ (Alex 2006) their ‘long-term plan[s]’ (Isha 
2006) to ‘get a decently paid job’ (Robin 2006).  One JA, now a team leader, was ‘concerned 
that we will not be having the same opportunities offered to parents…[which] means that 
we're going to have a lower skill level for those parents’ (Gulzar 2006).  Such criticisms were 
made even by those who held highly contradictory general attitudes about the new Welfare-
to-Work measures (see below).  The intensity of workload pressures, and the general de-
skilling which was occurring was resisted through union actions and other collective 
responses. 
 
Union responses to Howard’s welfare agenda 
 
According to a senior state executive, Patricia Scott (1999: 2), Sue Vardon had severe 
concerns that ‘dealing with a historically activist employee union’ would slow down the 
welfare interventionist changes planned for Centrelink.  In the mid-1990s union delegates 
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had officially-agreed time during work to organise and local paid-time meetings were 
regularly approved and held.  DSS offices were closed at 1.30pm every Wednesday 
afternoon, providing an opportunity to hold such meetings.  CES workers had a reputation as 
one of the more militant sections of the public sector, and union density and activism inside 
DSS were both high (Sasha 2006).  The scattered local campaigns to stop the privatisation 
of the CES were greeted with enthusiasm on both sides of the counter.  For example, the 
Stop the Chop campaign initiated by Brunswick CES members in 1996 witnessed a sizeable 
group of clients handing out leaflets alongside staff at shopping centres and outside the 
office.  A 100-strong meeting at the Brunswick Community Health Centre (25 July 1996) was 
attended by nearly half the staff and a significant number of local unemployed.  DSS union 
members had placed ‘popular’ (Daniels & Ireland 1997) bans on the Job Seeker Diary when 
it was introduced (July 1996) as part of a staffing campaign.  Activists remember that 
members did not issue ‘these stupid…diaries’ because there were ‘longstanding political 
bans on…ridiculous paperwork to make it appear that we were forcing people to look harder 
for work’ (Sasha 2006).  The bans were undemocratically lifted in January 1997, when the 
Workplace Relations Act came into force, threatening heavy financial penalties on unions 
and members for taking such actions during proscribed periods.   
 
Membership density inside Centrelink gradually dropped from about 70 per cent in the early 
1990s to hover around 50 per cent by the mid-2000s (Ira 2007).  Because enterprise 
bargaining had split departments into separate industrial agreements, pay scales and 
conditions, the CPSU was ‘vertically’ restructured into national, agency-based units 
(O'Donnell, O'Brien & Junor 2005).  A major casualty was that its state-based democratic 
layer, which had traditionally cohered members and activists during industrial campaigns, 
was abolished.   
 
This flurry of internal restructuring explained the lack of opposition to the draconian Code of 
Conduct provisions in the Public Service Act 1999, which were used promptly by state 
Managers to tightly discipline and divide staff (Quinn 2005).  The decision by National CPSU 
officials that only they could call industrial actions stripped delegates in the more active 
agencies, such as the Bureau of Statistics, the Tax Office, Customs and Centrelink, of their 
capacity to organise disputes through local committees.  While maintaining a viable delegate 
structure in Centrelink was officially a concern for the CPSU (Gepp 2001), this passive 
orientation to Howard’s attacks meant that the debates central to cohering activity and 
resistance in workplaces became bureaucratically distant from local members’ experience, 
so tending to reinforce management ideas and prerogatives.  Consequently, the tradition of 
holding regular local workplace meetings declined well before they were banned by 
Centrelink in 2004.   
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Also hampering union activism in Centrelink was the low participation of women delegates.  
In 2001 approximately 70 per cent of members were women, yet 70 per cent of delegates 
were men (Gepp 2001).  A survey of 133 Centrelink delegates that I conducted in 2001 
found that twice as many men than women were very confident in their CPSU role (Banks 
2001: 6).  Just over half of the respondents had held a local union meeting in the last six 
months, with ‘heavy workloads’ the most commonly cited reason among those who had not 
(Banks 2001: 4).  Women’s feelings of capability in their role was closely linked to when they 
last had a union meeting – those who held fewer union meetings expressed that they had 
significantly lower feelings of capability, whereas no such correlation was found among the 
male delegates (Banks 2001: 13-14).  It was uncertain whether having less union meetings 
contributed to feelings of lower capability or less capability may have contributed to calling 
fewer union meetings.  Abundantly clear was the need for a more active involvement by 
organisers and officials to regularly bring delegates together to discuss the political and 
technical challenges they faced.  Unfortunately this approach became confined to the 
minority of Centrelink Areas where left delegates continued in their attempts to promote such 
a political and industrial orientation.   
 
An early 2000s campaign in Area North Central Victoria to defend a victimised socialist 
delegate was successfully led by local delegates, in opposition to the national officials.  Their 
illegal call for half-day stoppages in the well-attended meetings they organised across 
thirteen workplaces was enthusiastically endorsed by members and resulted in the 
reinstatement of the union delegate, a trickle of fresh members and a rash of local disputes 
led by newly confident activists (Isha 2006).  
 
Poor training in DSS computer systems and the cultural clash experienced by ex-CES staff 
working in Centrelink contributed to more than half leaving within two years. Sasha (2006) 
recalls they were treated ‘shamefully’ by management: ‘some swam, some sunk’.  In a 
sense, local managers deliberately drowned many.  A management campaign to sack 
struggling ex-CES and other staff in one Area ended in the promotion of a Team Leader 
called the ‘toe-cutter’, who single-handedly organised the dismissal of thirteen workers in a 
12-month period (Sasha 2006).  They included George Salib – a bi-lingual ex-CES 
employee.  In his subsequent Administrative Appeals Tribunal hearing (2001) I gave the sole 
supporting evidence against a dozen staff and management witnesses in my capacity as his 
CPSU Delegate at Brunswick CES and Moreland Centrelink.  Finding in his favour, the AAT 
noted they were ‘moved and grateful’ for the ‘insight’ I provided about how the ‘structural 
racism’ of Centrelink had resulted in Mr Salib being ‘loudly told off’ for speaking Arabic at 
work and giving out his direct desk phone number to clients – a common practice in the CES, 
and supposedly part of the ‘one-to-one’ customer service culture being promoted in 
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Centrelink.  His poor ability to cope with the new computer systems and practices of 
Centrelink were ‘common’ among ex-CES staff, and Mr Salib was ‘on the outer’ because of 
poor training – not poor performance.  The Tribunal panel found it ‘distasteful’ that Centrelink 
management had arranged evidence from ‘a large number of…former workmates…to 
annihilate the character of Mr Salib’ – who was ‘well known and respected within the Arabic 
community’.  In coming to their decision about the work practices that Mr Salib had ‘endured’ 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal members were especially ‘disappointed with the attitude 
expressed by Ms Brian [Mr Salib’s Team Leader]…and by the nature of her evidence’.  The 
Tribunal found that Ms Brian ‘should have relieved herself of responsibility for his [Mr Salib’s] 
management’.  They also found Ross Horsfall, the local Manager, had ‘problems… 
integrating…CES and DSS employees’ due to the ‘differing organisational 
cultures…technology and computer systems and…approaches to customers’ and differing 
types of work (see AAT 2001: para. 143, 144, 148).  George Salib received a substantial 
payout but not what he was seeking – re-employment with Centrelink.  
 
Neither the introduction of Australians Working Together nor the politics of Mutual Obligation 
were opposed outright by the CPSU.  Instead the union issued a series of media releases, 
gave some leaflets for members to hand to income support recipients (though as staff they 
were banned from doing so) and joined with ACOSS in 2001 to set up the ‘independent 
inquiry’ on breaching (Pearce, Disney & Ridout 2002).  One leaflet, Senate uncovers money 
for dole breach scam (CPSU 2000b), reported on the discovery made by a Senate Estimates 
Committee that the Business Partnership Agreement Centrelink had with the Department of 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business contained ‘disgusting…breaching 
quotas for the unemployed’.  The $120m funding could be varied by up to 5 per cent 
depending on whether the quotas were met. It finished with ‘We must not allow the 
Government to paint us as uncaring, heartless bureaucrats’ (CPSU 2000b).  However, the 
union’s main worry was that Centrelink was to be privatised.  A Keep Centrelink Public leaflet 
argued for ‘people before profits’ and warned of the privacy consequences for clients if the 
ANZ Bank took over (CPSU 2000a).  Activists quietly handing out these leaflets in the 
workplace reported support for the first argument and bewilderment about the second, as 
most clients thought their records were already available for government departments and 
many businesses (Ira 2007).  Under pressure from left delegates the officials called for 
national membership meetings to be held in local offices as part of this campaign.  Their 
motion highlighted the need for proper resourcing, though a vague anti-breaching paragraph 
was included ‘to allow Centrelink workers to make decisions based on the circumstances of 
individual jobseekers in an open and transparent environment’ (CPSU 2000d).  Sharan 
Burrow, the ACTU President, sent an Open Letter to CPSU Members which called the 
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breaching quotas fracas the ‘Government’s cruel approach to welfare reform’, and urged 
Centrelink to be kept public (Burrow 2001).   
 
Only Members First, the left’s electoral organisation of the time, argued that the CPSU 
should actually oppose the McClure Report (Stephen 2000). One of these delegates (Ira) 
dismissed the ‘moral language’ of mutual obligation as 'stupid, petty, middle-class, small-
minded bourgeois prejudice…it has not found anyone a job’.  Against the government giving 
credit to either WorkChoices or Welfare-to-Work, ‘depending on which day of the week it is’, 
Ira (2007) attributed the lower unemployment rate to the Chinese resources boom.   
 
Through the 2000s, Centrelink staffing numbers continued to be cut, partly due the higher 
‘efficiency dividend’ which had been imposed on Centrelink compared to other government 
agencies (CPSU 2004d).  Basic conditions, such as a rostered 3-hours per week Learning 
and Development time became ‘all but non-existent’ (CPSU 2000c).  By 2005, as flexitime 
was ‘almost gone’, rosters became exactly aligned to opening hours.  Staff were often not 
paid for the 10 minutes required to boot up their computers, check the roster, close their 
computer and reboot another where they were stationed if they were to be ‘up and running to 
see customers’ when the doors opened (Alex 2006).  Because most frontline staff were also 
expected to clock off once the doors closed: 
 
The reality of CSA [Customer Support Adviser] life is you're seeing customers one after the 
other, bang, bang, bang, bang, and the paperwork you're collecting, you're not getting time 
to process because if you let the customer go, the team leader puts another one in front of 
you, and if you keep the customer there to do the paperwork, if you take too long the team 
leader will be narky at you for taking too long.  So the paperwork builds up. 
(Ira 2007) 
 
If cultural campaigns were required to prepare Centrelink staff for Welfare-to-Work, structural 
and industrial preconditions were also necessary.  By 2002, Vardon and the Board launched 
a fight to introduce Saturday opening hours.  Well-respected stoppages by CPSU members 
helped create the conditions for 72 per cent of staff rejecting of the non-union agreement 
management sought to ram through containing extensions to opening days and times (CPSU 
2002).  In the subsequent Certified Agreement with the CPSU (2003a), a compromise was 
reached which extended weekday opening hours in most offices by 14 per cent but with no 
extra staffing.95  In 2004, Vardon’s ongoing workload offensive was backed by the Board’s 
support to cancel all its consultative forums with the CPSU, ban paid-time local union 
meetings, and heavily restrict the right of organisers to enter workplaces.  The Senior 
Executive Service was increased by 20 per cent in the same year to provide the extra state 
management oversight needed to implement the pending Welfare-to-Work changes, while 
                                                
95
 The weekday opening hours of most offices increased from 8.30am -4.30pm to 8am-5pm, except in some 
smaller sites from August 2003.  
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2000 frontline jobs were ‘axed’ (CPSU 2005).  For frontline staff to take on the total load of 
participation work, including the activities previously conducted by the 1300 JET and PAs, 
other work they had done, such as processing claims, needed to be done by others.  ‘Back 
office’ processing centres were set up to deal with this work, requiring a massive relocation 
of staff.  One of the consequences of not resisting the introduction of the new Public Service 
Act was that many staff who had thought it would be difficult for management to direct them 
to work at another site discovered they had lost many of these rights.  Though the CPSU 
lodged a dispute with the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Vardon’s position was 
reaffirmed ‘that there are no jobs in Centrelink – just public servants who are on assigned 
duties wherever and whenever you determine’ (cited in CPSU 2004b).   
 
Centrelink’s campaign to introduce the 2006 Supporting Regular Attendance policy was 
pursued aggressively by local Managers. A CPSU bulletin (2006c), Shoot first, ask questions 
later, detailed examples of how ‘in lieu of commonsense’ a member was forced onto a 
disciplinary Attendance Plan for using two days of carers leave to look after a child with 
muscular dystrophy and another was denied carers leave when her husband was taken to 
hospital with breathing difficulties.  Instead of industrial action, an information campaign was 
launched, which saw organisers and delegates standing outside offices handing Sick Bags to 
members containing advice on their rights to personal leave (CPSU 2006b).  Therefore, 
because wages were traded off against productivity gains, the five Centrelink Agreements 
struck since 1998 incrementally weakened both working conditions and industrial capacities.   
 
Within this context of defeat and retreat, the CPSU’s response to the pending abolition of 
JAs and PAs was technical, apolitical and passive.  Even before the introduction of the 
compulsory Parenting Measure under AWT Phase 1 (September 2003), PAs had begun to 
be mainstreamed into the general office work practices, such as being rostered onto the 
reception counter.  Some of ‘second generation’ PAs recruited in 2003 had ‘no doubt…we 
were guinea pigs’ for AWT and thus expected their role to be eventually abolished even as 
they started (Kelly 2006).  Putting on a mock-official, male-bureaucratic voice, this PA voiced 
her opinion of the gradual entrenchment of compulsion in a very sarcastic tone:  
 
Let's see how it works…I mean, let's not be the bad guys here, government-wise, and throw 
people – well, into sort of work straightaway and tell them that they have to work because of 
this, this and that, because they're on a payment.  Let's just slowly sort of manoeuvre our 
way to this process we are now with the Welfare to Work system. 
(Kelly 2006)   
 
JAs were equally concerned.  However, because JAs had always worked with an essentially 
voluntary program, the turn to compulsion ‘devastated’ many (Alex 2006).  Longer-term JAs 
‘really struggled personally with the changes’ (Alex 2006).  JAs ‘feared’ that that it ‘wouldn't 
be possible’ to work ‘in the same way with the [AWT] changes’ being rolled out in 2003 (Alex 
2006). This general unease and fear the JAs and PAs felt about the future of their roles was 
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forcibly relayed to CPSU officials.  They only committed to publishing an ‘open letter’ to 
senior Centrelink management detailing the lack of response to issues the union had raised 
with lower-level managers which was ‘exasperating a situation where workers are trying to 
decipher Centrelink’s expectations of their roles, cope with increasing workloads and also 
assimilate training for the upcoming AWT changes of Centrelink’ (CPSU 2003b).  Though 
Darryl Alexander, the National Participation Manager, met with the CPSU in September he 
was evasive.  JAs and PAs were no wiser about what they were to do, which single parents 
to work with or even if they had a job.  Alexander’s (2003) only firm view was the Major 
Change provisions in the Centrelink Agreement did not apply, so JAs and PAs had no 
access any redundancy provisions.   
 
A 2004 Centrelink survey of JAs and PAs found little had changed.  PAs complained that 
because of their heavy compulsory workloads ‘we can’t get to the voluntary parents…the 
part of the job where we can really make a difference’ (SRC 2005b: 5).  As for the 
compulsory parents they did see: ‘usually they don’t know why they have to come in…they 
feel that we are trying to get them back into the workforce and many of them are already 
studying and working…they find it imposing as they are busy with work etc.’ (SRC 2005b: 
13).  The only minor concession CPSU ever wrought occurred in the lead-up to JET’s death 
in 2006, when Centrelink agreed to set up a Senior Practioner position in most sites paid at 
the Band 3 level.  JAs, who had been paid at this level, were ‘encouraged’ to apply for these 
positions. Longer-term JAs, who had started their role prior to 2002, had been ‘granted 
permanency’ at this level and tended to be placed in these ‘Senior Prac’ roles to give 
technical support to the Band 2 operational staff.  ‘Acting’ JAs employed after 2002, and 
nearly all PAs, simply reverted back into the generic pool of frontline Customer Service 
Advisers.   
 
Changes to staff practices and perceptions  
 
Under the Howard Government, mainstreaming single parents into the social security system 
(a goal of both femocrats and neoliberals) meant developing tactics to move as many as 
possible onto Newstart Allowance and into the compulsory welfare to work framework.  
Increasingly, JET had become an awkward policy anomaly not just because it worked within 
a voluntary framework but also its very existence as a unique, stand alone program refuted 
the government’s workfare agenda.  JET’s transformation into a compulsory policy was only 
a tactical, stop-gap measure before it was put down in 2006.  However, it was a hesitant, 
politically and institutionally iterative process which took the Coalition Government a decade 
to achieve.  The strengthening contradiction of JET’s relationship with the workfare agenda 
was expressed in the evaluations, surveys and studies of the program which became 
increasingly bereft of any analytical or progressive content.  The neoliberal presuppositions 
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and manoeuvrings which both generated and gradually captured these reports were 
sufficient, once the McClure Report had been accepted, to drop the pretence that any more 
were needed.  Inside Centrelink, as resources for the JET program were gradually 
withdrawn, interview times became shorter and more standardised, and the options for single 
parents narrowed.  At the same time the husk of JET was promoted to staff as the 
ideological exemplar of ‘good customer service’ work practices.  Also a medium term, 
iterative and highly political act, such decade-long tensions were expressed ‘from below’ in 
the practices and words of those employed as JET labour.  However, whenever resistance to 
these constraining practices inside offices occurred, small challenges to the ideological 
repression they generated was also evident.  
 
A case study of alienation 
In recounting their experiences of working in the same offices, two JET Program staff (Robin 
and Kelly) described how their feelings of alienation sharply increased when they moved 
from Site A to Site B.  Site A was an inner Melbourne office with a large indigenous, single 
parent and homeless clientele.  At first glance the description of Site A given by these 
workers seems to accord with a high expression of alienation.  Kelly talked about the office 
being ‘out of control’ where she ‘constantly felt that it was a race against time every day’.  
She experienced ‘quite a lot of violence’ and talked of being ‘pushed out of the way by 
customers’ and being ‘hit by …a computer sort of monitor’.   
 
Robin found the office so ‘crazy’ and ‘really hectic’ that she ‘developed a bit of an anxiety 
thing…for a little while’.  Her desk was near reception, which was ‘awful…with people yelling 
and fights and stuff’.  She ended up: 
 
Making a barricade out of one of those big concertina boards that you can pin things on…just 
to try and stop that energy coming through because you could just feel it.  At the end of the 
day you would be "Err,"[pretends to collapse on the floor]. 
(Robin 2006) 
Kelly reported that management’s power in the office began to collapse: 
 
The management was disgraceful, absolutely disgraceful… No-one had an [Performance] 
Assessment done in years; years, years…four years – and that was just how badly the office 
ran.  The staff ran the office.  Management didn't open the office.  Management would come 
in 10, 11 o'clock.  We opened the office.  We pretended we were managers so we could help 
each other out. 
(Kelly 2006)  
 
Given local managers had a weakened capacity to apply NPM practices or win staff to the 
more compulsory aspects of the government’s welfare reform agenda, the ‘naturalised’ 
welfare market processes Centrelink state managers sought to engender were partially 
dislocated.  Disruptions to work practices created a material opportunity taken up by Site A 
workers to partially redefine how they worked and what they did.  Staff were still ‘helping with 
payments and what not’ but, according to Kelly, they mainly ‘took upon the role’ of ‘band-
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aiding situations’ to address ‘homelessness and domestic violence issues’.  Robin described 
how local staff tried to ‘figure out ways’ to produce ‘stats’ for area management without 
putting ‘pressure on the wrong people’ – that is, the staff.  Instead of doing large numbers of 
long interviews to generate performance figures: 
 
We had to get crafty…We used to do things like we would look up customers that we knew 
were working…and we would ring them up and have a chat to them…and ask them, "Do you 
want to join the Job Network," and things like that knowing full well that they probably didn't, 
and we weren't going to have to take up too much of their time. 
(Robin 2006) 
 
Time saved this way was often spent ‘catching up’ with clients not wanting to come into the 
office (or banned from doing so) and developing personal connections with staff from other 
agencies in the locality: 
 
Outreach which was really good; good to get out of the office and have a chill-out, to get to 
know the people you were ringing up at the services and so you could recommend someone 
to a client and say, "Look, they're great.  This is what they do."  You know, done it, met them, 
this is how you get there – you know, people have a lot more faith in you when they know that 
you have been helping other people.  You can pick up the phone; they see you picking up the 
phone and say, "Gidday," and have a quick chat to whoever you are calling and catch up 
before you organise their business for them and it makes them feel really comforted, you 
know (Robin 2006). 
 
Because of the chaotic work environment at Site A, the self-initiated practices that frontline 
staff developed countered some of the more Taylorised processes produced and enforced in 
some other offices.  In collectively counteracting some of the material generators of 
alienation, a closer working relationship tended to be forged between the officers at this site.  
Kelly talked of high morale among staff and recalled ‘we spent many a day or night, even on 
a Monday night at the pub, sort of debriefing, if you will.  It seemed to be my only outlet at 
the time’ (Kelly 2006).  Robin remembered that the office was ‘really vibrant…I loved it…the 
people that worked there, they were all crazy, and we drank really hard, as a way of 
coping…people really pulled together’.   
 
These connections and disruptions opened a certain space for frontline staff to discuss not 
only how they would arrange their practices but also the ideological content of their work.  
Because the division of labour between JET workers and other staff was somewhat less 
acute at Site A, and the social connections often stronger, the issue of when or even if to 
apply Centrelink’s compliance policies had a greater resonance.   
 
Kelly gave an example of how she ignored some aspects of Centrelink policy in her 
interviews.  She used three voices – a neutral one, a voice of the client, and a coercively 
‘officious’ voice:  
 
Because it's not payment related, people are quite comfortable to disclose many personal 
things, and that could be in relation to a marriage-like relationship.  "My partner who lives with 
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me."  "Oh, bang! Trigger! Here’s a MLR”96 in perhaps all situations or ‘Let’s tip off the 
fraud investigation team!”  “Oh, and also on top of that I've got a business from home.  I'm 
doing hairdressing from home, getting cash in my hand."  Those things, once again, I'm not a 
police person…so I turned a blind eye religiously to that.  I suppose that would be like 
somebody is telling me that they're on a Centrelink payment and getting cash in hand.  Once 
again, I don't want to hear that in the sense, "What you do in your backyard is your business”. 
(Kelly 2006) 
 
Robin would also ‘work on’ other staff who acted as a ‘police person’ especially ‘if they're 
running off at the mouth and being nasty about a customer’.  One of her tactics of winning 
staff away from the breaching rules was by using ‘expert rules’ to re-humanise the client: 
 
I just always try and put it into perspective or just to try and give them a different outlook and 
just make them just take a step back and – you know, like I'll see someone… will have a really 
aggravated customer and then they will ask to speak to their Personal Adviser and the CSO is 
happy to palm it onto us to fix but then they're annoyed too.  We get the customer and I'm 
happy and smiling at the end and we're able to say, "Look, there were some questions you 
didn't ask.  You were just trying to deal with this breach or what have you, but you didn't really 
find out why and what was happening for that person, and you were being a bit harsh with 
them and so they just didn't want to tell you that there was a problem, and obviously if they 
told you things were being" – so I still and try do those things. 
(Robin 2006)  
 
The recollections of these PAs about the internal challenges to compliance and breaching 
which occurred at Site A provides a necessary corrective to research conducted by Cosmo 
Howard (2006), which rightly identifies that the 2002 Pearce Review resulted in some 
softening of the Government’s breaching regime, particularly the decision to impose a third, 
eight-week non-payment breach would now require further authorisation, usually from a 
Social Worker.  However, when Cosmo Howard interviewed frontline staff at the same inner 
Melbourne office where these two frontline staff worked, his bald conclusion was: 
 
One of the effects of this new approach was that it encouraged Centrelink staff to regard non-
compliance as a possible consequence of an inability to comply with the rules…splitting up 
the singular view of the recipient as a calculating cheat 
(Howard 2006, 145, my highlight).   
 
In siloing political opposition to the harsher effects of workfare to the actions of one section of 
the Australian intelligentsia, Cosmo Howard reifies Centrelink staff as politically inert and 
non-specific.  The experiences described by two who worked at this site illustrate that it was 
actually Cosmo Howard who clung to such a ‘singular view’ about these staff.   
 
When Kelly and Robin were transferred to Site B, a seemingly more stable workplace, both 
recounted a heightened experience of alienation.  Kelly initially felt it was like ‘an absolute 
holiday’, walking through the doors ‘with my hands up in the air like I was in…Chariots of 
Fire’.  It was ‘fabulous’ that ‘customers aren’t saying, "I want to see ‘Kelly’, can we see 
‘Kelly’," blah, blah, blah, blah”’.   
 
                                                
96
  A Marriage Like Relationship form given to single parents suspected of being in a relationship 
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But she soon found the ‘atmosphere’ to be ‘like a morgue’ because it was dark, staff were 
segregated and ‘I wasn't able to chat’.  She talked about the minimal natural light, describing 
the alienation she witnessed: 
 
People's faces have changed, like, expressions on people's faces…they might seem pasty or 
they might be red in the face or they look very stressed and agitated.  It's very obvious.  It's 
extremely obvious.  People talk secretly more than not.  Being a stress contact officer, I have 
also have had various individual cases of how people feel and not being heard is one main 
aspect; not being heard; not being treated as an adult or as an individual…The team leader 
level I think they are being bombarded by higher management so I don't necessarily believe 
that it's at their level that they are, you know, making the rules or – I think there is just – 
someone is, you know, hip and shouldering somebody else and hip and shouldering 
somebody else and it just goes down the line; but the morale is just terrible. 
(Kelly 2006) 
 
Robin used similar, if less graphic terms to explain how, in the ‘big push for stats’ at this 
office, she ‘didn’t give her all any more’: 
 
You stopped giving out your number because you didn't want your phone to ring all day 
because you just didn't have the time to talk to people any more.  It was very much about – 
got a profile[an electronic roster specifying the particular tasks to be done broken into 15 
minute sections]; six million JET Child Care referrals to do, you know, you just didn't have 
the time for people any more, so it was just a process thing [long resigned pause].  It's like 
being a checkout and people with their groceries; just get them through, which was sad 
because it really wasn't like that in the beginning. 
(Robin 2006)   
 
Under Centrelink’s enactment of the Government’s Welfare-to-Work agenda in its 
compulsory phase, the commensuration of income support recipients was accompanied by 
an institutional drive which divided staff among themselves, disconnected them from clients, 
split tasks in the labour process to a degree which further robbed them of their human 
content, and generated feelings of bleakness and ennui.   
 
Kelly thought both offices sites were violent but ‘the violence is different in the way that it's 
acted out’ at Site B: 
 
I have been mugged before, I have been at knifepoint before, and I've lived overseas when 
the former Yugoslavian war broke out and I lived on the border of Austria and the troops came 
over to the border so I've been around that sort of aggression, violence, tasted war to a small 
degree, but each situation was quite unique in itself and each reaction is as well.  When 
you're in your own country and during your own working environment sometimes you just feel 
that you are safe because you have people around you that know you and can support you, 
but as I've found out in the past, that's not necessarily so because sometimes people just tend 
to ignore the situation as opposed to come to someone's aid, and that's something that I can't 
change personally.  That's just the fear of the work environment that we live in and we are in. 
(Kelly 2006)   
 
Articulating her lived experience of alienation through deploying visual language, how 
‘people’s faces have changed’ and physical rhetoric of the ‘hip and shouldering’ which was 
occurring, this PA elicited feelings of dread (a ‘morgue’-like office) and hopelessness (that’s 
something I can’t change personally’).  Both resisted these pressures through taking union-
connected roles.  Kelly became one of Site B’s stress contact officers to support staff and 
continue to have semi-politicised discussions.  Robin became an active local union delegate. 
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Social liberals such as Cosmo Howard and those further to the left who hold to the politics of 
‘socialism from above’ (Draper 1966) tend to marginalise, even dismiss, the small instances 
of workplace resistance this thesis consistently seeks to identify.  Such fleeting scraps of 
Gramscian ‘good sense’ are too readily considered weak and inconsequential to the bigger 
frame of politics that reformists rightly observe dominates and prescribes daily life.  
Prescription, however, is not proscription.  Despite an increasingly coercive workplace, which 
eventually destroyed programs like JET, each oppositional act, however small, remains (as it 
has for over a 100 years) the yeast to build unions in the workplace (see Kuhn and O’Lincoln 
1996).  A daily reality confronting union activists is how to recognise and respond to an 
organising opportunity.  Reinforcing the tendency for reformism to blunt recognition and 
response to these openings from below is the deadening bureaucratic understanding of this 
reality by trade union officials (Cliff 2002).  Social liberal academics intellectually undergird 
an overly passive, top down misrecognition of what political possibilities and industrial 
difficulties confront workplace activism. 
 
Tropes of autonomy 
As JET’s Accord-mediated legitimation aspects moved into sharper contradiction with the 
1990s neoliberal turn in the state-capital elaborations of social policy to further accumulation.  
JA’s practices, and their perceptions of them, expressed these different and growing 
tensions through their sense of autonomy.  This is not to argue that this was a smooth or 
inevitable process at either the program or practice level.  JET’s institutionally congealed 
Accord-derived elements had a continuing influence on how it was delivered, and how it was 
perceived it should be delivered, up to the time it was abolished.   
 
JAs recruited mid-way through the program considered their sense of autonomy was derived 
through maintaining the operation of JET.  Outreach gradually declined and what did occur 
tended to build on established relationships rather than creating new ones.  Initiatives were 
still taken, but they tended to be organised by NSO rather than from below.  A greater focus 
started to be placed on simply processing parents through the program as JAs became ‘too 
busy’ with interviews five days a week as a new automated letter system resulted in their 
being ‘inundated with people’ (Jessie 2007).  By 2000 not only had outreach essentially 
finished, the factory rhythms of Centrelink practices were starting to impose a ‘cattle’ 
processing framework around JET. JA numbers had been increased to 120 and a record 
61,000 voluntary JET interviews were conducted in the 1999-2000 year (Newman 2000a).   
Isha, a Centrelink officer who started as a JA in 2000 considered her work had a high degree 
of autonomy as it was ‘extremely flexible, extremely creative, with how you can actually 
administer the program’.  Yet the practices she talked about expressed the changing 
commitment to, and understanding of what JET was, compared to the longer-term ‘Jetties’.  
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She had noticed that a JA vacancy had arisen which required no interview, a higher pay rate 
and a ‘really easy one page’ application so she thought ‘what the hell, I'll chuck it in’.  It was 
a job she ‘really liked the idea of doing’ since in her previous involvement in single parent 
group seminars ‘we would deliver a spiel on the JET Program and also get them to fill in 
these questionnaires to review their circumstances and we were able to get the whole lot 
done together’.  If they did not attend this seminar their payments were suspended, even 
though JET was a voluntary program at that time. This more corporate attitude to compelling 
and bulk processing single parents, rather than working in the earlier, far messier, JET 
tradition of detailed, individualised and iterative interactions with a client was carried through 
once she took up the JA role.  Isha dismissed JET as a ‘feel good sort of program for staff 
members’ and thought single parents would ‘find other ways to do stuff that they needed to 
do…even if the JET Program wasn't there’.  Therefore JET was not very ‘substantial’ 
compared to the ‘Welfare to Work type of strategy’ since the ‘goal was to help them do what 
they wanted to do, not really help them get back into work if you know what I mean’ (Isha 
2006).  
 
The Centrelink board’s commitment to roll out the institutional aspect of the government’s 
‘broad, integrated reforms’ in welfare delivery meant that Vardon’s campaign began to chip 
away at both JET resources and earlier ideology.  The annual $40,000 discretionary training 
budget each JA had to reimburse clients for courses not able to be funded otherwise was 
halved in 2001 (see Table 4).  Their financial delegation was removed in early 2006, 
restricting JAs to a similar range of pre-funded programs accessed by other staff (Hamilton 
2006; Isha 2006).  Labour time became increasingly focussed on interviews and away from 
community and agency engagements.   
 
However, the government’s attack remained contradictory and hesitant.  JET Child Care Fee 
Relief remained a durable and primary feature of the program until JET’s final year.  If the 
time limits placed on JET-funded childcare for working single parents (26 weeks) were 
construed as a partial defeat in the first few years of the program (compared to the virtually 
unlimited subsidies for study), by the time JET was operating within the Welfare-to-Work 
dominion of the 2000s it was this contradiction, more than any other, which provided a 
significant source of resistance to neoliberalism’s ‘work first’ welfare hegemony.  Education, 
training and other non-work activity continued to attract child care subsidies of up to 8 years 
until the Howard Government finally restricted these to a maximum of 12 months in 2006.  
Until then, therefore, the NPM campaign for clearly defined work outcomes tended to be an 
abstraction that cut little ice among most JAs.   
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In the late 1990s, before the publication of the McClure Report’s recommendation that JET 
become a compulsory program, the effect of Vardon’s and the Board’s NPM Welfare-to-Work 
campaign among the ‘autonomous’ JAs was only beginning to be understood.  The structural 
bias towards education and training within JET continued to shape general practices and 
perceptions.  What gave JA’s awareness greater specificity were their attitudes to JET’s 
‘philosophy’ and their overall relationships with other staff.  The initial political underpinnings 
of JET’s legitimation contradictions meant that the politics of the JAs themselves had a 
important bearing not only on how they perceived what JET’s purpose was, but their role in 
delivering it.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s there were rarely overt political arguments 
about how JET was changing.  Rather, in recounting of their area-wide three monthly 
meetings, a political division can be discerned between those who were seeking solidarity 
with each other and their clients as their budgetary and administrative space for autonomy 
shrank, and those who supported the changes.   
 
Previously, long-term JAs such as Geoff Hamilton had operated with an autonomy where 
‘you were the judge’ about which courses to fund.  Implicit in the apparently apolitical 
examples he gave was his broad commitment to the ‘velocity, the background, the history, 
the politics’ of JET supporting single parents seeking ‘non-traditional’ employment.  For 
Hamilton’s feminist political allusions not needing to be openly stated during the interview 
required that I be complicit in understanding this was his political intent.  For example, he 
recounted approving a single parent to undertake an accredited snake handler course at a 
wildlife sanctuary – which secured her a job as a council snake catcher in the Mansfield 
area.  He contrasted this with an instance he ‘regretted’ – ‘knocking back the $500’ for a 
parent seeking to do a henna tattoo course.  This single mother eventually borrowed the 
money from her grandmother and established ‘quite a business as a henna tattooist’.  By 
giving this self-deprecating example of making a ‘really bad decision’ Hamilton was making a 
salutary argument for JAs to be politically alert against stereotyping what work women 
should be expected to do.   
 
By the early 2000s, however, as Centrelink state managers eroded the practical and 
ideological bases for JET autonomy, political commitment to resist this required JAs to act 
collectively to keep the ‘velocity’ of the program centred on its original aims.  The $40,000 
yearly budget each JA had (which only ever amounted to about 80 parents a year being 
funded) had been centralised into an Area account before it was soon reduced.  Because 
each JA had access to this fund until it dried up it was in their three monthly Area-wide 
meetings discussion often occurred about what courses justified funding.   
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Some arguments centred on the administrative pros and cons of funding expensive nail 
technician, beauty therapy or hairdressing courses which many single parents thought could 
give them ‘a quick fix’ (Gulzar 2006).  ‘Sides were taken’ in these debates, which often 
became openly political (Cameron 2006).  Like Hamilton, Alex showed respect for the 
feminist grounds of the program’s intent:   
 
You could come to a meeting and say, "Oh, I've got someone who absolutely wants to do 
clowning.  She has got a history of domestic violence and history of taking anti-depressants 
but she's nearly over all that and she wants to do something that gives her confidence.  It's a 
bit out there.  And I thought of clowning and she was really keen on clowning.  Does anyone 
know any clowning courses?"  And everyone would madly research their area and make 
some suggestions so that kind of professional level of assistance everyone was really good. 
(Alex 2006) 
 
When Isha recollected these Area-wide JA meetings, her NPM-type attitudes to JET were 
undermined by feelings of comraderie.  She talked of the ‘feeling of warmth…I've never 
known… anywhere else in the organisation’ and about the ‘home’ JA hosting the rotating 
meeting always baking a cake.  Isha recalled one meeting where she ‘jumped in’ and ‘sided’ 
with a manager against a long-term JA about ‘how a program should be delivered’: 
 
After the meeting the JET Adviser came up to me and said, "You know, [name] sometimes I 
just need to be able to…vent”….an implication was that I should have just shut up, and she 
was right….I sent an email to …apologise…and I got this absolutely lovely warm email back 
from her and it was sort of like we had had a fight and we had just sort of made up and stuff 
like that.  It was quite unprofessional but it was quite a different sort of feeling.  The meetings 
were very much like that…there was a lot of talk about beliefs and about feelings and stuff as 
well in terms of the services that we were delivering to people. 
(Isha 2006) 
 
On the other hand, the political attitude of another JA (Cameron) was to welcome the 
compulsory turn.  She thought ‘the idea that there was something [clapping hands like calling 
for a dog] that was going to bring’ single parents in was a ‘good thing’.  Rather than seeking 
to retain a sense of autonomy from below it was derived from her conception of authority 
from ‘above’ – occupying as she did at the time if the interview a class contradictory Regional 
Manager’s role.  Her political commitment to the government’s welfare agenda was reflected 
in her derisory attitude to the JA meetings. I asked her what she thought about the value of 
baking cakes for these meetings: 
 
That was here, not everywhere. In some areas it was more [long pause] business.  Always 
good bonding among the group [using lightly dismissive tone and hand movement], but I’m 
not sure that a lot of our meetings actually resulted in a lot except the opportunity to just share 
among ourselves how we were going and that sort of thing.  We never actually did a lot of 
work here on directions, or raising the profile or where to now. 
(Cameron 2006) 
 
A NPM discourse is evident in Cameron’s attitude to these meetings.  Setting and reaching 
targets for processing single parents into the labour market were more important than 
dwelling on issues about the value of a course for an individual client or how to support a JA 
with a workplace problem she may be confronting.  
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Tropes of commensuration, equalisation, and fragmentation 
As the welfare policy movement to compulsion, pension denial and commensuration for 
single parents stuttered ahead, the practices of JET program workers were internally 
disaggregated, increasingly hemmed in by time and policy restrictions, and gradually 
mainstreamed into the office production rhythms.  By the mid-2000s single parents had 
started to be shepherded into compulsory 5-15 minute ‘interventions’ where most of the time 
was spent reiterating – Groundhog Day fashion, a truncated version of their ‘problems’.  
Under Integrated Governance, Centrelink continued to utilise NPM techniques to increase 
productivity among JET workers.   
 
The two-step, Australians Working Together to Welfare-to-Work political process required to 
fully institute the McClure recommendations created an institutional gap which was filled by 
the recruitment of PAs. (see Table 4)  The 45 months they existed can be considered the 
institutional corollary of this political tactic – a cynical holding operation or half-way house 
between the time consuming work conducted by the more expensive JAs and the faster and 
cheaper mainstreaming of all participation work by frontline staff which was to come in 2006.  
One indication of the political attention to detail was that the breaching provision supposedly 
attached to Parenting Payment recipients from September 2003 never occurred in practice 
until after Welfare-to-Work policies were introduced in 2006.  A JA who subsequently 
became an office Manager recalls: 
 
Look, we endured training for it [breaching]…but the message always from Canberra was “we 
don’t expect anyone will be breached’ and there wasn’t.  And it was made very clear – no-one 
was to be breached…I heard a case had gone up for review [to Canberra] I think it might have 
been from NT or somewhere obscure but I never heard of anyone being breached. 
(Cameron 2006).  
 
Unlike JAs, who had about 600 first-time interviewees as part of their yearly workload, PAs 
were expected to interview at least 1600 AWT ‘target group customers’ per year, of which 
single parents were only one group (Robin 2006).  Towards the end of this period both the 
PA and JA roles were also subject to a dual process of deskilling and skills transfer – where 
the residual quality of their work was progressively reduced and its ideological husk 
presented to frontline staff as their new normative working relationship with customers.  This 
quantitative commensuration of their work fitted with generalising their tasks across the 
frontline workforce cost-effectively, while holding to the ghost of an illusion that this remained 
a ‘customer oriented’ role.  Management wanted all ‘CSAs [frontline staff] to be PAs to some 
level so they would not say that they're closing down the role as such…but they don't have 
the time to do that’ (Kelly 2006).  They also did not have ‘the spiel’ because ‘it's not just as 
cut and dry as like, "So what do you want to do?  I'll put you in a new apprentice program."  
It's about engaging with the customer and talking to them about their needs, their wants’ 
(Kelly 2006).   
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Isha, a JA, argued in similar terms that: 
 
What we're doing now is that we are saying to people in a 10, 15-minute interview, "What sort 
of things do you want to do?"  And we're going to be pointing them into organisations like Job 
Network that is overworked, understaffed, and their entire payment base is around getting 
people into employment; short, sharp 12-month courses; you come out the other end and you 
have got some skills on the computer.  "Thanks, mate, you're in office work."  
 
This went against what Isha considered the primary purpose of the program: 
 
We're not going to be turning out nurses and doctors.  We're going to be turning out people 
who have marketable skills but short-term marketable skills…there's going to be far too many 
people qualified for these mid-level jobs. 
(Isha 2006)  
 
The increasingly repetitive nature of the work practices, the narrowing of the role and the 
shortening of interview times was reflected in the language used by these JET workers.  
Robin talked of how she felt ‘so robotic’ and ‘machine-like’.  Others kept being caught in a 
repetitive cycle of words echoing these new, and more alienated, practices.  Jessie 
described how ‘the  work is a lot more intense, it's a lot harder; you have to work a lot 
harder…the queues get longer and longer and it concerns me that we don't have enough 
staff.  It's just crazy…it's busy, it's really busy, and it's intense and it's full-on’.  Other JET 
workers adopted similar rhetorical approaches, such as Rahat who, when I asked ‘how is it 
at work now?’ replied, ‘how is it at work?  Look – how is at work?  It's getting harder.  It's 
getting very, very harder’.  The effect of these machine-like productive processes imposed 
on their work practices were, therefore, expressed through the staccato-like rhythms of their 
speech – a characteristic of a repressive trope of fetishism.   
 
In the equivalising policy movement to seemingly erase single parents as a welfare category, 
the always historically unstable coherence of JET was broken into compulsory and voluntary 
sections.  In a two-step process the compulsory element firstly enveloped parents with 
secondary school children then enlarged its scope to incorporate those with primary school 
children. JET-work expressed this repressive movement through its disaggregating practices 
coming increasingly into contradiction to its earlier phase.  These material contradictions can 
be found in what JET workers said about their work at this transformative moment in welfare 
policy for single parents. Mediated by this dialectic, their interviews not only passively reflect 
the generic productive rhythms being imposed upon them but also their challenges to them.  
It reflects the fetishising attribute of an economic rationality where the creative labour of a 
JET worker is invested into the object they are labouring upon – a single parents’ ‘work 
readiness’.  JET labour-power producing value increasingly becomes simply a variable 
component of the state-as-capital (Amariglio & Callari 1993: 208-210).  The qualitative 
character of the use-values a JA creates becomes further dominated by an alienating, 
economic metric.  The process of producing her use-value (potentiating single parental 
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labour-power) is increasingly attached to a fetish – that her creative powers are things (skills, 
tools or techniques) which are only personified in the ‘life’ of the object she is producing..   
 
Harley’s discussion about her expectation of the ‘skills’ staff were expected use to ‘engage 
customers’ captures the typical speech genre current in her circles at the time: 
 
That role doesn't necessarily entail a great deal of knowledge in the head.  Can we support 
those people by tools that enable them to be able to access information quickly and easily 
about how they deal with these particular things?  Can we put some parameters around the 
expectations to making people to make that task less –to not this big but really this big? 
[Opening hands wide and then cupping them]  And then beyond that some advice about, 
"When it steps outside of that you have to give it here or give it there". 
(Harley 2007)  
 
Centrelink’s requirement for empathic and emotional ‘skills to engage customers’ was a 
mediated function of the state’s accumulation demand for staff to ‘deal with these particular 
things’ – how to actuate the labour power embodied in the client-as-object to meet the 
‘needs’ of the market-as-subject.  Under neoliberal welfare reform policies the content of 
Centrelink frontline ‘participation’ labour deemed to productively meet such a function was 
‘cupped’ – Taylorised to the singular task of activating income support recipients onto the 
Work First conveyor belt.  Knowledge of all other tasks ‘in the head’ was considered 
extraneous.  Unless an answer could be quickly extracted from one of the tools on the 
system it was not part of ‘that role’.  An understanding of how to process a person’s claim, 
how their payments were affected by Child Support income, what estimate they should 
provide for their Family Tax Benefit or even the ability to accurately process a medical or rent 
certificate were sidelined, as it ‘steps outside of that [so] you have to give it here’.  Yet this 
was always an impossible functional separation in practice as these were the type of 
questions asked in participation interviews.  It just meant that those conducting this work 
came under more stress as they became increasing less competent to act on or answer 
them.   
 
As the tempo of this work quickened, and the participation interviews shortened, the capacity 
for ‘engagement’ (its supposed ideological-functional premise), was reduced to a coercive 
kernel.  The period leading up to JET’s irrelevance was a movement of these functional 
contradictions.  JET workers often articulated these contradictions through the ideas 
generated by their work. These expressed the fetishised forms of thought (tropes of 
equalisation, inversion, repression, autonomy and fragmentation) created by the increasingly 
alienated work they did.   
 
Except for the two staff who secured promotions to local management positions, the 
experiences of alienation recounted by the JET workers in the case example above was 
common among the frontline staff interviewed.  A small number of JET workers attempted to 
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escape the harsher expressions of this estrangement by taking on ‘acting’ Team Leader 
roles for a few of months.  Yet, as Isha bitterly recounted, she found it ‘frustrating being in 
that sort of role as well’.  By 2003-04 the institutional move towards a ‘whole of government’ 
approach was being expressed at the local office level through ‘the catchcry…of “United 
Leadership”’ (Gulzar 2006).   
 
This was likely to have exacerbated Isha’s feelings of being so ‘trapped’ and ‘caught’ that 
she ‘used to have dreams about my head being stuck in a vice’.  She considered that this 
was due to ‘all this pressure being applied from above’ not only to ‘meet KPIs’ but ‘to put 
pressure on my subordinates to do the same sort of stuff’.  The ‘only way’ she could do that 
was by forcing staff stay on reception ‘all day rather than actually having a break from that’.  
Rather than ‘supporting them’ the ‘task orientated’ approach ended up ‘just 
compartmentalising the stuff’.   
 
Isha attempted to argue in leadership meetings that ‘we just can't afford’ to place that 
‘relentless pressure’ of ‘long queues…of people who have been standing’ for long periods on 
reception staff – ‘people have got to have a relief from that’.  She : 
 
I had heard her [Vardon] make all these speeches about how dedicated the staff were and 
what wonderful staff members we were and that maybe it was about time that staff members 
were rewarded rather than with just platitudes and the occasional key ring, and stuff like that. 
(Isha 2006) 
 
Isha, who described herself as ‘not being economical with my point of view’, recalled that 
while nothing ‘was actually said formally’, her complaint to Vardon ‘sort of badged me’ and 
local mangers soon returned her to the JA role.   
 
In voicing the fragmentation and repression of the workplace, Isha was also expressing how 
her own disintegration and suppression was only aggravated by this frustrating and futile 
excursion across a significant ‘class line’ in Centrelink.  Her process of disabusing herself 
from the individuated illusion that Centrelink’s harsh labour processes could be ameliorated 
at the Team Leader level led this JA to ‘take sides’, as she put it.  She became far more 
active in the CPSU to pursue a collective response that ‘people have got to have some relief 
from that’.   
 
Morgan, another JET worker, had a similar experience in a Call Centre where she ‘couldn't 
reconcile the managerial side’ with ‘being fair’.  The example she gave was of a staff 
member taking 30 seconds extra in the toilet.  It was not ‘the fact’ that staff knew they were 
they were ‘being checked’ by her which was of concern.  What ‘bothered’ her is that staff 
‘would have to justify’ what they ‘were doing’ to her.  Again it was the demeaning, belittling 
aspects of the job which repulsed her.  
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When talking about JET’s compulsory elements at a general level the JAs and PAs had 
divided views, yet when recalling their concrete work practices they did not consistently hold 
this view and often contradicted themselves.  Isha talked about the move to make JET 
compulsory in these negative terms: 
 
The worst thing that we can do with a program like that is to do what I'll call "wrapping it in 
barbed wire", that if we take those – there are people out there who are already doing stuff off 
their own bat.  If we start talking to them and saying, "We don't trust you to look for work.  We 
don't trust you with being able to be self-motivated.  We believe that the only way that you're 
actually going to do stuff is if we push you". 
(Isha 2006) 
 
Yet when asked to give some examples of her current (compulsory) practices, she 
considered ‘in some ways, to be honest, it was a little bit more fun.  Like, there were some 
customers… I didn't mind going into police mode and forcing them to undertake some sort of 
activity’.  She gave one example of this ‘that I’m actually proud of’: 
 
A couple of my customers who were quite keen on learning the English language, for 
instance, but their husbands weren't keen on them accessing that and I was able to use the 
compulsory aspect of that to force the husband into allowing their wives to go off and do 
English language classes.  I found that quite useful.  I could use that to where I have got the 
customer's benefit…At the offices I was working at, generally people from Greek or round the 
Baltic sort of background. 
(Isha 2006) 
 
Such contradictory attitudes were common among both pro- and anti-compulsion 
interviewees.  Robin was generally opposed because it ‘put everyone in a box…[so] we're 
dictating the type of participation you can do now, you don't even have a choice any more’.  
Yet the concrete difficulties of working with voluntary customers led to her to re-consider:  
 
Sometimes you really tire of spending hours with people talking to them about what they might 
like to do and come out of it and they still have no idea because – well, for lots of different 
reasons and usually because they have no self-esteem or sense of self-worth.  It was nice 
having to push every now and again and you would come up against a challenging activity-
tested person who was just going, "Nuh, nuh, nuh, nuh," and you go, "Well, you know, you've 
got to say 'yes' to something," – and you would get quick results. 
(Robin 2006)  
  
Rahat generally supported compulsory programs for women once their youngest child turned 
12 years old.  She recalled how she used her own circumstances to speak to these single 
parents: 
 
You need to get out of the house.  You need to talk to people”.  I know what it's like.  I was 
climbing the walls and you talk to other mothers and all you talk about are kids, kids, kids and 
you need to get out there and – yes, I think it should be compulsory.  I mean, I had a lady 
once whose youngest was turning 16 and she was working part-time and she was going to 
lose her pension.  She came to me and she goes, "Oh, what am I going to do?"  And she was 
crying and carrying on, and just got upset and – "Well, increase your hours.  They're 16.  
They're not little kids.  They're old enough to look after themselves.  It's time you looked after 
yourself. 
(Rahat 2006) 
 
Yet, as Rahat continued, she started to reflect upon the broader political and structural 
situation faced by single parents: 
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Why do people hang on to this pension, this card?  To them it's their safety net…and I think 
today the way things are everyone is casual…and I think that's why they feel a bit insecure.  I 
remember me back in the 80s and I was never unemployed…but now it's all casual.  I'm too 
scared to go out there and look for work.  If I had the guts I would quit…but it's just getting 
harder…this is the picture that I've got in my mind of what they're saying…in Welfare to 
Work…"Just like shove them, throw them over to the Job Network member and leave them 
there”. 
(Rahat 2006) 
 
Attitudes to compulsion were often discussed through the techniques JET workers used to 
prise open processes which would lead to agreement from the single parent that this was in 
her best interests.  Here the question of what was considered to be productive labour was 
stymied by the compulsory turn.  For example, while most considered they could ‘force 
someone to do something’ under ‘the threat’ of payment suspension, ‘they're not going to be 
open…and receptive to the wording that they get’.  It was in how such ‘wordings’ were 
crafted by JAs and PAs that core aspects of JET work were perceived to be conducted and 
enacted.  Compulsion was therefore considered to be a barrier to ‘get’ this ‘wording’ because 
this stopped single parents from being ‘receptive’.  Any ‘forcing’ onto a course would mean 
‘people who didn't want to do anything about education or training…they're going to be 
resentful of what they're learning’ because ‘they weren't open and receptive to it’ (Jessie 
2007).   
 
Some thought otherwise.  In the post-2003 period when the requirement was for a single 
parent to seek work or another agreed activity for 6 hours a week, Morgan found it ‘more 
daunting to begin with’, but as she got into the program ‘a bit more’ she ‘enjoyed it’ and saw 
it as a ‘positive’.  She found ‘about half…weren't receptive towards the changes’.  Morgan 
saw her task to ‘gain…their respect as a worker…to sort of move them towards different 
thinking’.   
 
Resistance to the compulsory turn took different forms.  Alex talked of watching how an 
‘early’ JA struggled to cope: 
 
She used to come to meetings with a big folder with every single minute from every single 
meeting that they had ever had which…was like a symbol almost of how she felt about the 
JET Program and she would get very distressed and almost not be able to move into doing 
JET in a new way because the way they had been doing it was so effective. 
(Alex 2006). 
 
Robin talked of the need to constantly remind herself that her work was potentially 
dehumanising: 
 
You're having a bad day and you just think, "Shit," you know, you've just been on reception 
and the 20th person that has asked you for a duplicate SU19 and you just think, "This is 
bullshit," and then later on you kind of think, "Yeah, that was pretty crap of me to think that but 
I was just caught up in the moment”. 
(Robin 2006) 
The collapse of JET worker meetings in the mid-2000s meant that collective capacity to hold 
onto the earlier political premises of JET was severely eroded.  Robin recounted a story 
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where she overheard another PA having a loud argument with an old client of hers from a 
previous office.  The more personalised level of assistance which had previously been 
available had started to be erased due to the higher volume of processing work. She asked 
after this parent to the new PA and was told ‘Oh, she's being really difficult.  She's really 
giving me a really hard time’.  Since this client had then rung the Centrelink complaint line 
demanding ‘my old PA’ back the software systems had sent this as an ‘action item’ for the 
team leader, who then asked her to deal with it.  Because this woman’s JET Child Care 
details had not been updated due to the massive workload placed on the new PA, a large 
debt notice had been mistakenly issued, yet the parent was forced to pay ‘because they 
were going to kick her child’ out of the crèche.  The parent’s problem was she had not been 
re-credited for incorrect child care expenses.  Her ‘real problem’, however, was that ‘she had 
rubbed the other Personal Adviser up the wrong way’.  Once Robin had fixed this up she 
used a Gramscian ‘good sense’ argument with the other PA who ‘was really upset because 
the customer was being really pushy’: 
 
I said, "But you have got to understand she's a single parent.  She doesn't have any money.  
She has paid out hundreds of dollars so that they don't kick her child out, so she doesn't lose 
her spot, because she's doing her PhD and it was really important to her, and I would have 
been exactly the same if I had been in her situation.  It wasn't her fault and she couldn't fix it." 
(Robin 2006) 
 
Robin resisted the repression and fragmentation which generated a fetish that the ‘hard time’ 
the other PA was experiencing in the Centrelink workhouse of 2004 was somehow caused 
by a ‘difficult customer’ rather than how the welfare agenda was wringing the humanity out of 
those on both sides of the counter.  Now more isolated from the collective support of other 
JET workers, Robin kept the memory of the political premises of the program alive in her 
discussions with others as a form of resistance: 
 
So I try and do that all the time, because it's important.  It's important for me to remind myself 
of that so that I don't constantly just have negative thoughts about my customers or – half the 
job is keeping myself sane, but I just try and do it with other people as well. 
(Robin 2006) 
 
It was through such small, everyday political acts that Robin resisted the alienation she was 
experiencing over what was being produced, over the divisive nature of the labour 
processes, and against her own psychic splintering.   
 
JET workers’ opinions about JET’s abolition 
While most JAs supported the program many expressed a feeling of political hopelessness 
that the ‘government had made up its mind how many years ago that everything was going 
to change’ and the ability to counteract that was outside their ambit ‘I mean, we just provide 
a service’ (Robin 2006).  The division of labour caused by the introduction of the PAs 
resulted in some considering JAs passé and to wrongly think that they had a future in the 
organisation.  Gulzar had ‘no idea’ why JET ‘had numbered days’.  Morgan said she only 
  220 
supported JET as a fully resourced and voluntary program, and ‘preferred JET not to be 
there’, rather than the ‘washed out’ version she was working with in 2006 (Morgan 2006). 
 
Mixed responses were elicited when interviewees were asked whether JET’s abolition ought 
to have occurred.  Cameron (2006) thought JET ‘didn’t really have a place in where we were 
going…a lot of people were doing courses that were going nowhere’.  However, she 
admitted that ‘there’s going to be a certain number of customers who aren’t ready – the ones 
who we used to start on a self-esteem course or whatever’. Jessie attributed JET’s death to 
the need for the Howard Government to extinguish a program started by Labor: 
 
The JET Program was introduced by the Labor government and it was the only successful 
program introduced, and the Liberal government had been in for quite a while and everything 
they had brought in, I don't think, was as successful and I often thought it had a political 
overtone to it. 
(Jessie 2006) 
 
Others had sharper insights, agreeing that ‘JET was dead in the water’ by the time of the 
McClure Report (Gulzar 2006).  Alex thought JET’s abolition was a ‘tragedy’: 
 
The opposite to a feminist agenda, an attack on women's issues, you know; not just women, 
but an attack on sort of parents' issues and family issues and an attack on people that are 
experiencing unemployment and things like that so – it's antagonistic to social values, I would 
say, closing down the JET Program, especially when they continue to call it JET and it's 
actually something else altogether.  That's like one of those George Orwell-type scenarios.  
You know, it's almost sinister…It's just terrible. 
(Alex 2006) 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion: JET under Howard 
 
In the mid-1990s, JET was caught in the contradictions of the Australian state revamping its 
competition strategy to boost still low profit rates for most sections of national capital in a 
new period of economic growth and falling unemployment rates.  Single parent pensioners 
became one of the prime targets of the Howard government to utilise fallow labour power 
within the state’s broader aim of leveraging a higher overall rate of exploitation within the 
Australian working class (PC 2008: 8).  
 
JET was one particular expression of the changing political economy of workfare policy 
under the Howard government.  To help meet the state’s economic objectives, the increased 
conditionality and ‘de-pensionisation’ of income support receipt was complemented with 
more directly coercive interventions.  The ultimately aggressive neoliberal attack on single 
parent pensioners initially required a politically cautious and iterative process of legitimation 
by the state to win sufficient public acceptance that workfare was the new default norm for a 
single parent.   
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The history of JET’s last decade was located within the class struggles of a bureaucracy as 
new forms of managerialism began instituting the affective and emotional labour required for 
strenuous welfarism. Among those occupying contradictory class positions in Canberra, 
femocrats in DSS’s Social Policy Division initially resisted New Public Management 
pressures exerted by other sections of the state bureaucracy to reframe JET’s purpose and 
challenge the program’s viability.  This resistance soon collapsed and was replaced by a 
new-found commitment, led by Carmen Zanetti, once a champion for the social justice 
iteration of JET, to implement a workfare activation sensibility into the practices of frontline 
staff.   
 
By the early 2000s, as Australian capital demands for labour intensified, the initial successes 
of these changes in the emotional and affective labour of staff, overseen by a Board 
instituting business rationalities and practices in Centrelink, proved inadequate.  To help rein 
in the state’s rising social outlays (primarily to realise ‘maternal labour’ power), the Howard 
government reasserted tighter political control over Centrelink by abolishing the Board in 
2005.  Greater coercive measures were taken against staff to ensure that the series of 
labour-forcing campaigns Centrelink was directed to mount against those on the other side of 
the counter had more chance of success.   
 
JAs and other front line staff resisted and reflected these Taylorising and disciplinary 
pressures.  The various neoliberal contractual, compliance and cultural campaigns occurring 
on both sides of the welfare desk – against income support recipients and frontline workers – 
often became bureaucratically commensurate.  Public sector union responses to these 
attacks, though stifled by the Howard’s government’s industrial relations legislation and 
changes to the Public Service Act in 1999, failed to take the available opportunities to build 
the political and organising capabilities of Centrelink staff and JAs.  Within an overall context 
of defeat and retreat, the industrial passivity of the CPSU leadership reinforced the idea 
among JAs, PAs and other front line workers that JET’s abolition was inevitable.  Worse, the 
officials’ political acceptance of the program’s demise strengthened the reactionary notion, 
held by a significant number of staff, that JET’s destruction was desirable.    
 
The final chapter evaluates the significance of applying marxist concepts and method to 
historically investigate the political economy of workfare through a case critique of JET, 
before concluding with some proposals for further research.   
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5 
 
Conclusion: JET, workfare & marxism 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Emerging out of this first historical examination of JET is a new appraisal of Australian 
workfare.  The evaluation below highlights the research significance of the study’s inquiry of 
the program in the political economy of Australian neoliberal welfare ‘reform’, noting the more 
significant methodological and conceptual consequences of applying a marxist critique to 
investigate a state workfare policy.  Doing so raises a range of provocations to those within 
the Australian academic left, trade union movement and welfare industry who primarily treat 
the politics of welfare policy as a state-driven matter of individual desert and rights rather 
than a class struggle in and against the state-capital relation.  Section 5.3 discusses how 
fertile lines of social inquiry open by applying a marxist policy critique of current Australian 
state accumulation and legitimation strategies, recognising that to strengthen such inquiries 
requires further theoretical development within this tradition.  
 
 
5.2 JET: summary argument 
 
Confronting this project has been the standard research hurdle to viably bring the chosen 
theories into play and to link these concepts to the empirical investigation at hand.  The 
thesis proposes that to critically analyse the historical movement of welfare policy requires a 
dialectical engagement with its alienated economic and political character.  Marx’s method is 
used to capture changes in JET within the dynamics of its wider social reality, using a range 
of related categories (such as totality, contradiction, mediation, quantity/quality, and the 
negation of the negation) to carry the study’s arguments about Australian workfare and 
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society.  A Marxist investigation into state policies requires a method of discerning the 
complex properties of state policies as a whole at the different levels of abstraction.  Social 
policy may be deductively investigated using a set of categories to discern their immanent 
unfolding from simpler to more complex determinations and concrete levels of abstraction.  
Further, Marx dialectically connects such deductions with a strategic, inductive introduction 
of new determinate categories to historically situate and theoretically develop his critique of 
the capitalist mode.  
 
The central contention structuring this thesis is that state social policy is, in part, an aspect of 
the capital relation.  The semi-autonomous state does not only politically mediate capital 
accumulation but is an active collective capitalist entity materially enmeshed in determining 
capital accumulation at the national level.  Writers within the classical marxist tradition offer 
sufficient inter-linked methodological, conceptual and political resources to apply Marx’s 
method and categories, at different levels of abstraction, to analyse the social relations of 
social policy: the economic and political character of the relations between nation states; the 
state and capital; the processes of policy production; the policy labourer and her products.   
 
Marx recognised the necessity to integrate the state into an economic critique of capitalism.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, I adopted the positions taken by Harman and Callinicos (who draw 
from the tradition forged by Bukharin, Luxemburg, Grossman, Kidron and others) for such a 
critique.  In the contemporary competition to accumulate capital both authors apply Marx’s 
method to strategically position a new determination in the movement of value – the state-
capital relation.  The complex contradictions of this relation are primarily of a relatively 
independent nation-state that acts in its interests and those of national capital to compete for 
political power and capital accumulation against other national state-capital relations and 
classes.  The state’s contradiction of competing to secure local capital accumulation and 
defend its relative autonomy continually differentiates the state-capital relation by economic 
crisis and boom, geopolitical competition and class conflict.  The legitimation and 
accumulation strategies deployed by states express these tensions.  As a consequence, 
states, and state policies, take economic and political forms.  Socially mediating agency, 
these determining and determined relations, whether realised or potential, are not separate 
factors of capitalism but relations featuring capitalism’s differentiated totality in historical 
movement. One key analytical resource for effective social policy research is to investigate 
how social relations may feature aspects of broader, contradictory tensions in the state-
capital relation.  This approach simultaneously allows social policy to be non-reductively 
integrated into a critique of capital while politically defending any economic gains accrued by 
the working class against the state-capital relation in the form of the ‘welfare state’. 
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Social policy, conceived as a dialectical aspect of the state-as-state in relation to the state-
as-capital, requires a connected analysis at different levels of abstraction.  At a global level 
the economic character of a state’s social policy becomes a significant dimension in the 
inter-state struggle to accumulate national capital.  Systemic pressures are exerted on a 
state’s social policy political-economic interventions to be competitively productive for 
national capital.  Contemporary social policy theorists who consider that they are following 
Marx, in arguing (as Marx did) that state expenditures are unproductive expenses of 
production, are wrong on two interconnected counts: an initial misapplication of Marx’s 
method leads to a subsequent misunderstanding of how the state has become a key 
economic aspect of capitalist competition in the last century. By only employing a one-sided, 
deductive method the appearance that state social policy outlays are unproductive for an 
individual capitalist becomes a simplifying abstraction isolated from an inductive recognition 
of the essential economic character of these expenditures at a more concrete and complex 
level of abstraction.  As an historical consequence of the interaction of an individual capitalist 
as one of ‘many capitals’ struggling to accumulate, the state acts, in competition with other 
national economies, as an über capitalist for this collective by the national provision of 
commodities (fit, educated and sufficient labour power) and regulating commodity exchange 
(the legal framework and bureaucratic organisation).  That is, the dominant economic role of 
state social policy interventions to productively supply and maintain labour power is not only 
an internal precondition for national capital accumulation but vital for international 
competitiveness.   
 
In Chapter 2, these propositions are applied at a different level of abstraction to challenge the 
deductive simplification that the state workers only produce use-values.  Though theoretically 
underdeveloped, I logically contended that the productive character of social policy for 
national capital in general occurs within the state apparatus in the labour processes of 
maintaining or increasing the value of labour power, not just the use-value of labour.  
Drawing on Carchedi and Harman to situate market competition as only one dimension of 
contemporary capitalist competition and accumulation, the collective labour of state social 
policy workers (as the variable component of the state-as-capital) is construed as a 
productive aspect of the broader social processes (not immediately connected to the capital 
relation) for producing, reproducing and realising labour power.   
 
A more nuanced understanding of the social policy workplace emerges as an expression of 
the accumulation (state-as-capital) and legitimation (state-as-state) contradictions in the 
state-capital relation.  Firstly, they are analytically separable. On the one hand, social policy 
labour is necessarily unproductive (at a systemic and national level) when ideologically 
involved in shoring up the political legitimacy of the state (whether this takes a directly 
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coercive, social democratic or other forms) or ideologically promoting broader social relations 
of exploitation and oppression.  On the other hand, social policy labour may be systemically 
and locally productive, particularly when involved in furthering national capital accumulation 
in the production of labour power supply, training maintenance or reproduction.   
 
Secondly, the productive and unproductive aspects of social policy labour form a 
contradictory unity.  As an aspect of the state in the capital relation, the economic and 
political contradictions of state social labour are a unity of its productive-unproductive 
character.  Marx’s critique of capitalist ideology becomes a powerful theoretical tool to 
connect the state’s economic processes of policy production with the state’s more 
immediately apparent ideological legitimation processes.  The state-as-capital’s productive 
relation with social policy labour power tends to ideologically personify both the policies and 
the products produced in the name of these policies through an abstracting process which 
simultaneously represses, splits, alienates and dematerialises the social relations and 
character of those producing social policies.  This productive, fetishising relation is 
destabilised inside the social policy workplace by class conflict and also by the state-as-state 
defending in its relatively autonomous role against other states, fractions of capital, and the 
broader working class.  Voloshinov (1987) and Wayne (2003) provide theoretical resources 
to empirically analyse the contradictions of social policy production through its ideological 
effects.  Though the tentative results of applying these theories in this research are mixed 
and unfinished they nevertheless highlight their underlying potential for social policy inquiry. 
 
This study’s understanding of social policy production as particular expressions of the 
contradictions in the state-capital relation frames its historical inquiry.  Competition between 
states, capitals and classes unify the contemporary contradictions of global capitalist 
accumulation into spatially mediated and historically dynamic military, political, economic and 
social tension.  Within the state-capital relation, competition produces state policies to further 
accumulation for national capitals and drives a state to secure itself against other states and 
classes as a political entity appearing to act in the national interest of all.   
 
Marxist theories that conflate or separate this uneven relation reduce the ‘political sphere’ of 
welfare merely to the state.  They either reify politics into some black-boxed condensation of 
class forces or reduce the political to a sociological matter of empirically analysing the rule of 
a privileged network of senior state actors.  In contrast, theorising the realities of welfare 
politics within a classical marxist tradition brings the agency of state workers (as part of the 
working class) into conflict with these state-centric reductions.  It is within the more dominant 
economic dynamic of the state-capital relation that the political potential for welfare workers 
to exert their class agency is found – in the production relations of welfare.  The movement 
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of value in the dialectic of welfare policy is strategically discerned in the contemporary state-
capital relation.  Welfare policy production expresses the contradictions of the state-capital 
relation, mediating the tension between being productive of capital and politically expeditious 
for the state.  Applying this method of analysing social policy within Australian capitalist 
social relations carefully uncovers the complex, ‘relative and historically specific’ (Ollman 
2003: 142) character of JET.  JA’s micro-relationships within the program come into 
dialectical connection with other social relations expressing this ‘rich totality’ (Marx 1973: 
100).   
 
Historically evaluating JET in Australian welfare policy 
My historical critique of Australian capitalist social relations periodises Australian welfare 
production as three delayed state responses to economic crises, with a fourth unfolding at 
present.  These waves of Australian social policy were analysed as relationally unified 
aspects of the economic (the subsumption of family for stable male, then female, waged 
labour); the political (state ‘social wage’ mediations to enhance accumulation and strengthen 
the state within global imperialism); the military (boosting population to ‘defend’ the nation 
state); and the ideological (through notions of race and family).  The first two rafts of policies 
for a family wage (the Harvester judgement, Maternity Allowance and the Age Pension after 
the 1890s Depression; Child Endowment, Unemployment Benefit and the Widow’s Pension 
after the 1930s depression) had the accumulation purposes of stabilising male waged labour 
and increasing the population.  It was a mediated ‘vertical’ response to the reformist wing of 
the labour movement (met with some early stiff resistance from employer and conservative 
women’s groups) and a geo-political response to the racial and military defence of the nation 
state.  It is at the interstices of these contradictions and mediations that policies in both 
periods reinforced the ‘punishing’ of single mothers for undermining these accumulation or 
legitimation challenges (contributing to the ‘race suicide of the nation’ prior to Federation or 
standing in Calwell’s way of building a big White Australia) while ‘protecting the child’ to help 
meet these state-capital competitive goals.   
 
My study illustrates how the tendency of the state’s increasing economic weight in the 
national capital relation intensified its political struggle to cost-effectively manage and 
restrain the necessity of rising productive and unproductive social outlays.  State responses 
to the 1970s economic crisis furthered the subsumption of the family into the accumulation 
dynamics of capitalism (intensifying since the 1960s through the rise of women’s waged 
labour) leading to new mediations and conflicts within the bureaucracy, and between the 
state, capital and labour.  The failure of the Whitlam and Fraser governments to stabilise 
high profit rates opened an ideological battle in the 1980s about what state policies might 
best constitute the ‘national’ interest.  Left leaderships in the ALP, the Communist Party and 
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sections of the trade union bureaucracy gained sufficient support (or at least silence) from 
various conservative Labor politicians, state managers and elements in the ruling class to 
promote what seemed one of the few coherent ideological responses to this crisis – the 
Active Society.  In re-energising state policy interventions to boost Australian competitive 
advantage this new iteration of nation over class struggle intensified a market morality in the 
workplace urging greater individual effort to improve skills and employability in the 
workplace.  As a reformist conception of ‘activation’, it contributed to a political undermining 
of earlier militant notions in workplace leaderships and sections of the trade union 
bureaucracy of how to defend working class interests.   
 
As a response to the 1970s crisis, the Prices and Income Accord and the Social Security 
Review gave policy shape to the political economy of welfare arrangements in the 1980s.  To 
successfully implement the Accord policies to increase productivity, raise profit rates and 
oppose real wage rate increases required a payoff – the promise of a higher ‘social wage’.  
On one hand the idea of a better social wage connected with a political understanding held 
by many union members that state social reproduction policies could historically advance 
their interests.  On the other hand it became an unrealisable undertaking due to these 
officials’ disavowal of their members’ still powerful industrial capacities to actually achieve 
these gains.  Australian capitalism benefited from the Accord in three ways, because it 
succeeded in: reducing real wages; white-anting working class organisation; and, in the face 
of a long-term tendency for state social reproduction expenditures to increase, dampening of 
social wage costs more than had been achieved under the Howard government.  The Social 
Security Review’s intervention into the welfare component of the social wage bargain 
politically mirrored the reformist contradictions of the Accord’s unrealisable promise.  The 
Social Security Review’s rhetoric of welfare ‘activation’ being socially just was always in 
political tension with what the ALP in practice adopted – the OECD’s neoliberal contention 
that to increase labour supply and eventually temper government social outlays required 
compulsory ALMPs (2006: 68).  Investigating the paradox of JET – a voluntary mass 
workfare policy, historically locates its implementation within the political contradictions at the 
heart of the Social Security Review.   
 
JET was a ‘third wave’ Australian social policy – a component of the larger, delayed state 
reaction to the economic crisis starting in the 1970s.  In the flux of the initial years of JET the 
movement from social welfare to workfare policies was highly tentative, while political 
capitalists generally struggled to discover and politically legitimate a substitute for their 
earlier Keynesian certitudes.  The OECD had initially promoted one-off ALMPs for 
specifically targeted unemployed groups.  Internationally, ALMPs remained salami-slicing, 
tactical recommendations for member states until 1994, when a more aggressively confident 
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OECD (2006: 68) cohered them into its Jobs Strategy.  Therefore, Australian state policy 
development of the first ALMPs tended to be politically iterative, selective and hesitant.  
Reformist state responses to the collapse of profitability were not immediately subject to local 
capitals’ immediate demands for extra labour power, compared to those placed on the state 
from the late 1990s.  In welfare policy the high unemployment rates of the 1980s materially 
loosened the relationship between the state’s accumulation and legitimation functions and so 
afforded the Hawke government greater time to garner political support to legitimate the 
workfare strategy it was developing.   
 
For a period in the 1980s, even though the activist base of the social and trade union 
movements was in decline, a political contradiction emerged so that the state was more 
exposed to these pressures.  These movements had influenced the political ideas of a 
generation of state managers (consolidating as a new middle class within the state 
bureaucracy), trade union officials, academics and other policy actors occupying 
contradictory class locations.  Because these movements were in recent decline, it meant 
that for a few short years the state-centric solutions posed and mediated by these layers 
became more prominent in policy circles since a confident, fully-fledged neoliberal response 
to the ongoing collapse in profitability had yet to emerge.  In a period shifting to the right, an 
unstable, shrinking, political space existed for some minor tactical accommodations by the 
state for potentially progressive gestures in welfare policy.   
 
The Hawke government’s social policy response to single parents was to chip away at their 
period of entitlement and mount workfare arguments to gradually de-legitimise their pension 
rights.  While raising their level of poverty, the demographic pressure to further rein in social 
security costs was partially eased during the 1980s due to a temporary demographic 
stabilisation (14-15 per cent) of the proportion of single parent families (de Vaus 2004: 43).  
Operating in this increasingly unfavourable political terrain, the general enthusiasm that state 
and academic feminists had for women’s welfare mainstreaming was fundamentally 
misplaced.  Instead, a stubborn class defence of every current welfare gain should have 
been launched, while continuing to politically argue about welfare’s patriarchal 
underpinnings.  During this period the layer of feminist activists who had taken senior 
managerial positions in departments such as Social Security felt they wore two hats: to 
sharpen the progressive edge (or blunt the reactionary edge) of the realpolitik welfare polices 
state managers above required them to institute; and to politically justify their actions and 
decisions to each other and those in the broader women’s movement.   
 
JET’s early policy politically ‘gelled’ through a contradiction between the program’s social 
justice elements and declining mass movements, reflecting an historical and systemic 
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dynamic.  Various class divisions and connections mediated JET’s production.  The division 
of labour within DSS between femocrat policy managers, regional managers and frontline 
staff was further mediated by the intra-class tensions between femocrat and non-femocrat 
managers, and between JAs and general office staff.  Atypical connections between JAs and 
Canberra-based feminist policy workers in the early stages of JET partially by-passed the 
usual staff-management office conflicts and partially reinforced the separation of JAs from 
the rest of the local workers.  The sharpest class conflicts remained between staff and senior 
management.  They are also clearly discernable at three other levels: between CPSU 
officials and members; between femocrats occupying contradictory class locations and 
activists in the women’s movement; and even between those occupying the same class 
where the extra grade accorded to new JAs was frequently considered by other local staff to 
have placed them on a ‘pedestal’ (Deniz 2006).   
 
Resisting (and mediating) the overtly neoliberal arguments within the bureaucracy in the 
early 1990s to turn JET into a workfare program were two groups – DSS femocrats from 
‘above’ and JAs from ‘below’.  Weakening their potential resistance was a political 
disconnection due to occupying a contradictory class location (femocrats) or an industrial 
separation within the local office division of labour (JAs).  For the latter, DSS’s institutional 
struggle to cope with mass (and rising) unemployment, initially created a further contradiction 
– a strengthening of the voluntary, social justice side of the policy while JA work remained 
centred on a single parent’s non-labour market activities.   
 
The historical tension in JET’s coalface production also appears from the viewpoint of the 
state-as-capital.  The underlying workfare dynamics of the program, even in its voluntary 
period, pressured JAs to sort single parents into ‘work ready’ and ‘other’ categories.  The 
‘knack’ or ‘tricks’ JAs talked about to inculcate confidence in a single parent to eventually 
‘sell’ herself at a job-interview expressed the equivalising movement where a JA’s labour 
became quantitatively commensurable, reifying the object of their labour.  However, rushing 
to apply such state-as-capital formative abstractions to grasp JET is both theoretically and 
methodologically insufficient.  What JAs talked about cannot be neatly or even crudely 
categorised as concrete expressions of such a one-sided determination.  A crucial 
understanding of how the qualitative and quantitative are relational aspects of social policy 
production comes through bringing the state-as-capital into contradiction with its other side – 
the state-as-state.  Various vantage points are taken to analyse JET from this angle.  For 
example, Gulzar’s comment ‘that's what I want to be able to achieve; to help people to 
achieve what they want’ is not merely a socially quantitative, productive expression of her 
fetishised relationship with a single parent but also her own qualitative political and historical 
understanding of what constitutes a JET ‘achievement’.  When JAs spoke of their relative 
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autonomy (‘you pretty much ran your own show’, ‘it was very much on your own conscience’ 
and ‘I was doing it all on my own’), the quantitative dynamics of alienation identified are 
brought into tension with their feminist-social justice perceptions (it was ‘quite a radical 
program’) to analyse JET’s production under Labor.   
 
Implemented at the only time under the ALP that unemployment had dipped below 500,000, 
JET, like Newstart, was the first response by the state to connect Social Security policy 
production directly to the labour market.  Though termed an Active Employment Strategy in 
1991, these ALMPs remained targeted, tactical interventions until generalised across all 
working-age payment streams by the Howard government a decade later.  JET was initially 
voluntary because, unlike Newstart, the legitimation groundwork to compel single mothers 
into work had yet to yield widespread public acceptance and met stronger resistance in the 
women’s movement, especially after the attacks on their rights in the mid-1980s (see page 
114).   
 
Within this fluid, contradictory period the ideas and actions of individuals such as Meredith 
Edwards could prove to be historically decisive.  A political space had opened for femocrats 
to strike a ‘policy bargain’ (Levi & Edwards 1989: 7) with the ALP government about how 
single parent pensioners were to be incorporated into its Active Society agenda.  Feminist 
state managers across the major welfare departments networked together to score a 
significant tactical victory for the social elements of the program.  Having JAs located in DSS 
offices, rather than in the CES (the main welfare to work agency) gave the social justice 
ideas embedded in the program a brief opportunity to be enacted.  The ALP accepted that 
JET was a voluntary and universal ALMP.  Only the social and labour movements, however, 
could defend the reformist promise of JET.  By the late 1980s, the potential role for the 
labour movement to advance welfare demands for working class women was narrowing as 
trade union officials shifted their focus from boosting the social wage to enterprise bargaining 
(Hampson & Morgan 1999: 773).  Within such a context, the bureaucratic manoeuvrings by 
Edwards and others to somehow politically sever or minimise JET’s connections with 
compulsory ALMPs by placing the program inside Australia’s central welfare agency were 
always ill-founded.  The quid pro quo of this tactical bargain was for femocrats to accept that 
the program would have meagre staffing resources and, crucially, that JET Child Care 
Assistance for a single parent starting paid work would stop after 13 (and later 26) weeks.   
 
Understanding how this issue of ongoing subsidised child care was lost (or rather, sidelined) 
partially answers Lesley Lynch’s (1984: 38) ‘big question’ for the women’s movement: was 
the femocratic strategy a ‘healthy’ development or a mistaken ‘accommodation within state 
structures’ (Sawer 1993: 15)?  Given the balance of political forces in the late 1980s, it was 
  232 
always a remote possibility that working single mothers could secure free or even highly 
subsidised child care.  However, raising this core claim of the women’s movement to explain 
what JET could not do – create the opportunity for most single parents to permanently 
extricate themselves from welfare through paid work – was politically essential.  It would 
have clarified the problems with the gender mainstreaming arguments put by Cass and 
Yeatman, and the movement’s understanding of JET’s structural limitations and connections 
with the government’s neoliberal welfare agenda.  Edwards may have necessarily had ‘to 
bargain away the optimum’, but to argue state managerial feminists ‘retained their ideological 
commitments’ she only notes that ‘committed femocrats [in DSS, DCSH and DEET] 
successfully defeated various objections raised by other bureaucrats’ (Levi & Edwards 1990, 
165-166).  Edwards correctly sourced the ‘outside pressure’ of the women’s movement as an 
‘ally’ in achieving femocratic reforms such as JET but she crucially missed testing these 
ideological commitments within the broader women’s movement (Levi & Edwards 1989: 14).  
When interviewed, it was telling that Edwards was unaware, or had forgotten, that JET child 
care subsidies had run out although she readily agreed it was so ‘ridiculous’ that ‘no wonder 
they go back onto pensions’.  At the time of JET’s launch this straightforward argument was 
not broadly understood in the women’s movement of the late 1980s, which ‘continued to 
make important feminist inroads’ (Burgmann 1993: 115) because it was not publicly aired.  
As a result it further weakened the movement’s already diminishing capacity to campaign for 
increasing the rights of single parents against the social justice limitations of JET and its 
connections to the overall workfare agenda.   
 
In this sense the answer to Lynch is that she poses the wrong ‘big question’.  Even for a 
feminist ‘policy bargain’ to be struck, the bureaucratic manoeuvrings between feminists 
occupying contradictory class locations (or even senior state managerial roles) and other 
state managers is far less important than the women’s movement exerting sufficient political 
pressure on both for such tactics to bear fruit.  It was the class contradictions of the 
Australian women’s movement that were fundamentally not ‘healthy’.  A dialectic of 
appearance and essence is discerned in JET’s broad historical movement – from an initial, 
surface perception that the program was socially-just to its dissipation, during the 1990s, as 
its essential neoliberal workfare form became more firmly established.   
 
The apparent success of lobbying for JET to be operated from Social Security offices was 
further reinforced and extended while the department was fully occupied in driving down the 
costs of processing the rising numbers of unemployed.  In DSS the logic of managerialism 
and activation policies expressed a specific contradictory moment mediating the state-capital 
relation.  State managers rationally produced these strategies to ‘legitimately’ minimise the 
state-as-capital’s internal production costs, (re)produce internationally competitive variable 
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capital in the form of welfare-readied labour power, and place further political pressure on 
dampening class expectations for state outlays on unproductive welfare expenses.  Yet 
whatever economic, political and institutional logic state managers sought to further 
accumulation was constantly destabilised by the irrational chaos of capitalist competition.  
Even on its own terms, the idea that Hawke and Howe could quickly roll out this dual strategy 
in DSS was flawed.  Unemployment may have been falling under the ALP government in the 
seven years leading up to these confident welfare industry interventions but because it was 
coming off such an historically high and sharp spike that DSS was institutionally struggling to 
respond.   
 
Welfare’s economic and political tensions are explored at other levels of abstraction in the 
study.  JAs recalled that they had greater freedom to apply the feminist edge, the social 
justice principles, of the program.  Alex, for example, may have abstractly agreed her work 
was to ‘achieve a labour market outcome’ but what made this ‘quite a radical program’ for 
her was ‘the notion that people could take their time to move along their pathway’.  The 
essentially unrestricted child care subsidies for parents who were studying, compared to the 
limited resources for paid work, tended to concretely frame JET work processes and JAs’ 
perceptions of an achievement.  JET work, therefore, expressed the looser relationship 
between the state’s accumulation and legitimation welfare functions of the period.  Many 
drew on the progressive political and historical origins of the program, its ‘velocity’ as another 
JA (Geoff Hamilton) put it, to approach their work with individual attention to the 
circumstances of each single parent they interviewed.  Only a small minority looked to the 
future institutional integration of ALMPs with the daily work of DSS to promote the process-
driven side of the program.   
 
The thesis deploys Marx’s critique of capitalist ideology for its empirical inquiry.  The massive 
workloads imposed on all JAs meant that none could escape the department’s alienating 
factory pressures nor fully resist the insinuation into their conversations of various fetishistic 
tropes, which arose through these state policy production practices.  Because the chaos of 
capitalism, which historically engendered modern states, is systemic, states can only act as if 
their functional splitting of social relations is instrumentally rational, desirable or even 
feasible.  As a collective capitalist, states invert ‘social’ and ‘policy’ into national, goal-
inscribed objects of social production relations.  Within this fetishised logic, social policy (as a 
mediated aspect of capitalist commodity relations) appears real and stable.  In this sense 
JET became a productive thing – an ALMP– which had as its goal the realisation of another 
thing – the latent labour power of single parent pensioners.  Both directly operated within 
social production relations because the work to realise this objective was (in part) productive 
of value.  Producing consumable labour power, like any other commodity, becomes subject 
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to wider economic competitive pressures to increase the relative surplus value of JA labour.  
Hence the fetishistic ideology of capitalism was generated by the material reality of state 
welfare practices. 
 
JAs recalled their discussions with single parents as reified things in ‘speech techniques’ 
(spiels to clients).  Though educationally focused in JET’s early period, these techniques 
became objects brought into play as one of their instruments of the means of welfare 
production.  The divisions of labour inside each office, the industrial gulf between welfare 
workers and those representing their interests, and the political split between the union and 
welfare leaderships of the sector all contributed to weakening the capacity of those 
producing the program from ‘below’ to resist these ideological pressures.  However, 
compared to the analysis of JA interviews in Chapter 4, what is evident in JET’s voluntary 
phase is that these fetish tropes were less discernable and more muted.  That partially 
confirmed the broader historical arguments of the highly mediated political impact of the 
women’s movement on JET and the institutionally marginal nature of the early program 
inside DSS offices.  While carrying onerous workloads, the greater administrative and 
ideological space early JAs had to produce the program tended to materially blunt the 
sharper edges of alienation and fetishised practices they were soon to experience. 
 
JET’s feminist-inclined orientation towards voluntary, long-term strategies for single parents 
to enable them to ‘punch above their weight’ in the labour market, as one JET worker (Robin) 
put it, soon came under increasing attack.  JET appeared as if in contradiction to 
compulsion, to bulk processing into the labour market, to the later, morally charged 
neoliberal euphemism of ‘mutual obligation’.  Yet the early JET had remained historically 
related to its negation – a compulsory Active Society ALMP.  JET may have appeared to only 
operate at the margins of DSS under Labor but its contribution to reshaping welfare 
interventions in Australia was immense, to become epitome of what Centrelink managers 
saw as good customer service.  Deniz, an interviewee, brilliantly (if inadvertently) captured 
JET’s contradictions under the ALP when she called the program its ‘crowning achievement’.  
On the one hand, JET echoed the strength of the earlier women’s movement to seemingly 
secure a fragile policy gain for single parents.  From this perspective JET became the finest 
welfare achievement of Australian social democracy in the 1980s, put by a feminist manager 
(Orion) as ‘Social Security’s one decent social justice program’.  On the other hand, the 
program expressed the contradictions of a decade in which a new state activism responded 
to economic crisis by individualising social justice under the morality of the market.  From this 
view JET became a crown of thorns. 
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The social democratic renderings of the Active Society collapsed under its own 
contradictions as the crisis persisted, revealing what had underpinned it – the logic of 
neoliberal social and industrial policies.  By more clearly inverting what was ‘active’ from the 
social to the individual, greater political space opened for the state to entrench in welfare 
production a more openly compelling agenda of what should constitute ‘market’ activity and 
morality.  The Howard government seized this opportunity.  In its attempt to respond to still 
chronically poor profit rates in a period of economic growth and falling unemployment rates, 
welfare policy became increasingly focussed on cost-effectively ‘activating’ fallow labour.  
This was not simply a narrow attack on the unemployed but an aspect of what Treasury had 
termed the ‘broad integrated reforms’ that the Howard Government enacted to refurbish the 
state’s legitimation and accumulation functions.  Analysing social policy as an aspect of 
international geopolitical and economic competition resists the positivist pull to silo its 
production into a nationalist container and to sunder its political and economic character.  
The economic aspects of mutual obligation are linked to global competition.  Howard, 
Costello and Henry had a far greater clarity of how the politics of the government’s ‘welfare 
reform’ agenda was an economic intervention into the productive centre of an Australian 
capitalism in competition against other states than that held by activists and academics who 
were attempting to resist the agenda.  Welfare compulsion – as an idea and a practice, 
became a key element for the state to ‘squeeze the lemon’ (Howard 2005) of the Australian 
working class.   
 
The accumulation and legitimation welfare drive by the Howard government was a 
contradictory relation between its laissez faire ideology and its activist requirement to boost 
profit rates.  On the one hand the welfare ‘reform’ agenda was a neoliberal attack slicing 
away at the ‘moral and historical’ expectations of social provisioning.  By campaigning to 
raise the normative disdain of the unemployed, services and payments could be more easily 
reduced, compulsion increased, social expectations further lowered and wage demands 
tempered.  By treating deprivation and poverty as ‘pathologies’ (Levitas 1998), each new 
round of political sallies ratcheted up a ‘more intense regime of moral regulation’ (Denis 
1995: 373).  Social cohesion was to be reinforced around ‘degrees of labour market 
attachment’ where one’s duty was to ‘work, to save, to adopt a healthy lifestyle, to do 
homework, to parent in the approved manner’ (Jones & Novak 1999: viii).97  On the other 
hand, the research brings this drive into historical and systemic relation with its opposing 
dynamic – to increase social provision for large sections of the working class, primarily to 
free up more ‘maternal labour’ for capital.  While the economy was expanding it seemed that 
                                                
97
 Coercion was a broad-ranging strategy – there was even a 19 per cent increase in the imprisonment rate from 
127 to 157 prisoners per 100,000 in the decade up to 2004 (ABS 2004b). 
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only attempting to take a too ambitious neoliberal slice (such as the politically fatal decision 
to introduce the too draconian WorkChoices industrial legislation) would be its undoing.  Yet 
rising public expectations of greater social provisioning were also placing increased strains 
on the politics of welfare retrenchment.   
 
JET’s later production expressed neoliberalism’s economic and ideological tensions.  The 
decision taken by the Howard government in 2000 to discursively re-frame a welfare 
payment as the Family Tax Benefit (an apparently non-welfare payment), was a neoliberal 
attempt to increase ‘maternal labour’ while de-centring the essential connections between 
FTB and the Welfare-to-Work agenda.  A similar analysis of the institutional application of the 
term ‘customer’ reveals that the ideological connections that Centrelink managers made 
between staff and clients (as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ customers) demonstrated the Australian 
state-capital’s drive to raise the level of exploitation for both.  The study also uncovers this 
dialectic in the re-branding of Centrelink to have a ‘human face’, showing a neoliberal 
expression of welfare production in a period where ‘cultural change’ programs were 
occurring on both sides of the counter. 
 
The Howard government’s three initial responses were to politically distance welfare delivery 
into private and public businesses, roll out New Public Management techniques and institute 
strenuous welfarism.  By the early 2000s, as capital demands for cheaply realisable labour 
power put pressure on the state to ‘tighten oversight’ (Halligan 2007: 227) of its legitimation 
and accumulation strategies, the Howard government increased its political grip on the first 
two tactics through its Integrated Governance (Howard & Seth-Purdie 2005: 225) approach 
and intensified the third.   
 
Because the primary economic value of ALMPs and neoliberal welfare delivery is in their 
general productive effects within Australian workplaces, these neoliberal changes 
exacerbated an institutional tension in social provisioning.  What was effective service 
provision in a Centrelink with a ‘human face’?  Cheap, poor quality service enhanced the 
productive ‘teeth’ of mutual obligation.  Long waits in queues, endless contacts with a local 
office, delayed payments and frequent suspensions made moral and, thus, economic sense.  
Similarly, what constituted an ‘effective’ labour market program?  Welfare-to-Work policies 
became increasingly coercive as they served the dual accumulation purpose of quickly 
activating different reserve ‘stocks’ to internationally competitive utilisation rates and 
encouraging those already employed to work harder and be thankful for the job they had 
(DSS 1997a: 104).  Destroying the CES and transforming DSS into a public business 
assisted the Howard government in two ways.  Politically, it helped relocate potential 
problems to its workfare agenda onto Centrelink by legitimising the delivery of mutual 
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obligation as a quasi-apolitical, semi-commercial matter.  Economically, it quickened the 
production of workfare-readied labour power.  Because these neoliberal interventions 
remained in contradiction, what had been two highly successful tactics in the late 1990s soon 
failed to sufficiently meet capital’s ongoing demands for labour.  The government imposed 
greater political and administrative control of Centrelink (though it publicly pretended 
otherwise).  At the frontline the pace of work was further increased as the emotional and 
affective labour now required came to fruition as strenuous welfarism. 
 
The earlier welfare labour of JAs was ideologically appropriated by managers and inverted 
into a neoliberal, New Public Management sensibility to meet Centrelink’s mission.  The 
bureaucratically commensurable value state managers saw in JET’s emotional and affective 
labour practices to institute strenuous welfarism across the frontline workforce came into 
contradiction with JA’s still reformist-inflected program-specific practices.  Led by a key 
femocrat from JET’s early years, Centrelink’s ‘main message’ to staff – drummed in by 
various ‘cultural change programs’ – was that their administrative, social wage pay-office 
work now came a distant second in the new race of emotionally ‘engaging customers’ to 
more promptly sell their labour power (Zanetti 1998).  As one Regional Manager put it, the 
‘core business’ of the organisation had expanded so that the ‘full suite of services’ now 
included the capacity to ‘change the behaviours’ of welfare recipients’ (Harley 2007).   
 
Sue Vardon, the first CEO of Centrelink, reflected on how JET was the pivotal moment when 
DSS management realised that its work practices needed to be transformed from passively 
technical to actively emotional and affective labour: 
 
JET was a fantastic innovation and showed that Social Security officers could do more than 
just determine grants but could actually work like the CES did and help people move to the 
next step in their lives.  This was the significant shift.  Through the permutation of the jobs 
and evolution of Centrelink the emphasis was from passive to active intervention.  This was 
the change and more jobs were crafted around that type of intervention. 
(Vardon 2006, my highlights). 
 
New divisions of labour were instituted to ‘free up’, as Vardon put it, frontline staff to take on 
these supposedly more JET-like tasks.  The claims for payments they received were sent to 
a bewildering number of specialised ‘processing centres’ devoted solely to assessing these 
forms.  In part a primitive accumulation drive, in part to maximise exploitation among the 
employed and those on its periphery, the agenda required Centrelink workforce to 
expeditiously produce from a welfare subject an object – viable labour power for the market.  
Such emotional labour meant transforming the organisation from a ‘bunch of grunts’ to 
‘people… more highly motivated…and prepared to take up the opportunities’ presented by 
the Welfare-to-Work agenda (Harley 2007).  Strenuous welfarism inside Centrelink inverted 
apparently clement and empowering notions, such as ‘help’, ‘support’ and ‘motivation’, into 
intimidating managerial weapons used to attack staff.  The alienation experienced by 
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frontline workers became so extreme that when a manager mentioned one of these words 
when talking to a staff member about their work, it usually led to feelings of dread, frequently 
to physical illness, and sometimes to dismissal.   
 
A dialectical movement of quantity to quality, where small changes of degree eventually 
result in changes of type, historically courses through the overall welfare changes under 
neoliberalism and the JET program.  The neoliberal, market-logic of incremental slicing away 
of pension entitlements for single parents throughout the 1980s and 1990s had, by the turn 
of the millennium, increased the political and ideological tensions on their pension category 
to the extent that a sharp, qualitative transformation into the lower-paid, unemployment 
allowance group of social security recipients occurred.  The increasing irrelevance of a JET-
specific program to the government’s workfarist agenda was politically reinforced by 
ministers such as Jocelyn Newman who argued that only single parents not using JET were 
unmotivated enough to need a generalised, compulsory version of the program.  As such 
workfare rhetoric was retailed further down the line by those in contradictory class locations, 
the pace of working life in regional offices, still dominated by payment and assessment 
processes, increased and was transformed into strenuous welfarism.   
 
JET’s generic rationalisation into the compulsory mainstream of workfare programs reflected 
this movement.  Far clearer fetish tropes and expressions of the alienating work processes 
were identified as a JA’s capacity to support the non-labour market activities of single 
parents was financially and physically restricted in the late 1990s, eroding further when, in 
2002, PAs took over some aspects of JET work, and, in July 2003, qualitatively transforming 
with the introduction of compulsory activity requirements.  A JET worker’s capacity to resist 
the dominating rhythms of Centrelink’s strenuous welfarism was strengthened through the 
personal, political and industrial linkages some JET workers made between each other, 
office staff, and the traditions of the women’s and labour movements.  It was also 
institutionally facilitated in those offices where the management of staff broke down due to 
massive workloads.  For example, Robin’s capability to be ironic when talking of new PAs 
being urged by a trainer to think about the ‘qualities that set us apart’ (Chapter 4) not only 
came from her general activist politics but also from the confidence she drew in dealing with 
the collapse of managerial authority.  
 
Changes in the contradictions of welfare policy production were reflected in the perceptions 
local managers and CPSU officials had about the Business Partnership Agreements the 
organisation struck with other agencies.  A key provision in Centrelink’s Welfare-to-Work 
contract with DEEWR to be both ‘systematic and sensitive’ was thought so highly 
contradictory by Harley (an office manager with a union pedigree of being ‘stood down’ 
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during the 1981 industrial dispute) to be a ‘nonsense’.  However, Harley’s contradictory class 
location contributed to a narrowing of her political perceptions, despite remaining a member 
of the CPSU.  From her managerialist perspective the progressive way to resolve the 
Business Partnership Agreement’s dilemma was to reduce it to an operational problem.  To 
be ‘good to us [Centrelink management] and our staff’ so that CSOs could ‘embrace’ a 
sensitive workfare ‘philosophy’ required the one administrative measure of increasing a 
CSO’s contracted customer ‘interaction’ time from three to ‘eight or nine’ minutes.  If such 
comments express how a manager’s role may constrict their political attitudes to workfare to 
a quantitative problem of doubling the frontline workforce to allow such interaction times to 
occur, it also materially highlights why the ‘cattle-customer contradiction’ was so sharp.  The 
intensity of this material contradiction is differentially heard among frontline staff arguing 
about how they should deal with being ‘caught up’ by a client at the front counter or at their 
desk.  It often became an intensely political idea since it was connected to action – the extra 
work required by ‘good customer service’ at the expense of blowing ‘the line out’ for those 
waiting to be seen, so putting extra pressure on other staff (and supervisors).   
 
It was not only politically debilitating for CPSU delegates and activists that their union officials 
held similar attitudes to Harley – it was industrially damaging.  For all the talk about 
rebuilding a core activist base in the 2000s, through campaigns such as the ACTU’s 
unions@work (1999), no strategic lead was given of how to counter strenuous welfarism 
beyond calling for more staff.  Delegates could take no clear industrial stand within the micro-
controversies surrounding what constituted good customer service because the CPSU had 
no position on such internally divisive issues.  Yet these widely and deeply felt issues were 
precisely the organising opportunities being sought by the trade union movement to 
‘strengthen collective structures in the workplace’ and ‘form strong alliances with other 
groups in the Community’ (ACTU 1999: i).  Apolitically campaigning for more staff as if their 
work was still a disaggregated set of 1980s technical tasks fundamentally misrecognised 
how the emotional and affective character of Centrelink welfare labour in the 2000s was a 
major industrial matter.  Centrelink’s cultural change programs were a managerial attack not 
only on the pace of work but also on the changing relationship staff were required to have to 
the nature of their labour. The failure to identify and then contest strenuous welfarism 
weakened workplace organisation and led to the very quiet death of JET. 
 
The dialectic of negation of the negation is discerned in JET’s broad historical movement, 
expressing how two contradictory (but not necessarily equal) forces react on one another so 
that a new antagonism results from their clash to both preserve and substantially alter them 
at the same time.  This historical dynamic is found in the antagonistic relationships between 
the various welfare policy constructions of single parents and their lived experience.  It was 
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through the political struggle at the height of the women’s movement that unmarried mothers 
fully emerged as a normative welfare category ‘pensioner’ in 1973.  In the ruling class 
counter-offensive against welfare rights, beginning in the 1980s, cloaked in social democratic 
garb, Active Society programs such as JET, began to negate single parents as a pensioner 
welfare group.  Recast as in transition to work, which could free them from this welfare 
category, began to destablise their normative right to this category.  JET embodied the 
reformist contradictions of the period – that state actions primarily focused on supporting 
capital and holding back working class demands could achieve real gains for sections of the 
working class and the women’s movement.  JET’s Accord-derived recognition that single 
parents required their own distinctively perceived set of voluntary market-activation programs 
appeared for what it was – a program to give material and emotional support for their ‘long 
march’ out of poverty.  JA work was concretised through the single parent (even if repressed 
by individuated, labour marketed, welfare stigmatised, bureaucratised and gender oppressed 
tropes) in her using the resources and time offered by the program to explore a range of 
options not necessarily or immediately connected to the labour market.  But JET came with 
the high cost of furthering the reformist idea that such limited programs (and wage rates) 
were the ‘surest way’ to realise a single parent’s journey from poverty (Howe & Pidwell 2004: 
1770).  
 
JET’s existence, therefore, emerged from the reformist ‘real-illusion’ that it expressed a 
positive policy potential for single parents to actively negate themselves as a pensioner 
welfare category.  The neoliberal welfare agenda seized the negative pole of this apparent 
policy potential.  The compulsory phase of JET expropriated the role of ‘activist’ from the 
single parent to the state.  JA practices reflected this expropriation.  Interviews became 
increasingly standardised and coercive, and the earlier resources available for JAs to 
support single parents’ non-labour market activities were reduced and removed from their 
control.  Similarly, it was reflected in the state refusing a single parent pensioner the means 
or time to have any other option but immediate connection with the labour market.  By 2006, 
however, the introduction of the Welfare-to-Work measures denied single parents with 
children over 7 years of age the right to a pension.  JET’s positive (social democratic) and 
negative (neoliberal) illusion to negate single parents as a pension category was itself 
negated.  A new welfare antagonism emerged between poor single parents and non-right 
based conditional labour market payments.  In negating this negation, single parents were 
both preserved as a (mainstreamed) welfare category and transformed from ‘deserving’ 
pensioners to ‘undeserving’ unemployed.   
 
By being reduced as merely one more component floating in an increasingly ubiquitous 
‘working age income support’ pool, single parents’ distinct social and economic 
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circumstances were politically devalued and further denied.  They were reductively re-
packaged as Newstart ‘principal carers’, economically condensed to their immediately 
realisable labour market capacities, and herded onto the Welfare-to-Work and Rapid 
Connect conveyor belt.  Because the central ideological grounds for JET no longer held, the 
always disparate elements of the program were not consolidated in any rationale and 
exploded into pieces in 2006.   
 
Concluding comments 
The capacity to initiate the JET program exposed a fundamental political contradiction in the 
reformist politics of the late 1980s – the specific social justice possibility of JET was based 
on a general acceptance of workfare.  In accepting the politics that informed the SSR and the 
Accord the femocrats implementing JET were powerless to argue how the program’s 
voluntary character, supported by the women’s movement, was located inside a class attack 
that continues to this day.  This first overall appraisal of JET reclaims the program’s central 
historical role in shaping current Centrelink welfare practices.  The study uniquely argues 
that JET was used to resolve a legacy problem confronting neoliberal managerialism – how 
to institute strenuous welfarism in a technocratically-focused organisation.  It was a tragic but 
necessary irony that senior managers had to rely on the expertise built by the only social 
justice program the department operated.  The emotional and affective labour demanded by 
strenuous welfarism was both material (contra Hardt and Negri) and productive (contra 
Jessop et al.).  This conceptual insight is unique among Australian policy analyses.  In this 
study it provides a sharper theoretical capacity to historically connect the feminisation of 
frontline work practices to changes in the social relations of welfare production, and 
Centrelink’s cultural change program to the broader competitive dynamics of Australian 
capitalism.     
 
Researching the relations of social policy is an ‘intervention into the world of which they are 
part’ (Ollman 2003: 97).  This case-critique of Australian workfare is held in analytically 
innovative tension by taking every empirical opportunity to theoretically and politically 
connect with those (at an individual, industrial and social movement level) opposing 
strenuous welfarism and the neoliberal attacks on welfare policy arrangements.  The overall 
failure of their opposition to the oppressive dynamics of JET’s trajectory was historically 
contingent, contested in small acts of resistance, and politically avoidable.  The study, 
therefore, resists reducing JET’s political contradictions to some historically inevitable and 
tragic workfare juggernaut. 
 
Analyses that only focus on the political or economic elements of welfare, or deal with both 
too distinctly, divide social policy’s inherently politico-economic nature.  There is a deplorable 
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paucity in the quantity and quality of critiques of Australian welfare policy, which accounts for 
such a massive proportion of federal state outlays.  The study explicitly challenges existing 
research approaches, which regard ‘the objective’ either as a positivist given or a 
discursively constructed chimera.  It is insufficient to simply condense an understanding of 
social policy to a hermeneutic formulation that it is ‘an irreducibly linguistic and political 
process’ (Marston & Watts 2003a: 43) (see also Bessant & Watts 2002; Bessant et al. 2006).  
Such an argument reduces the economic, social and institutional ‘circumstances’ of these 
processes to a background field of positivist connections, which is a theoretical approach 
authors such as Bessant and Watts (2002: 297; 1997: 16-17) claim to reject.  Even when 
social policy was seen as a form of social wage, as occurred in the 1980s, the general 
acceptance that better health, education and welfare was counterposed to real wage 
increases theoretically and politically undercut its force.  Rather, political and discursive 
processes feature the ideologically occluded social relations of policy production.  What often 
appears to be target of social policy is peripheral to the state-capital relation’s economic 
concerns to further mine the overall productive capacities of those at its centre.  .A marxist 
critique of social policy does not reduce the political and discursive to the mechanical 
economic domination of booms and slumps but further politicises ‘the political’ as a relational 
aspect of the economic: within the class-conflictual divisions of welfare labour at the 
workplace and other bureaucratic levels; as a tension between the state-as-state and the 
state-as-capital; as a contradictory unity of productive and unproductive labour etc.   
 
The methods and theories of the classical marxist tradition provide this critique of JET with a 
capability to expand the interpretive possibilities of what is being discussed, contested and 
produced in social policy. The tradition offers a powerful method, which simultaneously 
escalates the interventionist possibilities of defending welfare, contesting workfare and, 
eventually, negates the capitalist underpinnings of both.  
 
 
5.3 Directions for further research 
 
The British socialist feminist Lynne Segal (1999: 206-207) was half-right to consider the rise 
of workfare to be the ‘single most general threat to Western women’s interests at present – 
at least for those many women who are not wealthy, and who still take the major 
responsibility for caring work in the home’.  Segal appropriately places single and poor 
parents at the forefront of what she termed a ‘quiet revolution’.  In the Australian context, 
Philip Mendes (2003) also half-captures the neoliberal social agenda by calling it a ‘welfare 
war’.  However, neither adequately recognise the intimate, competitive tensions between 
capital accumulation and the political character of workfare.  Single mothers were not only 
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confronting a welfare onslaught, single parent pensioners were caught up in a class war.  
They were at the interface of the industrial and welfare changes of a neoliberal state 
struggling to defend its power and create ‘a good business climate’ to compete globally by 
maximising the expropriation of labour power’s value locally (Harvey 2005: 79).   
The concepts and methods applied in this research outline some bases for raising such 
contentions.  However, the study is only a pilot exercise of using marxism to investigate 
Australian workfare, scoping the potential of linking an empirical analysis of social policy to a 
potent theoretical tradition.  Multiple lines of inquiry are needed to theoretically develop these 
possibilities.  Based on a small sample of interviewees, this thesis was limited to 
investigating a minor social policy, aimed at a fraction of one country’s social security 
population, from one side of the ‘welfare desk’, over two decades.  Each of these practically 
necessary limitations narrows the perspective from which to mount a critique of welfare 
production in the political economy of Australian workfare.  The political and social 
movements pressuring the state to initiate unemployment benefits, and disability and carer 
pensions, had their own historical dynamics, which continue to influence state accumulation 
and legitimation strategies.  The relationships between the Age Pension, superannuation and 
the working-aged employed and unemployed are major political considerations for a state 
pursuing a workfare agenda.   
 
One specific omission for a sharper critique of JET was the experiences and views of those 
on the other side of the desk.  Limited financial resources and time aside, the focus on 
developing theories and a method to historically analyse one aspect of welfare production 
was a sufficiently difficult task.  Connecting the social relations of single parents (and other 
social security groups) to the production and consumption of social policy requires additional 
conceptual categories and dialectically linking a new set of relations into a critique.  
Investigating the social context within which this consumption occurs would be enlarged by 
applying Fine’s (2009) theory that welfare is comprised of diverse ‘systems of provision’ such 
as food, health, housing and transport systems, whose types, levels and quality of 
consumption differ across social groups.  As a consequence, the reproduction of labour 
power, within and across segmented labour markets, creates differentiated standards of 
consumption not reducible to one common moral and historical element.  Linking the 
dynamics of consumption norms to welfare production would provide a more effective 
political-economic critique of Australian workfare. 
 
Crucially, Ollman’s salutary warning against pursuing an empirical investigation as a game of 
hunt-the-contradiction threatens to be an empty phrase unless there is a sufficiently 
theorised account of the political and economic categories constituting social policy.   Only 
when furnished with such an account does a dialectically integrated capturing of their 
  244 
interactions as a whole become possible.  Because the study worked with some under-
theorised conceptual relations, aspects of this method only occur in sections (to uncover 
elements of social policy’s systemic economic relations, to conceptually link JET to the 
contradictions of the state-capital relation, to hold the state-as-capital in dialectical relation 
with the state-as-state etc.).   
 
A further theoretical flushing-out of how Marx’s method can be empirically applied in social 
policy would be of broad benefit.  Social policy critiques not only struggle with an unusually 
wide range of the more disputed concepts within marxism, but also deal with many under-
theorised or under-researched questions.  What is the economic character of state labour?  
What are the specific relations between a state’s social policy production of value (if it exists) 
and other circuits of capital?  How are the divisions of labour in the state to be understood in 
their general and bureaucratically differentiated relations to each other and the broader 
divisions of labour in capitalism?  How are other aspects of social policy such as education, 
health and immigration to be brought into relation with welfare?  Greater clarity on economic 
and political relationships between state-funded workfare entities (private and not-for-profit 
agencies) and the state is needed for an articulate critique of the political economy of 
Australian welfare.  This study thematises the affective and emotional aspects of strenuous 
welfarism to characterise and investigate changes in welfare work practices, however a far 
more theorised account of the micro-relations of welfare policy production is required.  How 
are these relations connected to the internal administrative workings of the state-as-capital?  
A small example of the welfare customer-staff relationship is analysed.  Mooney and Law 
(2007: 37) provide some insight into how the strange ‘hybrid’ between bureaucracy and 
markets structurally underpins this relationship, but further investigation of how this may be 
more generally applicable with respect to neoliberal relationships in advanced states would 
provide valuable theoretical and historical resources for marxist social policy critiques.   
 
The problem confronting any campaign for a better social wage by the current women’s and 
industrial movements is how to seize Bloch’s (1995: 1370) ‘wishful’ thinking and turn it into a 
politically ‘realistic expectation’.  Reformist conceptions about the welfare state and its social 
provisioning reflect and contribute to the political weakness within the movements.  In the 
Australian context, marxist welfare policy research (which has barely emerged) needs to 
clearly situate its analyse within an understanding that federal welfare outlays aimed at 
increasing the rate of exploitation continue a five-decade long rise (ABS 2010b: 288, Table 
9.9) and that the recent economic crisis and subsequent ‘boom’ have tightened the 
contradictions of the Australian state’s relation with capital.  Neoliberal welfare policies to 
economically and ideologically support local capital accumulation efforts  to maintain labour 
power and shore up the state’s legitimacy have exhibited greater tensions, coming into 
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greater conflict with an efficiency drive to keep welfare costs productive for capital.  Such a 
contextual understanding would assist left critiques of four current social policy interventions.   
 
Firstly, the ALP government’s introduction of the Paid Parental Leave Scheme in 2011 is 
most usefully seen as an intervention in a period of labour shortage – to ensure that the 
episodic maintenance of the value of ‘maternal labour’ power is cost-effectively linked to its 
regular realisation (CoA 2009).  The Business Council of Australia welcomed the Scheme as 
both ‘modest’ and ‘crucial…to raise workforce participation’ (BCA 2008).  A 
misunderstanding of how the accumulation pressures on the state opened a significant 
political opportunity for real social wage/industrial gains weakened left challenges to the 
government’s claim that paying a non-superable minimum wage for 18 weeks to care for a 
newborn child was a substantial gain for working women.   
 
Secondly, the current debate about ‘middle class welfare’ exemplifies a misunderstanding of 
the connections in accumulation and legitimation functions in social policy, leading to 
ineffectual political responses.  Social liberal analyses frequently mis-define middle class 
welfare by lumping tax breaks which disproportionately benefit higher income earners 
(negative gearing, and rebates for superannuation, private education and heath insurance) 
with various welfare payments such as Family Tax and Child Care Benefit (Macintyre 2009: 
293)(Hamilton 2005: 173, 176)(Saunders, P 2002a: 59)(Mendes 2003: 45)(Saunders, PG 
2002: 59-84). However, these last two benefits are overwhelmingly received by Australian 
working class families earning less than the average weekly wage (ABS 2010a)(FAO 2011).  
Social liberal welfare assumptions reinforce the idea that those receiving payments are 
either greedy or needy, creating divisions within the working class which hamper an effective 
political or industrial response to defend any welfare provisioning.  Such assumptions end up 
passively accommodating neoliberal efforts to cost-effectively roll-out or roll-back whichever 
welfare payments suit the state’s accumulation purposes.     
 
Thirdly, two recent ACTU interventions exemplify how separating the economic aspects of 
welfare policy from their underlying political connections weakens the potential strength of 
the movements.  The ACTU rightly called for the Federal government to raise the rate of 
Newstart in the 2011 Budget (ACTU 2011a: 16) while also properly demanding that the Fair 
Pay Commission raise the minimum wage (ACTU 2011b: 109).  However, the ACTU could 
not put to the government that Newstart be boosted from 41 per cent of the current minimum 
wage back to its 1997 ratio of 45 per cent (Schneiders 2011) since the ACTU’s core 
argument to the Commission was that unless minimum wages rose sufficiently, their 
‘relativity’ to Newstart would be ‘eroded’ (ACTU 2011b: 109).  Since no actual campaign was 
mounted for either claim, former Fair Pay Commissioner Ian Harper could simply brush aside 
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the ACTU’s tactics, allowing him to openly express his position as a political capitalist that 
the accumulation demands of the state required keeping the minimum wage and Newstart 
low to create the most productive ‘tension’ in the ‘incentive relative to unemployment benefits 
to induce people to take on a low-paid job’ (Harper cited in Schneiders 2011)  No serious call 
was made out of the silos occupied by progressive social policy or industrial relations 
academics, or the left generally, urging the ACTU and ACOSS to mount what should be an 
obvious class response – a joint industrial and political campaign to increase the social and 
minimum wage.  
 
Fourthly, a sharper analysis is required among many critics of the government’s racist 
Northern Territory Emergency Response into the lives of indigenous communities to more 
explicitly bring this intervention into clearer systemic and historical tension with the national 
welfare reform agenda.  Many of the left argue this state intervention was to support a land 
grab by mining companies (Sealy 2010).  Others point to how the broader ideological intent 
of ‘solving the Aboriginal problem’ shores up the neoliberal legitimacy of Australian 
capitalism as a whole (Gibson 2009).  However, in mid-2010, the government achieved the 
legislative capacity (CoA 2010: section 123TFA) to declare all states and territories one 
‘income management area’ and withhold from the far larger non-indigenous body of social 
security recipients 70 per cent of income support payments for what Centrelink staff will 
deem as ‘priority items’ (Centrelink 2010b).  As these coercive measures roll out the question 
of the relationship between the accumulation and legitimation aspects of social policy 
requires greater application of the theories and methods used in this study to both critically 
analyse and politically resist these attacks.  
 
To conclude, of most personal interest is a particular line of inquiry – to analyse the current 
frontline production of welfare in Centrelink.  For an organisation spending more than 40 per 
cent of government outlays (Laurie & McDonald 2008: 36) and employing over 27,000 
people (Centrelink 2010a: 8) there has been remarkably little critical research into the 
organisation’s street-level practices.  Cosmo Howard (2003) has conducted a small study of 
nine workers’ approaches to clients who breach their welfare obligations.  A number of 
papers (based on 82 responses to an electronic survey) analyse Centrelink Social Workers’ 
attitudes to the impact welfare-to-work policy and administrative changes have had on 
restricting their roles (Marston & McDonald 2006b; McDonald & Chenoweth 2006; McDonald 
& Marston 2008).  The vital need for more extensive critiques about the contested nature of 
‘policy-as-produced’ (Brodkin 2000: 3) has become all the more urgent with the passage of 
The Human Services Legislation Amendment Act 2011.  From July 2011, the Australian 
Department of Human Services will directly manage a 47,000 strong workforce, integrating 
into one bureaucracy the services of Centrelink, the Health Insurance Commission (and its 
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delivery arm Medicare Australia), the Child Support Agency, CRS Australia (formerly the 
Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service) and Hearing Australia..  The thesis presents theories 
and methods within a current of marxism which provide unique resources for conducting 
such an inquiry.  
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Australian welfare ‘reform’ critiques – limitations of the debate 
 
 
This short review groups recent Australian welfare policy literature politically: documents 
actively promoting attacks on welfare recipients; supposedly apolitical texts produced for the 
‘evidence-based policy movement’ (Marston & Watts 2003a: 32); and left/feminist challenges 
to the neoliberal turn.  The brief, critical engagement with the third, oppositional, category is 
primarily restricted to those who hold theoretical positions that are ostensibly anti-liberal – 
governmentality studies and discursive hermeneutics.  A response to the bulk of the 
left/feminist literature is through one illustration – their reactions to the rise of ‘mutual 
obligation’ requirements imposed on welfare recipients from the late 1990s.  
 
Neoliberal boosters for welfare compulsion and cutbacks 
 
One of the more influential figures writing on Australian social policy in the last decade has 
been the political-academic activist Peter Saunders (Centre for Independent Studies).  
Professing a consistent ideological position, his writings sharply express the contradictions of 
the neoliberal period.  A self-described ‘classical liberal’, he has distinguished between the 
‘virtuous’ – who gained ‘self-reliance through work’, and the unrighteous ‘malingerers’ 
receiving social welfare payments (Saunders, P 2002b: 47).  On one hand Saunders saw it 
as unethical for a ‘coercive’ state to ‘take money…from people who have established a just 
entitlement to them and distribute it other people in the name of “social justice”’ (Saunders, P 
2002b: 47-48).  On the other, he actively promoted Lawrence Mead’s view that state 
coercion in welfare was a necessary ‘moral obligation’ to achieve such self reliance ‘because 
both government and the recipient are expected to conform to [these] agreed values (Mead 
1997: 4, highlights in original).  The question was not to blame people if they ‘deviate’ but for 
the state to ‘persuade them to blame themselves’ (Mead 1986: p 10).  
 
However, rather than a pure ‘classical liberal’ support for employees and employers to 
‘freely’ negotiate wage rates, Saunders argued a ‘class’ position that the ‘danger’ of unions 
gaining higher pay required greater government regulation to reduce wages, especially at the 
low-wage end of the market where they should be ‘cut’ or ‘frozen’ (Saunders 2004: 161-162).  
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It seems that only business people have a ‘just entitlement’ to money and the state is morally 
justified in coercing the whole working class (Saunders, P 2002b: 47).98   
 
The social liberal reflex of those criticising Saunders often fell into the trap of thinking that 
their main task was to present an alternative, positive vision of liberal ethics (Goodin 2001; 
Moss 2001; Saunders, PG 2002).  Rather than taking Saunders ‘seriously’ (Marston & Watts 
2004: 37) the central, neoliberal character of his texts is only superficially analysed.  Ethics 
for Saunders are instrumentally useful to promote ‘concepts like “dependency culture”’ – the 
‘construction’ of which he readily acknowledges ‘reflects the purposes of those who develop 
them’ (Saunders 2000a: 7).  His political intention was to assemble a number of popular 
intellectual justifications the Howard Government could deploy to justify its welfare ‘reform’ 
agenda.   
 
In this respect, Saunders had a firmer grasp of how to advocate class politics than did other 
writers on welfare policy, who tended to restrict their conversations to each other.  Saunders 
(2004: 74) directly appealed to the ‘deeply embedded instincts of the Australian public’ who 
‘know’ the pressure they experience is due to ‘high taxes’ caused by ‘destructive’ and 
‘massive welfare costs’. Throughout 2004, he widely popularised the notion that:  
 
Over the last 40 years, Australia has become addicted to welfare…Back in the 1960s, we 
could afford what we were spending, for there were comparatively few welfare recipients. In 
those days there were 22 people in employment to support every one person of working age 
living on benefits. Today, this dependency ratio has collapsed to just five to one. 
(Saunders 2004: 3, 4) 
 
Academic critics of Saunders were not politically adept at running a counter-argument in the 
media to defend welfare rights.  It could, for example, have been pointed out that by 
restricting the denominator of this ‘dependency ratio’ only to those in receipt of a welfare 
payment, Saunders sidelined the further subordination of the working class to the labour 
market during this period99.   
                                                
98
 An uncertain grasp of social security policy often undercuts Saunders’ intent.  He incorrectly tells us, for 
example, that the single parent pension rate increases with more children (Saunders 2004: 99).  An argument is 
put that single parents must work and so not receive payments such as Family Tax Benefit Part B but married 
women are free to stay at home because ‘this decision only affects the immediate family’ (Saunders 2004: 99-
100). Empirically, both claims were incorrect when made in 2004.  Working single parents (with a child under 18) 
received this payment irrespective of their income, as did an unwaged partnered parent regardless of what their 
spouse earned (Centrelink 2003b: 18).  Similar missteps pepper Saunders’ writings on intergenerational welfare 
dependency, his construction of the ‘welfare burden’ and childcare ‘costs’ (Saunders 2004: 3, 4, 6).  He studiously 
ignores, for example, a Department of Family and Community Services study, which found that every dollar 
outlaid directly by the government returned $1.86 ‘directly to the Government’s bottom line, in the form of 
increased taxation and reduced government outlays’ (Martin 2004: 9). 
99
 58.3 per cent in 1964 and 76.0 per cent in 2006 (Chapman & Kapuscins 2001: 3) (DEWR 2006a: 156). 
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A hypothetical press release, using Saunders’ metaphors, could have reframed the political 
debate in class terms: 
 
Since the 1960s, the addiction of business to increase profits and women’s greater 
expectation and need to have paid work, often to meet rising family costs, has dramatically 
increased the ratio of paid to unpaid workers.  Forty years ago, there was only one person in 
paid work to support the expenses for each adult who was not.  Today, despite employers 
blaming welfare expenditures as an ’unaffordable’ brake on profitability, this support ratio has 
massively increased to three to one.100  
 
Left and feminist critics of Saunders rarely incorporated such political and empirical 
arguments to publicly campaign against Saunders.  Some recognised the need to become 
more politically engaged to resist this neoliberal welfare onslaught (McDonald & Marston 
2003: 312; Watts 2006b), but as Pam Kinnear (2002: 249) pointed out most confined ‘their 
often strident and well-argued critiques to academic journals rather than placing their critique 
in the public arena’.  Dominique Lecourt comments on the consequences the profound 
impact neoliberalism has had among academics: 
 
Replacing the engaged intellectual was the melancholic ‘anti-barbarian intellectual’. Replacing 
the proletariat was the disparate and rootless plebe, equally resigned to its own limitations – 
seeking neither power, honour nor wealth but succour from oppression. Replacing politics with 
ethics, the modern intellectual offered a disengaged judgements of the world based on a 
choice between good and evil. 
(Lecourt 2001: 205)   
 
Within Australian social policy literature these pressures, while partially resisted, have left 
their mark.   
 
‘Evidence-based’ policy literature 
 
One conservatising consequence of neoliberalism has been the rapid growth of ‘policy-
relevant research’. In more tightly knitting the practices and ideas of researchers, research 
institutes and governments, ‘policies of inequality’ have gained greater legitimacy (Jamrozik 
2005: 328).  Ideologically underpinning these networks is an ‘information-theoretic approach’ 
to research, which has come to ‘colonise’ the social sciences (Fine 2000).  Welfare 
economics, for example, has increasingly focused on the problem of dealing with 
informational imperfections and complexities of incentive compatibilities between work and 
social security payments.  The welfare state is reduced to a set of ‘factors’, with the more 
sophisticated models capable of including (endogenising) norms and other previously 
‘exogenous’ concepts such as equity in the context of these informational and other market 
imperfections (for an overview of the Australian literature see Kalb 2003).  This is one step 
beyond the neoclassical conception of market harmony and rationality of earlier policy 
                                                
100
 The political point is sharpened by rounding to whole numbers – the actual ratios of ‘those participating to 
those that are not’ are 1.4:1 in 1964 and 3.2:1 in 2006.  Also the participation rate, of course, includes those who 
are unemployed and actively seeking work.  Nevertheless, the rounded ratio of 3:1 in 2006 remains even when 
the 4.6 per cent unemployed rate is stripped out of the participation rate (ABS 2006b). 
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research (ANAO 1993; Redmond 1999) but it was at the expense of further entrenching a 
methodological individualism at its centre (Fine 1999). Because these technocratic methods 
are held to be pragmatically driven by ‘evidence’ of ‘what works’, policy design has taken on 
a ‘deeply rationalistic, positivistic and mechanistic approach to strategic management 
(Parsons 2001, 108).  Since the objectives of this rational ‘policy core’ is to ‘place’ this 
evidence within such a strategic political context, this positions strategic issues as irrational, 
‘irritating’ obstacles best dealt with by those coordinating the implementation of the policy 
(Parsons 2001: 93).   
 
While the two most influential sets of welfare policy documents of this period –the Social 
Security Review (Cass 1986a) and the ‘McClure’ Report (RGWR 2000a), adopted an openly 
politicised ‘policy cycle’ approach (Bridgman & Davis 2000), the rise of managerialism in 
welfare bodies from the late 1980s (Reynoldson 2000) reinforced the assumption that 
research evidence was an ‘apolitical’ and ‘objective’ policy tool used to achieve its ‘business’ 
outcomes.  In practice, this self-deception meant that there was even less capacity to 
distinguish between what was evidence-based-policy and what was in fact policy-based-
evidence.  Critical insight into the neoliberal contradictions of welfare policy can be gleaned 
from these numerous studies through linking their ideological frame to the course of events 
they operate within.   
 
Left and feminist challenges to Australian welfare policy, practices and institutions. 
 
Linking progressive Australian welfare analyses with the rest of the above literature is a 
commitment, in one form or other, to liberalism.  The theoretical, political or methodological 
constraints this places on their research limits their capacity to: (1) historically connect their 
investigation of welfare policy, practices or institutions to the social (and natural) context it 
operates within; (2) explain what they are investigating; and (3) provide an effective political 
critique they seek of neoliberal social policy.  They tend either to provide a detailed empirical 
investigation with a poor connection to social theory, or a theorised account which crudely 
connects it to the empirical evidence offered.   
 
The overview below highlights two theoretical approaches: governmentality studies and 
discursive hermeneutics.  An account of the more positivist forms of social liberal, social 
democratic and feminist critiques, while recognising they offer a rich empirical and historical 
resource and political counterfoil for this research, are summarised through one political ‘acid 
test’ – their responses to the rolling out of mutual obligation requirements under the Howard 
Government.  
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Governmentality studies 
The overall claim in the Australian governmentality literature101 is for distinctive insight into 
the ‘how’ of governing – a totalizing concept which includes ‘self-governing’ (Dean 2002b: 
132).  A politically radical posture is adopted that ‘today it is possible to change society – 
perhaps even revolutionise it – by acting upon the mechanisms through which it is governed’ 
(Dean 1999: 197).  Such governing is imbued with neoliberal ‘rationalities and techniques’ 
which can be discursively and ‘concretely’ ‘revealed’, for example, in ALMPs (Dean 2002b: 
132). Working within a neo-Foucauldian notion of the heterogeneity of power-knowledge, a 
‘form of exemplarily criticism’ is deployed to uncover ‘regimes of practices’ through which 
‘identities are constructed and taken up’ and ‘resistance’ is located (Dean 1999: 26, 38, 27; 
Harris 2003: 99; McDonald & Marston 2003: 297). Such revelatory purposes are white-anted, 
however, by a liberal conception of (neo)liberalism: 
 
good government is to be grounded in the ways in which persons govern themselves…[and] 
allow[s] us to accept a sense of responsibility for the consequences and effects of thinking 
and acting in certain ways….to reveal possibilities of doing things otherwise…[so] we can 
practice our freedom. 
(Dean 1999: 37, 38) 
 
The classical liberal dualities (such as freedom-sovereignty, choice-constraint and private-
public) problematically re-surface, destabilizing and occluding the analyses. As a 
consequence, governmentality’s anti-reductionist claim (multiform relations of power and 
conduct) that it is theoretically counterposed to essentialist, liberal conceptions of 
sovereignty (and marxist conceptions of the state) proves unfounded (Dean 1999: 26; 
Marston 2002: 303; Marston & Watts 2003b: 3).  Because only a ‘rationalist conception of 
rationality’ (Lemke 2002: 57) is provided, notions such as ‘rationalities of government’ end up 
expressing one of the more functionalist and essentialising concepts in the social policy 
literature. They are simply asserted to be enacted within a ‘relatively stable field’ (Dean 1999: 
27) – on what Thomas Lemke (2002: 54) calls a plane of immanence – as a ‘taken for 
granted point of reference’. Governmental rationalities (the conduct of conduct) are also 
specifically ‘problematised’ as internal state rationalities – to ‘bracket off’ or reduce to a 
discursive notion the broader socio-political and economic terrain of market and civil society 
(Dean 2002a: 53; Harris 2001).  Such moves reify the analyses offered (Langemeyer 2006: 
7).  
 
Choice, for example, is formally recognized as a necessary practice of (liberal) self-rule, yet 
the coercive relations of power deployed in ALMPs are only rejected when no choice is able 
                                                
101
 Dean 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Harris 2001, 2003; Lackner & Marston 2003; 
Marston 2002; McDonald & Marston 2002, 2003, 2005; McDonald, Marston & Buckley 2003; and 
Penna & O'Brien 1996. 
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to be expressed. Dean (1998: 105) condemns the Work for the Dole program only because 
choice and coercion have been ‘bifurcated’ – the ‘targeted population is simply forced to 
work’. Where programs meld coercion and choice no judgment or ‘position’ can or should be 
taken (Dean 1999: 34). Such a crudely bi-polar treatment has no analytical capacity to 
explain what is constituted in a program such as JET, how it historically changed from a 
voluntary to a compulsory program, or why it did.  Rather than analysing neoliberalism, 
governmentality – even if cloaked in its ‘Operation Dissidence’, radical liberal form – mirrors 
(neo)liberalism back on itself (Lecourt 2001: 196). 
 
Greg Marston and Catherine McDonald claim, for example, that their interview-based study 
of the ‘micro-relations of power’ in Job Network case management practices illustrates ‘why 
these programs of government are so politically successful’ (McDonald & Marston 2003: 312, 
297, highlight in original).  A sociological description of these practices is founded on 
considering that neoliberal politics mediates the experience of the case manager/client 
relationship ‘as therapeutic and empowering, rather than as coercive and disciplinary’ (2003: 
311).  Yet because they only abstract practice into liberal categories they term ‘citizen 
equations’ (such as ‘state-citizen’, ‘worker-citizen’ and ‘parent-citizen’), they lack a social 
theory which apprehends the broader economic and social constitution of these practices as 
a work process (Marston & McDonald 2006a: 3).  Changes to welfare policy after the 
economic crisis in the 1970s become due to welfare regimes being ‘exhausted’ and suffering 
from a general ‘institutional sclerosis’ (McDonald & Marston 2002: 380).   
 
This theoretical framework has methodological consequences.  Immediately bolting 
abstractions such as ‘rationalities of government’ directly onto these interviews reduces their 
analysis to a descriptive typology of practices, case managers, and clients.  By defining 
political success through a social theory and methodology which is incapable of analysing 
the ideological, social and historical circumstances within which these interviews occurs 
occludes rather than illustrates politics.  Is case management only a ‘therapeutic-coercive 
process’ or is it, especially at times of labour shortages, also a socially productive process?  
Why assume, even in periods of labour oversupply, that these programs are primarily for the 
unemployed?  It is therefore not surprising that their initiating and bold claim that the 
research would ‘offer resources for …resistance practices’ eventually collapses into 
standard, liberal policy-speak that it would allow ‘policy makers to engage in more informed 
implementation and candid evaluation’ (Marston 2002: 312; McDonald & Marston 2003: 297-
298).  
 
Paul Henman’s (2006) governmentality-based critique of the new technologies in welfare 
administration leads to similarly unedifying political conclusions.  An initially promising claim 
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is made that liberal concepts of public policy fail to ‘take account of the…material basis of 
policy’ (Henman 2006: 217).  However, by identifying technology as the ‘material’, his 
description of new techniques of targeting welfare compliance leads him to the superficial 
contention that this is the explanation for ‘reconfiguration of welfare state political rationality’ 
(Henman 2006: 215)!   
 
Discursive hermeneutics 
Of the non-Marxist literature, the welfare critiques of Rob Watts and Judith Bessant are often 
closest to the politics of this thesis. Yet, because they hold what Lyotard (1984: xxiii) refers to 
as an ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, Bessant (Bessant et al. 2006: 127) and Watts 
(2003: 64) see ‘little value’ in ‘adopting a systematic approach’ found in approaches such as 
‘marxism, feminism, social liberalism’.  Instead of these ‘redemptive myths’, which too often 
hold ‘ordinary people in contempt’, an anti-positivist, inductive, hermeneutic investigation of 
‘discursive processes’ is offered through which ‘structure’, meaning and policies are said to 
be constituted and explicable (Bessant et al. 2006: 346; Watts 2003: 64; 2006a: 53).  Social 
policy becomes the history ‘of the interplay of self-interpreting historical actors and their 
discursively constituted attempts to act’ (Watts 2003: 11).  Such a methodologically ‘pluralist 
approach’ is based on a ‘robust anthropological understanding’ of policy discourses and 
networks (Bessant et al. 2006: 257, 272).  This ‘thick description’ of policy-making provides 
‘direct insights into how and why the policy shifts …came about’ (Bessant et al. 2006: 257, 
272),   
 
However, because a hermeneutic view delimits contradiction, these analyses ‘pull away’ 
from a critical engagement with the crises, conflicts and contradictions in the broader world 
(Callinicos 1987a: 237).  Recessions and globalisation become theatrical backdrops, formally 
acknowledged as part of an historical process ‘involving people who make choices and 
exercise judgements in circumstances that are not always of their own making’ (Bessant & 
Watts 2002: 297).  The analytical capacity of these texts suffer from giving only passing 
attention to what constitutes these circumstances, how they constrain decisions, what 
opportunities exist to breach them or who may be able to do so.  The ‘actual policy-making 
process’ is reduced to a ‘contingent historical process in which ideas or discourses play the 
central role’ (Watts 2000: 148). 
 
As a result, description replaces analysis.  The state becomes a formless entity, ‘always 
contingent and complex’ (Bessant & Watts 2002: 160).  An interesting depiction of the 
interplay of its ‘highly variable conglomeration of institutions, practices and arguments’ is 
available, but not a theorised explanation of them (Beilharz, Considine & Watts 1992: 9).  
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Ethical assumptions paper over the cracks created by this lack of an explanatory social 
theory.  For example, Bessant, Watts, Dalton, and Smyth flatly assume that: 
 
Governments make social policy…because they believe they will improve the welfare of 
groups of people or even an entire society… as a kind of ethical answer to the question of 
justice, that is, what do we as citizens owe to each other? 
(Bessant et al 2006: 250)  
 
Are ethical answers policy-specific or does the same ethical belief extend to the making of 
fiscal, military and other policies?  If not, why not?  If it does, why raise it as some distinctive 
grounds to investigate social policy?   
 
Discursive hermeneutics reduces the contradictory economic, political and ideological 
circumstances social policies operate within and express to the specific politics of policy ‘talk’ 
(Gardiner 1999).  As a result a liberal philosophical commitment to the idea that talk and 
‘beliefs are what will determine action’ is abstracted from an effective explanatory 
engagement with the material constraints and opportunities within which these actions, 
beliefs and talk occur (Bessant et al. 2006: 101).  The academically quietest and 
conservatising political consequences parallel those in the governmentality literature where 
‘what matters most is not so much the striving for greater equality …but how we name and 
represent unequal social relations and difference’ (Bessant et al. 2006: 197). 
 
Responses to Mutual Obligation in the feminist/left-liberal/social-democratic literature  
The remaining body of oppositional literature mainly provides structuralist or pluralist 
accounts of social welfare policy, practices and institutions, invariably within a positivist 
methodological framework. Many are empirically rich, historically grounded studies, and they 
are critically drawn upon or used as a counterfoil to clarify an area of welfare.102  All, 
                                                
102
 Such as social security law legislation (Carney 2006a), comparative international welfare (Castles 
1997; Whiteford 1998a);  public policy-making (Bacchi 1999; Considine 2005; Edwards 2001; Gibson 
1990; Gunn 1995; Hancock, Howe & O'Donnell 2000; Pusey 1991); welfare organisations (Eardley 
2002; Halligan & Wills 2008; Reynoldson 2000; Rowlands 2002; Webster & Harding 2001; West 1995; 
Wettenhall 2007); histories of single parents (Howe & Swain 1993); feminist actors in welfare 
bureaucracies (Levi & Edwards 1990; Yeatman 1990); the relationship between welfare policy, the 
state and the family/civil society (Baker 1997; Broomhill & Sharp 2004; Bryson 1992; Cass 1994a; 
Edgar 1992; Edwards 2001; Jamrozik 2005; Jayasuriya 2006; McMahon, Thomson & Williams 2000; 
Mendes 2003; O'Connor, Shaver & Orloff 1999; Shaver & Burke 2003; Smyth & Cass 1998); political 
campaigns for welfare rights (Branigan 2007; Fox 2000; Keebaugh 2005; Swinbourne, Esson & Cox 
2000; Thibodeaux 2002; West 1991); work in welfare organisations (Face 1995; Jones & May 1992; 
Maconachie 1996; Matheson 2007a); and ethics-based discussions of social welfare (Beder 2001; 
Goodin 2001; Kinnear 2000; Moss 2001; Saunders, PG 2002).   
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however, lack the theoretical capacity to successfully integrate their analyses into the social 
circumstances within which they occur.   
 
The most striking aspect of a ‘progressive’ attachment to various forms of liberalism is the 
rainbow of political responses to the compulsory Welfare-to-Work, mutual obligation (MO) 
policies the Howard government imposed on extensive groups of social security recipients 
(see Chapter 3).  In rejecting a social theory which analyses mutual obligation as the welfare 
face of contemporary capitalism – an approach which would lead those seeking to oppose 
MO to broaden their political critique to contemporary capitalism tout court, these analyses 
tend to split the economic from the political, and ideas from practices.   
 
One consequence is that prevarication and equivocation riddle many texts.  Cosmo Howard 
(2003: 126, 129, 145) is somewhat discomforted by the ‘contractual-paternalist synthesis’ of 
MO, yet by simply considering a judgement of its success ‘is fundamentally an empirical one’ 
finds it is ‘desirable’.  Many seek a change of balance between what Mead terms help and 
hassle.  Eardley, Brown, Rawsthorne, Norris and Emrys (2005: 143) ask ‘How might 
breaching be improved?  Lackner and Marston (2003: 36-37) note that the ‘balance between 
sticks and carrots is not working’ by pointing to ‘the personal consequences of inappropriate 
breaches’.  An Australian Council of Social Services report (2006: 5) requested that ‘activity 
requirements for people on payments are reasonable’.  Ziguras, Considine, Hancock and 
Howe (2002: 9) argue ‘there is a strong case for substantially reducing’ breach penalties.  
Terry Carney (2006b: 40) aims his fire at the ‘disciplinary excesses’ in MO.  Braithwaite, 
Gatens and Mitchell (2002: 225) worry about some of the changes yet find the ‘much to 
recommend’ in a softer form of MO.  Mark Considine (2001: 137) chides the tendency of 
some theorists ‘to meet the contemporary ferment [of welfare reform] with contempt…and to 
find within it only a malevolent purpose’ which ‘risks asserting only those elements of control 
or regulation and closing off access to the subtle dynamics of invigoration which attend many 
of these reinvigoration strategies’.  Peter Gordon Saunders (2001a: 105) finds ‘nothing 
wrong in principle with the idea of compulsion’ only that the lack of government, business 
and community involvement makes it ‘unbalanced’, as does Philip Mendes (2003: 94) who 
opposes MO only because ‘it lacks reciprocity’.  Alison McClelland (2002: 209, 216).quibbles 
that the earlier reciprocal obligation arrangements under the Keating government were ‘more 
explicitly geared to capacity building’ yet accepts that the ‘welfare responsibilities’ of the 
Howard government requires some new form of MO.  
  
Many situate their criticisms within an overall commitment to the liberal notion that the 
relationship between social security recipients and the state is one of citizen-contractualism.  
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Anna Yeatman (2000b: 1, 14-15) condemns Mead’s conception of citizenship as a 
‘Manichean structure of populist conservatism’, yet argues Mead is: 
 
right to insist that we think about the agency of people on welfare…this is where we find 
common ground. It might be said that he and I take individualised citizenship seriously even 
though we adopt very different conceptions of it. 
(Yeatman 2000b: 14-15)   
 
For Yeatman, a ‘non-discriminatory conception of the self-reliant individual’ is now extant 
because ‘market liberalism has assumed an equal opportunity form’, and so agrees that MO 
programs are supportable because they are ‘post-racial, post patriarchal and expect people 
with disabilities to work’ (Yeatman 2000c: 163).  A deeply embedded elitism informs such a 
‘new contractualism’.  Her potentially progressive point of difference with Mead is that social 
security recipients need greater ‘voice and choice’ in MO.  This only accentuates her 
underlying agreement with Mead, given that the purpose for recipients to have a larger say is 
so that they can be better ‘actively engaged in this process of learning to be an individual’ 
(Yeatman 2000c: 168).   
 
Feminists such as Bettina Cass and Sheila Shaver fall into a similar cul de sac.  Both were 
influential welfare policy actors who helped develop ‘the emerging gender-neutral safety net’ 
during the neoliberal period.  De-gendering welfare policy (which reduced many women’s 
payment rights and rates) was justified as part of a progressive, feminist project which 
‘assumes and requires effective redress of women’s inequality in other spheres’ (Shaver 
1995: 157).  The elitist idea that they were progressive by acting on this abstract assumption 
sharply confronted them in mutual obligation – a politics which entrenched the inequalities 
they sought to rectify, and reliant on the new ‘neutrality’ they helped institute.  Both opposed 
MO.  Shaver (2002: 342) considered it ‘a denial of the equality of selfhood’.  Cass (2002: 
259) thought it to be ‘essentially individualistic, contractual and places onerous obligations on 
the most disadvantaged individuals’.   
 
Neither, however, have a social theory that can adequately respond to this attack.  Shaver 
(2002: 343) considers that ‘some of the policy prescriptions that flow from…ideas about 
activity, participation and responsibility …contradict values fundamental to liberalism…the 
presumption that all citizens are equal in status, dignity and worth’.  Cass (2006: 246) attacks 
MO because it ‘moved towards a citizen worker and away from a citizen parent model’.  
Because the models and presumptions they offer simply reflect a different notion of 
liberalism, they have little capacity to analyse the content of neoliberalism except as an idea.   
 
Similarly, since Mitchell Dean (1998: 105) is beholden to the liberal form of (self)government 
he cannot take an ‘unequivocal position’ on MO programs since many are not ‘purely’ 
  259
coercive.  Patricia Harris sums up the conundrum faced by those who hold progressive 
liberalism close to their theoretical centre:  
 
neo-liberalism’s call to choice, risk-taking and personal independence puts resistance in the 
corner. Traditionally, we kick against the pricks to get free – to get away from the parents, to 
make our own way, to be our own person etc. But now, it seems, authority is telling us to do 
just that. How to rebel? 
(Harris 2003: 99) 
 
Joy Puls’ (2002: 73, 75) radical feminist criticisms of MO takes Cass to task for the 
‘unintentional strengthening of the public representation of non-nuclear families as 
problematic and undesirable’ arguing how there is ‘a remarkably similar’ acceptance 
between neoliberals and ‘pro-welfare policy-feminists’ that redressing the problem of single 
parents pivots on paid work.  Puls argues that such a prioritisation downplays women’s 
disadvantage within the family, entrenches mother-headed households as ‘problem families’, 
and therefore feminism ‘risks being absorbed into the neo-conservative agenda which is 
concerned with the restoration of “traditional” family values’ (Pringle 1996: 1; cited in Puls 
2002: 77).  The normative family model is further ingrained, ‘perpetuating women’s economic 
dependence on men’, rather than meeting one of second wave feminism’s primary demands 
to ‘smash the family’ (Puls 2002: 75).  Puls’ argument that feminists should be promoting 
dual parenting is a step forward.  What it misses, however, is that women’s oppression has 
deep economic roots in the reproductive role of the nuclear family for capitalism.  This 
generates familial arrangements and ideologies which pose far greater challenges for such a 
demand to be realised or even the idea of dual parenting to become the norm.  
 
A range of social liberal and -democratic writers apply economic and class factors into their 
analyses of MO.  At the more conservative end is Paul Smyth (2005: 35) who dismiss the 
MO debate as ‘sideshow fisticuffs’.  Yet his concept of a ‘social investment state’ with an 
‘embedded…market’ continues to promote ‘social cohesion’ through active labour market 
policies which simply papers the neoliberal politics of MO with a Third Way veneer (Smyth, 
Perkins & Nelms 2005: 37).  Similar proposals are made by Brian Howe and Anthony 
O’Donnell (2003: 74) based on an acceptance that ‘the strict divide between “welfare” and 
“work” which had prevailed in Australian policy arrangements for much of the twentieth 
century had become blurred’.  Francis Castles (2001: 31) contends that MO completes ‘the 
process of tearing down the edifice of Australia’s distinctive welfare state’.  The process of 
making welfare ‘a charity rather than a right’ started under the Hawke-Keating government 
and became entrenched by the Howard government as part of its attacks on industrial 
relations.  Adam Jamrozik (2005: 176) also connects MO to the ‘lowering of wage rates at 
the bottom end of the scale’.  Similar observations are made by Pamela Kinnear (2003) and 
Terry Carney (2002).  Yet because all consider these economic, political and industrial 
factors within a positivist framework, the actual connections and contradictions between 
them are only partially apprehended.  Castles moves Australian welfare into the US model – 
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but how or why did this reconfiguration occur?  Jamrozik (2005: 25) contends there is a 
‘basic incompatibility between the capitalist system and the concept of the welfare state 
which is, fundamentally, a social-democratic concept’.  However, no real analysis is given 
why this concept was not incompatible for the three decades after World War Two, why state 
welfare expenditures continued to grow under the Howard government, or what this says 
about social democratic concepts.  Kinnear (2002: 253) argues ‘for true mutuality to exist, 
dependency and vulnerability must be approximately equally shared between contracting 
parties and each must have the option to withdraw from, or not to enter, a contract if the 
possibility for exploitation is present’.  She argues that the ‘Mutual Obligation contract is at 
once asymmetrical – the individual is dependent upon the government to supply basic needs 
– and unilateral: the government has no corresponding dependency’ and is therefore 
‘exploitative’.  Similarly, Carney (2006b: 31) highlights how MO is based on the ‘false 
premise of equality’ between the employer or welfare provider ‘which now leave non-
standard workers vulnerable to contractual exploitation whether in work or not’.  A normative 
assumption that ‘standard’ workers are not exploited underpins such arguments and 
ultimately reduces opposition to MO to an ethical issue – that it is not ‘morally empowering’ 
(Carney & Ramia 2002: 280).   
 
Such a presumption underlies those who oppose MO on social justice, human rights and 
other liberal ethical grounds.  Jeremy Moss (2001: 3) mounts a detailed philosophical 
argument that MO is not ‘fair’ yet within a liberal framework which ideally construes society 
as just.  Writing with Watts, Marston (2003b: 26-27) usefully argues ‘it is time to 
fundamentally overhaul this anachronism [contemporary social security system]’ and to 
introduce a Basic Income for all.  Yet the only strategy offered is a liberal appeal for a 
‘rethinking’ of the concept of citizenship to institute a new ethic of ‘respect’ in welfare 
(Marston & Watts 2003b: 23).  Bessant (2000) sees mutual obligation policies as ‘civil 
conscription’ and breaches of human rights, quoting (2006) Sennett’s (2003: 49) observation 
that ‘unlike food, respect costs nothing. Why then should it be in short supply?’  In welfare 
policy, however, respect does have immense economic value for capitalism.  Peter Gordon 
Saunders (2006) thinks the strategy to be used by those ‘of us who favour reduced 
inequality’ is ‘to draw on moral arguments and research evidence to support our case’ – as if 
neoliberal welfare policy was a high school debate which could be won by better argument.  
Goodin (2000: 2) dismisses mutual obligation as ‘principles serving purely as fig leaves’ but 
does not have a social theory capable of explaining what the fig leaves are hiding. MO 
‘raises questions of fairness’ for Ziguras and others (2004) as if other parts of society do 
operate fairly.   
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In opposing MO, these arguments unfortunately continue to naturalise the exploitation upon 
which capitalism exists.  They keep the realm of production hidden, and accept capitalism's 
ideology of 'equal exchange'.  Such theories of justice, instead of questioning this ideology, 
ask how we can make the exchange truly 'just'.  For marxists, the question of exploitation is 
not one to be solved 'fairly', but one to be abolished, hence the (different) focus on solving 
people's needs.  Marxism therefore ‘does not involve a moral approach to history; but rather 
a historical approach to morality’ (Sayers 1998: 116). 
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B 
Letter to Sue Vardon 
 
Sue Vardon 
Chief Executive 
Department for Families and Communities 
Adelaide 
 
5th August 2006 
 
 
Doctoral research interview questions 
 
Dear Sue 
 
 
I am writing to you as a follow up to my conversation with your office regarding my research on the 
Jobs, Education and Training (JET) Program.   
 
Firstly I would like to thank you for agreeing to provide me some of your unique insights and 
recollections from the period you were the CEO at Centrelink.  I am seeking to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of the policy making and implementation processes for the JET Program.   
 
I recently interviewed Professor Meredith Edwards, Director of the National Institute for Governance at 
the University of Canberra, who highlighted how important individual actors were in the early stages of 
framing, developing and implementing the Program.  It is in this context that I think you would be well 
placed to provide insights into the JET Program from your time as Centrelink CEO.   
 
While my focus to date has been on interviewing a range of JET Advisers, Personal Advisers and 
some social workers, I am now starting to conduct a series of interviews with policy actors in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Canberra.  
 
There are two areas I would most appreciate your views and recollections.  These are: 
 
 How the relevance and viability of the JET Program may have changed over time; and 
 Your view of the broader policy/political context within which welfare activation policies were 
situated in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
 
I have broken these areas into a set of questions set out in the attachment.  However, please feel free 
to re-frame these elements in ways which better convey what it is that you wish to express. 
 
Thank you again for your time responding to these questions and completing the pro-forma.   
 
Best Regards 
 
 
Marcus Banks 
Postgraduate Research  
School of Global Studies, Social Science & Planning 
RMIT University 
City Campus 
Building 15 
Level 5 
Room 3 
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Questions 
 
 
 
 
The JET Program 
 
Do you consider the ‘trajectory’ of JET was somewhat inevitable? That is, was JET ‘destined’ to be 
mainstreamed, for elements of the JET Adviser role to be subsumed, initially by the Personal Advisers, 
and since July this year by Customer Service Advisers and Employment Service Providers?  
 
Was there a point at which JET began to be seriously questioned as an effective program in 
Canberra? There were a series of policy papers during the 1990s that highlighted some of the 
shortcomings of the program, and proposed various alternatives.  Do you recall which of these papers 
or research pilots was most commonly mentioned when the viability of JET was discussed?  
 
Do you think there was sufficiently detailed, outcomes based evaluation methodology applied to JET?  
 
Should JET have ever been delivered through DSS? That is, would it have made more policy ‘sense’ 
to have run the program through the CES as the lead agency in the 1990s?  
 
Why did JET not have activity requirements throughout the 1990s when most other customer service 
groups (apart from recipients of DSP) were brought into the welfare activation policy framework? 
 
Do you consider JET to have ever been a viable program? 
 
 
Context 
 
a) Governance 
 
My understanding of the history and role of the Centrelink Board is that it was  introduced to apply a 
more thoroughgoing business model of governance to CSDA/Centrelink’s strategies, tactics and 
practices, which then were implemented through the Guiding Coalition. Does this understanding in fact 
capture the range of the Board’s mandate? 
 
Was the Board’s very success in helping to further establish a business framework ultimately seen as 
too limited when set against the Management Advisory Committee’s drive for connected government?  
For example, were the more integrated and responsive arrangements needed to implement Work First 
best met by a more direct involvement between Centrelink, the Department of Human Services and 
DEWR?  
 
 
b)  Centrelink and welfare 
  
To what extent do you consider that the Centrelink model was unique? 
  
From an international perspective, what was it about Centrelink (and possibly the Job Network) that 
attracted delegations from other welfare agencies? 
 
How well did Centrelink address the needs of single parents with dependent children? 
  
Have you any final comments you wish to make about the current welfare arrangements and 
administration in Australia? 
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C 
List of interviewees 
 
Name of 
interviewee 
in thesis 
Background Interview 
date 
Alex Started in 1998 became a JA in 2000 July 2006 
Brogan Became a PA in 2004 July 2006 
Cameron Working in DSS since 1983, she started as a JA with the 
second intake of JET in March 1990 and continued until 
2005, broken by a three year period working in the private 
sector.  She had an Area management role at the time of 
the interview.  
July 2006 
Deniz Had been working in DSS since the late 1970s.  She was 
involved in JET’s initial promotional campaign as a mid-
level National Office public relations manager.  At the time 
of the interview she was still working in this role for 
Centrelink.  
May 2006 
Gulzar Started DSS in 1994 and became a JA in 1996.  Was a 
team leader in a regional office at the time of the 
interview. 
October 2006 
Harley Started working in Social Security in 1978 and was 
involved in JET’s earlier publicity campaigns.  Has 
occupied various management roles since the mid-1980s.  
May 2007 
Ira Started at Centrelink in 1995 and is currently working in a 
non-managerial outposted national office position.  Was a 
Newstart officer during the period of JET  
May 2007 
Isha Joined DSS in 1989 and started JA job in 2000.  Currently 
working as a trainer  
July 2006 
Jessie Started work at the ‘Green Latrine’ – DSS central office 
for Victoria in 1977 as a Clerical Assistant.  Secured a JA 
position in the early 1990s.  Currently working as a 
frontline worker at a suburban regional office.  
May 2007 
Kelly Started work in Centrelink in 2001 and was a PA for three 
years. 
August 2006 
Morgan Started working in Social Security in 1989 and was a JA 
from 2001-2006. 
July 2006 
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Quinn Call Centre CPSU Delegate May 2007 
Orion Was a mid-level National Office staff member involved in 
the organisational implementation of JET in local offices.  
Senior Executive in a social welfare agency at the time of 
the interview. 
February 2009 
Rahat Started in DSS in about 1991 as a JET Support Worker   
Was a PA from 2004-2006 
March 2006 
Robin Started in 2000 at a Centrelink Call Centre.  Recruited in 
the second intake of PAs in 2004.  Frontline staff member 
at the time of the interview.  
July 2006 
Sasha CPSU Newstart officer May 2006 
Social Worker  Long-term Social Worker in a metropolitan Centrelink 
office 
August 2006 
CM1  Centrelink National Manager and member of the inter-
departmental committee advising Cabinet on GST and 
family payments policy issues in the late 1990s. 
May 2002 
CM2 Centrelink National Manager May 2002 
AM Centrelink Victorian Area Manager February 2002 
VM Centrelink Victorian Manager April 2002.   
Named interviewees 
Geoff 
Hamilton  
Started work in a DEETYA-funded Youth Access Centre 
in Shepparton giving careers advice to school leavers.  
Joined DSS in the second intake of JAs.  Retired in the 
late 1990s. 
August 2006 
Sharon 
Andrews  
Started work in DSS in 1986 and left in 1996.  Was a 
team leader of a Newstart steam during most of this 
period,  Sharon was a lecturer at RMIT at the time of the 
interview.  
June 2006 
Carmen 
Zanetti  
JET’s National Program Manager in the early 1990s 
before returning in the late 1990s to oversee Centrelink’s 
Cultural Change Program. 
2009 
Sue Vardon CEO of Centrelink. Nov 2006 
Meredith 
Edwards  
Meredith Edwards headed the Social Policy Division of 
DSS in the late 1980s and early 1990s and was a key 
architect of JET.  At the time of the interview she was an 
Emeritus Professor at the University of Canberra. 
May 2006 
Mark Gepp  National Secretary, Community and Public Sector Union, 
Centrelink. 
July 2002 
Margo 
Northey  
Co-ordinator, Council of Single Mothers and Their 
Children 
July 2002 
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D 
 
Gender-share changes in Centrelink – a thought 
experiment 
 
 
To assess the possible significance of these gender-share changes in Centrelink discussed 
on pages 182-184 a thought experiment was conducted.  The 11,600 (in 2007) local office 
operational staff are considered as a separate 4-Digit Australian Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ASCO) occupational category.  At this level ASCO classifies occupations into 
390 different units such as payroll clerks, personnel clerks, inquiry and admissions clerks, 
accounting clerks, insurance clerks and social workers.  The ‘ideal number’ of people 
occupying each unit is 3,000, so a proxy unit-level category of ‘Centrelink frontline 
operational staff’ has more than sufficient occupants for comparative purposes (ABS 1997).  
This category has been created to engage with research conducted by Alison Preston and 
Gillian Whitehouse (2004) into changes in the gender composition of Australian labour 
markets.  As part of their study of the sex-differentiated patterns of employment they 
compare the changes in the gender composition of occupations between 1996 and 2002 by 
analysing ABS data at the 4-digit level (Preston & Whitehouse 2004: 323).  Their central 
argument is that despite the gains made by women in recent years towards greater 
occupational integration it is ‘not a totally positive story’ as ‘enduring sex segregation’ 
remains within and between particular occupations (Preston & Whitehouse 2004: 310).   
 
They particularly focused on those occupations where women’s employment grew 
‘disproportionately’ – that is at more than twice the 1.2 per cent increase of women’s share of 
overall employment during the period (Preston & Whitehouse 2004: 318).  It is also likely that 
Call Centre Band 2 staff experienced disproportionately high feminisation rates.  Though the 
available figures only start at 1999, the subsequent annualised rate would generate a 3.0 per 
cent increase over a seven-year period such as used in the study – just over the 2.4 per cent 
criteria set by Preston and Whitehouse.  They note that 3 other occupations in which women 
had at least a 60 per cent share also grew disproportionately more feminised, but at a lower 
rate than Centrelink operational staff.  Two required professional or para-professional 
qualifications – Pre-Primary School Teachers and Medical Technical Officers.  Only one – 
Sales Demonstrators and Models, could be considered non-professional (Preston & 
Whitehouse 2004: 321).  The trend figures in Figure 13 also suggest that women’s share of 
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employment among these local operational workers DSS/Centrelink had reached 60 per cent 
at some time in the late 1980s or early 1990s – coinciding with the introduction of ALMPs 
(PSMPC 1998: 12).   
 
No publicly available research has been conducted why women’s share of work increased 
among Centrelink coalface staff.  Many influences would need to be included in such an 
investigation before such a claim could be reasonably substantiated, such as maternity leave 
and part-time work provisions, the unusual geographical spread of Centrelink workplaces, 
changes in the wage relativities of frontline staff and recruitment practices.  The long-term 
decline of front line wages compared to average weekly earnings since the 1980s [CPSU 
national delegate] may have made this work disproportionately less attractive to men, 
especially once the economy recovered in the early 1990s.  Access to paid maternity leave 
and part-time work may have made this work more amenable for many women.  Centrelink, 
for example, has the highest proportion of part-time staff in the federal public sector at 30 per 
cent, compared to the APS average of 22 per cent (APSC 2008a: 5; 2008b: 20).  Whether 
this helped generate higher feminisation rates or just passively reflected them is unknown.  
With over 300 ‘Customer Service Centres’ Centrelink is one of only two federal government 
departments (Medicare outlets being the other) with locally dispersed workplaces.  This is 
likely to be another, possibly gendered, influence.  Recruitment for frontline staff changed 
dramatically in the late 1990s – many staff came in via Centrelink Call Centres – a highly 
sex-segregated work environment.  Others were recruited through contracted-out processes 
which used group sessions to assess the decision-making and empathetic ‘skills’ of those 
applying.  Other, already highly gendered ‘emotional’ labour conducted by professional 
Centrelink staff such as Social Workers and Psychologists, were likely to have experienced 
little change.  In 2008 Centrelink employed 1375 of these ‘professional’ level workers, the 
bulk of whom were social workers (600) and psychologists (450) – operational staff who 
overwhelming (93 per cent) worked out of local offices.  84 per cent of these professionals 
were women, generally reflecting the gender composition of the Australian social worker 
workforce (Barns & Preston 2003: 29; Centrelink 2008: 65, 70, 205-206). 
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E 
 
Table 10 
Details of Chair, CEO or Director level positions 
held by Centrelink Board members: 1997-2002 
 
Don Fraser Safeway Australia 
Woolworths Queensland 
Dairy Farm International (Retail stores) 
Didasko Ltd (training for hospitality industry) 
RIRDC Organic Produce Research and Development Committee 
Christine Gilles Sealcorp (taken over by George Bank, then Westpac as Asgard Wealth Solutions).  
St George Bank (taken over by Westpac from 2008). 
Bank of Melbourne (Westpac). 
CommSecure 
Coles Myer 
CPT Global Ltd (Corporate IT purchasing advice) 
Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority 
DMR Victoria (tourism) 
Robin Marrett Mobil Oil NZ 
Mobil Oil Hong Kong 
Ruskin Industries (plastics) 
Electricity Trust of South Australia 
Economic Development Authority of South Australia 
John Pascoe Sealcorp (taken over by George Bank, then Westpac as Asgard Wealth Solutions). 
Mallesons (legal advice) 
QANTAS 
Aristocrat Leisure (gaming machines) 
George Weston Foods 
Objective Ltd (software products) 
University of Sydney 
Federal Magistrates Court 
Philip Pearce NM Rothschild and Son Australia (Investment bank) 
Arthur Anderson (legal advice) 
James Boag and Son (beer) 
Woolworths 
David Rosalky Department of Family and Community Services  
Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business 
ACT Chief Minister’s Department 
Canadian Treasury Board 
Peter Shergold Dept of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Dept of Education, Science and Training. 
Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business Comcare 
Public Service and Merit Protection Commission 
Comcare Australia 
Aboriginal And Torres Strait Islander Commission 
John Thame Advance Bank (St George Bank, now with Westpac Bank) 
St George Bank (taken over by Westpac from 2008)  
Permanent Trustee (in ‘strategic partnership’ with Westpac from 2007) 
Australian Wheat Board 
Reckon (software products) 
Sue Vardon Dept of Correctional Services (South Australia) 
Office of the Commissioner for Public Employment (South Australia) 
Office of Public Sector Reform (South Australia) 
Department of Family and Community Services (South Australia) 
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